John Bishop v. County of Macon, N.C. , 620 F. App'x 148 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2172
JOHN WILLIAM BISHOP; DONNA J. BISHOP,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
COUNTY OF MACON, NORTH CAROLINA; MACON COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT; ROBERT L. HOLLAND, Individually and in his
Official Capacity as Sheriff of Macon County; C. J. LAU,
Individually and in his Official Capacity as Deputy Sheriff
of Macon County; GARY GARNER; W. T. POTTS; OHIO CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Bryson City. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (2:10-cv-00009-MOC-DLH)
Submitted: June 29, 2015 Decided: July 9, 2015
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Paul Louis Bidwell, Asheville, North Carolina; Douglas A. Ruley,
Leicester, North Carolina, for Appellants. Sean F. Perrin, WOMBLE
CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina; Ronald
K. Payne, LONG, PARKER, WARREN, ANDERSON & PAYNE, PA, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
John William Bishop (“John”) and his mother, Donna J. Bishop
(“Donna”), appeal the district court’s order adopting the
magistrate judge’s revised recommendation and dismissing with
prejudice Donna’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012);
dismissing with prejudice the Bishops’ state law claims for
negligence and bailment against Appellees Holland and Lau in their
individual capacities; dismissing with prejudice Donna’s state law
claims against Appellee Garner; and dismissing without prejudice
Donna’s remaining state law claims. The Bishops assert that the
court erred in dismissing Donna’s federal claims, erred in
dismissing the negligence and bailment claims, and abused its
discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over some of
their state law claims but not others. Finding no error, we
affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim, accepting factual allegations in the complaint as
true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v.
Montgomery Cnty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012); see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint’s
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level,” with “enough facts to state a claim
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to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Under this standard, bare
legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth”
and are insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Moreover, when “a complaint pleads facts
that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Bishops first challenge the dismissal of Donna’s § 1983
claims, asserting that personal property was wrongfully seized
from her home because the items were not listed in the search
warrants. A valid search warrant must “particularly describ[e]
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The purpose of this requirement is to
preclude officers from a general, “exploratory rummaging in a
person’s belongings.” United States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 647
(4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Nevertheless, a warrant is not intended to impose a
constitutional strait jacket on investigating officers. Courts
must refrain from interpreting warrant terms in a hypertechnical
manner, and should instead employ a commonsense and realistic
approach.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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“A search is not invalidated in its entirety merely because some
seized items were not identified in the warrant.” United States
v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 381 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, to prevail
on an unlawful seizure claim, a plaintiff must prove that the
government unreasonably seized property. Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506
U.S. 56, 71 (1992).
Although some of the personal property seized was not listed
in the search warrants, we find no error in the district court’s
dismissal of these claims. A commonsense but not hypertechnical
review of the search warrants accounts for the items seized. The
mere assertion, without more, that police seized some items not
listed in the warrants does not render the seizures
unconstitutional.
The Bishops next contend that the district court erred in
dismissing their state law claims for negligence and bailment
against Holland and Lau in their individual capacities, arguing
that public official immunity did not apply. We disagree. In
North Carolina, public officials are generally immune from
personal liability for negligence in the performance of their
duties unless evidence demonstrates that they acted maliciously,
corruptly, or outside the scope of their official authority.
Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 742 (4th Cir. 2003); Wilcox v.
City of Asheville, 730 S.E.2d 226, 238 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). Here,
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the Bishops have neither alleged nor presented any evidence
demonstrating that Holland or Lau acted maliciously, corruptly, or
outside the scope of their official authority. Moreover, the
Bishops’ mere allegations of gross negligence cannot defeat
immunity. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 803 (4th Cir. 1994).
The Bishops also challenge the district court’s exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims. We review
the court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of
discretion. Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 203
(4th Cir. 1997). The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction allows
district courts “authority to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction in limited circumstances, including . . . where the
court dismisses the claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376,
394 (4th Cir. 2012); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2012). In
deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a court
should consider “the values of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity.” Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343, 350 (1988). We conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction and
dismissing the state law claims that involved issues of settled
state law. Mauro v. S. New England Telecomms., Inc., 208 F.3d
384, 388 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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