United States v. Razak A. Dosunmu , 713 F. App'x 211 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4798
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RAZAK A. DOSUNMU, a/k/a Zak Dosunmu,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, District Judge. (1:16-cr-00054-AJT-1)
Submitted: December 6, 2017 Decided: December 20, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate Attorney,
Kevin R. Brehm, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Jack Hanly, Assistant United States Attorney,
Edward P. Sullivan, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Razak Dosunmu was charged with two counts of bribery of a public official, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2012). Dosunmu moved to suppress the inculpatory
statements he made to law enforcement, arguing that they were obtained in violation of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1986). The district court denied the motion.
Dosunmu proceeded to a jury trial, where he was convicted of two counts of the lesser
included offense of offering illegal gratuities to a public official, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(c) (2012). Now, Dosunmu appeals his conviction and 15-month sentence,
challenging the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
On appeal, the parties primarily dispute whether Dosunmu’s waiver of his
Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent in light of the advisements he received from
the interviewing agents regarding his right to appointed counsel before and during
questioning. Ultimately, we conclude that we need not resolve this dispute, as any such
constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Admission of a defendant’s statement obtained in violation of Miranda does not
mandate reversal of the defendant’s conviction if “the admission of the statement at issue
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, such that it is clear that a rational fact finder
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” United States v. Giddins, 858
F.3d 870, 885 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the Miranda
context, factors relevant to harmlessness include: “(1) the importance of the statement to
the government’s case; (2) the impact on credibility of other evidence; and (3) the
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admission of prejudicial evidence based solely on the admission of the statement.” Id. at
886 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 297-300 (1991)). We review the record
de novo to determine whether the Government has met its burden to establish that the
admission of Dosunmu’s statements did not contribute to his conviction. See Fulminante,
499 U.S. at 295-96.
We conclude that the Government satisfied its burden here. As the Government
observes, the trial provided overwhelming and largely undisputed evidence that Dosunmu
offered illegal gratuities to a government official. Dosunmu’s own recorded statements
to the official clearly established his intention to provide the official with money in
appreciation for his assistance in securing a government fuel contract. Dosunmu made
unequivocal offers of payment and repeatedly referenced the financial assistance he
would provide the official for his efforts. In a recorded, in-person meeting with the
official, Dosunmu explicitly described these payments as a “gratuity” or “treat,” and he
suggested methods for concealing the payments. He eventually made a nominal payment
to the official, which he explained was intended as a token of his sincerity in offering
larger future sums. While Dosunmu also admitted to offering the official money as a
gratuity during his interview with law enforcement, that admission was essentially
duplicative of other uncontroverted evidence introduced at trial.
Dosunmu observes that the Government relied on his interview with law
enforcement during its closing argument. Although we recently recognized that reliance
on evidence in closing argument may indicate the weight that evidence carries in relation
to the trial as a whole, we declined to adopt a bright-line rule that evidence addressed by
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the Government in closing necessarily contributed to the defendant’s conviction. See
Giddins, 858 F.3d at 885. Here, the Government relied on Dosunmu’s statement to law
enforcement primarily to support its argument that the evidence established Dosunmu’s
“corrupt intent”—the mental state distinguishing the charged bribery offenses from the
lesser-included illegal gratuity offenses of which he was convicted. See United States v.
Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1013 (4th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing illegal gratuity from
bribery). The jury agreed with Dosunmu in acquitting him of the bribery charges.
Dosunmu also argues that the introduction of his statement altered his trial
strategy, as he would not have conceded the illegal gratuity offenses and instead would
have argued more forcefully that he was entrapped by the government official or was
merely joking or “playing along” with the official’s solicitation of bribes. This argument,
too, ignores the nature and import of Dosunmu’s own recorded statements to the official.
Dosunmu did not offer an entrapment defense with respect to the illegal gratuity offenses,
and we conclude such a defense would find little support in the evidence, even if his
statement to law enforcement were excluded. See United States v. Ramos, 462 F.3d 329,
335 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing entrapment); United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542,
569 (4th Cir. 2000) (same). In short, our review of the record as a whole convinces us
“beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the jury’s verdict.” See
Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353, 360 (4th Cir. 1980).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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