United States v. James Kelson ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4100
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES E. KELSON, a/k/a James Joseph Kelson, Jr.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia,
at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, Chief District Judge. (3:16-cr-00024-GMG-RWT-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2017 Decided: November 14, 2017
Before NIEMEYER and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Nicholas J. Compton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kristen M. Leddy, Research
and Writing Specialist, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Betsy Steinfeld
Jividen, Acting United States Attorney, Anna Z. Krasinski, Assistant United States
Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James E. Kelson pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to failure to
register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2012). Kelson was
sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment but challenges only the district court’s imposition
of his lifetime term of supervised release. We affirm.
This court reviews a sentence’s reasonableness under “a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). The sentence
imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the purposes of
sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). We first determine whether the district court
committed significant procedural error, such as an incorrect calculation of the Sentencing
Guidelines range, inadequate consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, or insufficient
explanation of the sentence imposed. United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 170 (4th
Cir. 2014). When we evaluate the district court’s Guidelines calculations, we review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United
States v. White, 771 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2014). In assessing a sentencing court’s
explanation for its lifetime sentence of supervised release, we have stated that although
the district court must consider the statutory factors and explain the sentence, “it need not
robotically tick through the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148,
153 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (affirming lifetime term of
supervised release).
Kelson first argues that the district court procedurally erred by failing to properly
explain his lifetime term of supervised release. We disagree. The district court
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conducted an individualized assessment and expressly considered applicable § 3553(a)
factors, noting that Kelson continued to commit crimes of violence in his 50s despite
prior incarceration. In view of Kelson’s substantial criminal history, the court concluded
that Kelson’s criminal history revealed him to be a dangerous individual with a
propensity for violence. The court therefore found lifetime supervision necessary, in
view of this history, to allow for continuous monitoring of Kelson’s conduct and
protection of the public. Under these circumstances, we find the sentence procedurally
reasonable. Helton, 782 F.3d at 153.
Kelson next contends that his lifetime term of supervision is substantively
unreasonable. This lifetime term, within the properly-calculated advisory Guidelines
range, * “is presumed on appeal to be substantively reasonable.” Helton, 782 F.3d at 151
(affirming substantive reasonableness of lifetime term of supervised release). “Such a
presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295,
306 (4th Cir. 2014). This Kelson fails to do. Therefore, his sentence is substantively
reasonable. See United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 425 (4th Cir. 2015).
*
Section 3583(k), 18 U.S.C.A. (West 2015 & Supp. 2017), provides for a
supervised release term of five years to life, and Kelson’s Sentencing Guidelines range is
the same. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.2(c) (2016).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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