William Cox v. Duke Energy , 876 F.3d 625 ( 2017 )


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  •                                       PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 16-6625
    WILLIAM B. COX, Personal Representative for the Estate of Robin G. Fleming,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    and
    ROBIN G. FLEMING,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    DUKE ENERGY INC.; J.W. BYRD, Darlington County Sheriff; JOYCE C.
    EVERETT; WILLIAM GIDEON, a/k/a Randy; DARLINGTON COUNTY
    SHERIFFS OFFICE; GARY STREETT,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
    Florence. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (4:13-cv-01456-BHH)
    Argued: September 12, 2017                           Decided: November 20, 2017
    Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge
    Duncan and Judge Floyd joined.
    ARGUED: John Adams Hodge, JOHN ADAMS HODGE & ASSOCIATES, LLC,
    Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas Rush Gottshall, HAYNSWORTH
    SINKLER BOYD, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina; Samuel F. Arthur, III, AIKEN,
    BRIDGES, NUNN, ELLIOTT & TYLER, PA, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellees.
    ON BRIEF: Sarah P. Spruill, Joshua D. Spencer, Samuel R.B. Shealy, HAYNSWORTH
    SINKLER BOYD, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees Duke Energy Inc. and
    William Gideon.
    2
    NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
    When Robin Fleming flew his glider plane over the H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant
    — operated by Duke Energy Progress, Inc., in Darlington County, South Carolina — and
    then began circling repeatedly nearby, plant security personnel found the glider’s
    presence suspicious and notified the Darlington County Sheriff’s Office, the nearby
    airport, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), and Shaw Air Force Base.
    Responding Sheriff’s deputies ordered Fleming to land his glider at the airport and, once
    he landed, took him into custody, arresting him for misdemeanor breach of the peace.
    They held him in a cell overnight, advising him that Homeland Security and the FBI were
    interested in questioning him the next morning. He was released the next day on bond.
    Several weeks later, while at court for trial on the breach-of-peace charge,
    Fleming, with the advice of his attorney, agreed to waive any civil claims that he might
    have against the Darlington County Sheriff’s Office in exchange for dismissal of the
    charge. Nonetheless, Fleming later commenced this action against Duke Energy, Duke
    Energy’s vice president in charge of the Robinson Nuclear Plant, the Darlington County
    Sheriff’s Office, the Sheriff, and two deputies. Invoking 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , he alleged
    that the defendants had violated his civil rights under color of state law, denying him the
    “freedom of movement, freedom from arrest and detention, and freedom to conduct a
    lawful activity,” in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He also
    alleged state law claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, negligence, and civil
    conspiracy.
    3
    The district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, holding
    (1) that Fleming had validly waived his right to sue the Darlington County Sheriff’s
    Office, the Sheriff, and the deputies; (2) that Duke Energy and its vice president were
    private actors not operating “under color of” state law as required for liability under
    § 1983; and (3) that Fleming’s remaining state law claims were preempted by federal
    law’s exclusive regulation of nuclear safety.
    For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    I
    Fleming, a retired aeronautical engineer and experienced glider pilot, set off in his
    glider from an airfield in Jefferson, South Carolina, on the afternoon of July 26, 2012,
    from where he was “aerotowed” to an altitude of 2,000 feet and then released. During his
    flight, Fleming flew over the Robinson Nuclear Plant at an altitude of approximately
    1,100 feet and then flew a short distance eastward toward Lake Robinson. Once over the
    lake but still near the plant, he began to circle repeatedly so as to gain altitude — a mode
    of flight known as “thermalling.”
    Security personnel employed by Duke Energy noticed Fleming’s glider and grew
    suspicious, especially of the aircraft’s continued circling in the vicinity of the plant.
    After they put the plant on “heightened awareness,” they contacted the Darlington
    County Sheriff’s Office, the Hartsville Regional Airport, the FAA, and Shaw Air Force
    Base. The Hartsville Airport was unaware of a glider operating in the area, and neither
    the FAA nor Shaw could locate the aircraft on radar.
    4
    The Sheriff’s Office dispatched deputies to the airport, who, upon arriving,
    directed the airport’s assistant manager to establish radio contact with the pilot and
    instruct him to land at the airport. The assistant manager responded that only the FAA
    had authority to issue such an order.       She also spoke by telephone with an FAA
    employee, who indicated that because the pilot had apparently done nothing wrong, the
    aircraft could not be ordered to land. The deputies nonetheless told the assistant manager
    again to order the glider to land, and she accordingly advised the pilot via radio that “the
    Sheriff wanted [him] to land as soon as possible.”
    Although Fleming knew that he had not entered any restricted airspace, he landed
    his plane as directed and was taken into custody by the Sheriff’s deputies, who arrested
    him on a misdemeanor charge for breach of the peace, advising him that the FBI and
    Homeland Security wanted to interview him the next day. The deputies handcuffed
    Fleming, placed him in the back of a Sheriff’s Office vehicle, and read him his Miranda
    rights.    By that time, Duke Energy security personnel had arrived, and they asked
    Fleming whether he knew that he was flying over a nuclear power plant. Fleming said
    that he did. Fleming was then taken to a holding cell, where he was kept overnight.
    The next morning, Fleming met with his attorney, Gerald Malloy, whom an
    acquaintance had retained on his behalf.          After Malloy departed, Fleming was
    interviewed by an FBI agent and an investigator from Homeland Security. At the bail
    hearing that afternoon, Fleming was released on bond, having spent approximately 24
    hours in custody.
    5
    Several weeks later, on August 21, 2012, Fleming and his attorney Malloy
    attended court for trial on the breach-of-peace charge. After Fleming had been waiting
    outside the courtroom for some time, Malloy came out and told him that the only way he
    could get out of the case was to sign an agreement releasing the Sheriff’s Office from
    civil liability. Fleming at first resisted the proposal because he felt that he had “done
    nothing wrong.” Malloy responded with some agitation, stating that Fleming had made
    an “incredible mess” that had prompted the “release [of] aircraft,” specifically “F-16”
    fighter jets, from Shaw Air Force Base (a representation that Fleming claims was untrue
    and that, in any event, is not supported by the record). Although the two discussed —
    indeed, even argued — about the proposal for approximately 20 minutes, Fleming, after
    giving “consideration to the alternatives,” ultimately became convinced that jurors from
    the Hartsville community would feel as though the Sheriff’s Office acted appropriately to
    ensure their safety and that he “would have no chance of clearing [his] name.” As he
    explained:
    The reason I [signed the waiver agreement] was that the trial would be held
    in Hartsville, and I’m sure that the people of Hartsville would say that the
    nuclear station did the right thing to, you know, have me shot down, if
    necessary, because they were protecting Hartsville and [its] occupants.
    And these would be the jury members. And I thought to myself there’s no
    way I’m going to win this case. I’ll lose the case, pay a fine, have a
    criminal record. And I took those . . . things into consideration. I said this
    is the best option.
    After Fleming agreed to the proposal, Malloy instructed Fleming to draft a release
    himself using “whatever language [he] desired,” and Fleming handwrote a two-sentence
    paragraph stating that he “accept[ed] dismissal of the subject breach of peace [charge]
    6
    against [him]” and “agree[d] that no legal action will be taken against Darlington County
    law enforcement now, or in the future.” After Fleming signed the document, Malloy
    presented it to the Sheriff’s representatives in court, and the breach-of-peace charge was
    dismissed.
    Some nine months later, on May 11, 2013, Fleming commenced this action in state
    court against the Darlington County Sheriff and a deputy, as well as Duke Energy and its
    vice president, and the defendants removed the case to federal court. Then, in July 2013,
    Fleming passed away from cancer, and his personal representative, William B. Cox, was
    substituted as the plaintiff in October 2013. Cox filed an amended complaint adding as
    defendants the Darlington County Sheriff’s Office and another Sheriff’s deputy.
    On motions filed by the defendants, the district court granted summary judgment
    to all defendants. The court concluded first that none of the claims against the Darlington
    County Sheriff’s Office, the Sheriff, and the deputies could proceed “because Mr.
    Fleming [had] executed a valid waiver of his rights to sue them in connection with his
    arrest.” In doing so, the court assessed the validity of the waiver under the factors
    identified in Town of Newton v. Rumery, 
    480 U.S. 386
     (1987), and Rodriguez v.
    Smithfield Packing Co., 
    338 F.3d 348
     (4th Cir. 2003). The court next concluded that
    Duke Energy and its vice president could not be held liable under § 1983 because they
    were private actors who were not operating “under color of” state law and they “were not
    responsible for the state’s actions in ordering Mr. Fleming to land, arresting him, and
    charging him with breach of the peace.” The court noted also that they had a duty under
    federal law “to report any suspicious activity in the area around the Plant to specified
    7
    federal authorities and local law enforcement” and that it would thus “not be appropriate”
    to treat their conduct as “state action.” Finally, the court dismissed Fleming’s state law
    claims against Duke Energy and its vice president, concluding those claims were
    preempted by federal law’s exclusive regulation of nuclear safety because the claims
    “would have a direct and substantial effect on security decisions concerning radiological
    safety levels by those charged with operating nuclear facilities.”        In reaching this
    conclusion, the court cited to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission directives for
    reporting security threats, finding that Duke Energy had “followed the applicable
    guidance” in those directives.
    From the district court’s judgment dated March 31, 2016, Fleming’s estate
    (hereafter, “Fleming”) filed this appeal.
    II
    Our review of a summary judgment is de novo, and we construe inferences that
    may be drawn from the underlying facts “in the light most favorable to the party
    opposing the [summary judgment] motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 
    369 U.S. 654
    ,
    655 (1962).
    Fleming contends first that he did not voluntarily waive his civil claims against the
    Sheriff’s Office, the Sheriff, and the deputies, claiming that he only had a short time to
    consider the waiver agreement and was under duress at the time. He asserts further that
    his attorney fed him “misinformation” and “browbeat[]” him into signing. Finally, he
    argues that the Sheriff’s Office was pursuing “illegitimate charges” against him for the
    8
    purpose of avoiding civil liability and thus his waiver was the product of prosecutorial
    misconduct.
    The Sheriff’s Office defendants contend, on the other hand, that the record
    incontrovertibly demonstrated the validity of Fleming’s waiver agreement and that the
    district court properly concluded, after applying the relevant factors from Rumery, that
    the agreement was valid and enforceable.
    In Rumery, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that release-dismissal
    agreements are “inherently coercive” because they unfairly “present a criminal defendant
    with a choice between facing criminal charges and waiving his right to sue under
    § 1983.” 
    480 U.S. at 393
    . In enforcing the agreement before it, the Court held that
    review of such agreements must be conducted on a case-by-case basis and that such an
    agreement is enforceable, provided that it was “voluntary,” it did not involve
    “prosecutorial misconduct,” and it “would not adversely affect the relevant public
    interests.” 
    Id. at 398
    ; see also 
    id. at 401
     (O’Connor, J., concurring). In supplying the
    Court’s fifth vote, Justice O’Connor noted that “[m]any factors” might bear on whether a
    release-dismissal agreement is voluntary and not the product of prosecutorial
    overreaching:
    The knowledge and experience of the criminal defendant and the
    circumstances of the execution of the release, including, importantly,
    whether the defendant was counseled, are clearly relevant. The nature of
    the criminal charges that are pending is also important, for the greater the
    charge, the greater the coercive effect. The existence of a legitimate
    criminal justice objective for obtaining the release will support its validity.
    And, importantly, the possibility of abuse is clearly mitigated if the release-
    dismissal agreement is executed under judicial supervision.
    9
    
    Id.
     at 401–02; see also Rodriguez, 
    338 F.3d at 353
    .
    Applying the Rumery principles here, we reject Fleming’s arguments that his
    execution of the waiver agreement was not voluntary and that the Sheriff’s prosecution of
    him amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.
    As to voluntariness, the record shows that during his entire consideration of
    whether to sign the agreement, Fleming was represented by counsel, Gerald Malloy, who
    was acting exclusively in Fleming’s best interest. Indeed, it is undisputed that when
    Fleming and Malloy went to court, it was Malloy who initially conceived of the
    agreement.    According to the Sheriff, after Malloy met with Fleming outside the
    courtroom and before trial, Malloy provided the Sheriff’s representatives with the
    proposed release-dismissal agreement. As the Sheriff stated, his Office did not suggest or
    demand the waiver and was prepared to proceed with trial on the charge against Fleming.
    While the record indicates that Malloy advised Fleming to enter into the release-
    dismissal agreement, it also shows that Malloy made sure that Fleming understood his
    right to go to trial.   Their discussion was relatively brief, lasting approximately 20
    minutes, but Fleming never indicated that he needed more time to make the decision. To
    the contrary, he recounted that during the discussion, he considered his alternatives and
    ultimately resolved that executing the waiver agreement was in his best interest. He
    stated further that while he continued to maintain that he had done nothing wrong, he also
    believed that he would probably lose the case if he exercised his right to go to trial,
    resulting in a fine and a criminal record, because he was “sure that the people of
    Hartsville would say that the nuclear station did the right thing to . . . protect[] Hartsville
    10
    and [its] occupants.”     Fleming summarized that he took all of these things “into
    consideration” and concluded that signing the waiver was “the best option.”
    Not only is there no indication in the record that the time Fleming had to consider
    the proposal was insufficient, there is also no evidence of pressure from the opposing
    side. Rather, Fleming was alone with his attorney when he reached his decision. And it
    is further worth noting that Fleming, who was mature and educated, wrote the waiver in
    his own hand using his own language.
    Fleming contends nonetheless that the agreement should be set aside because
    Malloy fed him “misinformation” and pressured him into signing the release. To be sure,
    we must assume at this stage of the case that Malloy misinformed Fleming about the
    scrambling of F-16s to drive home his point that Fleming had made a “mess.” But it is
    clear that such a misrepresentation — if made — regarding the gravity of the situation
    caused by Fleming’s glider flight could not have made his decision to sign the agreement
    involuntary. Fleming stated that before he took flight, he was aware that the FAA had
    instructed pilots to avoid circling near nuclear facilities and that this instruction had been
    prompted by 9/11 — when airplanes were used as tools of terrorism. In addition, he
    testified that once he had been arrested, he learned that his glider flight had prompted the
    interest of both the FBI and Homeland Security.
    Fleming also continues to maintain that the agreement was unenforceable because
    he did not have adequate time to consider it and thus was unduly pressured to make the
    decision to waive his rights, being faced with an imminent trial on the misdemeanor
    charge.   He now characterizes that pressure as duress.          But if he considered the
    11
    imminence of trial to have placed undue pressure on him, he and his lawyer could have
    requested more time to consider the proposal or could have asked for a postponement.
    They did neither; indeed, the subject never entered the discussions. Rather, all the
    evidence indicates that after discussing the options with Malloy, Fleming made a free and
    reasoned choice, one he himself characterized as the best choice available. Moreover,
    after signing the waiver, Fleming waited outside the courtroom for a half hour before he
    was advised that the case was dismissed, a time during which he could have reflected
    further and changed his mind. But he never did.
    Relying on Rumery, Fleming also contends that prosecutorial misconduct was
    involved, arguing that the Sheriff’s Office knew that the warrant for his arrest was
    “invalid on its face” and that the Office “mistakenly” held him “in anticipation of
    forthcoming Federal charges.”      But that argument addresses the circumstances of
    Fleming’s arrest and detention, not the conduct of the Sheriff’s Office in accepting the
    release-dismissal agreement. Indeed, the record is undisputed that the Sheriff and his
    deputies subjectively believed that the charge was legitimate, and there is simply no
    indication that anyone attempted to use the charge to extract a waiver from Fleming. To
    the contrary, the fact that the agreement was initially suggested by Malloy, as opposed to
    any Darlington County official, strongly indicates that it was “not the product of
    prosecutorial overreaching.” Rumery, 
    480 U.S. at 401
     (O’Connor, J., concurring); see
    also Rodriguez, 
    338 F.3d at 353
    .
    In sum, because the record indicates that Fleming’s execution of the waiver was
    both voluntary and not the product of prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude that the
    12
    district court did not err in determining that the release-dismissal agreement was
    enforceable.
    III
    Fleming next contends that the district court erred in concluding that Duke Energy
    and its vice president did not act “under color of” state law and therefore that they could
    not be held liable under § 1983.
    Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, “Every person who, under color of any
    statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
    subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
    to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
    laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (emphasis added). Thus,
    in order to be liable to Fleming for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights,
    Duke Energy and its vice president would have to be persons acting “under color of”
    state law. See Wahi v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 
    562 F.3d 599
    , 615–16 (4th
    Cir. 2009). “[M]erely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,” is
    excluded from the reach of § 1983. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 
    526 U.S. 40
    , 50
    (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 
    457 U.S. 991
    , 1002 (1982)). Stated otherwise, to be
    sued under § 1983, a defendant “must either be a state actor or have a sufficiently close
    relationship with state actors such that a court would conclude that [it] is engaged in the
    state’s actions.” DeBauche v. Trani, 
    191 F.3d 499
    , 506 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Wahi,
    
    562 F.3d at 616
     (explaining that a private entity’s activity is generally not actionable
    13
    under § 1983 “unless the state has so dominated such activity as to convert it to state
    action”) (quoting DeBauche, 
    191 F.3d at 507
    ). To be sure, when a private party exercises
    sovereign power conferred on it by a government, the private party may be subject to
    § 1983 liability, see United Auto Workers Local No. 5285 v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., 
    43 F.3d 902
    , 906 (4th Cir. 1995), but a State’s “‘[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the
    initiatives of a private party’ is insufficient,” DeBauche, 
    191 F.3d at 507
     (quoting Blum,
    
    457 U.S. at 1004
    ). In short, to be liable under § 1983, a party must be one “who may
    fairly be said to be a state actor,” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins., 
    526 U.S. at 50
     (quoting Lugar v.
    Edmondson Oil Co., 
    457 U.S. 922
    , 937 (1982)), such that “the allegedly unconstitutional
    conduct is fairly attributable to the State,” 
    id.
    In this case, Fleming acknowledges that Duke Energy and its vice president are
    private actors who ordinarily would not be liable under § 1983. He maintains, however,
    that through their conduct in connection with the events in this case, they “act[ed] in a
    quasi-governmental capacity” and thereby “contributed to the deprivation of [his]
    constitutional rights.” The district court rejected that argument, noting that on the day in
    question, Duke Energy and its personnel simply functioned as private actors assisting law
    enforcement, as any private actor would. We agree.
    The record shows that Duke Energy’s security personnel reported the presence of
    Fleming’s glider to the Sheriff’s Office shortly after observing it fly over and circle near
    the Robinson Nuclear Plant. Those personnel also provided the Sheriff’s Office with the
    glider’s “tail number.” Thereafter, Duke Energy dispatched members of its security team
    to the Hartsville Airport, where one employee viewed the inside of Fleming’s glider and
    14
    photographed it. Once Fleming had been taken into custody, a Sheriff’s deputy asked
    Fleming whether he would answer questions from two Duke Energy employees. Fleming
    stated that “it depended on what the questions were.” The Duke Energy personnel then
    proceeded to ask Fleming a single question — whether he knew that the facility he had
    flown over was a nuclear plant, to which Fleming responded that he did.
    Fleming argues that when Duke Energy provided law enforcement with
    misinformation about the height at which the glider was flying (allegedly reporting that it
    flew at 100 feet above the plant) and the fact that the plant was in a restricted area or a
    “no-fly zone,” it contributed to the deprivation of his constitutional rights by the Sheriff’s
    Office. But as the record makes clear, Fleming’s arrest and detention were effected only
    by the Sheriff’s Office, not by Duke Energy or due to any request made by Duke Energy.
    Moreover, Fleming’s allegation that Duke Energy employees provided misinformation
    does not make the employees state actors, any more than would a witness’s erroneous
    report to police of the license number of a vehicle fleeing a bank robbery.
    Fleming also argues that when Duke Energy’s employees questioned him at the
    airport, the company was “act[ing] in a quasi-governmental capacity,” thus subjecting it
    to § 1983 liability. Yet, Fleming makes no showing that the Duke Energy employees
    questioned him pursuant to a governmental request or for any governmental purpose.
    Duke Energy had its own interest in the security of its plant, and obtaining information
    about a person who had flown near the plant was important to that interest.
    15
    Finally, Fleming contends that an internal email prepared by Duke Energy
    personnel demonstrates that Duke Energy was “integrally involved” in the Sherriff’s
    Office’s decisions to arrest and charge Fleming. The email stated:
    The control room was contacted by Security personnel regarding an
    unidentified airborne craft in the area near the plant. Further investigation
    and monitoring identified the craft as a glider. The tail number has been
    obtained by a security officer stationed in one of the BRE towers. This
    information has been forwarded to Darlington County Law enforcement to
    assist in determining the crafts origin in an effort to capture and detain the
    individual for further questioning. The individual has been apprehended at
    the Hartsville Airport by local law enforcement personnel.
    This email, however, indicates no more than the fact that Duke Energy was attempting to
    assist law enforcement in their efforts in connection with the incident. It does not, as
    Fleming argues, suggest that Duke Energy demanded or participated in the Sheriff’s
    decision to arrest and charge Fleming. And, even if it did, a request to arrest someone
    apparently posing a risk to a nuclear plant does not make the requester a state actor. The
    record remains uncontroverted that the Sheriff’s Office made all of the decisions of
    which Fleming complains — demanding that Fleming land at the airport, charging him
    with a misdemeanor offense, and arresting and detaining him pending questioning by the
    FBI and Homeland Security. Duke Energy participated in none of these decisions.
    At bottom, there is no evidence that Duke Energy had the requisite relationship to
    the Sheriff’s Office so as to convert its conduct into state action, see DeBauche, 
    191 F.3d at
    506–07, and the district court correctly concluded therefore that Fleming failed to state
    a claim against Duke Energy and its vice president under § 1983.
    16
    IV
    Finally, Fleming contends that the district court erred in concluding that his state
    law claims against Duke Energy and its vice president were preempted by federal law.
    The gravamen of those claims is (1) that the Duke Energy defendants acted negligently
    when they deemed Fleming’s glider flight to be suspicious and then conveyed inaccurate
    information to law enforcement about the glider’s movements and the restrictions on the
    airspace above the plant; and (2) that this negligence was a but-for cause of Fleming’s
    false arrest and imprisonment by the Darlington County Sheriff’s Office. Thus, these
    state law claims would succeed or fail based on the reasonableness vel non of the Duke
    Energy defendants’ conduct in communicating to law enforcement officers the security
    threat that they perceived.
    The district court held that these state law claims were preempted by federal law
    because the conduct supporting the claims fell within a field that Congress intended for
    the federal government to occupy exclusively.           Specifically, the court noted that
    Fleming’s claims implicated “the ability of officials at nuclear facilities to assess activity
    in the airspace around a facility, to evaluate whether that activity is suspicious or
    concerning, to report that activity to federal and local law enforcement, and to follow-up
    to determine what, if any, risk was or is posed to the facility by the activity.” It stated
    that these are matters “upon which federal regulators have provided very specific
    guidance” — referring to several Nuclear Regulatory Commission directives regarding
    the reporting of security threats — and that “the Duke [Energy] defendants followed the
    applicable guidance” when they reported Fleming’s glider flight to the Sheriff’s Office.
    17
    Accordingly, the court concluded, to hold the Duke Energy defendants liable for their
    allegedly negligent response to a perceived security threat “would have a direct and
    substantial impact on judgments that Congress intended these operators to make
    exclusively in accordance with guidance from federal authorities.”
    Federal preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause — including state
    causes of action — is “fundamentally . . . a question of congressional intent.” English v.
    Gen. Elec. Co., 
    496 U.S. 72
    , 79 (1990). The Supreme Court has recognized that there are
    three ways by which Congress manifests that intent:        (1) when Congress explicitly
    defines the extent to which its enactment preempts state law (express preemption); (2)
    when state law “regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal
    Government to occupy exclusively” (field preemption); and (3) when state law “actually
    conflicts with federal law” (conflict preemption). 
    Id.
     at 78–79. In this case, the district
    court relied on field preemption.
    Beginning in the 1940s with the development and first use of atomic power for
    energy and continuing up to the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the “use,
    control and ownership of nuclear technology remained a federal monopoly.” Pacific Gas
    and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 
    461 U.S. 190
    , 206
    (1983). But with the Atomic Energy Act, Congress authorized licensing for the private
    construction and operation of commercial nuclear power reactors, and it ultimately gave
    the Nuclear Regulatory Commission — the successor to the Atomic Energy Commission
    — the authority over the licensing of nuclear facilities. The Commission’s “prime area
    of concern” in exercising this authority was to ensure the “national security, public
    18
    health, and safety.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    435 U.S. 519
    , 550 (1978) (citing 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 2132
    –33, 2201). At the same time, Congress
    gave authority to the States over the economic considerations concerning the construction
    and operation of nuclear plants, as well as regulation of the energy produced. See Pacific
    Gas, 
    461 U.S. at
    206–07. The Supreme Court thus summarized:
    [T]he Federal Government maintains complete control of the safety and
    “nuclear” aspects of energy generation; the States exercise their traditional
    authority over the need for additional generating capacity, the type of
    generating facilities to be licensed, land use, ratemaking, and the like.
    
    Id. at 212
    .
    Based on these actions by Congress, the Supreme Court in Pacific Gas concluded
    that “the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns,
    except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States,” such that “safety regulation of
    nuclear plants by States is forbidden.”          
    Id.
     (emphasis added).    And the Court
    subsequently reiterated this conclusion in other cases regarding nuclear field preemption.
    See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 
    464 U.S. 238
    , 249 (1984); English, 
    496 U.S. at 82
    .
    Moreover, it explained further that state law causes of action are subject to field
    preemption when they “have some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by
    those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels.”
    English, 
    496 U.S. at 85
    .
    In this case, the Duke Energy defendants were sued because they allegedly acted
    negligently when they deemed Fleming’s glider to be suspicious and then conveyed
    inaccurate information to law enforcement about the glider’s movements, as well as the
    19
    restrictions on the airspace above the plant.     Fleming asserts that the Duke Energy
    defendants’ negligent reporting was the but-for cause of his false arrest and imprisonment
    by the Darlington County Sheriff’s Office. But Duke Energy’s conduct, even if tortious,
    was responsive to the safety concerns governed exclusively by federal law, see Pacific
    Gas, 
    461 U.S. at 212
    , and imposing liability based on such claims would have a “direct
    and substantial effect” on decisions designed to ensure the facility’s safety, English, 
    496 U.S. at 85
    . Duke Energy’s suspicions reflected the risks posed by an unidentified plane
    with an unknown purpose circling near a nuclear facility. Among others, those risks
    included an intentional impact with the facility and the resulting release of radiation or
    possible surveillance in furtherance of a terrorist plot — especially salient threats in the
    aftermath of 9/11. Until such legitimate suspicions were allayed, ultimately here through
    the questioning by the FBI and Homeland Security, the entire incident implicated the
    very nuclear safety concerns at the core of the field preempted by federal law. See
    Pacific Gas, 
    461 U.S. at 212
    .
    Moreover, subjecting the operators of nuclear facilities to tort liability for harms
    like those suffered by Fleming — i.e., harms inflicted by law enforcement officers
    responding to reports of security threats — would obviously affect the operators’
    decisionmaking regarding the reporting of threats. Here, for example, Fleming alleged
    that Duke Energy provided inaccurate or incomplete information to the Sheriff’s Office.
    The prospect of state damage awards resulting from such reports could cause a company
    such as Duke Energy to be hesitant to inform the authorities when confronted with an
    indeterminate phenomenon potentially implicating its security, especially when the
    20
    company lacks the ability to control how law enforcement might respond to its report.
    And such hesitation could thus compromise the responsibility of reporting threats
    promptly before it becomes too late for the government to respond — a concern that is
    substantially magnified in the context of maintaining the integrity of a nuclear reactor and
    its attendant facilities.
    A conclusion that Fleming’s state tort claims fall within the preempted field of
    nuclear safety is further supported by several express directives issued by federal
    agencies. For one, the FAA had issued a “Special Notice,” which, “in the interests of
    national security,” advised pilots “to avoid the airspace above, or in proximity to
    [nuclear] sites” and stated further that “pilots should not circle as to loiter in the vicinity
    over these types of facilities.” FAA National Flight Data Center, Special Notice 4-0811.
    And in a similar vein, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had instructed nuclear facility
    operators, as the district court noted without revealing specifics because of security
    concerns, to report a flight they considered suspicious. See NRC Advisory 1A-06-05
    (Dec. 8, 2006) (under seal in this case). While we recognize that these directives may
    also support a finding of conflict preemption, we need not decide that question because
    Congress has already preempted the entire field of nuclear safety, and the instructions in
    these directives make clear that the concerns prompting Duke Energy to report Fleming’s
    presence to law enforcement were at the heart of that field.
    We thus agree with the district court that Fleming’s state law claims against the
    Duke Energy defendants fell within the field preempted by federal law.
    21
    Fleming nonetheless argues that his claims are not barred by field preemption
    because they are similar in kind to those in Silkwood and English, where the Supreme
    Court held that the claims before it did not fall within the preempted field. A careful
    reading of those cases, however, reveals important distinguishing aspects regarding the
    specific claims at issue before the Court — in Silkwood, a claim for damages based on
    radiological harms caused by a nuclear accident, and in English, a retaliation claim
    against a nuclear facility company that had allegedly punished an employee for reporting
    safety violations. In Silkwood, the Court’s holding that field preemption did not apply to
    state law causes of action “insofar as damages for radiation injuries [were] concerned,”
    
    464 U.S. at 256
    , was based substantially on the existence of legislative history indicating
    that Congress, in amending the Atomic Energy Act, had specifically “assumed that
    persons injured by nuclear accidents were free to utilize existing state tort law remedies,”
    
    id.
     at 251–52 (citing S. Rep. No. 85-296, at 9 (1957)). Relatedly, in English, the Court
    reasoned that it would be “odd, if not irrational,” for Congress to have preempted
    retaliation claims by those reporting safety violations at nuclear facilities given its
    intention to allow tort actions for radiological harms arising from such violations as
    recognized in Silkwood. See English, 
    496 U.S. at 86
    .
    But the case before us does not involve injuries to individuals caused by radiation
    damage or retaliation against an employee for reporting safety violations. Rather, it
    involves the actions of a nuclear facility operator taken to ensure the facility’s safety by
    reporting a threat it perceived from an unidentified aircraft circling nearby. Unlike the
    claims in English or Silkwood, it is clear that the claims here are ones that Congress
    22
    intended to include within the preempted field of nuclear safety. As we have explained,
    Fleming’s claims — which seek to apply state tort law to regulate the good-faith
    reporting of security threats to nuclear facilities — would have a “direct and substantial
    effect” on the safety-related decisions of those who operate such facilities. English, 
    496 U.S. at 85
    . Accordingly, we conclude that those claims are preempted.
    *      *      *
    For the reasons given, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    AFFIRMED
    23