United States v. Clement Hope , 701 F. App'x 273 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4145
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CLEMENT J. HOPE, a/k/a Qwan,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:08-cr-00030-RJC-1)
Submitted: September 29, 2017 Decided: November 13, 2017
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ross Hall Richardson, Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Clement J. Hope appeals the 60-month revocation sentence imposed after we
remanded his case to the district court for further proceedings on his supervised release
revocation. Hope contends that this sentence is plainly unreasonable, both procedurally
and substantively. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation
of supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013); see
also United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. 2017). We will affirm a revocation
sentence that “is within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable.”
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether
the sentence imposed is procedurally and substantively unreasonable, applying the same
general considerations utilized in our evaluation of original criminal sentences. Id. at
438. In this initial inquiry, the court “takes a more deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for
guidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Only if we find the sentence unreasonable will we
consider whether it is “plainly so.” Id. at 657 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court considered the policy statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors applicable in revocation
proceedings. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. The district court also must provide a statement
of reasons for the sentence imposed, but that explanation “need not be as detailed or
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specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). In
fashioning an appropriate sentence, “the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s
breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the
underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.” U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2009). A revocation sentence is substantively
reasonable if the court “sufficiently state[s] a proper basis” for concluding the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at
440.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that Hope’s sentence is not plainly
unreasonable. The district court indicated that Hope’s sentence reflects the demonstrable
need to protect the public from future crimes by Hope and to deter Hope from continuing
to commit acts of violence against women. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C). The
record also makes plain that the court chose the sentence because Hope’s commission of
new crimes amounted to a significant breach of the court’s trust. See USSG ch. 7, pt.
A(3)(b). Given that the district court identified these proper and persuasive reasons for
the revocation sentence, we reject Hope’s claim that the court committed reversible error.
For these reasons, we affirm the amended revocation judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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