Brenda Mveng-Whitted v. Thomas Larose , 570 F. App'x 307 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2238
BRENDA MVENG-WHITTED,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
LAWRENCE HAWTHORNE,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS LAROSE, Individually and in his official capacity as
Chairperson of the Art Department of Virginia State
University; VIRGINIA STATE UNIVERSITY,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
DR. WELDON HILL,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:11-cv-00842-JAG-MHL)
Submitted: April 28, 2014 Decided: May 1, 2014
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Josephine S. Miller, LAW OFFICE OF JOSEPHINE SMALLS MILLER, East
Hartford, Connecticut; Samuel H. Woodson, III, LAW OFFICE OF
S.H. WOODSON, III, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Rhodes B. Ritenour,
Deputy Attorney General, Peter R. Messitt, Ronald N. Regnery,
Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Brenda Mveng-Whitted appeals the district court’s
order granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
her employment discrimination and retaliation claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and her
remaining claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). ∗ On appeal, she
contends that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to the Defendants based on the evidence. We affirm.
We review whether a district court erred in granting
summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards as
the district court and viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Martin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d
132, 135 (4th Cir. 2012). A court must enter summary judgment
“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there
is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation and
∗
The district court previously dismissed her § 1981 claim
against Virginia State University based on sovereign immunity.
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internal quotations omitted). “The nonmoving party cannot
create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation
or the building of one inference upon another,” Othentec Ltd. v.
Phelan, 526 F.3d 135, 140 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal
quotations omitted), and she cannot defeat summary judgment with
merely a scintilla of evidence, Am. Arms Int’l v. Herbert, 563
F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 2009). Rather, she “must produce some
evidence (more than a scintilla) upon which a jury could
properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,
upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Othentec Ltd., 526
F.3d at 140 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs,
and we conclude that the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment to the Defendants. Accordingly, we affirm for
the reasons stated by the district court. See Mveng-Whitted v.
Larose, No. 3:11-cv-00842-JAG-MHL (E.D. Va. Sept. 12, 2013); see
also Adams v. Trustees of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d
550, 557-60 (4th Cir. 2011). We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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