United States v. Christopher Moore , 572 F. App'x 214 ( 2014 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-7930
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER C. MOORE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap.        James P. Jones,
    District Judge. (2:11-cr-00004-JPJ-1; 2:13-cv-80654-JPJ-RSB)
    Submitted:   April 29, 2014                   Decided:   May 22, 2014
    Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Christopher C. Moore, Appellant Pro Se. Zachary T. Lee,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia; Kartic
    Padmanabhan, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke,
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Christopher             C.   Moore       appeals   the   district          court’s
    order denying his motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R.
    Crim.    P.       33,    and     its   order      denying    reconsideration             of   that
    order.    For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    We        review    a    district        court’s   denial     of     a     Rule    33
    motion for abuse of discretion.                        United States v. Robinson, 
    627 F.3d 941
    , 948 (4th Cir. 2010).                         Rule 33 permits the court to
    vacate    a       criminal       judgment       and     grant    a   new     trial       on     the
    defendant’s motion “if the interest of justice so requires.”
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a).                    To establish his entitlement to a new
    trial based on newly-discovered evidence, * the defendant must
    satisfy       a    five-prong          test    by      demonstrating        that       “(1)     the
    evidence is newly discovered; (2) the defendant exercised due
    diligence;         (3)    the     newly       discovered     evidence       is     not    merely
    cumulative         or    impeaching;        (4)     the   evidence     is    material;          and
    (5) the evidence would probably result in acquittal at a new
    trial.”       United States v. Moore, 
    709 F.3d 287
    , 292 (4th Cir.
    2013).
    *
    Moore does not assign error to the district court’s
    construction of his motion as one seeking relief based on
    newly-discovered evidence.  Insofar as Moore’s motion sought a
    new trial on other grounds, it was properly denied as untimely.
    See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2) (requiring motion for new trial
    not based on newly-discovered evidence to be filed within
    fourteen days of verdict).
    2
    Moore’s      Rule      33    motion         primarily     relied    upon    a
    December 3, 2009, investigatory memorandum, which states that
    Moore invoked his right to counsel when officers attempted to
    interview him following the incident that formed the basis for
    his    conviction.         In     some     circumstances,          of   course,    further
    custodial interrogation by government agents after an invocation
    of the right to counsel constitutes a Fifth Amendment violation.
    See Edwards v. Arizona, 
    451 U.S. 477
    , 484-85 (1981) (holding
    that, when suspect invokes right to counsel during custodial
    interrogation,       he     may      not    be       questioned       further    until   he
    reinitiates later discussions with police and waives right to
    counsel).         However,        even     if       the    district     court    erred   in
    concluding that Moore could not meet the Rule 33 requirements of
    materiality and a likely effect on the verdict, Moore failed to
    make the requisite showing for a new trial because he has not
    demonstrated that the December 3 report was newly discovered.
    To the contrary, the record shows that the Government attached
    the report to a pretrial pleading to which Moore’s trial counsel
    had access.        See United States v. Fulcher, 
    250 F.3d 244
    , 250
    (4th   Cir.    2001)      (recognizing          that      “newly   discovered     evidence
    means evidence discovered since the trial” (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted)).                       Moreover, because Moore should
    have been aware of the factual predicate of his claim at the
    time   of   his   trial,        he   cannot      demonstrate       that   he    diligently
    3
    pursued his claim.           Our review of the record indicates that
    Moore’s motion failed to make the requisite showing to obtain
    relief under Rule 33 on any basis, and thus the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
    Turning          to    Moore’s        subsequent       motion        for
    reconsideration, motions for reconsideration of final judgments
    or orders in criminal cases are not authorized by either statute
    or   the   Federal    Rules      of   Criminal    Procedure.          See     United
    States v. Breit, 
    754 F.2d 526
    , 530 (4th Cir. 1985).                   Because the
    court lacked authority to grant reconsideration of its order
    denying a new trial, its denial of the motion was not error.
    Accordingly, we affirm both the district court’s order
    denying a new trial and its order denying reconsideration.                       We
    dispense    with     oral    argument    because       the    facts   and     legal
    contentions   are    adequately       presented   in    the   materials       before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-7930

Citation Numbers: 572 F. App'x 214

Judges: Diaz, Floyd, Niemeyer, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 5/22/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024