United States v. Lamarr Murphy , 547 F. App'x 272 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4959
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LAMARR PATE MURPHY, a/k/a Bandana Red,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00301-WO-1)
Submitted: November 4, 2013 Decided: December 3, 2013
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S.
Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Stephen T. Inman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lamarr Pate Murphy pleaded no contest to possession of
a firearm after sustaining a prior conviction for an offense
punishable by a term exceeding one year of imprisonment, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court
sentenced Murphy to 120 months of imprisonment, with twenty-four
months to run concurrently with any sentence Murphy would
receive for pending related state charges. Murphy now appeals.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Murphy argues on appeal that the sentence is
substantively unreasonable because the district court did not
impose a sentence entirely concurrent to the anticipated state
sentence. We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330,
335 (4th Cir. 2009). A district court has the discretion to
impose a federal sentence concurrent with, consecutive to, or
partially concurrent with any anticipated state sentence. See
Sester v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1468-69 (2012). In
deciding whether to run a sentence concurrently or consecutively
to another sentence, the court must consider the factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b).
Here, the district court recognized its authority to
sentence Murphy either consecutively to, concurrently, or
2
partially concurrently with the anticipated state sentence,
thoroughly considered and discussed the parties’ arguments and
the § 3553(a) factors, and exhaustively explained the chosen
sentence. Based on the factors discussed by the district court,
we conclude that the court’s within-Guidelines sentence imposed
partially concurrent with the not-yet-imposed state sentence is
substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
3