United States v. Freedom Born Divine , 547 F. App'x 280 ( 2013 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-4385
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    FREEDOM BORN DIVINE, a/k/a Rico Rivers,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Norfolk.    Mark S. Davis, District
    Judge. (2:11-cr-00168-MSD-TEM-1)
    Submitted:   November 6, 2013             Decided:   December 3, 2013
    Before SHEDD and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam.
    Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Richard J.
    Colgan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt,
    Appellate Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant.     Neil H.
    MacBride,  United  States   Attorney,  V.   Kathleen   Dougherty,
    Assistant  United  States   Attorney,  Norfolk,   Virginia,   for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Freedom Born Divine appeals the fifteen-month sentence
    imposed upon the revocation of his supervised release term.                     On
    appeal,      Divine    asserts     that       his   revocation     sentence    was
    procedurally unreasonable, because the court erred in concluding
    that   his    most    serious     violation—possession       of    marijuana—was
    properly     classified      as   a   Grade     B   violation.       Finding     no
    reversible error, we affirm.
    Generally,     we    will    affirm    a   sentence   imposed     upon
    revocation of supervised release unless the sentence is “plainly
    unreasonable.”        See United States v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d 433
    , 437
    (4th Cir. 2006).           We first determine whether the sentence is
    unreasonable, applying the same general inquiry used to assess
    the reasonableness of original sentences.                 
    Id. at 438.
        If the
    sentence is found unreasonable, we must determine whether it is
    “plainly” so, relying on the same definition of “plain” applied
    when   conducting      a   plain-error        analysis.     United    States    v.
    Thompson, 
    595 F.3d 544
    , 547-48 (4th Cir. 2010).
    Because Divine did not challenge in the district court
    the characterization of his possession-of-marijuana violation as
    a Grade B violation, we review the issue for plain error.                       See
    United States v. Bennett, 
    698 F.3d 194
    , 199 (4th Cir. 2012),
    cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 1506
    (2013).               To establish plain error,
    Divine must show (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain,
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    and   (3)    the   error   affected      his    substantial        rights.         United
    States v. King, 
    628 F.3d 693
    , 699 (4th Cir. 2011).                          Even if he
    makes this showing, we will exercise our discretion to reverse
    “only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
    public reputation of judicial proceedings.”                        United States v.
    Powell, 
    680 F.3d 350
    , 358 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks
    omitted),     cert.     denied,    133   S.     Ct.       376   (2012).      “The    term
    ‘plain’ error is synonymous with ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ error.                           An
    error is plain if the settled law of the Supreme Court or this
    circuit establishes that an error has occurred.”                          United States
    v. Carthorne, 
    726 F.3d 503
    , 516 (4th Cir. 2013) (some internal
    quotation     marks     omitted;    citations       omitted);      see     also    United
    States v. Strieper, 
    666 F.3d 288
    , 295 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]here
    we    have   yet   to   speak     directly     on     a    legal   issue     and    other
    circuits are split, a district court does not commit plain error
    by following the reasoning of another circuit.”).
    Divine asserts that the district court plainly erred
    in classifying his marijuana possession as a Grade B violation,
    rather than a Grade C violation.               Grade A violations include
    conduct constituting (A) a federal, state, or local
    offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding
    one year that (i) is a crime of violence, (ii) is a
    controlled   substance  offense,   or  (iii)  involves
    possession of a firearm or destructive device of a
    type described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); or (B) any
    other federal, state, or local offense punishable by a
    term of imprisonment exceeding twenty years.
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    U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 7B1.1(a)(1), p.s.
    (2003).        Grade B violations include “conduct constituting any
    other federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of
    imprisonment         exceeding         one   year.”      USSG      § 7B1.1(a)(2),           p.s.
    Grade     C    violations        include       conduct       constituting        any    other
    criminal offense punishable by a year or less of imprisonment or
    any other violation of a supervised release condition.                                      USSG
    § 7B1.1(a)(3), p.s.               “The grade of violation does not depend
    upon the conduct that is the subject of criminal charges or of
    which   the     defendant         is    convicted       in    a   criminal       proceeding.
    Rather,       the    grade   of    the       violation       is   to   be   based      on    the
    defendant’s actual conduct.”                 USSG § 7B1.1 cmt. n.1.
    The    parties      agree      that     Divine’s        conduct    would          be
    punishable as a federal offense under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012),
    which     criminalizes           the     simple      possession        of   a    controlled
    substance.           A person who violates this provision and has no
    prior drug conviction is subject to a maximum sentence of one
    year of imprisonment.              
    Id. However, a
    person who violates this
    provision      and     has   a    prior      drug     conviction       is   subject         to    a
    sentence of fifteen days’ to two years’ imprisonment.                            
    Id. Although Divine’s
           criminal    history       reveals     at   least
    one prior controlled substance conviction, he asserts that this
    prior conviction is not “conduct” relevant in determining the
    classification for his supervised release violation.                              He relies
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    upon both Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 
    560 U.S. 563
    (2010), and
    United States v. Simmons, 
    649 F.3d 237
    , 243 (4th Cir. 2011) (en
    banc), to argue that the court could not consider the recidivist
    enhancement for his hypothetical § 844(a) offense because the
    Government     was    unable    to    comply    with   the   protections   of    21
    U.S.C. § 851 (2012) in the context of a revocation proceeding.
    He also identifies authority affirming revocation sentences for
    simple possession violations that were classified as Grade C
    violations.
    In response, the Government argues that the district
    court did not err in classifying Divine’s offense as a Grade B
    violation, as Divine was eligible for the recidivist enhancement
    due to his prior conviction, and § 851 notice requirements are
    inapplicable in the supervised release context.                   The Government
    also distinguishes Carachuri-Rosendo and Simmons and identifies
    unpublished cases affirming revocation sentences in which simple
    possession violations were classified as Grade B violations.
    Ultimately, we need not resolve this dispute, as any
    error   by    the    district    court   was    not    “plain.”    The   district
    court’s      conclusion   that       Divine’s   marijuana    possession    was    a
    Grade B offense is supported by unpublished authority from this
    circuit, e.g., United States v. Jemerson, 132 F. App’x 488, 489-
    90 (4th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5008); United States v. Justice, 70
    F. App’x 719, 720 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-4388), as well as
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    authority from other circuits, see United States v. Trotter, 
    270 F.3d 1150
    ,   1154     (7th     Cir.    2001)       (recognizing     that,     when
    determining whether defendant’s conduct is punishable by more
    than one year of imprisonment in context of supervised release
    revocation,    “court    must    determine         whether    the   conduct   is   a
    felony (etc.) after prior convictions are taken into account”);
    United States v. Crace, 
    207 F.3d 833
    , 837-38 (6th Cir. 2000)
    (permitting court to consider prior convictions when determining
    whether conduct was properly classified as Grade B violation);
    United States v. Seiber, 516 F. App’x 208, 214-16 (3d Cir. 2013)
    (No. 12-2523) (rejecting argument, under Carachuri-Rosendo, that
    § 851 notice was required to apply recidivist enhancement when
    determining    possible        penalty       for     simple     possession,     and
    concluding recidivist simple possession is Grade B violation);
    United States v. Jackson, 510 F. App’x 149, 155-56 (3d Cir.)
    (No.   12-2390)     (rejecting      argument        that      supervised   release
    violation based on simple possession could not be Grade B felony
    unless Government filed § 851 information), cert. denied, 133 S.
    Ct. 1477 (2013).      Moreover, to the extent Carachuri-Rosendo and
    Simmons may provide support for Divine’s conclusion that his
    conduct was a Grade C violation, they do not clearly compel that
    conclusion,    as   they   do    not     address     drug     possession   in   the
    context of revocation proceedings.                 Thus, while this circuit’s
    unpublished    authority       finding    simple      possession     offenses      as
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    Grade B violations predates both Carachuri-Rosendo and Simmons,
    neither Carachuri-Rosendo nor Simmons so clearly abrogates the
    court’s prior reasoning as to require reversal for plain error.
    The district court’s classification of Divine’s conduct as a
    Grade B offense therefore did not run afoul of any settled law
    and was not obviously incorrect under available authority.
    Because   Divine   cannot   demonstrate   plain   error,   we
    affirm the district court’s judgment.        We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before this court and argument would
    not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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