United States v. William Rone , 547 F. App'x 360 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4137
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM ALLEN RONE, a/k/a Tweet,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00219-TDS-4)
Submitted: November 21, 2013 Decided: December 10, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles L. White, II, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Allen Rone pled guilty to distributing cocaine
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012), and being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012). The district court sentenced Rone to 168
months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Rone argues that his sentence
is procedurally unreasonable because the district court erred in
its calculation of the drug quantity applicable to Rone. We
affirm.
We review sentences for reasonableness “under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review entails appellate
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining
procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district
court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines
range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an
appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, did not rely on clearly erroneous facts in selecting
the sentence, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence.
Id. at 49-51. We review the district court’s drug quantity
finding underlying its calculation of the base offense level for
clear error. United States v. Crawford, __ F.3d __, __, 2013 WL
5861809, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 1, 2013). This deferential
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standard of review requires reversal only if we, upon review of
the record as a whole, “[are] left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The district court’s calculation of the drug quantity
attributable to Rone was based on statements Rone made to
federal agents. At the sentencing hearing, Rone did not dispute
that he actually made the statements; he argued instead that he
had not been truthful. The district court therefore had to make
a credibility determination as to whether Rone was lying at the
sentencing hearing or whether he had previously lied to federal
agents. The record reveals that the district court heard
evidence from Rone and the Government, carefully considered that
evidence, and resolved the credibility determination in the
Government’s favor. See United States v. Henry, 673 F.3d 285,
292 (4th Cir.) (according district court’s credibility
determinations at sentencing “great difference”), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 182 (2012). In the face of this record, we are not
left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court
made a mistake. Therefore, we conclude that Rone’s sentence is
procedurally reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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