United States v. Francisco Castrejon-Alvarez , 549 F. App'x 162 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-7679
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner – Appellee,
v.
FRANCISCO CASTREJON-ALVAREZ,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:08-hc-02101-D-JG)
Submitted: November 27, 2013 Decided: December 18, 2013
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lewis A. Thompson, III, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC,
Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker,
United States Attorney, R.A. Renfer, Jr., Joshua B. Royster,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Francisco Castrejon-Alvarez appeals from the district
court’s order civilly committing him pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 4248 (2012) to the custody and care of the Attorney General.
The United States sought to commit Castrejon-Alvarez as a
sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247, 4248 (2012) (the
Act). On appeal, Castrejon-Alvarez contends that the Act
violates equal protection, and is criminal and not civil in
nature. Castrejon-Alvarez also contends that the district court
clearly erred in finding that the Government proved by clear and
convincing evidence that he would be unable to refrain from
future acts of child molestation. Finding no error, we affirm.
Pursuant to the Act, after a hearing, if the district
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a person is a
“sexually dangerous person,” the court must commit the person to
the custody of the Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d). A
“sexually dangerous person” is one “who has engaged or attempted
to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and
who is sexually dangerous to others . . . .” 18 U.S.C.
§ 4247(a)(5). A person is considered “sexually dangerous to
others” if “the person suffers from a serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would have
serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct
2
or child molestation if released.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6). We
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and
legal decisions de novo. United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456,
462 (4th Cir. 2012).
Castrejon-Alvarez argues that 18 U.S.C. § 4248
violates equal protection because it applies only to federal
prisoners and those committed to the Attorney General under 18
U.S.C. § 4241 (2012). He further claims that the Act is a
criminal statute and is not civil in nature. As
Castrejon-Alvarez recognized in his brief, this Court’s decision
in United States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2012)
forecloses these issues. In Timms, we applied rational basis
review and held that “Congress rationally limited § 4248’s scope
to sexually dangerous persons within BOP custody.” Id. As to
Castrejon-Alvarez’s argument that the Act is a criminal statute,
the court in Timms made clear “that § 4248 creates civil — not
criminal — proceedings, and that [respondent’s] arguments
relying on § 4248 being a criminal proceeding therefore fail.”
Timms, 664 F.3d at 456.
Castrejon-Alvarez also claims that it was error to
find that he would be unable to refrain from sexually violent
behavior or molestation of a child, as required by 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4748(A)(5)-(6). In this regard, he contends that the court
gave undue deferential weight to the opinions of the three
3
experts for the Government and essentially discounted the
testimony of Castrejon-Alvarez’s expert, Dr. Warren. When
“[e]valuating the credibility of experts and the value of their
opinions,” we are “especially reluctant to set aside a finding
based on the trial court’s evaluation of conflicting expert
testimony.” Hall, 664 F.3d at 462 (citation omitted). It was
within the province of the district court to determine which
expert opinion to credit. There is nothing to indicate that
Drs. North, Graney, and Artigues’s testimony is inconsistent
with the evidence presented. Indeed, it appears more consistent
with the record than Dr. Warren’s testimony, as the district
court also found. Expert opinion is critical to determining
whether Castrejon-Alvarez suffers from a mental illness. See
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
The serious difficulty element “refers to the degree
of the person’s ‘volitional impairment,’ which impacts the
person’s ability to refrain from acting upon his deviant sexual
interests.” Hall, 664 F.3d at 463 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)). Three experts testified that it was
their expert belief that Castrejon-Alvarez would have serious
difficulty refraining from sexually deviant conduct. Their
expert testimony is supported by Castrejon-Alvarez’s conduct, as
he has repeated involvement in sexually-motivated offense
behaviors. In addition, Castrejon-Alvarez has not been
4
compliant or availed himself of sex offender treatment. As the
experts opined, such conduct is a likely indicator that
Castrejon-Alvarez will not be amenable to future treatment. In
addition, the actuarial measures all indicated Castrejon-Alvarez
has an elevated risk of reoffending. Thus, the record as a
whole shows that Castrejon-Alvarez will have serious difficulty
in refraining from sexually violent conduct if released.
Under the applicable clear-error standard, we will not
reverse unless “we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Caporale, 701 F.3d 128, 135 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). We have no such conviction. We
have reviewed the record, the hearing transcript, and the
district court’s order incorporating its ruling from the bench
and conclude that the district court did not clearly err. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5