William Coleman v. Rock Hill Municipal Court ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-7280
WILLIAM T. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ROCK HILL MUNICIPAL COURT; JUDGE LONG; JUDGE MODLZ; UNKNOWN
ROCK HILL MUNICIPAL COURT DEFENDANTS, May be amended,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (0:12-cv-01909-JFA)
Submitted: December 27, 2013 Decided: January 16, 2014
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William T. Coleman, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Coleman appeals the district court’s order
accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (2012). We have reviewed the record and find no
reversible error. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of
the claims against the Rock Hill Municipal Court and Judge Modlz
for the reasons stated by the district court. See Coleman v.
Rock Hill Mun. Court, No. 0:12-cv-01909-JFA (D.S.C. July 29,
2013).
However, we agree with Coleman that the favorable
termination rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), does not bar his pro se § 1983 action against Judge
Long. See 512 U.S. 477, 487 & n.7 (“[I]f the district court
determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will
not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal
judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to
proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.”). We
nevertheless affirm the district court’s judgment on this claim
on alternative grounds. See MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of
Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e are
entitled to affirm the court’s judgment on alternate grounds, if
such grounds are apparent from the record.”). Our review of the
record leads us to conclude that Judge Long is entitled to
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absolute judicial immunity because his actions were well within
the scope of his jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356-57 (1987).
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the material before this Court and argument will
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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