United States v. Jamaal Byers , 707 F. App'x 134 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4345
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMAAL RASHAAD BYERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Anderson. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (8:15-cr-00838-BHH-1)
Submitted: December 19, 2017 Decided: December 21, 2017
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Wallace H. Jordan, Jr., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jeanne
Howard, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamaal Rashaad Byers appeals the 37-month sentence imposed following his
guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012). On appeal, counsel for Byers filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the sentencing factors relied upon
by the district court were factually supported, but concluding that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal. Although notified of his right to do so, Byers has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007). We “must first
ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error,” such as
improperly calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors, or inadequately explaining the sentence imposed.
Id. at 51.
Counsel suggests that the Government’s sentencing argument—that Byers created
a dangerous situation by driving without a license in a vehicle that contained a gun and
marijuana—was not supported by the record. However, the district court did not adopt
this argument. Rather, the court determined the sentence based on the need to protect the
public and to rehabilitate Byers, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C), (D), and relied on the
undisputed facts that the instant offense was committed while Byers was on probation,
that the offense involved a firearm, and that, within the last few years, Byers was
convicted of burglary and strong arm robbery. In addition, the district court correctly
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calculated the Guidelines range and amply explained its sentencing decision. We
therefore conclude that Byers’ sentence is procedurally reasonable.
Having found no procedural error, we examine the substantive reasonableness of
Byers’ sentence under “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The
sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals
of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume on appeal that a within-Guidelines
sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir. 2014). Here, by not showing that his within-Guidelines sentence “is unreasonable
when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors,” Byers has failed to rebut this
presumption. Id.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Byers’ conviction and
sentence. * This court requires that counsel inform Byers, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Byers requests that
a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Byers.
*
To the extent Byers raises a legal sufficiency challenge, United States v. Gosselin
World Wide Moving, N.V., 411 F.3d 502, 515 (4th Cir. 2005), his constructive possession
of the firearm was sufficient to support his § 922(g)(1) conviction, United States v.
Lawing, 703 F.3d 229, 240 (4th Cir. 2012).
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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