Gordon Goines v. Valley Community Services Board , 822 F.3d 159 ( 2016 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1589
GORDON GOINES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
VALLEY COMMUNITY SERVICES BOARD; DAVID SHAW; ROBERT DEAN; D.
L. WILLIAMS; JENNA RHODES; JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Elizabeth Kay Dillon,
District Judge. (5:14-cv-00065-EKD-JCH)
Argued: January 26, 2016 Decided: May 9, 2016
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published
opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the opinion in which Judge
Wilkinson and Judge Niemeyer joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a
separate concurring opinion.
Timothy Lawrence Coffield, COFFIELD PLLC, Keswick, Virginia;
Jesse Howard Baker, LAW OFFICE OF JESSE BAKER IV, Gainesville,
Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Hustis Milnor, ZUNKA MILNOR &
CARTER, LTD, Charlottesville, Virginia; James Morton Bowling,
ST. JOHN, BOWLING, LAWRENCE & QUAGLIANA, LLP, Charlottesville,
Virginia; Rosalie Fessier, TIMBERLAKE, SMITH, THOMAS & MOSES,
PC, Staunton, Virginia, for Appellees.
TRAXLER, Chief Judge:
Gordon Goines went to the police station to report the
theft of his cable services and ended up involuntarily detained
for six days for a mental-health evaluation. Goines thereafter
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was
unlawfully seized without probable cause in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Goines named as defendants
the police officers who initially detained him, as well as the
mental-health worker who evaluated him, and the mental-health
worker’s employer. The district court granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. We
conclude that the claims against the mental-health evaluator and
her employer were properly dismissed. As to the two officers
who initially took Goines into custody, however, we find the
allegations of Goines’ complaint sufficient to survive the
motion to dismiss. We therefore affirm the district court’s
order in part, vacate in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
I.
In § 1983 actions, government officials are entitled to
qualified immunity so long as they have not violated “clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
2
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The contours of the law relevant to
this case are easily stated. “[T]he general right to be free
from seizure unless probable cause exists is clearly established
in the mental health seizure context. . . . [A]n officer must
have probable cause to believe that the individual posed a
danger to himself or others before involuntarily detaining the
individual.” Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 741 (4th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). We
will consider the sufficiency of Goines’ complaint in light of
this standard.
II.
According to the allegations of the complaint, Goines
suffers from cerebellar ataxia, a neurological condition that
causes him difficulties with his speech, balance, and certain
fine motor functions. The disorder does not affect Goines’
cognitive functioning, and he has no mental health issues.
In May 2014, Goines began experiencing problems with his
cable television service -- the service would intermittently
disconnect and the television would freeze and produce loud line
noises while it was turned on. A technician with the cable
provider visited Goines on May 15 and determined that an unknown
neighbor had spliced into Goines’ cable, causing the
disconnections and line noises. The technician advised Goines
3
to report the theft to the police. Goines thereafter walked
across the street to the police station and reported the cable
theft, telling the police that he did not want to confront the
neighbor because he did not know how the neighbor would react
and he did not want to get into a fight.
The officer to whom Goines first spoke turned him over to
defendant officers David Shaw and Robert Dean (together, the
“Officers”). Goines agreed to take the Officers back to his
apartment so he could demonstrate the problem. Because the
Officers did not turn on the television, however, they did not
hear the noises. The Officers asked Goines if he had any mental
health issues, which Goines denied, and asked whether “he
‘wanted to talk to someone.’” J.A 12. Believing that he would
be speaking to someone about the cable theft, Goines answered in
the affirmative. The Officers then handcuffed Goines, walked
him back to the police station, and placed him in the back of a
patrol car. Goines told the Officers he wanted to go home and
asked to be let out of the car, but Officer Dean told Goines
“‘that wasn’t an option.’” J.A. 12. The Officers transported
Goines, involuntarily, to the Augusta County Medical Center,
where he was strip-searched and handcuffed to a table. While at
the Medical Center, the Officers learned that Goines owned a
registered handgun. Goines volunteered to give the gun to the
4
Officers if “‘there was a problem,’” J.A. 13, and Goines
reiterated his desire to go home.
Goines was evaluated at the Medical Center by defendant
Jenna Rhodes, an emergency services and intake clinician
employed by defendant Valley Community Services Board. Goines
attached as an exhibit to his complaint the “Preadmission
Screening Report” completed by Rhodes. J.A. 22. In the
Screening Report, Rhodes described her personal observations of
Goines as well as information about Goines’ statements and
behavior that the Officers had provided her. Based on her
observations and the Officers’ information, Rhodes concluded
that Goines suffered from a mental illness and that he posed a
threat to the safety of his neighbors, and Rhodes filed a
petition seeking to have Goines involuntarily detained. The
magistrate judge granted the petition at 8:41 p.m. on May 15,
2014, and issued a temporary detention order. Goines thereafter
was transported to Crossroads Mental Health Center, where he
remained until he was released on May 20, 2014.
The facts set out above form the core of Goines’
constitutional claims that the defendants violated the Fourth
Amendment because they lacked probable cause to believe Goines
had a mental illness and was a threat to himself or others. In
addition to these facts, however, Goines’ complaint contains
several references to a report (the “Incident Report”) that
5
Officer Shaw prepared sometime after the interaction with
Goines.
Quoting from the Incident Report, the complaint states that
the first police officer to whom Goines spoke told Officers Shaw
and Dean that Goines “‘seemed to have some mental health issues
going on over an issue with a television.’” J.A. 11. The
complaint also alleges that the Officers “ignored or did not
take the time to understand” the nature of Goines’ problem --
that someone had spliced into his cable, which was causing line
noises and other issues when the television was turned on. As
an apparent indication of the Officers’ failure to understand,
the complaint then quotes Shaw’s statement in the Incident
Report that Goines told the Officers that “‘there was a clicking
noise in the wall because someone outside was controlling his
T.V.’” J.A. 11. The complaint, again quoting from the Incident
Report, states that even though Goines denied having any mental
health issues, the Officers “[n]evertheless . . . concluded that
Goines was ‘having irrational issues and hearing things.’” J.A.
12.
Although Goines quoted the Incident Report in his
complaint, he did not attach it as an exhibit or explicitly
incorporate the entire report by reference. The defendants,
however, attached a copy of the Incident Report to their motion
to dismiss and referred to other parts of the Incident Report --
6
i.e., parts not quoted by Goines -- when arguing that Goines
failed to state a claim.
While a 12(b)(6) motion focuses on the allegations of the
complaint, it is well established that a document attached to a
motion to dismiss may be considered when evaluating a motion to
dismiss if the document was “integral to the complaint and
authentic.” Sec’y of State For Defence v. Trimble Nav. Ltd.,
484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). The district court therefore
treated the Incident Report as if it had been attached to the
complaint and considered the contents of the Incident Report.
Recognizing the general rule that the exhibit prevails in the
event of a conflict between an attached exhibit and the
allegations of a complaint, see S. Walk at Broadlands
Homeowner’s Ass’n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175,
182 (4th Cir. 2013), the district court believed that because
the Incident Report was prepared by the Officers and reflected
their version of the relevant events, an exception to the
exhibit-prevails rule was required. Accordingly, when
considering the sufficiency of Goines’ complaint, the district
court treated the contents of the Incident Report as true,
except where “the complaint expressly conflicts with, or
contradicts any factual allegations in the . . . Incident
Report.” J.A. 187-88 (emphasis added).
7
As to the constitutional claims against the Officers, the
district court determined that the facts reflected in the
complaint and Incident Report established that the Officers were
entitled to qualified immunity. In the district court’s view,
“it was objectively reasonable for the officers to conclude that
there was probable cause to believe Goines was suffering from a
mental illness,” and it was likewise objectively reasonable to
believe “that there was probable cause to believe Goines posed a
threat to others.” J.A. 200. Central to the court’s analysis
were certain “facts” appearing in the Incident Report but not in
the Complaint: (1) that Goines told the Officers while they were
in his apartment that he was then hearing noises that the
Officers could not hear and repeatedly said that “someone
outside [was] controlling” his television, J.A. 39, which made
it objectively reasonable for the Officers to conclude that
Goines had a mental illness; and (2) that Goines, in response to
a series of questions from the Officers, stated that he would
“hurt” his neighbors “by punching them,” J.A. 39, which made it
objectively reasonable for the Officers to conclude that Goines
was a threat to others. The court therefore dismissed the
claims against the Officers.
The court likewise dismissed the constitutional claims
against Rhodes and her employer. As previously noted, Goines
attached the Screening Report prepared by Rhodes to his
8
complaint. The district court took the same approach with the
Screening Report as it did with the Incident Report -- unless
the complaint explicitly contradicted the Screening Report, the
court accepted the contents of the Screening Report as true.
The district court concluded that, in light of the information
set out in the Screening Report, Rhodes had probable cause to
believe that Goines had a mental illness and was a danger to
others. Accordingly, the court dismissed the claims against
Rhodes and her employer.
This appeal followed.
III.
We begin with Goines’ claims against the Officers. Goines
argues that the district court erred in treating the allegations
of the Incident Report as true and that the allegations in his
complaint establish that the Officers lacked probable cause to
believe that he was mentally ill or that he posed a danger to
himself or others. As noted above, the district court relied on
the Incident Report to dismiss the claim against the Officers.
The question, then, is whether the court’s reliance on that
document was proper.
A.
“A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint,”
Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 2013),
and our evaluation is thus generally limited to a review of the
9
allegations of the complaint itself. However, we also consider
documents that are explicitly incorporated into the complaint by
reference, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551
U.S. 308, 322 (2007), and those attached to the complaint as
exhibits, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). And, as mentioned above,
we may consider a document submitted by the movant that was not
attached to or expressly incorporated in a complaint, so long as
the document was integral to the complaint and there is no
dispute about the document’s authenticity. See Trimble, 484
F.3d at 705; Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc.,
367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004); Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc.,
190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999).
Whether the court properly considered the Incident Report,
which was quoted in but not attached to the complaint, is not
entirely clear. Although the complaint included a few quotes
from and references to the Incident Report, Goines’ claims do
not turn on, nor are they otherwise based on, statements
contained in the Incident Report. See Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d
57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Limited quotation from or reference to
documents that may constitute relevant evidence in a case is not
enough to incorporate those documents, wholesale, into the
complaint.”). Under these circumstances, the Incident Report
arguably is not integral to the complaint and therefore should
not have been considered by the district court. See Chambers v.
10
Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining
that a document is “integral to the complaint” “where the
complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 249, 255 (2d
Cir. 2015) (document with “no independent legal significance to
[plaintiff’s] claim” was not integral to complaint).
Nonetheless, because Goines does not argue otherwise, we
will assume without deciding that the Incident Report was
integral to the complaint. And because there is no question
about the authenticity of the Incident Report, we will therefore
assume that the district court properly treated the Incident
Report as if it had been attached to the complaint. The more
difficult question is whether the district court properly
treated the factual contents of the Incident Report as true.
As previously noted, the district court’s approach to this
question began with its recognition of the exhibit-prevails
rule, which provides that “in the event of conflict between the
bare allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached . . .
, the exhibit prevails.” Fayetteville Inv’rs v. Commercial
Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991)); accord S.
Walk, 713 F.3d at 182. Under the rule, if a plaintiff “attaches
documents and relies upon the documents to form the basis for a
claim or part of a claim, dismissal is appropriate if the
document negates the claim.” Thompson v. Illinois Dep’t of
11
Prof’l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, if a breach-of-contract plaintiff alleges a failure
to perform an act required by the contract, the contract’s
description of the defendant’s duties will prevail over the
plaintiff’s contrary characterization. See E. Shore Markets,
Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 181 (4th Cir.
2000) (district court properly dismissed breach-of-lease claim
where terms of attached lease established that landlord had the
contractual right to take action challenged by the plaintiff);
cf. S. Walk, 713 F.3d at 182 (looking to terms of attached
contract to conclude that plaintiff seeking to invalidate
portions of the contract lacked standing). Similarly, if a
securities-fraud plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s
prospectus failed to disclose a material risk, the claim will be
dismissed if the prospectus shows the disclosure was in fact
made. See Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharm. Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 625
(4th Cir. 2008) (where securities-fraud complaint quoted from
investment analysts’ reports to support claim that defendant
intentionally misled the public, district court properly
reviewed reports in their entirety when dismissing the
complaint).
Animating the exhibit-prevails rule is the presumption that
the plaintiff, by basing his claim on the attached document, has
adopted as true the contents of that document. Plaintiffs
12
attach exhibits to their complaints for all sorts of reasons,
however, see EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d
773, 778 (7th Cir. 2007), and it is not always appropriate to
conclude that the plaintiff has adopted the contents of an
attached document, see N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City
of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that
“Rule 10(c) does not require a plaintiff to adopt every word
within the exhibits as true for purposes of pleading simply
because the documents were attached to the complaint to support
an alleged fact”). Indeed, if attached documents were always
treated as if their contents were adopted by the plaintiff, a
libel plaintiff would plead himself out of court simply by
attaching the libelous writing to his complaint. See Gant v.
Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A]
libel plaintiff may attach the writing alleged in the complaint
to be libelous without risk that the court will deem true all
libels in it.”). Accordingly, before treating the contents of
an attached or incorporated document as true, the district court
should consider the nature of the document and why the plaintiff
attached it. Cf. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor, 163 F.3d at 455 (before
treating contents of attached document as true, courts should
“consider why a plaintiff attached the document[], who authored
the document[], and the reliability of the document[]”).
13
When the plaintiff attaches or incorporates a document upon
which his claim is based, or when the complaint otherwise shows
that the plaintiff has adopted the contents of the document,
crediting the document over conflicting allegations in the
complaint is proper. See, e.g., Am. Chiropractic, 367 F.3d at
233-35 (dismissing civil RICO claim despite complaint’s
allegation of justifiable reliance where terms of document upon
which claim was based established that any reliance would not
have been justified). But in cases where the plaintiff attaches
or incorporates a document for purposes other than the
truthfulness of the document, it is inappropriate to treat the
contents of that document as true. For example, if a prisoner
attaches an unfavorable decision from a prison tribunal to show
that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, he does not
thereby adopt the factual findings of that unfavorable decision.
See Carroll v. Yates, 362 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 2004)
(rejecting as “fantastic” the argument that “all facts contained
in any attachments to a complaint are automatically deemed facts
alleged as part of the complaint” (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted)). Similarly, if a plaintiff attaches or
references a report prepared by a third-party to show how he
learned of certain facts alleged in his complaint, he does not
automatically adopt all of the factual conclusions contained in
the report. See Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d
141119, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Banneker referred to some of the
report’s recitations to show how it learned some facts in the
complaint, but it did not purport to and was not required to
adopt the factual contents of the report wholesale.”).
The purpose for which the document is offered is
particularly important where the document is one prepared by or
for the defendant. Such unilateral documents may reflect the
defendant’s version of contested events or contain self-serving,
exculpatory statements that are unlikely to have been adopted by
the plaintiff. Treating the contents of such a document as true
simply because it was attached to or relied upon in the
complaint, even though the plaintiff relied on it for purposes
other than truthfulness, would be “contrary to the concept of
notice pleading” and “would enable parties to hide behind
untested, self-serving assertions.” N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor, 163
F.3d at 456.
B.
In this case, we think it clear that Goines did not adopt
the Incident Report as true simply by relying on the Report for
some of the facts alleged in his complaint. As previously
noted, Goines does not base his claims on the Incident Report --
that is, no portion of any of his claims is dependent upon the
truth of any statements contained in the Incident Report.
Instead, Goines’ complaint tells the story of police who assumed
15
from Goines’ physical difficulties that he was mentally ill and
never actually listened to what Goines was telling them, and
Goines referred to portions of the Incident Report to support
that theory of the case. Thus, Goines alleged that he is not
mentally ill, but then quoted from the Incident Report that the
first police officer to whom Goines spoke told the Officers that
Goines “‘seemed to have some mental health issues.’” J.A. 11.
Goines alleged that the line noises and other problems with his
television service occurred when the television was turned on
and that the Officers did not hear the line noises because they
never turned on the television. See Complaint, J.A. 10-12, ¶¶
18-19, 27. Goines juxtaposed these clear allegations against
the statement in the Incident Report that Goines told the
Officers that “‘there was a clicking noise in the wall because
someone outside was controlling his T.V.,’” J.A. 11, which
Goines contended showed that the Officers “ignored or did not
take the time to understand Goines’ complaint,” id. Likewise,
Goines alleged that he told the Officers that he did not have
any “mental health issues,” but that the Officers
“[n]evertheless” determined that Goines was “‘having irrational
issues and hearing things.’” J.A. 12. Thus, when the complaint
is read in the light most favorable to Goines and in light of
his theory of the case, it is apparent that Goines’ purpose in
quoting from the Incident Report was not to assert the
16
truthfulness of the statements contained in the Report, but
instead to illustrate the mistakes he believed were made by the
Officers.
Because Goines did not rely on the Incident Report for its
truthfulness, the district court erred by treating as true the
factual statements contained in the Incident Report. The
district court instead should have treated the Report as what it
was -- a document prepared by Officer Shaw representing the
Officers’ view of events, not a document representing the true
facts. See Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 561 (6th
Cir. 2008) (in case where plaintiff attached to his complaint
transcripts of investigatory interviews with defendant police
officers, declining to “assume everything the officers said in
those interviews is true”). The court likewise should have
treated Goines’ allegations regarding the Incident Report as
what they were -- allegations that the Officers made the quoted
statements, not allegations that the statements themselves were
true. See id. (“[W]e treat the exhibit as an allegation that
the officers made the statements in the transcript and we treat
that allegation as true. . . . We do not accept as true,
however, that [the officers’ statements are] accurate or
true.”); N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor, 163 F.3d at 455 (“The letters
that [the plaintiff] attached to its complaint demonstrate that
[the defendant] stated it adopted the policy for safety reasons
17
during a public meeting that had been publicized and during
which individuals opposed to the policy had the opportunity to
voice their concerns. [Attaching the letters to the complaint]
does not, however, establish the truth of these unilateral
statements.” (emphasis added)).
C.
When the statements in the Incident Report are treated not
as true, but as assertions made by the Officers, we have little
difficulty in concluding that Goines’ claims against the
Officers should not have been dismissed.
To withstand a motion to dismiss, a § 1983 plaintiff must
allege facts that, “if true, show a violation of clearly
established constitutional rights.” Cloaninger ex rel. Estate
of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 331 (4th Cir. 2009).
“[T]he general right to be free from seizure unless probable
cause exists is clearly established in the mental health seizure
context.” Bailey, 349 F.3d at 741 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). “[P]robable cause to seize a person for a
psychological evaluation [exists] when the facts and
circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a
prudent man to believe that the person poses a danger to himself
or others.” Cloaninger, 555 F.3d at 334 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
18
Goines alleged that he has no mental illness, and the facts
he described in the complaint -– noises in the television line
and signal disruption caused by a neighbor splicing into Goines’
cable line and a desire not to fight with the thieving neighbor
-- provided no basis for the Officers to have reasonably
concluded otherwise. While the Incident Report indicates that
Goines told the Officers that he was hearing noises in the
apartment that they could not hear, that assertion cannot be
treated as true, and there are no facts alleged in the complaint
that would permit the inference that Goines heard noises in the
apartment. Indeed, given Goines’ allegations that the noise
occurred when the television was turned on and that the officers
never turned on the television, the only permissible inference
that can be drawn from the complaint is that Goines did not hear
noises because the television was never turned on. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that when
reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “we construe facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draw all
reasonable inferences in his favor” (citation, alteration, and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The facts as alleged in the complaint likewise provided no
reasonable basis for the Officers to have concluded that Goines
was a danger to himself or others. Goines alleged that he went
19
to the police “because he did not know how the neighbor would
react” to a confrontation with Goines and “he did not want to
‘get in a fight’ with the neighbor,” J.A. 11, and that he never
made “any threat to do harm to any person or to himself,” J.A.
12. These allegations are contradicted by assertions contained
in the Incident Report, but, again, those assertions cannot be
treated as true. By quoting from and referring to the Incident
Report, Goines effectively alleged that the Officers viewed the
facts differently, but he did not adopt the Officers’ version of
the facts as his own. Goines’ preemptive acknowledgement of the
defense may be unusual as a matter of pleading style, but it
does not make Goines’ allegations of the relevant facts
implausible or otherwise support a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in
the face of disputed facts. See Gale v. Hyde Park Bank, 384
F.3d 451, 452 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he plaintiff may tell the
court what his adversary has said without throwing in the
towel.”).
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, Goines,
though having speech and other physical difficulties, exhibited
no signs of mental illness and made no threats to harm himself
or others, but instead sought the help of the police to avoid a
confrontation and potential fight with a neighbor who had
spliced into Goines’ cable line. Under these facts, the
Officers lacked probable cause for an emergency mental-health
20
detention, and Goines’ complaint therefore alleges a
constitutional violation. See Bailey, 349 F.3d at 739 (“If
probable cause was lacking, then [the plaintiff] has
successfully asserted the violation of a constitutional right --
specifically his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizure . . . .”).
And again accepting Goines’ allegations as true, the
constitutional violation alleged is one for which the Officers
would not be entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified
immunity shields government officials from civil liability
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir.
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The relevant,
dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly
established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); see Smith v. Reddy,
101 F.3d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1996) (“If the right was not clearly
established at the relevant time or if a reasonable officer
might not have known his or her conduct violated that right, the
officer is entitled to immunity.”).
Probable cause, of course, is a “fluid concept that cannot
be reduced to a neat set of legal rules,” Bailey, 349 F.3d at
21
739 (internal quotation marks omitted), and our cases applying
the concept in the mental-health context are perhaps not easily
reduced to bright-line rules. Nonetheless, the facts as alleged
by Goines -- the involuntary detention of a man with physical
disabilities who exhibited no signs of mental illness and made
no threats of harm -- are sufficiently beyond the realm of
probable cause that no reasonable police officer would find them
adequate. See id. at 740 (“The law does not permit random or
baseless detention of citizens for psychological evaluations.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because Goines’ complaint plausibly alleges facts that no
reasonable officer would have found sufficient to justify an
emergency mental-health detention, the complaint states a
constitutional violation by the Officers for which they would
not be entitled to qualified immunity.
The whole area of civil commitment involves a number of
difficult judgment calls, especially for officers with little or
no training in mental health issues. Under the facts as
alleged, however, the officers failed to make sufficient
inquiry. As noted, this was not a matter of a third-party
complaint. Goines himself had reported to the stationhouse
seeking police assistance. The officers, however, simply
assumed a threat without exploring whether the situation
reflected some misunderstanding, a bizarre but non-dangerous
22
incident, or something more problematic. Further inquiry is
useful in the sorts of situations where officers are not
presented with emergency circumstances or a “substantial
likelihood” of harmful behavior. Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-808. We
therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of the claims
against the Officers and remand for further proceedings on those
claims. 1 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007) (“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is
improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
IV.
We turn now to Goines’ claims against Jenna Rhodes, the
mental-health evaluator, and her employer, Valley Community
Services Board.
Goines’ claims against these defendants, as we understand
them, proceed on a very different path from his claims against
the Officers. As we explained in the previous section, because
1 In addition to Officers Shaw and Dean, Goines named
Officer D.L. Williams as a defendant. Although the district
court dismissed the claims against Williams, Goines does not
challenge that dismissal on appeal. Goines has thus abandoned
his claims against Williams, and we therefore affirm the
district court’s dismissal of those claims. See, e.g., Suarez–
Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 248–49 (4th Cir. 2013)
(issues not raised in the argument section of the opening brief
are abandoned).
23
Goines’ claims against the Officers were not based on the
Incident Report and Goines did not otherwise adopt it, we did
not treat the contents of the Incident Report as true when
evaluating the claims against the Officers. The claims against
Rhodes and her employer, however, are based on the Screening
Report. That is, Goines does not contend that the Officers did
not provide the information set out in the Screening Report or
that Rhodes otherwise fabricated the information in the Report.
Instead, Goines contends that the information in the Screening
Report is not sufficient to provide probable cause for a mental-
health detention. See Complaint, J.A. 16 (“Based on the
observations of Goines as set forth in the Preadmission
Screening Report, Defendant Rhodes lacked probable cause . . .
.”); Brief of Appellant at 38 (“No objectively reasonable
evaluator would have concluded, based on the information
available to Rhodes, that Goines had a mental illness.”); Brief
of Appellant at 43 (“No objectively reasonable evaluator would
have concluded, based on the information available to Rhodes,
that Goines, as a result of mental illness, posed an imminent
threat to others.”). Goines has thus accepted the contents of
the Screening Report and based his claims on the assumed truth
of the Screening Report. Under these circumstances, then, it is
proper for us to likewise assume the truth of the Screening
Report when considering whether Goines has stated a claim
24
against Rhodes and her employer. See Am. Chiropractic, 367 F.3d
at 233-35 (dismissing civil RICO claim by looking to terms of
document upon which claim was based); E. Shore Markets, 213 F.3d
at 181 (looking to terms of attached lease when dismissing
breach-of-lease complaint).
Accordingly, the question on appeal is whether the
information contained in the Screening Report is sufficient to
provide probable cause for an emergency mental-health detention.
We believe it is. 2
The Screening Report contains Rhodes’ personal observations
of Goines and notes that Goines’ eyes were darting around as if
he were responding to visual hallucinations; that Goines was
2 Relying on Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257 (4th
Cir. 1991), the district court rested its probable-cause
analysis in part on the court’s view that the magistrate’s
issuance of the temporary detention order created a rebuttable
presumption of probable cause. In Torchinsky, a false-arrest
case, we used rebuttable-presumption language when considering
the effect of the issuance of an arrest warrant based on
judicial findings of probable cause on the arresting officer’s
claim of qualified immunity. See id. at 261 (“[T]he decision of
a detached district judge that Siwinski satisfied the more
stringent probable cause standard is plainly relevant to a
showing that he met the lower standard of objective
reasonableness required for qualified immunity.”). The
presumption in Torchinsky thus was not a presumption that
probable cause existed, but a presumption of the reasonableness
of the officer’s reliance on the arrest warrant. See id. at 262(“The presumption of reasonableness attached to obtaining a
warrant can be rebutted where a reasonably well-trained officer
. . . would have known that his application failed to establish
probable cause and that he should not have applied for the
warrant.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).
25
perseverating on a neighbor “controlling” his television; that
Goines displayed inappropriate affect (including laughing at
inappropriate times) and delayed response; and that Goines was
disoriented as to time, believing it to be March 2012 rather
than May 2014. The Screening Report also contains information
given to Rhodes by the Officers, including the Officers’ reports
that Goines heard clicking noises in his apartment that they did
not hear and that Goines first threatened to assault his
neighbors “with [his] hands” and then later threatened to take
care of the problem himself “with his Smith & Wesson firearm.”
J.A. 23. According to the Screening Report, Goines repeated his
threat to Rhodes, telling her that if released, “he [would]
return home and assault his neighbors ‘because [he was] just
tired of it.’” 3 J.A. 23.
As we have explained, “probable cause to seize a person for
a psychological evaluation [exists] when the facts and
circumstances within [the defendant’s] knowledge and of which
[the defendant] had reasonably trustworthy information were
3 Goines alleged in his complaint that he never
threatened to harm anyone, an allegation we treated as true as
to his claims against the Officers. As we have explained,
however, Goines has accepted the truth of the Screening Report
for purposes of his claims against Rhodes and her employer, such
that the Screening Report controls over the contrary allegation
in his complaint. See, e.g., S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s
Ass’n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 182 (4th
Cir. 2013)
26
sufficient to warrant a prudent man to believe that the person
poses a danger to himself or others.” Cloaninger, 555 F.3d at
334 (internal quotation marks omitted). In our view, the
information set out in the Screening Report satisfies this
standard. 4 Rhodes observed Goines behaving as if he were
responding to visual hallucinations, and she had “reasonably
trustworthy information” from the Officers that Goines was
suffering from auditory hallucinations as well. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). In Rhodes’ presence, Goines
threatened to attack his neighbors when released, and Rhodes was
informed by the Officers that Goines had earlier made similar
threats. In our view, these facts are “sufficient to warrant a
prudent man to believe the person poses a danger to himself or
others,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), thus
establishing probable cause for the emergency mental-health
detention. 5
4 Goines told Rhodes that he was “born with a ‘shrunken
cerebellum,’” J.A. 23, and gave her the name of his primary care
physician, and he seems to suggest that Rhodes’ failure to
confer with Goines’ physician somehow negates probable cause.
We disagree. Cf. Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir.
2000) (“Although an officer may not disregard readily available
exculpatory evidence of which he is aware, the failure to pursue
a potentially exculpatory lead is not sufficient to negate
probable cause.”).
5 In his brief, Goines makes much of the fact that
Rhodes included a diagnosis of “Psychotic Disorder NOS [not
otherwise specified]” in the Screening Report. J.A. 27. Goines
(Continued)
27
As explained above, Goines has accepted the information set
out in the Screening Report for purposes of his claim against
Rhodes. And because that information established probable
contends that Rhodes, who is not a psychiatrist or psychologist,
lacks the qualifications necessary to make such a diagnosis, and
he argues that Rhodes misled the magistrate about her
qualifications by including the diagnosis in the Screening
Report relied upon by the magistrate. In Goines’ view, “where
the basis for detention rests on the diagnosis of a mental
health disorder, there is simply no probable cause for detention
where the evaluator making the diagnosis is not properly trained
to do so.” Brief of Appellant at 37-38.
Even assuming that a deficiency in training could negate
the probable cause otherwise established by the facts set forth
in the Screening Report, we disagree with Goines’ assertion that
Rhodes lacked the necessary qualifications. As Goines
recognized in his complaint, Rhodes evaluated Goines in her
capacity as the “designee and employee of Defendant Valley
Community Services Board.” J.A. 14. Under Virginia law,
designees of local community services boards must be “skilled in
the assessment and treatment of mental illness” and must have
“completed a certification program approved by the Department
[of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services],” Va. Code
Ann. § 37.2-809(A); see Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-100. Such
designees are specifically authorized to conduct evaluations and
determine whether the criteria for temporary detention are met.
See Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-809(B). Although Rhodes is not a
psychologist, she has the qualifications deemed necessary by
Virginia to evaluate Goines and determine the need for temporary
detention, an inquiry that requires determining whether a mental
illness is present. See Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-809(B)
(authorizing involuntary temporary detention “if it appears from
all evidence readily available,” that, inter alia, “the person .
. . has a mental illness and . . . there exists a substantial
likelihood that, as a result of mental illness, the person will,
in the near future, . . . cause serious physical harm to himself
or others as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting,
or threatening harm and other relevant information”). Rhodes
thus did not mislead the magistrate, and Goines’ qualifications-
based challenge to Rhodes’ actions fails.
28
cause, Goines’ complaint fails to allege a constitutional
violation by Rhodes. The determination that Rhodes did not
violate Goines’ constitutional rights also forecloses Goines’
claims against Valley Community Services Board, Rhodes’
employer. See, e.g., Waybright v. Frederick Cty., 528 F.3d 199,
203 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[M]unicipalities cannot be liable under §
1983 without some predicate constitutional injury at the hands
of the individual state officer . . . .” (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted)). We therefore affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Goines’ claims against Rhodes and
her employer.
V.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm
the district court’s dismissal of Goines’ claims against Rhodes,
Valley Community Services Board, and Officer D.L. Williams.
However, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of Goines’
claims against Officers Shaw and Dean, and we remand for further
proceedings on those claims. In concluding that the complaint
against Officers Shaw and Dean survives a motion to dismiss, we
need not and do not reach the question of whether the summary
judgment record would afford a sound basis for awarding judgment
to defendants.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
29
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I am pleased to concur in Chief Judge Traxler’s fine
opinion, recognizing his nuanced articulation of how the pleader
may variously use a document incorporated into the complaint. I
write this brief concurrence only to note that, in determining
qualified immunity, we need not recognize only the pleader’s
version of the facts that are stated in the incorporated
document if the document is taken to state those facts
accurately from the defendants’ point of view, here the
officers’ point of view. Thus, if the document -- in this case,
the Incident Report -- were taken to state accurately the
officers’ perceptions, we could use those perceptions to
determine qualified immunity. See Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d
167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994). In Rowland, Judge Wilkinson wrote:
Though it focuses on the objective facts, the immunity
inquiry must be filtered through the lens of the
officer’s perceptions at the time of the incident in
question. Such a perspective serves two purposes.
First, using the officer’s perception of the facts at
the time limits second-guessing the reasonableness of
actions with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. Second,
using this perspective limits the need for decision-
makers to sort through conflicting versions of the
“actual” facts, and allows them to focus instead on
what the police officer reasonably perceived.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
On remand, the officers will be able to supply their own
affidavits of their perceptions at the time of the incident,
30
thus enabling the district court to conduct an appropriate
analysis of their qualified immunity defense.
31