United States v. Wheeler , 317 F. App'x 298 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4582
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RODNEY TYREAL WHEELER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (3:07-cr-00070-JPB-3)
Submitted: November 17, 2008 Decided: December 1, 2008
Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Troy N. Giatras, THE GIATRAS LAW FIRM, PLLC, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon L. Potter, United States
Attorney, Thomas O. Mucklow, Assistant United States Attorney,
Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rodney Tyreal Wheeler was convicted after a trial of
one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute
in excess of fifty grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006), two counts of distribution of
crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), and one
count of possession with intent to distribute 53.7 grams of
crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(c). On
appeal, Wheeler claims the district court abused its discretion
by denying his motion to suppress evidence and by admitting
evidence of a prior felony drug conviction. He also claims the
life sentence was not proportional to the convictions and the
Government failed to provide proper notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851(2006) of its intention to seek an enhanced sentence based upon
prior felony drug convictions. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review the district court’s factual findings
underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Grossman,
400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). When a suppression motion
has been denied, this court construes the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government. United States v. Seidman, 156
F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). A traffic stop of a vehicle
constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and is permissible if the officer has probable cause to believe
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a traffic violation has occurred, Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996), or a reasonable suspicion of unlawful
conduct, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968), regardless of
the officer’s subjective motivations, Whren, 517 U.S. at 810,
813-19 (1996). See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-48
(1972) (police had reasonable suspicion to stop person in
vehicle based upon an informant’s tip). In the context of an
arrest, probable cause exists “‘when facts and circumstances
within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in
the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.’” Porterfield v.
Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). Reasonable suspicion
requires more than a hunch but less than probable cause and may
be based on the collective knowledge of officers involved in an
investigation. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232
(1985). This court has held that “[b]ecause an ordinary traffic
stop constitutes a limited seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, . . . such action must be
justified by probable cause or a reasonable suspicion, based on
specific and articulable facts, of unlawful conduct.” United
States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal
citation omitted). Accordingly, when an officer observes even a
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minor traffic offense, a stop of the vehicle is constitutionally
permissible. Id., 5 F.3d at 730. We find the record clearly
supports the finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to
believe the car driven by Wheeler was stolen. Thus, there was
no constitutional error with respect to stopping or searching
the car.
We review the district court’s determination of the
admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1997). Evidence of other
crimes is not admissible to prove bad character or criminal
propensity. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence is admissible,
however, to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”
Id.; see Queen, 132 F.3d at 994. Rule 404(b) is an inclusive
rule, allowing evidence of other crimes or acts except that
which tends to prove only criminal disposition. See Queen, 132
F.3d at 994-95.
Evidence of prior acts is admissible under Rule 404(b)
and Fed. R. Evid. 403 if the evidence is (1) relevant to an
issue other than the general character of the defendant,
(2) necessary, and (3) reliable, and if the probative value of
the evidence is not substantially outweighed by it prejudicial
effect. Queen, 132 F.3d at 997. A limiting jury instruction
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explaining the purpose for admitting evidence of prior acts and
advance notice of the intent to introduce evidence of prior acts
provide additional protection to defendants. See id. We find
the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
evidence of Wheeler’s prior felony drug conviction. The
evidence was relevant on the issues of intent and identity and
was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they
are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been
employed in various forms throughout our Nation's history.”
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991). In United
States v. Kratsas, 45 F.3d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1995), this court
held that “a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without
release, as applied to a repeat drug offender, did not run afoul
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.” We find no error in Wheeler’s life sentence.
An enhanced statutory maximum sentence under § 841
based on a prior drug conviction applies only when, before the
trial or entry of a guilty plea, the Government has filed an
information stating in writing the prior convictions to be
relied on and served the information on the defendant. 21
U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (2006). The purpose of providing notice
under § 851 is to give the defendant reasonable notice of the
government’s intent to rely on a particular conviction or
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convictions in seeking an enhanced sentence and to give the
defendant a meaningful opportunity to be heard. United
States v. Beasley, 495 F.3d 142, 149 (4th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1471 (2008). We find the Government was not
required in this instance to provide a second § 851 notice after
the superseding indictment was issued. See, e.g., United
States v. Thompson, 473 F.3d 1137, 1144-47 (11th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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