United States v. Goodson , 319 F. App'x 222 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4511
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARVIN MAURICE GOODSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00380-RJC-1)
Submitted: January 30, 2009 Decided: March 23, 2009
Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Matthew R. Segal,
FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United
States Attorney, Adam Morris, Melissa L. Rikard, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marvin Maurice Goodson was convicted of one count of
armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (2000),
and one count of brandishing a firearm in the commission of that
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
He received a 156-month sentence. Goodson argues on appeal that
the district court erred in rejecting his Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986), challenges to the Government’s peremptory
strikes of three black jurors and erred in two evidentiary
rulings. Finding no error, we affirm.
The Equal Protection Clause forbids the use of a
peremptory challenge for a racially discriminatory purpose.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. This court affords great deference to a
district court’s determination of whether a peremptory challenge
was exercised for a racially discriminatory reason and reviews
the district court’s rulings on that point for clear error.
Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995).
Generally, a Batson challenge consists of three steps:
(1) the defendant makes a prima facie case of racial
discrimination; (2) the Government offers a race-neutral
explanation for its strikes; and (3) the trial court decides
whether the defendant has carried its burden and proved
purposeful discrimination. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765,
767-68 (1995). However, once the Government has offered a race-
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neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge and the trial
court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination, “the preliminary issue of whether the defendant
had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). This second step of the Batson
inquiry does not require that the Government’s proffered
rationale for the strike be persuasive or even plausible.
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-68. Further, the proffered reason need
not be worthy of belief or related to the issues to be tried or
to the prospective juror’s ability to provide acceptable jury
service. Jones, 57 F.3d at 420. All that is required is that
the reason be race-neutral. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768.
Here, the prosecutor explained that she struck a black
female juror on account of her occupation as a private
investigator, gun ownership, and her maternal relationship to a
convicted criminal. The Government also struck two black males,
and the prosecutor explained that she struck one on account of
his occupation as an attorney and his prior experience with the
criminal justice system and the other on account of his
inattentiveness to the proceedings and his demeanor. At the
second step of the Batson inquiry, occupation, relationship to a
convicted criminal, experience with the criminal justice system,
and demeanor and attentiveness are legitimate race-neutral
reasons to strike. See Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 867 (8th
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Cir. 2008) (occupation legitimate reason to strike); United
States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1163 (4th Cir. 1995)
(relationship to one involved in criminal activity provides a
proper basis to strike); United States v. Wilson, 867 F.2d 486,
487-88 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding the strike of a juvenile court
social worker who had experience working with police officers
and defense lawyers); United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448,
1454 (9th Cir. 1993) (lack of attentiveness a neutral reason to
strike). Additionally, a potential juror’s gun ownership
provides a permissible basis upon which to strike. See
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (noting that unless a discriminatory
intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the
proffered reason will be deemed race-neutral). By articulating
race-neutral reasons for the strikes, the Government satisfied
its burden at the second step of the analysis.
If steps one and two are met, the trial court must
then decide whether the Government’s explanation is pretextual
and whether the opponent of the strike has met his burden of
proving purposeful discrimination. The defendant must “show
both that [the Government’s stated reasons for a strike] were
merely pretextual and that race was the real reason for the
strike.” United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 953 (4th Cir.
1994). In making this showing, the “defendant may rely on all
relevant circumstances to raise an inference of purposeful
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discrimination.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant need not
“point to an identical juror of another race who was not
peremptorily challenged.” Golphin v. Branker, 519 F.3d 168, 179
(4th Cir. 2008). Rather, “direct comparisons between similarly
situated venire-persons of different races” are probative. Id.
at 179-80 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Goodson did not identify similarly situated venire
members who were not peremptorily challenged, see Golphin, 519
F.3d at 179, or otherwise establish that race was the real
reason for the Government’s strikes. Accordingly, the district
court did not err in concluding that the Government’s strikes
did not violate Batson.
Next, Goodson challenges as a violation of Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b) the district court’s admission of evidence that
Batson committed a prior robbery. We review for abuse of
discretion the district court’s determination on the
admissibility of evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). See
United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1997).
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes is not admissible to
prove bad character or criminal propensity. Fed. R. Evid.
404(b). Such evidence is admissible, however, to prove “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.” Id.; see Queen, 132 F.3d at
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994. An “inclusive” rule, Rule 404(b) allows the admission of
evidence of other crimes or acts except those which tend to
prove only criminal disposition. See Queen, 132 F.3d at 994-95.
Evidence of prior crimes is admissible under Rules
404(b) and Fed. R. Evid. 403 if the evidence is: (1) relevant to
an issue other than the defendant’s general character;
(2) necessary; (3) reliable; and (4) the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect. Queen, 132 F.3d at 997. An acceptable purpose for
evidence of other crimes is to prove the immediate context, or
res gestae, of the case. See United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d
83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980). Other bad acts are admissible when they
are intimately connected with and explanatory of the crime
charged so that their proof is appropriate to complete the story
of the crime. Id. A limiting jury instruction explaining the
purpose for admitting evidence of prior acts and advance notice
of intent to introduce evidence of prior acts provides
additional protection to defendants. Queen, 132 F.3d at 997.
In this case, a jailhouse informant housed with
Goodson testified that Goodson admitted to the commission of a
previous robbery and had learned lessons from his mistakes
during the previous robbery, such as how not to get caught and
that if he robbed the bank on his own, no co-defendants would
testify against him. The Government filed a notice of its
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intent to use this evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b). The
district court permitted the informant’s testimony upon finding
it was relevant to Goodson’s plan and preparation and completed
the story of the robbery with which he was charged by explaining
how Goodson’s commission of the charged robbery was informed by
his mistakes in the prior robbery. Further, there was no
suggestion from Goodson that the prior robbery was any more
sensational or disturbing than the one with which Goodson was
charged. Accord United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 637 (4th
Cir. 1995) (holding that no unfair prejudice is present when the
prior act is no more sensational or disturbing than the crimes
with which the defendant was charged). The district court also
conducted a balancing analysis and issued a limiting instruction
to the jury. On these facts, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the
prior robbery.
Goodson also alleges error in the district court’s
exclusion of testimony from an Assistant United States Attorney
(“AUSA”). Here, the jailhouse informant also testified that,
during their incarceration together, Goodson had shown him a
page of a plea agreement listing penalties Goodson would have
faced had he signed the agreement. The district court struck
this testimony sua sponte and instructed the jury to disregard
it. Believing that the informant was lying about the existence
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of a proposed plea agreement, Goodson sought to call an AUSA to
testify that the United States Attorney’s Office had not offered
Goodson a plea agreement in this case. The district court
refused this request, noting that the informant’s testimony
concerning the existence of a plea agreement was purely about a
collateral matter and that it had already struck the informant’s
testimony that Goodson had shown him a page of that agreement
listing penalties.
Goodson also contends that the district court’s ruling
violated Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) and his constitutional right to
present a defense. Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) states in relevant part
that “[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ character for
truthfulness . . . may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.” We
conclude, however, Rule 608(b) is not implicated in this case,
as Goodson sought to introduce the testimony of a third party,
the AUSA, to give testimony on the question that did not
implicate the conduct of the informant. Moreover, even if Rule
608(b) was implicated, we would conclude that the district
court’s exclusion of the testimony of the AUSA did not run afoul
of the Rule.
Finally, although a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to present evidence in his favor, see,
e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 471 (4th Cir.
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2004), “a defendant’s right to present a defense is not
absolute; criminal defendants do not have a right to present
evidence that the district court, in its discretion, deems
irrelevant or immaterial.” United States v. Prince-Oyibo, 320
F.3d 491, 501 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered
[Sixth Amendment] right to offer testimony that is incompetent,
privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under the standard rules
of evidence.”)). Therefore, if the district court acted within
its discretion in excluding irrelevant or immaterial evidence
offered by a defendant, the exclusion did not violate his
constitutional rights.
In this case, the district court properly ruled that
the informant’s testimony concerning the plea agreement was
collateral to the charges in this case. Because the district
court acted within its discretion in so ruling, the exclusion of
the AUSA’s testimony did not violate Goodson’s constitutional
right to present a defense.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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