United States v. Leon Blount ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4694
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEON FITZGERALD BLOUNT, a/k/a John Doe, a/k/a Pookie,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:00-cr-00137-JAB-1)
Submitted: March 7, 2014 Decided: March 12, 2014
Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Samuel A. Walker, CPLS, P.A., Orlando, Florida, for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Andrew C. Cochran, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
While on a six-year term of supervised release,
following the completion of his sentence for distributing
cocaine base (“crack”), Leon Blount’s release was revoked
because of nine positive tests for cocaine. At the time of his
supervised release hearing, defense counsel informed the court
that Blount was interested in gaining admission to the two-year
drug program, Triangle Residential Options for Substance Abuse
(“TROSA”). Blount personally addressed the court and explained
that the only reason he previously did not want to be in the
TROSA program was that he would have to give up his job, but now
sobriety was his only goal. The parties discussed the fact that
TROSA was an intensive 24-7 program and that prior substance
abuse programs had failed.
The court imposed a new term of imprisonment and
supervised release thereafter. The written judgment “ordered” a
twelve-month term of imprisonment and forty-eight-month term of
supervised release, “recommended and ordered” that Blount
participate in a substance abuse program, and “recommended” that
he participate in the TROSA program, “should a space be
available for him upon his release from the custody portion of
this Judgment.” (J.A. 22).
Blount was released from his twelve-month
incarceration and began his new term of supervised release. A
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petition for revocation of supervised release was filed on May
15, 2013, alleging that Blount failed to take the steps
necessary to get himself entered into the TROSA program. At the
hearing on the petition, the Government presented evidence from
a probation officer that Blount refused to participate in TROSA
and failed to complete the application process needed for the
program. The probation officer explained to Blount——to no
avail——that his participation in TROSA was not optional and that
he needed to participate in the program when he was released
from incarceration.
The district court found that Blount violated his
supervised release by failing to take the necessary steps to
enter the TROSA program and by failing to follow the
instructions of his probation officer on the matter. The court
sentenced him to six months of imprisonment and forty-two months
of supervised release. Blount appeals, raising two issues: (1)
whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
supervised release, because Blount complied with the court’s
order; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion
by revoking his supervised release because the probation officer
had no authority to order Blount to enter the TROSA program.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a district court’s decision to revoke
supervised release for abuse of discretion, United States v.
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Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999), viewing the district
court’s findings of fact related to supervised release
violations for clear error. United States v. Benton, 627 F.3d
1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2010). To order revocation, a district
court need only find a violation of a supervised release
condition by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e)(3) (2012); United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831
(4th Cir. 1992). This quantum of proof “simply requires the
trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more
probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Manigan, 592
F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Blount was ordered by the district court to
enter the TROSA program upon his release from incarceration.
Any confusion Blount may have had regarding the mandatory nature
of this requirement was clarified by his probation officer. He
was not free, as he argued below, to choose his own substance
abuse program. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion by the
district court in its finding that Blount violated the terms of
his release. Pregent, 190 F.3d at 282.
Next, Blount argues that the probation officer
exceeded her scope of authority. In every delegation, the court
must retain the right to review findings and to exercise
ultimate responsibility. United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806,
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808-09 (4th Cir. 1995). Thus, we have held that a district
court may not delegate to the probation officer the final
authority to establish the amount of a defendant’s partial
payment of either restitution or a court-imposed fine. See
United States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1996).
Here, however, the probation officer merely effected the court’s
directive that Blount enter the TROSA program, if possible.
Blount’s refusal to do what was necessary to enter the program
was in violation of the court’s order and contrary to the
instructions of his probation officer. We find no delegation or
scope of authority problem based on these facts.
Accordingly, because Blount’s claims fail on appeal,
we affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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