Boyce Moneyhan v. Alvin Keller ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-7385
BOYCE S. MONEYHAN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
and
DONALD NELSON, a/k/a William Donald Shopey,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALVIN W. KELLER; ROBERT C. LEWIS; JENNIE LANCASTER; GARY A.
JONES; HAROLD WEBSTER; CHRIS BATTEN; STEPHEN WARREN; RICKY
DUDLEY; ANN E. REID; DAVID MITCHELL; MICHAEL SLAGLE; LISA
ALDRIDGE; MARK FREEMAN,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
REGINALD MEWBORN; KENNETH JONES; REGINALD E. MIDGETTE;
BRADLEY BANNON; JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:10-ct-03053-BO)
Submitted: February 27, 2014 Decided: March 28, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Boyce S. Moneyhan, Appellant Pro Se. Yvonne Bulluck Ricci,
Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Boyce S. Moneyhan appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Defendants—several North Carolina
state prison officials in their individual and official
capacities—and dismissing his civil complaint as moot. 1
Moneyhan, a former North Carolina state prisoner, alleged that
he had been wrongfully denied the opportunity to participate in
programs that would allow him to accrue Earned Time Credits
(“ETC”). Moneyhan claimed that the North Carolina Department of
Corrections’ (“DOC”) policy regarding the accrual of ETC for
disabled inmates violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, and the United States
Constitution. 2 Because Moneyhan was a state prisoner at the time
he filed his complaint, the district court properly construed
Moneyhan’s constitutional claims as arising under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006). Moneyhan requested injunctive relief in the form
of a revised DOC policy regarding the accrual of ETC,
1
Although Donald Nelson was a named plaintiff in the
district court, he has failed to comply with the requirements of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act. We have therefore dismissed
Nelson as a party on appeal.
2
Moneyhan has abandoned his claims under the North Carolina
Constitution on appeal. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b) (limiting
appellate review to issues raised in informal brief).
3
compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and court
costs.
During the pendency of his case, Moneyhan was released
from prison. The district court concluded that Moneyhan’s
claims were rendered moot by his release from custody and
dismissed his complaint for that reason alone. We affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint
as moot de novo. Wall v. Wade, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 350636, at
*3 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 2014). The case or controversy requirement
of Article III permits federal courts to exercise jurisdiction
only where “conflicting contentions of the parties present a
real, substantial controversy between parties having adverse
legal interests, a dispute definite and concrete, not
hypothetical or abstract.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l
Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (internal quotation marks and
ellipses omitted). A case is moot, and no longer justiciable,
when resolution of the issues presented no longer implicates a
legally cognizable interest. Townes v. Jarvis, 577 F.3d 543,
546 (4th Cir. 2009).
We conclude that the district court correctly
determined that Moneyhan’s claim for injunctive relief was
rendered moot by his release. See Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d
4
182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that, “as a general rule, a
prisoner’s transfer or release from a particular prison moots
his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to
his incarceration there”). Accordingly, although we grant
Moneyhan leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm the
dismissal of Moneyhan’s claim for injunctive relief.
We also conclude, however, that the district court
erred by dismissing Moneyhan’s claims for monetary damages as
moot and that the court should have considered the merits of
Moneyhan’s arguments. 3 See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820,
823 (4th Cir. 1991) (claims for monetary damages are not
rendered moot by inmate’s transfer or release). Accordingly, we
vacate the dismissal of Moneyhan’s claims for damages.
Moneyhan, however, is not entitled to damages on some
of his claims as a matter of law. Neither the ADA nor the
Rehabilitation Act authorizes suits for monetary damages against
Defendants in their individual capacities, see Garcia v. SUNY
Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001), nor do these
statutes authorize punitive damages. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S.
181, 189 (2002). Moreover, Moneyhan is not entitled to monetary
damages under § 1983 against Defendants in their official
3
By so holding, we express no opinion either as to the
merits of Moneyhan’s allegations or the viability of any
defenses the Defendants may seek to assert.
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capacities. See Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir.
1996) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars suits against non-
consenting state, its agencies, and its officers acting in their
official capacities). We therefore remand this case to the
district court to determine whether Moneyhan is entitled to:
(1) compensatory damages against Defendants in their official
capacities under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; and
(2) damages against Defendants in their individual capacities
under § 1983.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART;
AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
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