United States v. Purnell , 233 F. App'x 321 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5251
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WILLIE MACK PURNELL, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:05-cr-00770-TLW)
Submitted: May 30, 2007 Decided: July 11, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kathy Price Elmore, ORR, ELMORE & ERVIN, LLC, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Alfred William Walker Bethea,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Willie Mack Purnell, Jr. appeals his 118-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea and convictions for robbery,
aiding and abetting a carjacking, and a firearm offense. His
attorney filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967). Though notified of his opportunity to file a pro se
supplemental brief, Purnell has not done so. The Government has
declined to file a reply brief. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
Purnell suggests that the district court erred by not
fully complying with Fed. R. Crim P. 11 at the guilty plea hearing.
Contrary to this assertion, the district court meticulously
followed Rule 11 to ensure that Purnell fully understood the
significance of his guilty plea and that the plea was knowing and
voluntary. After questioning Purnell about the charges, his
attorney’s services, the rights that he was giving up by pleading
guilty, the advisory guidelines ranges, the maximum penalties, and
relevant conduct, the court found Purnell fully competent and
capable of entering an informed plea. The district court fully
complied with its Rule 11 obligations, and we find this issue
meritless.
Purnell also suggests that the district court erred by
violating the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in fashioning a
sentence. After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a
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district court is no longer bound by the range prescribed by the
sentencing guidelines. However, in imposing a sentence
post-Booker, courts still must calculate the applicable guideline
range after making the appropriate findings of fact and consider
the range in conjunction with other relevant factors under the
guidelines and § 3553(a). United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424,
432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006). This court
will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it “is within the statutorily
prescribed range and is reasonable.” Id. at 433 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] sentence within the
proper advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.”
United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2006).
“The district court need not discuss each factor set
forth in § 3553(a) ‘in checklist fashion;’ ‘it is enough to
calculate the range accurately and explain why (if the sentence
lies outside it) this defendant deserves more or less.’” Moreland,
437 F.3d at 432 (quoting United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729
(7th Cir. 2005)).
Here, the district court sentenced Purnell post-Booker
and appropriately treated the guidelines as advisory. The court
sentenced Purnell after considering and examining the sentencing
guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors, as instructed by Booker.
Purnell’s seventy-eight-month sentence for the robbery and
carjacking convictions is below both the appropriate guidelines
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range and twenty-year statutory maximum sentence. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1951(a) (West Supp. 2006). Purnell’s sentence of forty months
for the firearms offense is likewise below guidelines range and the
statutory maximum. The court determined that it should depart
based upon Purnell’s willingness to cooperate and assist the
Government in its case against his relative, his immediate remorse
and withdrawal from the criminal activity, his lack of criminal
history, and his youth. Neither Purnell nor the record suggests
any information so compelling to rebut the presumption that his
sentence was reasonable. We accordingly conclude the sentence was
reasonable and affirm.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Purnell’s convictions and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Purnell, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Purnell requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Purnell.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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