Sharon Harris v. Susan Sutphin ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1756
SHARON B. HARRIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SUSAN BOWER SUTPHIN,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Robert S. Ballou, Magistrate
Judge. (7:14-cv-00378-RSB)
Submitted: March 30, 2016 Decided: April 13, 2016
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James J. O’Keeffe, IV, JOHNSON, ROSEN & O’KEEFFE, LLC, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant. Joshua D. Goad, JOHNSON, AYERS &
MATTHEWS, PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sharon B. Harris appeals from the final judgment after an
unfavorable jury verdict in her diversity personal injury action
arising from a motor vehicle accident. The parties consented to
the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
(2012). Harris appeals from the magistrate judge’s denial of
her Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 motions for judgment as a matter of law
at the conclusion of the evidence and after the jury returned
its verdict. Harris also challenges the adequacy of the
magistrate judge’s jury instructions. We affirm.
We review de novo the denial of Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 motions
for judgment as a matter of law. Adkins v. Crown Auto, Inc.,
488 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007). In assessing whether there
was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to return a
verdict for the nonmoving party, we must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in her favor. Id.; Buckley v. Mukasey,
538 F.3d 306, 321 (4th Cir. 2008). We “may not make credibility
determinations or substitute our judgment for that of the jury.”
United States v. Kivanc, 714 F.3d 782, 795 (4th Cir. 2013).
Our review of the briefs and the record leads us to
conclude that the magistrate judge did not err in denying
Harris’ motions for judgment as a matter of law. We agree with
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the magistrate judge that the evidence presented an appropriate
question for the jury as to liability.
Turning to Harris’ contention that the magistrate judge
improperly instructed the jury, we note that we generally
“review challenges to jury instructions for abuse of discretion,
bearing in mind that a trial court has broad discretion in
framing its instructions to a jury.” Gentry v. E. W. Partners
Club Mgmt., __ F.3d __, __, No. 14-2382, 2016 WL 851673, at *3
(4th Cir. Mar. 4, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Instructions are adequate “if construed as a whole, and in light
of the whole record, they adequately informed the jury of the
controlling legal principles without misleading or confusing the
jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” Id. (alteration
and internal quotation marks omitted). Although we review de
novo whether the jury instructions were correct statements of
law, “[e]ven if a jury was erroneously instructed . . . we will
not set aside a resulting verdict” absent serious prejudice to
the challenging party’s case. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
If the challenging party failed to preserve an argument by
“object[ing] on the same basis below as [s]he contends is error
on appeal,” we review for plain error. United States v. Zayyad,
741 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2014); see Gentry, 2016 WL 851673,
at *6 (applying plain error standard to unpreserved challenge to
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jury instructions). We conclude that, in the instant case,
Harris is entitled only to plain error review. Accordingly,
Harris must establish that the district court erred, that the
error was plain, and “that the error affected her substantial
rights, meaning that there must be a reasonable probability [as
opposed to a mere possibility] that the error affected the
outcome of the trial.” Gentry, 2016 WL 851673, at *6 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “the error should only be
corrected where not doing so would result in a miscarriage of
justice or would otherwise seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that Harris cannot satisfy the plain error
test. Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judge’s rulings on
Harris’ Rule 50 motions, and we affirm the final judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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