United States v. Bryant , 321 F. App'x 314 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4791
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RONALD DELANE BRYANT,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:01-cr-00096-NCT-1)
Submitted: March 11, 2009 Decided: March 30, 2009
Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Todd A. Smith, LAW FIRM OF TODD A. SMITH, Graham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Albert Jamison Lang, Assistant
United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Delane Bryant was found in violation of the
terms and conditions of his supervised release and was sentenced
to eighteen months’ imprisonment, to be followed by twelve
months of supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In
the Anders brief, counsel suggests that Bryant’s sentence was
unreasonable due to his poor mental health and the challenging
conditions of the environment in which he was living while
trying to complete supervised release. We affirm.
This court reviews a sentence imposed as a result of a
supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence
was plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). The first step in this analysis is
whether the sentence was unreasonable. Id. at 438. This court,
in determining reasonableness, follows generally the procedural
and substantive considerations employed in reviewing original
sentences. Id. If a sentence imposed after a revocation is not
unreasonable, this court will not proceed to the second prong of
the analysis--whether the sentence was plainly unreasonable.
Id. at 439.
Although a district court must consider the policy
statements in Chapter Seven of the sentencing guidelines along
with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006) and
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), the district court ultimately has
broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a
term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461
F.3d at 439 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244
(2d Cir. 2005)). Finally, on review, this court will assume a
deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion. Id.Bryant’s sentence was both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. Bryant’s most serious offense was a
grade B offense; this offense, combined with his criminal
history category of V, resulted in an advisory guidelines range
of eighteen to twenty-four months’ imprisonment. U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 7B1.4(a) (2007). Bryant’s
eighteen-month sentence was within the two-year statutory
maximum and his advisory guidelines range. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (2006). Prior to imposing sentence, the district
court heard the argument of counsel and Bryant’s allocution.
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that the
district court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors prior to imposing sentence. See United States v.
Johnson, 138 F.3d 115, 118 (4th Cir. 1998).
Bryant’s sentence, at the low end of the applicable
policy statement range, was also substantively reasonable.
Bryant admitted to multiple violations of the conditions of his
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supervised release and was given several opportunities by his
probation officer to comply with the terms and conditions of his
supervised release prior to the probation officer filing a
request for a summons.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Bryant’s sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform Bryant, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Bryant requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Bryant.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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