United States v. Lucas , 322 F. App'x 326 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4500
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAWN MAURICE LUCAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:07-cr-00046-FDW-1)
Submitted: February 20, 2009 Decided: March 26, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark P. Foster, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF MARK P. FOSTER, P.C.,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F.
Shappert, United States Attorney; Matthew T. Martens, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shawn Maurice Lucas appeals from his conviction and
120-month sentence after pleading guilty to possession of a
firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and
924(e) (2006). Lucas claims that the traffic stop that led to
his arrest was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, as the placement of his temporary registration plate in
the window of his vehicle rather than the bumper did not violate
any North Carolina motor vehicle regulation. Lucas contends the
district court’s interpretation of the relevant motor vehicle
statute went beyond the terms of the statute itself and that the
court improperly characterized the relevant issue as being
whether the officer relied on a “reasonable” interpretation of
that statute. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we
conclude the district court did not err in denying Lucas’ motion
to suppress.
This court reviews the district court’s factual
findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, and
the district court’s legal determinations de novo. United
States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). When a
suppression motion has been denied, this court reviews the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. United
States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006).
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Because an automobile stop constitutes seizure of an
individual, police must comply with the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement “that it not be unreasonable under the
circumstances.” United States v. Wilson, 205 F.3d 720, 722 (4th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10
(1996)). An automobile stop “must be justified by probable
cause or a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and
articulable facts, of unlawful conduct.” United States v.
Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). While there are limited circumstances
under which suspicionless automobile stops are permitted, police
may not carry out random or discretionary stops that are
unsupported by articulable, reasonable suspicion of a violation.
Wilson, 205 F.3d at 722.
In ruling on the motion to suppress, the district
court noted that, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-63(d)
(2007), a vehicle registration plate is required to be “attached
to the rear of the motor vehicle.” The district court found
that the statute lacked a specific definition as to what
constituted the “rear” of the vehicle and conceded that placing
the registration tag in the back window, as Lucas had done,
could arguably constitute compliance with the terms of § 20-
63(d). The district court concluded, however, that § 20-63(d)
could not be read in isolation, as another motor vehicle
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statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-129(d) (2007), supported the
officer’s interpretation as to “proper placement” of the license
plate, as a plate that was placed in the window could not be
properly illuminated as required under § 20-129(d).
While neither party has brought to our attention any
applicable case law regarding the specific requirements for
placement of the registration plate under § 20-63(d), we note a
recent decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, North
Carolina v. Stone, 634 S.E.2d 244 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006), that
addresses this very matter. In Stone, a police officer began
following a vehicle after he suspected the driver was speeding.
Id. at 246. When the vehicle stopped in a parking lot, the
officer saw that “the vehicle’s license plate was displayed on
the rear window instead of the bumper,” at which point the
officer approached the vehicle. Id. The trial court determined
that the officer’s traffic stop “was based on a ‘reasonable
suspicion’ (if not probable cause) that the driver had been
speeding . . . and was not properly displaying the vehicle’s
license tag (in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-63(d)).” Id.
at 247. Because the driver had been speeding and “the vehicle’s
license plate was displayed in the rear window, rather than on
the bumper,” the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the
officer had “reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, to
believe that two traffic violations had occurred.” Id. at 248.
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Stone supports the conclusion that placement of the
tag on the rear window, alone, constituted a violation of § 20-
63(d) and provided probable cause for a traffic stop. To the
extent that Stone leaves any room for doubt, however, we agree
with the district court that, under the circumstances of this
case, the display of the registration tag was unlawful under
North Carolina law, as the tag was not properly illuminated
under § 20-129(d) of the North Carolina Code. Accordingly, the
fact that the tag was displayed in the rear window in a manner
in which it was unreadable provided the officer with probable
cause to stop Lucas’ vehicle. Hence, the district court
properly denied Lucas’ motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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