Timofei Chernov v. Loretta Lynch ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2191
TIMOFEI CHERNOV,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: June 29, 2015 Decided: July 31, 2015
Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark A. Urbanski, LAW OFFICES OF MARK A. URBANSKI, PLLC,
Woodbridge, Virginia, for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Shelley R. Goad,
Assistant Director, Carmel A. Morgan, Office of Immigration
Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Timofei Chernov, a native and citizen of the Kyrgyz
Republic, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“Board” or “BIA”) dismissing his appeal
from the immigration judge’s denial of his requests for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). * We have thoroughly reviewed the
record, including the evidence presented to the immigration
court and the transcript of Chernov’s merits hearing. We
conclude that the record evidence does not compel any factual
findings contrary to those made by the immigration judge and
affirmed by the Board, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012), and
that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision to
uphold the denial of Chernov’s applications for relief. See
INS v. Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (“The BIA’s
determination that [an applicant is] not eligible for
asylum . . . can be reversed only if the evidence
presented . . . [is] such that a reasonable factfinder would
*
Chernov did not challenge in his administrative appeal the
immigration judge’s denial of his application for protection
under the CAT. As such, to the extent that Chernov seeks review
of the disposition of this claim, we lack jurisdiction to
consider it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2012); Kporlor v.
Holder, 597 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2010) (“It is well
established that an alien must raise each argument to the BIA
before we have jurisdiction to consider it.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution
existed.”).
We have also considered the various bases for Chernov’s
claim that the immigration judge’s conduct at the merits hearing
violated his due process rights. On this record, we, like the
Board, are not persuaded that there was a defect that rendered
the hearing fundamentally unfair or that, if there was, any
prejudice resulted therefrom. See Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d
243, 256 (4th Cir. 2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2012)
(directing immigration judges to “interrogate, examine, and
cross-examine the alien and any witnesses”); Iliev v. INS, 127
F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the immigration
judge “has broad discretion to control the manner of
interrogation in order to ascertain the truth”); cf. Cham v.
Attorney Gen. of U.S., 445 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2006) (granting
petition for review and holding the immigration judge violated
due process in his conduct at the merits hearing, which
included, among other things, “continually abus[ing] an
increasingly distraught petitioner, rendering him unable to
coherently respond to [the judge’s] questions”).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for the
reasons stated by the Board. See In re: Chernov (B.I.A. Oct. 2,
2014). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
PETITION DENIED
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