United States v. Daniel Travis ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6361
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL TRAVIS,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:11-hc-02016-H-JG)
Submitted: August 28, 2014 Decided: September 23, 2014
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Jude Darrow, LAW OFFICE OF MARY JUDE DARROW, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, R. A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
Michael E. Lockridge, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Travis appeals the district court’s order
committing him as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the “Adam Walsh
Act”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247-4248. Travis argues that the district
court erred in finding that he would have serious difficulty in
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if
released because the court neglected to consider relevant
evidence. We affirm.
The Adam Walsh Act allows for the civil commitment of
sexually dangerous individuals following the expiration of their
federal prison sentence. To civilly commit an individual as
sexually dangerous, the government must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the individual: (1) has engaged or
attempted to engage in child molestation; (2) currently suffers
from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder; and (3)
as a result of the illness, abnormality, or disorder, would have
serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct
or child molestation if released. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247(a)(5)-(6),
4248(d); United States v. Heyer, 740 F.3d 284, 291-92 (4th Cir.
2014).
On appeal, Travis does not contest the district
court’s findings that he has engaged in child molestation in the
past and presently suffers from a serious mental illness,
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abnormality, or disorder. He only contends that the district
court erred in finding that he would have serious difficulty in
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if
released. Specifically, he argues that the court failed to
consider relevant evidence that supported a contrary finding,
including Dr. Plaud’s opinion and the fact that Dr. Cunic did
not characterize Travis as a sexually dangerous person until her
most recent evaluation. We review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2012). When
the district court’s findings are based on its assessment of
conflicting expert testimony, this court is especially reluctant
to set aside the district court’s determinations. Heyer, 740
F.3d at 292. We will not reverse the district court’s holding
on the serious difficulty prong unless our review leaves us
“with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” United States v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151, 165 (4th
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The question of whether a person is sexually
dangerous is by no means an easy one . . . . In the end,
however, it is for the factfinder to decide among reasonable
interpretations of the evidence and determine the weight
accorded to expert witnesses.” Hall, 664 F.3d at 467 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The serious difficulty prong of
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sexual dangerousness “refers to the degree of the person’s
volitional impairment, which impacts the person’s ability to
refrain from acting upon his deviant sexual interests.” Id. at
463 (internal quotation marks omitted). The determination of a
particular individual’s risk of recidivism may rely not only on
actuarial tests, but also on factors such as the individual’s
participation in treatment, ability to control his impulses, and
commitment to controlling his behavior. Id. at 464. Also
relevant are an individual’s resistance to treatment, continuing
“deviant sexual thoughts,” and “cognitive distortions and
thinking errors about the appropriateness of children as sexual
partners.” United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 462 (4th Cir.
2012).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
district court did not err. The court thoroughly described the
evidence and specifically noted Dr. Cunic’s initial reports that
opined that Travis did not meet the criteria for commitment.
The court also explained in great detail its weighing of the
experts’ opinions, its reasons for finding Dr. Plaud’s opinion
less persuasive than Dr. Arnold’s and Dr. Cunic’s opinions, and
its consideration of the other evidence in the case. The
court’s conclusion that Travis lacks the volitional control
necessary to refrain from sexually violent conduct or child
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molestation is based on the factors we have previously
recognized as relevant and is amply supported by the record.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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