United States v. Rolando Stockton , 546 F. App'x 242 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-7298
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROLANDO STOCKTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:99-cr-00352-MJG-6; 1:09-cv-00281-MJG)
Argued: October 31, 2013 Decided: November 20, 2013
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KING and THACKER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Michael Lawlor, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. James G. Warwick, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Andrea L. Smith,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rolando Stockton, a federal prisoner, filed a 28 U.S.C. §
2255 motion contending, inter alia, that his trial counsel
failed to advise him properly with regard to two pre-trial plea
offers. The district court denied relief but granted a
certificate of appealability. We review the district court’s
conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear
error. See United States v. Nicholson, 611 F.3d 191, 205 (4th
Cir. 2010).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Stockton
must show that: (1) counsel’s failures fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient
performance was prejudicial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). The Supreme Court recently addressed
the standard for showing ineffective assistance during the plea
bargaining stage in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012),
and Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). In Lafler, the
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
applies to the plea bargaining process, and prejudice occurs
when, absent deficient advice, the defendant would have accepted
a plea that would have resulted in a less severe conviction,
sentence, or both. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384–85. In Frye,
the Supreme Court held that a component of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in the plea bargaining context is that counsel
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has a duty to communicate any offers from the Government to his
client. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
In this case, counsel communicated the plea offers from the
Government to Stockton prior to trial, along with Stockton’s
sentence exposure, and provided an assessment of Stockton’s
available defense. Although counsel told Stockton that the plea
offers were “good offers,” counsel made no affirmative
recommendation that Stockton accept the offers and left the
decision of whether to accept the offers solely to Stockton, who
steadfastly maintained that he was not guilty of the charges.
Stockton contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to make such an affirmative recommendation and failing to
vigorously attempt to persuade him to accept it.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, and we
agree with the district court that trial counsel’s performance
was not deficient. See, e.g., Burt v. Titlow, No. 12-414, ____
U.S.L.W. ____, 2013 WL 5904117, *6 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2013)
(“Although a defendant’s proclamation of innocence does not
relieve counsel of his normal responsibilities under Strickland,
it may affect the advice counsel gives.”); Jones v. Murray, 947
F.2d 1106, 1109-11 (4th Cir. 1991) (“We cannot conclude that
counsel’s decision, at this point and in the context of his
client’s rejection of the plea offer for the stated reason that
he was innocent, to refrain from a vigorous attempt to change
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his client’s mind was ‘outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690)).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED
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