United States v. Randall Robertson , 464 F. App'x 186 ( 2012 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-4764
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    RANDALL H. ROBERTSON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
    (2:10-cr-00263-DCN-1)
    Submitted:   January 26, 2012             Decided:   February 10, 2012
    Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Cameron   J.   Blazer,   Assistant   Federal   Public  Defender,
    Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant.      William Nettles,
    United States Attorney, M. Rhett DeHart, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Randall H. Robertson pled guilty to possessing child
    pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (West
    Supp. 2011).        Although Robertson’s Guidelines sentencing range
    was   87-108       months,       Robertson     sought      a     variance       to    a
    noncustodial, supervisory sentence.              The district court rejected
    Robertson’s request for a noncustodial sentence, but agreed that
    a variant sentence was appropriate.                 It accordingly imposed an
    active prison term of forty-two months’ imprisonment.                     Robertson
    challenges the reasonableness of this sentence on appeal.                             We
    affirm.
    We     review    a   sentence     for    reasonableness       under      an
    abuse-of-discretion standard.             Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007).        This review requires consideration of both the
    procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence.                             
    Id. First, we
    assess whether the district court properly calculated
    the Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
    factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
    sufficiently explained the selected sentence.                    
    Id. at 49-50;
    see
    United States v. Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
    , 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n
    individualized       explanation     must     accompany        every    sentence.”);
    United    States    v.   Carter,    
    564 F.3d 325
    ,   330   (4th    Cir.   2009)
    (same).    An extensive explanation is not required as long as the
    appellate court is satisfied “‘that [the district court] has
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    considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
    exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’”                  United
    States v. Engle, 
    592 F.3d 495
    , 500 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita
    v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007)).
    Robertson asserts that the district court failed to
    give   a   particularized      explanation     for   the    sentence   in   open
    court.     Even assuming, however, that the court’s explanation
    during the sentencing hearing did not satisfy Carter and Lynn,
    we agree with the Government’s assertion that any procedural
    error is harmless.
    The district court issued a sentencing order placing
    on the record a thorough explanation of the reasons for its
    chosen sentence.       The sentencing order, as well as the court’s
    interactions    with     the        parties   and    Robertson     during    the
    sentencing   hearing,       reflects    the   district   court’s   familiarity
    with Robertson’s particular circumstances.                 We are unpersuaded
    by Robertson’s arguments to the contrary.                Thus, any procedural
    error occasioned by the court’s articulation of the basis for
    the chosen sentence in a written order rather than in open court
    did not prejudice any of Robertson’s substantial rights.
    Turning    to     the    substantive     reasonableness    of    the
    sentence, we may presume that a sentence within the Guidelines
    range is reasonable; however, we may not presume that a sentence
    outside the Guidelines range is unreasonable.               
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 3
    51; see United States v. Tucker, 
    473 F.3d 556
    , 560-62 (4th Cir.
    2007)     (reviewing          district        court’s          variance          sentence       for
    reasonableness).             Rather, in reviewing a sentence outside the
    Guidelines          range,     this    court          must      “consider         whether       the
    sentencing          court    acted    reasonably            both    with    respect       to    its
    decision       to    impose    such    a    sentence         and    with        respect   to    the
    extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.”                                       United
    States    v.    Hernandez-Villanueva,                 
    473 F.3d 118
    ,       123    (4th     Cir.
    2007) (citation omitted).                  The substantive reasonableness of the
    sentence       “entails       taking       into       account      the     totality       of    the
    circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the
    Guidelines range.”             United States v. Pauley, 
    511 F.3d 468
    , 473
    (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Here, the district court explained its reasons both
    for imposing a below-Guidelines sentence and for declining to
    grant Robertson’s request for a noncustodial sentence.                                         While
    the     district        court’s       explanation            was     not        extensive,       it
    meaningfully referenced the § 3553(a) factors and provided an
    adequate       basis    for    appellate       review.             Especially         considering
    that     the    court’s       variant        sentence         worked       significantly         to
    Robertson’s advantage, we have no difficulty concluding that the
    sentence       imposed        by     the     district         court        is     substantively
    reasonable.
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    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    We   dispense   with   oral   argument   because   the   facts   and   legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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