United States v. Miguel Angel Urieta-Jaimes ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                                     UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 17-4750
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    MIGUEL ANGEL URIETA-JAIMES, a/k/a Raul Sanchez,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
    Anderson. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. (8:16-cr-00296-TMC-1)
    Submitted: July 26, 2018                                          Decided: July 30, 2018
    Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, FLOYD, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Jessica Salvini, SALVINI & BENNETT, LLC, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant.
    Daniel Josev Brewer, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Miguel Angel Urieta-Jaimes pled guilty to possessing with intent to distribute 50
    grams or more of a mixture of a substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of
    
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2012), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a
    drug trafficking crime, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A) (2012). The district court
    sentenced Urieta-Jaimes to 157 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a
    brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), conceding that there are no
    meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the district court clearly erred in
    applying a two-level enhancement because Urieta-Jaimes was an organizer or leader of
    the conspiracy and whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Although notified of his right to do so, Urieta-Jaimes has not filed a pro se supplemental
    brief. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
    We review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
    standard.” Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007). Under this standard, a sentence
    is reviewed for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. 
    Id. at 51
    . In determining
    procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district court properly calculated the
    defendant’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to
    argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2012) factors, and
    sufficiently explained the selected sentence. 
    Id. at 49-51
    .
    If a sentence is free of “significant procedural error,” then we review it for
    substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” 
    Id. at 51
    . “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is
    2
    presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 
    756 F.3d 295
    , 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
    “Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable
    when measured against the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors.” 
    Id.
    A defendant qualifies for a two-level enhancement to his offense level if he “was
    an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than described
    in (a) or (b).” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(c) (2016). The district court’s
    determination that a defendant was an organizer or leader is a factual matter reviewed for
    clear error. United States v. Thorson, 
    633 F.3d 312
    , 317 (4th Cir. 2011). Here, Urieta-
    Jaimes’ codefendants identified him as the leader of their loosely-defined organization.
    Urieta-Jaimes was also the main source of supply of controlled substances for the
    organization. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in applying this
    enhancement.
    We discern no other procedural error in this case. The district court allowed
    Urieta-Jaimes to argue for an appropriate sentence and explained why the § 3553(a)
    factors supported a within-Guidelines sentence. We further conclude that Urieta-Jaimes
    has failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness accorded to his within-
    Guidelines sentence.     Finally, while counsel questions whether trial counsel was
    ineffective, counsel’s ineffectiveness does not appear on the face of the record and thus
    Urieta-Jaimes should raise this claim, if at all, in a 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     (2012) motion. See
    United States v. Faulls, 
    821 F.3d 502
    , 507-08 (4th Cir. 2016).
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
    have found no meritorious issues for review. We therefore affirm the district court’s
    3
    judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Urieta-Jaimes, in writing, of the right
    to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Urieta-Jaimes
    requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
    frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
    Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Urieta-Jaimes.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-4750

Filed Date: 7/30/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/30/2018