United States v. James Bragg ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4289
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES BRAGG,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:14-cr-00111-F-2)
Submitted: March 28, 2016 Decided: April 8, 2016
Before KING, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, Warrenton,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Bragg appeals the district court’s judgment imposing
a 24-month term of incarceration and a 10-year term of
supervised release following Bragg’s guilty plea to distribution
of a quantity of cocaine base. Bragg argues on appeal that his
supervised release term is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable and that his 24-month sentence of incarceration is
substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We generally review a sentence for reasonableness, applying
“a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); United States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d
106, 111-12 (4th Cir. 2015). However, because Bragg did not
object to the term of supervised release in the district court
or argue for a term of supervised release different than the one
imposed by the district court, we review the procedural
reasonableness of the supervised release term for plain error.
See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576—8 (4th Cir. 2010).
Under the plain error standard, Bragg must show (1) an error;
(2) that is plain; (3) that affects his substantial rights; and
(4) that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Webb, 738
F.3d 638, 640-41 (4th Cir. 2013) (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Bragg asserts that his term of supervised release is
procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to
adequately explain its reasons for imposing the 10-year term.
In evaluating a sentencing court’s explanation of a selected
sentence, the district court “must make an individualized
assessment based on the facts presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
While the “individualized assessment need not be elaborate or
lengthy, . . . it must provide a rationale tailored to the
particular case at hand and adequate to permit meaningful
appellate review.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court explained its reasons for imposing
the 10-year supervised release term. Specifically, the district
court discussed Bragg’s lengthy criminal history, including nine
drug-related convictions and eight misdemeanor infractions, as
well as his previous failure to complete supervision without a
violation. The district court also considered the appropriate
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors before imposing the sentence. We
therefore conclude that there was no procedural error in the
district court’s imposition of the 10-year term.
We next review the term of supervised release for
substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality
of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from
the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Bragg challenges
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the substantive reasonableness of the 10-year term on the ground
that it is greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of
sentencing. Because Bragg “simply challeng[es] the substantive
reasonableness of his [supervised release term] due to its
length or non-specific considerations,” our review is for abuse
of discretion rather than plain error. See United States v.
Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2010).
A district court, “in determining the length of the term
and the conditions of supervised release, shall consider the
factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),
(a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(c). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 10-
year term of supervised release given Bragg’s extensive criminal
record and repeated prior violations of probation and supervised
release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B) (identifying
“nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant” and “adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct” as factors for determining proper sentence).
Thus, the above-Guidelines term of supervised release is
substantively reasonable.
Finally, we turn to the substantive reasonableness of the
within-Guidelines-range sentence of incarceration. We presume
that a sentence within a properly calculated Sentencing
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Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756
F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
A defendant can rebut this presumption only “by showing that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors.” Id. We conclude that Bragg’s within-
Guidelines-range sentence of incarceration is substantively
reasonable and that Bragg has not made the showing necessary to
rebut the presumption of reasonableness. See id.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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