United States v. Darrell Lewis , 466 F. App'x 170 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4681
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARRELL RICARDO LEWIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:09-cr-00093-MOC-1)
Submitted: January 30, 2012 Decided: February 16, 2012
Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, LAW OFFICE OF CHIEGE O. KALU OKWARA,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins,
United States Attorney, Melissa L. Rikard, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Darrell Ricardo Lewis seeks to appeal his conviction
following a conditional guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)
(2006). Pursuant to rights reserved by his plea agreement,
Lewis bases this appeal on the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress the firearm and Lewis’ incriminating
statements. We affirm.
When considering a district court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.
Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). When a suppression
motion has been denied by the district court, this court
construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government. Id.Lewis first argues that the district court erred in
finding that the firearm was lawfully seized during a protective
search of his vehicle. A temporary detention of an automobile,
even if only for a limited time or purpose, constitutes a Fourth
Amendment seizure. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10
(1996). Because a routine “traffic stop is . . . more like an
investigative detention than a custodial arrest,” its
limitations must be evaluated under the “dual inquiry” set out
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). United States v.
2
Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 764 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under this analysis, we determine
whether the stop “was justified at its inception” and “whether
the continued stop was sufficiently limited in scope and
duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.”
Id. (internal qutoation marks omitted).
Regarding the first Terry inquiry, if an officer has
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe a suspect has
violated a traffic law, the officer’s decision to stop the
suspect’s car is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
regardless of the officer’s subjective motivation for the stop.
See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d
726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993). In evaluating the second inquiry, we
must consider whether the officers “‘diligently pursue[d] the
investigation of the justification for the stop.’”
Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d at 768 (quoting United States v.
Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 509 (4th Cir. 2011)).
A lawful routine traffic stop justifies detaining the
vehicle’s occupants for the time necessary to request a driver’s
license and registration, run a computer check, and issue a
citation. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507. The officer also is
permitted to request passenger identification or inquire into
unrelated matters, as long as doing so does not measurably
prolong the length of the traffic stop. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d
3
at 765. However, the officer may not “‘definitively abandon[]
the prosecution of the traffic stop and embark[] on another
sustained course of investigation’” absent additional
justification. Id. at 766 (quoting United States v. Everett,
601 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Because a defective tag light violates N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 20-129(d) (2011), we conclude that the district court did not
err in finding the initial stop of Lewis’ vehicle lawful.
Additionally, we conclude that the officers promptly and
diligently pursued the purpose of the traffic stop, and neither
the scope nor the duration of the traffic stop violated Lewis’
Fourth Amendment rights.
Turning to whether the protective search of the car
violated Lewis’ Fourth Amendment rights, officers are not
permitted to “conduct automobile searches whenever they conduct
an investigative stop.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049
n.14 (1983). However, the Supreme Court has held that an
officer may search the passenger compartment of an automobile if
he “possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer in
believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain
immediate control of weapons.” Id. at 1049 (internal quotation
marks omitted). We must evaluate whether the officer possessed
4
a reasonable belief of (1) the suspect’s dangerousness, and
(2) the possibility that the suspect might gain control of
weapons inside the vehicle. United States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d
270, 277 (4th Cir. 2004).
We conclude that the officer’s search of the car was
lawful. Given the totality of the circumstances—including
Lewis’ evasive behavior and visible nervousness; his presence in
a high-crime area at a late hour; the vehicle’s missing tag
light; Lewis’ inability to articulate clear answers to simple
questions; his numerous prior arrests for breaking and entering
and drug and firearms violations; and the officer’s knowledge
that Lewis and his passenger generally matched the description
of robbery suspects and carried tools consistent with robbery—
the officer reasonably believed that Lewis could be armed and
dangerous. Moreover, Lewis’ lack of restraint and close
proximity to the driver’s side door permit the conclusion that
Lewis could access any weapons within the vehicle. See Long,
463 U.S. at 1051-52; United States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 320
(4th Cir. 2007).
Lewis argues that the limitations on an automobile
search incident to arrest established by Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332 (2009), should apply to his case because the officer
exceeded the scope of the traffic stop and his seizure was a de
facto arrest. Contrary to Lewis’ assertion, the subjective
5
reasoning of neither the officer nor the defendant is sufficient
to convert a Terry stop into an arrest. See Elston, 479 F.3d at
319. We therefore conclude that the limited restraint placed on
Lewis prior to the search did not amount to a formal arrest that
would trigger Gant’s protection.
Lewis also argues that his incriminating statements
were taken following an involuntary waiver of rights pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). Any incriminating
statement made during a custodial interrogation is presumed
involuntary and inadmissible unless preceded by Miranda
warnings. See id. at 467-73; Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
307 (1985). A defendant may validly waive the rights conveyed
by Miranda warnings, including the right to remain silent, if,
under the totality of the circumstances, (1) the defendant
voluntarily relinquished his rights as “the product of free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception” by law enforcement; and (2) “the waiver [was] made
with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”
United States v. Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 139-40 (4th Cir.
2002). Under the first prong, the relevant inquiry “is whether
the defendant’s will has been overborne or his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired because of coercive
6
police conduct.” Id. at 140 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
A confession may be involuntary if “obtained by any
direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the extension
of any improper influence.” United States v. Shears, 762 F.2d
397, 401 (4th Cir. 1985). Police officers are permitted to
“make some representations to a defendant,” including
“promise[s] to make a defendant’s cooperation known to the
prosecutor,” without effectively coercing a confession. Id. at
401-02. However, promises by government agents must be viewed
from the perspective of the defendant to determine whether they
are involuntary. Id. at 402 & n.5. Where a defendant
reasonably perceives that he has been promised his charges will
be dropped in exchange for his confession, the promise is not
kept, and the promise constituted the driving force behind his
confession, the confession is involuntary. See id. at 401-03 &
n.2,4,5; Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409, 412-13 (4th Cir. 1968).
We conclude that Lewis knowingly and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights and that his statements were not the
product of coercion or specific guarantees of leniency.
Although Lewis felt substantial pressure to confess in exchange
for possible leniency, this pressure was internal and not the
result of the officers’ actions. Thus, we conclude the district
court did not err in denying Lewis’ suppression motion. See
7
United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 309-10 (4th Cir. 2005);
Shears, 762 F.2d at 401-02.
Accordingly, we affirm Lewis’ conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
8