Sherman v. Smith ( 1996 )


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  • PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    TIMOTHY SCOTT SHERMAN,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    WILLIAM L. SMITH, Warden,
    No. 94-6831
    Maryland House of Correction-
    Annex; JOHN JOSEPH CURRAN,
    Attorney General for the State of
    Maryland,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    William M. Nickerson, District Judge.
    (CA-91-2006)
    Argued: April 2, 1996
    Decided: July 17, 1996
    Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and RUSSELL, WIDENER,
    HALL, MURNAGHAN, ERVIN, WILKINS, NIEMEYER,
    HAMILTON, LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and MOTZ,
    Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Wilkinson wrote the
    majority opinion, in which Judges Russell, Widener, Hall, Wilkins,
    Niemeyer, Hamilton, Luttig, and Williams joined. Judge Murnaghan
    wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judges Ervin and Michael
    joined. Judge Motz wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Andrew Lewis Frey, MAYER, BROWN & PLATT,
    Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Ann Norman Bosse, Assistant
    Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, OFFICE OF THE
    ATTORNEY GENERAL, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON
    BRIEF: Roy T. Englert, Jr., James G. Duncan, MAYER, BROWN
    & PLATT, Washington, D.C.; Stuart J. Robinson, Bel Air, Maryland,
    for Appellant. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland,
    Criminal Appeals Division, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN-
    ERAL, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    WILKINSON, Chief Judge:
    We granted en banc review in this case to consider whether the dis-
    trict court properly denied Timothy Sherman's petition for a writ of
    habeas corpus. In 1988, a state jury convicted Sherman of killing his
    mother and adopted father, Ann and Stevenson Sherman, and sen-
    tenced him to two consecutive terms of life. Sherman asks this court
    to overturn his conviction due to one juror's unauthorized visit to the
    crime scene during the course of his trial. Because we find that the
    juror's excursion was not a structural error requiring a per se reversal
    of Sherman's conviction, and that the effect of the juror's visit was
    harmless, we affirm.
    I.
    Early in the morning of October 12, 1987, Ann and Stevenson
    Sherman were shot to death as they slept. Each died from a fatal shot-
    gun blast. When police arrived, Timothy Sherman, Ann and Steven-
    son's eighteen-year-old son, was in the house with his maternal
    grandfather, William Gibson. Timothy told the officers that he had
    heard gun shots and then had run to his grandfather's nearby home.
    The two of them returned to the Sherman house, where Gibson sum-
    moned the police.
    2
    Timothy was in his parents' house when the murders occurred. The
    house, which was equipped with an extensive alarm system, revealed
    no signs of forced entry or theft. The burglar alarm system was turned
    off. Police officers found two expended Remington 12-gauge shotgun
    shells in the hallway outside Ann and Stevenson's bedroom. In Timo-
    thy's bedroom, officers uncovered a box of Remington 12-gauge
    shotgun shells stuffed under the mattress of his bed. The box held five
    shells, and two were missing; the three remaining shells matched the
    expended shells found outside the Shermans' bedroom.
    Police deputies also found a 12-gauge shotgun, which belonged to
    the Shermans, lodged in a pine tree near Gibson's house. The gun was
    pushed inside the branches of the tree, with the barrel pointing down-
    ward toward the trunk of the tree and the butt pointing upward. Tests
    confirmed that the two shells that police found in the hallway outside
    the Shermans' bedroom had been fired from this shotgun. Three latent
    fingerprints matching those of Timothy Sherman were also found on
    the weapon, including a fingerprint above the trigger assembly.
    Timothy Sherman was charged and tried for the murder of his par-
    ents. At trial, the state relied heavily on the evidence gathered at the
    crime scene. The defense emphasized that Sherman had no apparent
    motive for the murders, no gunshot residue on his hands or clothing,
    and no pine needles or sap on his clothing even though he allegedly
    hid the weapon in the tree. After a lengthy trial, the jury convicted
    Sherman of two counts of first-degree murder.
    Sherman thereafter moved for a new trial based, in part, on allega-
    tions of juror misconduct during the course of the trial. Specifically,
    he alleged that one of the jurors, Blane Miller, had made an unautho-
    rized visit to the crime scene on the second or third day of the trial.
    Sherman argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the juror's
    visit infringed his Sixth Amendment rights.
    The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new
    trial. At the hearing, juror Miller testified that one evening two or
    three days into the trial he and his wife drove to the crime scene,
    which was located in a development called Gibson Manor. As he
    explained, he "went to the Sherman house and then[ ] drove back the
    streets from the Sherman house, back to the entrance of Gibson
    3
    Manor in looking for a tree that was so involved in the case." Miller
    confirmed that he saw the tree and the house. He visited the site, he
    said, "so I could see the tree that was so much in question."
    At the close of the hearing, the trial judge rejected the motion for
    a new trial. Sherman appealed this ruling, and alleged nine other
    assignments of error. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, how-
    ever, declined to grant relief. The Maryland Court of Appeals and the
    United States Supreme Court declined to review Sherman's convic-
    tion. Sherman v. Maryland, 
    498 U.S. 950
    (1990).
    Sherman then filed a federal habeas petition alleging that the
    juror's site visit warranted reversal of his conviction. In August, 1992,
    the district court denied his petition. A panel of this court vacated the
    district court's judgment and remanded to the district court for a de
    novo review of the record to determine "the nature of the error" and
    whether it "influenced the jury's deliberations." Sherman v. Smith, 
    8 F.3d 820
    (Table), No. 92-6947, slip op. at 7 (4th Cir. 1993) (per
    curiam).
    On remand, following a de novo review of the record, the district
    court again denied the petition, and Sherman filed the instant appeal.
    A panel of this court reversed and granted Sherman's petition. 
    70 F.3d 1263
    (Table), No. 94-6831 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The
    court then voted to hear the case en banc.
    II.
    Sherman contends that juror Miller's unsupervised visit to the
    crime scene violated his Sixth Amendment rights to confront and
    cross-examine witnesses against him and to be judged by an impartial
    jury. We shall assume for purposes of argument that juror Miller's
    site visit amounted to a constitutional violation of Sherman's rights.
    This error, Sherman claims, constituted a structural error requiring
    automatic reversal of his conviction, rather than a trial error which
    can be "quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence pres-
    ented" in order to determine whether its occurrence was harmless.
    Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    499 U.S. 279
    , 308 (1991). We disagree with
    Sherman's claim. An unsupervised juror site visit does not constitute
    structural error, but rather is subject to harmless error analysis.
    4
    A.
    Criminal defendants in this country are entitled to a fair, but not a
    perfect trial. "[G]iven the myriad safeguards provided to assure a fair
    trial, and taking into account the reality of the human fallibility of the
    participants, there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial,"
    and the Constitution does not demand one. United States v. Hasting,
    
    461 U.S. 499
    , 508 (1983). This focus on fairness, rather than on per-
    fection, protects society from individuals who have been duly and
    fairly convicted of crimes, thereby promoting "public respect for the
    criminal process." Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 
    475 U.S. 673
    , 681
    (1986).
    With this in mind, the Supreme Court has recognized that most
    errors do not automatically render a trial unfair and thus, can be harm-
    less. 
    Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306-07
    . Fulminante enumerated the
    wide variety of constitutional errors subject to harmless error analysis.
    They include improper admission of an involuntary confession, 
    id. at 306-12;
    overbroad jury instructions at the sentencing stage of a capital
    case, Clemons v. Mississippi, 
    494 U.S. 738
    (1990); improper admis-
    sion of evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital case, Satterwhite
    v. Texas, 
    486 U.S. 249
    (1988); jury instructions containing erroneous
    conclusive or rebuttable presumptions, Carella v. California, 
    491 U.S. 263
    , 266-67 (1989) (per curiam); Rose v. Clark, 
    478 U.S. 570
    (1986); erroneous exclusion of a defendant's testimony regarding the
    circumstances of a confession, Crane v. Kentucky , 
    476 U.S. 683
    , 691
    (1986); improper restriction on a defendant's right to cross-examine
    witnesses for bias, Van 
    Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 673
    ; denial of a defen-
    dant's right to be present at trial, Rushen v. Spain, 
    464 U.S. 114
    , 117-
    19 and n.2 (1983) (per curiam); improper comment on a defendant's
    silence at trial, 
    Hasting, 461 U.S. at 499
    ; improper prohibition on the
    provision of a lesser included offense instruction in a capital case,
    Hopper v. Evans, 
    456 U.S. 605
    (1982); failure to instruct the jury on
    the presumption of innocence, Kentucky v. Whorton, 
    441 U.S. 786
    (1979) (per curiam); improper admission of identification evidence,
    Moore v. Illinois, 
    434 U.S. 220
    , 232 (1977); erroneous admission of
    an out-of-court statement of a nontestifying codefendant, Brown v.
    United States, 
    411 U.S. 223
    , 231-32 (1973); improper admission of
    a confession made to an undercover officer, Milton v. Wainwright,
    
    407 U.S. 371
    (1972); admission of evidence obtained in violation of
    5
    the Fourth Amendment, Chambers v. Maroney, 
    399 U.S. 42
    , 52-3
    (1970); and improper denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing,
    Coleman v. Alabama, 
    399 U.S. 1
    , 10-11 (1970). Indeed, "if the defen-
    dant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is
    a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are
    subject to harmless-error analysis." 
    Rose, 478 U.S. at 579
    ; see also
    United States v. Blevins, 
    960 F.2d 1252
    , 1261-62 (4th Cir. 1992).
    The Supreme Court has also recognized that certain structural
    errors are so severe as to render a trial inherently unfair and thus,
    should not be subject to harmless error analysis. 
    Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10
    ; see, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
    508 U.S. 275
    (1993) (the
    denial of the right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond reasonable doubt);
    McKaskle v. Wiggins, 
    465 U.S. 168
    (1984) (the denial of the right of
    self-representation at trial); Waller v. Georgia , 
    467 U.S. 39
    (1984)
    (the denial of the right to public trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
    372 U.S. 335
    (1963) (the total deprivation of the right to counsel); Tumey
    v. Ohio, 
    273 U.S. 510
    (1927) (the presence of a biased judge). Unlike
    other errors, "[t]hese are structural defects in the constitution of the
    trial mechanism" and "``[w]ithout these basic protections, a criminal
    trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination
    of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded
    as fundamentally fair.'" 
    Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10
    (quoting
    
    Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78
    ). Structural errors affect the "entire conduct
    of the trial from beginning to end," and therefore cannot be harmless.
    
    Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309
    .
    Correctly applied, harmless error and structural error analyses pro-
    duce identical results: unfair convictions are reversed while fair con-
    victions are affirmed. Expanding the list of structural errors, however,
    is not mere legal abstraction. It can also be a dangerous endeavor.
    There is always the risk that a sometimes-harmless error will be clas-
    sified as structural, thus resulting in the reversal of criminal convic-
    tions obtained pursuant to a fair trial. Given this risk, judges should
    be wary of prescribing new errors requiring automatic reversal.
    Indeed, before a court adds a new error to the list of structural errors
    (and thereby requires the reversal of every criminal conviction in
    which the error occurs), the court must be certain that the error's pres-
    ence would render every such trial unfair. See 
    id. at 310.
    6
    Here, Sherman maintains that a juror site visit is so unfair that it
    must constitute a new addition to the short list of structural errors. But
    a juror site visit "does not compare with the kinds of errors that auto-
    matically require reversal of an otherwise valid conviction." 
    Rose, 478 U.S. at 579
    . Unlike the complete denial of counsel and other
    structural errors, which affect the "entire conduct of the trial from
    beginning to end," juror site visits can be discrete moments in the
    course of an otherwise fair trial. Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 309. As it
    cannot be said with any certainty that a juror site visit renders every
    trial in which it occurs unfair, it would be a reckless undertaking to
    remove such errors from the rubric of harmless error analysis.
    After all, our criminal justice system represents a balance between
    the rights of accused persons and the need for public safety. This bal-
    ance is best expressed in the notion of a fair, but not a perfect, crimi-
    nal trial. When an error is misclassified as one requiring automatic
    reversal, the balance is upset, and proceedings that in reality are per-
    fectly fair are discarded in the name of an elusive systemic perfection.
    B.
    Sherman maintains, however, that unauthorized juror site visits
    constitute structural error because they "defy" harmless error analysis.
    That analysis requires a reviewing court to quantitatively assess the
    effect of the error "in the context of other evidence presented" at trial.
    
    Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308
    . Sherman observes that the rules of evi-
    dence prevent examination of the jury's mental impressions formed
    during the deliberative process. See Tanner v. United States, 
    483 U.S. 107
    , 117 (1987). Without such evidence, he argues, a reviewing court
    could never determine the effect of a crime scene visit on the jury's
    verdict.
    We disagree. Alleged infringement of Sixth Amendment rights is
    no exception to the general rule that "most constitutional errors can
    be harmless." 
    Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306
    . The Supreme Court has
    "long since rejected the argument that, as a general matter, the Sixth
    Amendment prohibits the application of harmless-error analysis in
    determining whether constitutional error had a prejudicial impact on
    the outcome of a case." 
    Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 282-83
    (Rehnquist, C.J.,
    concurring).
    7
    Sherman's argument is further undercut by the Supreme Court's
    application of harmless error analysis to claims of juror misconduct
    and bias, claims that are essentially indistinguishable from those Sher-
    man alleges. In Smith v. Phillips, 
    455 U.S. 209
    (1982), the Court held
    that a juror's mid-trial application for employment in the District
    Attorney's office responsible for prosecuting the defendant did not
    require automatic reversal of the conviction. As the Court observed,
    the Constitution "does not require a new trial every time a juror has
    been placed in a potentially compromising situation . . . [because] it
    is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence
    that might theoretically affect their vote." 
    Id. at 217.
    In Remmer v.
    United States, 
    347 U.S. 227
    (1954), an outsider apparently offered a
    juror a bribe in return for a favorable verdict; the trial judge ordered
    an investigation without disclosing the proffered bribe or investiga-
    tion to defense counsel. Even in these circumstances, the Court did
    not require automatic reversal of the conviction. Instead, it directed
    the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the prejudicial impact
    of the developments. 
    Id. at 230.
    Smith and Remmer thus contemplate
    the precise inquiry that Sherman characterizes as impossible: discern-
    ing the effect of juror misconduct or bias on the verdict without exam-
    ining the thought processes of the jury.
    Following the Supreme Court's lead, this court has repeatedly
    examined instances of juror misconduct and bias for harmlessness.
    See United States v. Seeright, 
    978 F.2d 842
    , 849-50 (4th Cir. 1992)
    (juror's independent investigation of evidence did not require a mis-
    trial when judge excused juror from further service and satisfied him-
    self that other jurors were not affected); Stockton v. Virginia, 
    852 F.2d 740
    , 743-46 (4th Cir. 1988) (jury's exposure to improper third-party
    contact examined to determine extent of prejudice), cert. denied, 
    489 U.S. 1071
    (1989); United States v. Malloy, 
    758 F.2d 979
    , 982-83 (4th
    Cir.) (juror's previous service at trial of co-defendant did not require
    a new trial), cert. denied, 
    474 U.S. 1009
    (1985); Miller v. Harvey, 
    566 F.2d 879
    , 881 (4th Cir. 1977) (jury's improper experiment, in which
    one juror bit another to observe the resulting bruises, did not violate
    due process and thus did not require granting a writ of habeas
    corpus),cert. denied, 
    439 U.S. 838
    (1978). Likewise, other courts
    have applied harmless error analysis to such claims. See, e.g., Lawson
    v. Borg, 
    60 F.3d 608
    , 612-13 (9th Cir. 1995) (juror's comments about
    defendant's reputation for violence subject to harmless error analy-
    8
    sis); United States v. De La Vega, 
    913 F.2d 861
    , 869-71 (11th Cir.
    1990) (jury foreman's actions of reading a book, showing book to
    other jurors, and organizing deliberations based on book subject to
    harmless error analysis), cert. denied, 
    500 U.S. 916
    (1991); Marino
    v. Vasquez, 
    812 F.2d 499
    , 504-07 (9th Cir. 1987) (juror's out of court
    experiment, in which she attempted to fire a weapon while holding it
    in a position consistent with defense's version of shooting, subject to
    harmless error analysis).
    Abundant caselaw thus rejects any special rule of automatic rever-
    sal for unauthorized juror site visits. Such visits do not, as Sherman
    alleges, "defy" harmless error inquiry. In performing that inquiry, a
    court can look to the nature and extent of the juror's activity and
    assess how that activity fit into the context of the evidence presented
    at trial. See De La 
    Vega, 913 F.2d at 870-71
    . The court can consider
    whether the juror learned information that was merely cumulative of
    other evidence or whether he unearthed new information not previ-
    ously presented to the jury. See Farese v. United States, 
    428 F.2d 178
    (5th Cir. 1970) (jury finds substantial sum of money in shirt admitted
    into evidence; existence of money unknown to court or parties). In
    short, juror site visits may be casual or they may be intensive. They
    may reveal much or they may uncover little. It makes no sense, how-
    ever, to apply to this wide range of circumstances a single rule of
    automatic reversal. Rather, an assessment of the degrees of potential
    prejudice from a site visit is ideally suited for harmless error inquiry.
    The inquiry here is no more speculative than consideration of other
    errors that are examined for harmlessness. All harmless error analysis
    involves some level of indeterminacy because, "in the end no judge
    can know for certain what factors led to the jury's verdict." 
    Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 284
    (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Nonetheless, reviewing
    courts may capably judge the effect of the unconstitutional admission
    or exclusion of particular evidence, 
    Crane, 476 U.S. at 691
    , including
    the admission of an involuntary confession, 
    Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306
    -12. And they are able to gauge the effect of a partial denial of a
    defendant's right to be present at trial, Rushen , 464 U.S. at 117-19
    and n.2, and limitations on the right to cross-examine witnesses, Van
    
    Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681-84
    . By comparison to these errors, assessing
    the effect of a juror's site visit does not involve an unacceptable level
    of conjecture.
    9
    Our conclusion that harmless error analysis applies here is rein-
    forced by the Supreme Court's treatment of errors that have a more
    direct influence on the jury's deliberative process. For instance, "the
    Court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error
    to harmless-error analysis." United States v. Gaudin, 
    115 S. Ct. 2310
    ,
    2321 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see , e.g., Yates v. Evatt,
    
    500 U.S. 391
    (1991), disapproved in part on other grounds, Estelle
    v. McGuire, 
    502 U.S. 62
    , 72-3 n.4 (1991); Carella, 
    491 U.S. 263
    ;
    
    Rose, 478 U.S. at 579
    -82. Juries receive instructions from the trial
    court, and that guidance carries the court's official sanction. 
    Yates, 500 U.S. at 403
    . Yet the Supreme Court has held that even an errone-
    ous instruction carrying the court's imprimatur can be harmless if the
    faulty instruction is "unimportant in relation to everything else the
    jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record."
    
    Id. at 403.
    The discrete error is viewed from the perspective of the
    total trial.
    If instructional errors that carry the trial court's seal of approval
    can be harmless, a juror site visit can also be harmless. Far from
    viewing such a visit as officially sanctioned, other jurors will know
    that the visit was improper. At a minimum, we cannot conclude that
    one juror's unauthorized site visit is a structural error that renders
    every trial inherently unfair. We conclude, to the contrary, that the
    issue here is amenable to the traditional tools of harmless error analy-
    sis.
    III.
    We must next address which harmless error standard applies to the
    error alleged in this case. In habeas proceedings, an error is harmful
    only if it "``had substantial and injurious effect or influence in deter-
    mining the jury's verdict.'" Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
    507 U.S. 619
    , 637
    (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 750
    , 776
    (1946)). We have consistently applied the Brecht standard on collat-
    eral review. Tuggle v. Netherland, 
    79 F.3d 1386
    , 1392-93 (4th Cir.
    1996); Correll v. Thompson, 
    63 F.3d 1279
    , 1291 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.
    denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 688
    (1996). Sherman argues, however, that the
    Brecht standard is inapplicable here. Relying on decisions of the
    Eighth Circuit, Sherman asserts that the stricter harmless error stan-
    dard of Chapman v. California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    (1967), governs our
    10
    review because, unlike in Brecht, the Maryland courts allegedly failed
    to apply the Chapman standard on direct review. See Starr v.
    Lockhart, 
    23 F.3d 1280
    , 1292 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    115 S. Ct. 499
    (1994); Orndorff v. Lockhart, 
    998 F.2d 1426
    , 1430 (8th Cir. 1993),
    cert. denied, 
    114 S. Ct. 1631
    (1994).
    Brecht cannot be so easily circumvented. That decision recognizes
    that a federal court's collateral review of state court convictions
    implicates the "State's interest in the finality of convictions that have
    survived direct review within the state court system." 
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635
    ; see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 
    463 U.S. 880
    , 887 (1983).
    Based on this weighty state interest, the Supreme Court has frequently
    applied different rules to direct and collateral review. 
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633-35
    . And Brecht itself rested on this respect for the finality
    of state court convictions. As the Court noted,"[o]verturning final
    and presumptively correct convictions on collateral review because
    the State cannot prove that an error is harmless under Chapman
    undermines the States' interest in finality and infringes upon their
    sovereignty over criminal matters." 
    Id. at 637.
    Consequently, it con-
    cluded that a less onerous harmless error standard was "better tailored
    to the nature and purpose of collateral review and more likely to pro-
    mote the considerations underlying" its habeas jurisprudence. 
    Id. at 638.
    These principles of federalism, comity, and finality apply regard-
    less of the harmless error standard used by the state court. We have
    already recognized as much in Smith v. Dixon, 
    14 F.3d 956
    (4th Cir.)
    (en banc), cert. denied, 
    115 S. Ct. 129
    (1994). There, we applied the
    Brecht standard in a habeas proceeding where the state court (because
    it found no error) conducted no harmless error analysis. 
    Id. at 974-81.
    And at least three other circuits have rejected the Eighth Circuit's rea-
    soning. Castro v. Oklahoma, 
    71 F.3d 1502
    , 1516 n.14 (10th Cir.
    1995); Tyson v. Trigg, 
    50 F.3d 436
    , 446-47 (7th Cir. 1995), cert.
    denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 697
    (1996); Horsley v. Alabama, 
    45 F.3d 1486
    ,
    1492 n.11 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 410
    (1995). In the pres-
    ent case, Sherman received full consideration of his claim by the
    Maryland courts, including a post-trial evidentiary hearing in which
    juror Miller testified and was subject to cross-examination. See
    
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636
    . The trial itself occurred some eight years
    ago. And the federal district court was the fifth court asked to assess
    11
    the effect of juror Miller's site visit; we are the sixth. Collateral
    review in this case thus implicates the same interests of respect for
    final state convictions that animated the Brecht decision.
    Our conclusion is reinforced by the implications of the rule that
    Sherman suggests. In many habeas cases, a state court will have
    rejected the petitioner's claim of error, and thus will have had no
    opportunity to apply harmless error analysis. 
    Tyson, 50 F.3d at 446
    ;
    
    Smith, 14 F.3d at 979
    . Sherman would have us ignore Brecht's com-
    mands in these cases, a "limitation that would rob the decision of any
    general significance." 
    Tyson, 50 F.3d at 446
    .
    Moreover, it is unwise to make our harmless error standard turn on
    a characterization of the state court's standard of review. Hinging a
    habeas court's standard on such an inquiry will inevitably lead to liti-
    gation over what methodology of review the state court applied. This
    in itself is intrusive. State courts have no obligation to use particular
    language in considering claims presented in their courts. See Coleman
    v. Thompson, 
    501 U.S. 722
    , 739 (1991). But the rule Sherman pro-
    poses will place an implicit obligation on state courts to do just that.
    Finally, inconsistent harmless error standards on collateral review will
    prove to be confusing and inequitable. We shall adhere consistently
    to the Brecht standard in collateral proceedings.
    IV.
    We turn finally to whether juror Miller's site visit had a "``substan-
    tial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's ver-
    dict.'" 
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637
    (citation omitted). We hold that it did
    not.1
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 does not
    address harmless error standards governing cases arising under 28 U.S.C.
    § 2254. See Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). The Act, however,
    does require a federal habeas court to defer to state court legal determina-
    tions. 
    Id., § 104.
    In view of the fact that we affirm the district court and
    deny habeas relief in all events, we have no occasion to address whatever
    additional hurdles Sherman might face under the Act.
    12
    At the post-trial hearing in state court, juror Miller testified that
    two or three days into the trial he drove to the crime scene with his
    wife. His visit seemed motivated by a simple sense of curiosity. Mil-
    ler acknowledged that he saw the Sherman house and the tree where
    police officers recovered the weapon. As he said, he made the visit
    "so I could see the tree that was so much in question." Based on juror
    Miller's testimony, it is not clear whether he ever left his car for a
    more detailed inspection of the area.2
    We agree with the district court that Miller's site visit was harm-
    less. First, whatever juror Miller may have observed did not have a
    "substantial and injurious" influence on the jury's verdict because it
    was cumulative of the abundant evidence admitted at trial about the
    crime scene. See 
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639
    . That evidence included
    numerous photographs, videotapes, and extensive testimony about the
    Shermans' neighborhood and the tree where police found the weapon.
    The introduction of this large amount of evidence persuaded the
    Maryland courts that Miller's visit would add little to what the jury
    already knew. When the state trial court rejected Sherman's motion
    for a new trial, it referred to its earlier ruling denying a request to
    have the jury "view" the crime scene: "I denied the view, not because
    I felt that any significant information would come about, but I felt it
    would be a waste of time and expense to take the jury out there
    because I felt the issue was fully covered. So that I think that [Miller's
    visit] is not of such a magnitude as to warrant a new trial or reversible
    appeal." Likewise, the Maryland appellate court remarked on the "nu-
    merous testimonial references, videotapes, and photographs relating
    to and depicting the crime scene."
    _________________________________________________________________
    2 In the state court hearing, Miller did not say -- nor was he asked --
    whether he left his car, and for purposes of our review we need not
    assume that he merely observed the crime scene from his car. Miller's
    description of the visit, however, left the impression with at least two
    courts that he stayed in his car. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals
    said, without more, that Miller "drove to the neighborhood of the murder
    scene." And the panel of this court that remanded Sherman's petition to
    the district court for further consideration said that Miller "found the tree
    but did not leave his car [ ] to inspect it." Sherman v. Smith, No. 92-6947,
    slip op. at 5 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
    13
    The district court also concluded that Miller's site visit was cumu-
    lative of other evidence presented at trial. In particular, the court
    addressed the specific claim that Sherman presses most forcefully in
    his petition: that Miller's visit may have led him to conclude that
    Sherman, despite a slight build, had the ability, as well as the opportu-
    nity, to hide the weapon in the thick branches of the tree -- an issue
    Sherman contends was a key contested question at trial. In reviewing
    this claim, the court granted Sherman the benefit of several assump-
    tions: "that Miller examined the tree, told the other jurors that he dis-
    agreed with the photographs, and concluded that it was possible for
    Sherman to hide the gun in the tree in the condition in which it was
    found." Even under these assumptions, the district court found that
    the error was harmless because substantial other evidence indicated
    that Sherman hid the weapon in the tree. That evidence included pho-
    tographs showing that Sherman had an opportunity to hide the
    weapon in the tree, which was located on the route between the Sher-
    man and Gibson houses. Testimony introduced at trial also indicated
    that Sherman had previously used -- as a hiding spot -- the precise
    place in the tree where the gun was hidden.3 In this context, the dis-
    trict court appropriately concluded that the juror's site visit "was
    cumulative of the detailed evidence presented at trial" about the
    neighborhood where the murder took place and the hiding place for
    the weapon.
    _________________________________________________________________
    3 Sherman contends that Corporal Hopkins, who removed the weapon
    from the tree, cast serious doubt on Sherman's ability (because of his
    slight build) to wedge the weapon in the tree. Hopkins, who was six feet
    tall and 210 pounds, testified at trial that "with [his] size and stature" he
    "would have had difficulty putting the gun inside the tree." But Hopkins
    also testified that the person who put the weapon in the tree "would not
    [have] to be strong, but had to be forceful." Under questioning, Hopkins
    even left open the possibility that the weapon could have been thrown
    into the tree: as he said, he could not "put a figure on the force [used to
    hide the weapon] or if someone would have thrown it would it have
    landed in the same position; I can't answer that. It was deeply placed
    inside the tree." Finally, the state emphasized that the gun proved diffi-
    cult to remove because the officers did not want to disturb this key piece
    of evidence. In short, Hopkins' testimony is hardly the confirmation of
    reasonable doubt that Sherman makes it out to be.
    14
    Second, the state offered powerful evidence at trial from which the
    jury concluded that Sherman killed his mother and stepfather. The
    murder occurred in the middle of the night when Sherman was home;
    there was no indication of forced entry, and the house was equipped
    with an alarm system. The murder weapon was a 12-gauge shotgun
    that belonged to the Shermans. Police discovered Sherman's finger-
    prints above the weapon's trigger assembly and a box of 12-gauge
    shotgun shells under his mattress. The box itself contained only three
    shells, and police located two matching (the box held five) expended
    shells that experts concluded were fired from the murder weapon.
    Police found the shotgun lodged in the branches of a tree, where, as
    already noted, Sherman had previously hidden objects and which is
    located between his own house and that of his grandparents where he
    ran to report the murder.
    Sherman argues, in response, that the question of guilt in this case
    was a close one. He emphasizes that at trial the state could not point
    to a motive for the murders. And he notes that officers discovered no
    gunpowder residue, pine needles or sap on his hands or clothing.
    Given what he characterizes a close case, Sherman contends that Mil-
    ler's investigation of the crime scene, and in particular the tree, can-
    not be considered harmless because the characteristics of the tree
    were relevant to a crucial disputed point at trial: whether Sherman
    could have hidden the weapon there.
    Sherman's argument is simply overwhelmed by what we alluded to
    earlier, namely, the powerful array of evidence presented at trial that
    convinced the jury that Sherman was guilty. And, even if Miller's site
    visit generated conclusions damaging to Sherman about the tree, we
    already observed that there was substantial other evidence from which
    the jury could conclude that Sherman hid the weapon in the tree. In
    fact, considering the evidence that contributed to the jury's verdict,
    the juror's site visit is nothing more than a roundabout way for Sher-
    man to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him, an argu-
    ment that Sherman himself admits cannot succeed.
    In light of all the evidence presented at trial, we harbor no "grave
    doubt as to [the] harmlessness" of Miller's site visit. O'Neal v.
    McAninch, 
    115 S. Ct. 992
    , 995 (1995). We conclude that the unautho-
    rized excursion to the crime scene was harmless. A new trial -- some
    15
    eight years after the fact -- would not produce a fairer, more reliable,
    or more just verdict than the one already rendered.
    V.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court and deny Sherman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
    AFFIRMED
    MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the
    right to "a fair trial in a fair tribunal" and a jury verdict "based upon
    the evidence developed at the trial." Irvin v. Dowd, 
    366 U.S. 717
    , 722
    (1961) (citations omitted). "This is true, regardless of the heinousness
    of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender or the station
    in life which he occupies." 
    Id. In the
    matter before us, neither the trial
    nor the tribunal was fair because a juror made an unauthorized and
    unsupervised visit to the scene of the crime which, though discussed
    with other jurors, remained undisclosed to the parties and the court
    until after the guilty verdict had been returned. The majority decision
    upholding the conviction despite this fundamental flaw, therefore,
    strikes a blow to the foundations of American criminal jurisprudence
    and sacrifices the integrity of the means our nation has chosen for
    what the majority views to be the proper ends in this specific case.
    Even a wrong that appears slight becomes significant when it has the
    power to lessen public confidence in our guarantee that a jury trial
    will be a fair trial, and thus cannot be ignored.
    I.
    Here, Timothy Sherman's trial was not fairly conducted. At the
    start of it, jurors received a handbook to assist them in understanding
    their duties which cautioned them about discussing evidence among
    themselves and considering information from outside the courtroom.
    The handbook stated that "a juror should never, while a trial is in
    progress, inspect the scene of an accident or other event involved in
    the case."1 Handbook at 33. The defense asked that the jury be
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 While nothing in the handbook"is to be regarded by jurors as instruc-
    tions in law," the pamphlet makes clear what constitutes proper evidence
    and that an unsupervised or unpermitted inspection of the scene of the
    crime is wrong.
    16
    allowed to visit the crime scene, but the trial judge refused.2 During
    the presentation of evidence, two central issues arose: whether the
    defendant--6' 2" tall and weighing but 130 pounds--possessed the
    physical capability to lodge the shotgun deep into the branches of a
    thick pine tree as it was found; and whether the defendant could have
    hidden the gun in the tree without generating some outward signal of
    his efforts, such as a scratch from a branch or tree sap and pine nee-
    dles on his person.
    One juror, confused by the seemingly conflicting testimony on
    these issues and the unrevealing photographs of the tree, took it upon
    himself to see, i.e., to witness, "the tree that was so much in question."3
    In disregard of the handbook and without the knowledge of the par-
    ties, their counsel or even the judge supervising the trial, the juror and
    his wife drove one evening after court ended for the day to the subdi-
    vision where the crime had occurred.
    Because of the sparse inquiry into the matter at a post-trial hearing,
    we do not have all of the facts concerning the juror's investigation.4
    We do know that he located the Sherman house and then drove
    through the neighborhood "looking for a tree that was so involved in
    the case." We also know that he found the tree. We do not know,
    though, whether the juror touched the tree in an attempt to determine
    if there was exposed sap or loose needles, or even conducted his own
    experiment by trying to force something down among the branches.
    _________________________________________________________________
    2 The State has asserted that the jury knew about neither the request nor
    the denial. Those circumstances do not change the fact that a site visit
    was precluded both before the request and after the denial.
    3 Photographs of the tree and the neighborhood had been introduced at
    that point in the trial, but the juror wanted a clearer view.
    4 Federal and state evidentiary rules forbid inquiry into how outside
    influences might have affected the jury's deliberations and verdict, but
    permit questioning about whether extraneous prejudicial information was
    improperly brought to the attention of any juror. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b);
    Md. R. Evid. 5-606(b). Thus the parties could have asked for the details
    of the juror's visit. The trial judge prohibited the question of why the
    juror went to the site, but the juror explained his actions anyway, testify-
    ing at the post-trial hearing that "the reason why I went there was so I
    could see the tree that was so much in question."
    17
    Nor do we know whether he tried to gauge the distance between the
    two houses and the tree.
    The wayward juror told others on the panel of his outing.5 The trial
    judge and the parties learned of the impropriety only after the jury had
    rendered its verdict, when it was too late to take corrective action.
    Before deliberations began, therefore, the judge had no reason to
    remind the jurors to disregard outside viewing of a scene nor to direct
    them specifically to ignore any information gathered during the
    juror's visit to Sherman's neighborhood. See Jeffries v. Blodgett, 
    5 F.3d 1180
    , 1191 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding unfair prejudice where infor-
    mation that the defendant was a convicted criminal was conveyed to
    jurors outside the courtroom without the attorneys and the judge
    knowing or having an opportunity to correct), cert. denied, 
    114 S. Ct. 1294
    (1994). We do not know what role the juror's independent
    investigation played in his own mind or in deliberations because we
    cannot inquire into such matters. See Mattox v. United States, 
    146 U.S. 140
    , 149 (1892) (holding inadmissible juror testimony regarding
    the motives and influences which affected the jury's deliberations).
    Nor do we have juror testimony regarding the presence or absence of
    prejudice resulting from the visit.6 See United States v. Seeright, 978
    _________________________________________________________________
    5 Sherman has submitted the affidavit of an alternate juror, indicating
    that the juror told the others about his investigation and shared what he
    learned. Because that affidavit was not presented before a state court,
    however, there is some question as to whether it may properly be consid-
    ered on federal habeas review. See Boggs v. Bair, 
    892 F.2d 1193
    , 1199
    n.2 (4th Cir. 1989) (prohibiting the introduction of an affidavit for the
    first time on federal habeas review after determining that it could have
    been presented at state court proceedings), cert. denied, 
    495 U.S. 940
    (1990). We previously ruled in the present matter that the state court's
    determination that the unauthorized site visit did not warrant a new trial
    was not a finding of fact entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),
    but subject to de novo review in a federal habeas proceeding. Sherman
    v. Smith, 
    8 F.3d 820
    (table), 
    1993 WL 433317
    , at *4 (4th Cir. Oct. 27,
    1993) (unpublished) (No. 92-6947); see also Lawson v. Borg, 
    60 F.3d 608
    , 612 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the harmlessness of a constitutional
    error is not a factual determination entitled to§ 2254(d)'s presumption
    of correctness). It therefore would seem proper for the federal habeas
    court to consider the affidavit, as the district court here did, especially
    considering the time when the subject arose.
    6 There was no questioning of individual jurors regarding the possibil-
    ity of taint or prejudice here, nor was there warning by the judge for the
    jurors to avoid it.
    
    18 F.2d 842
    , 850 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that a juror's personal investi-
    gation and sharing of result with rest of panel did not warrant a mis-
    trial because the trial judge dismissed the offending juror and
    questioned each of the other jurors individually and specifically until
    he was satisfied that they were neither tainted nor prejudiced).7
    _________________________________________________________________
    7 Like the instant case, Crockett v. Commonwealth, 
    47 S.E.2d 377
    (Va.
    1948), concerned a prosecution for murder and an unauthorized, though
    innocent, jury view of the crime scene. There, though, the question of the
    burden of proof to show prejudice or lack thereof was at issue. 
    Id. at 386.
    The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and
    ordered a new trial. 
    Id. at 387.
    Not deciding whether the Virginia rule
    requiring the defendant's presence on a jury view came into play in the
    matter before it, the court said a new trial was necessary to protect "the
    fundamental rights of an accused." 
    Id. at 385.
    The court concluded:
    We cannot say that impressions the jury could have so obtained
    may not have been harmful to the accused. Though no wrongful
    action was intended . . . the happening casts a shadow of such
    magnitude over that part of the proceedings as to constitute such
    misconduct on their part as to impose upon the Commonwealth
    the burden of disproving any harmful result to the accused. That
    such proof, under the circumstances here presented, is difficult
    if not well-nigh impossible, does not render less imperative the
    necessity of its production.
    
    Id. at 386.
    Roberts v. United States, 
    60 F.2d 871
    (4th Cir. 1932), also concerned
    an unauthorized visit by jurors to the scene of the crime involved in the
    case. There, however, the court found that the mere fact that an unautho-
    rized view took place caused no prejudice to the defendant, but said
    nothing about on whom the burden of proving prejudice fell. 
    Id. at 873.
    Relying on Roberts, the court in People v. Kraus, 
    265 N.Y.S. 294
    (Ct.
    Gen. Sess. 1933), found no prejudice shown to have resulted from an
    independent site visit by a juror who was unaware that his actions were
    improper. 
    Id. at 297-300.
    The trial court admitted that it had failed to
    order the jurors not to visit the scene of the crime. 
    Id. at 296.
    Another
    case invoking Roberts, Orenberg v. Thecker, 
    143 F.2d 375
    (D.C. Cir.
    1944), found that an unauthorized visit to the scene brought no extrane-
    ous influences to bear upon the jurors and therefore affirmed the trial
    court's denial of a new trial. 
    Id. at 376.
    United States v. Kansas City,
    MO, 
    157 F.2d 459
    (8th Cir. 1946), also relied on Roberts in holding that
    the verdict was not affected by an unauthorized viewing by some of the
    jurors of the property at issue in the case. 
    Id. at 462-63.
    The court there
    19
    II.
    The juror's unauthorized and unsupervised visit clearly amounted
    to constitutional error as a violation of Sherman's Sixth and Four-
    teenth Amendment rights. The majority treats the error as a trial
    defect and holds it to be harmless. If harmlessness were the proper
    inquiry, I do not agree with the majority's finding. In my opinion, the
    personal viewing of the tree was harmful because it allowed the injec-
    tion of evidence without the defendant having an opportunity to
    object, confront or cross-examine.8 Actual, secret, physical inspection
    _________________________________________________________________
    also made much of the fact that, if a request for permission to view had
    been requested, it "would doubtless have been granted." 
    Id. at 462.
    Neither Roberts nor its progeny expressed any belief or concern that
    unauthorized viewing was unconstitutional. While they therefore did not
    address the question of whether the error was "structural" or "trial," that
    omission is understandable because they antedated the United States
    Supreme Court's decision that constitutional errors could be harmless in
    Chapman v. California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    (1967). Most significantly, however,
    these cases did not even allude to the vital rights of confrontation and
    cross-examination of which the parties were deprived. Nor did they con-
    cern situations where a visit to the scene was not only unauthorized but
    specifically forbidden.
    In considering the matter before us, we cannot overlook the fact that
    evidentiary rules precluded the parties from questioning the jurors--
    including the maker of the forbidden site visit--as to what effect the
    unauthorized viewing had on them and that the juror's actions directly
    violated both the handbook and the trial judge's denial of a jury visit to
    the scene. Despite the results in Roberts, the error in Sherman's case very
    clearly involves both the flawed structural character of the jury trial he
    was given and exhibits a behavior infraction that amounted to a funda-
    mental invasion of the defendant's rights.
    8 Unauthorized juror viewing of the scene at issue in an ongoing trial
    is not generally acceptable conduct. Ruling in an 1888 case deemed
    "without precedent" and "of the greatest importance," Scottish judges
    found that a juror's unpermitted and unsupervised visit to the site of an
    injury led to "a gross miscarriage of justice." Sutherland v. Preston-
    grange Coal & Firebrick Co., 15 R. (Ct. of Sess.) 494, 495 (Scot. 1888).
    In setting aside the jury verdict, the judges viewed it as largely irrelevant
    20
    of the tree can in no way be construed as "cumulative" of the evidence
    presented at trial, which consisted of photographs, videotape and tes-
    timony. The juror presumably would not have made his outing if that
    evidence were sufficient for him to resolve the issues in dispute. Even
    the district court, accepting that there was error in the juror's actions
    but finding it harmless, acknowledged that the prosecution's most
    _________________________________________________________________
    whether the juror had influenced his fellow panel members. The Lord
    President explained:
    The jury are empaneled and sworn to return a verdict according
    to the evidence led before them. They are not entitled to proceed
    upon anything else but the evidence given upon oath, and if they
    do proceed upon anything else they cannot return a verdict
    according to their oath. . . . I think therefore it is essential to the
    justice of the case that we should grant a new trial.
    
    Id. at 495-96.
    A second judge expressed his opinion as follows:
    It is impossible to feel satisfied that the verdict in this case was
    returned according to the evidence laid before the jury. It is
    impossible to believe that this gentleman . . . was not impressed
    by what he saw. He therefore gave his verdict upon evidence not
    obtained at the trial. Whether, or how far, he influenced others
    by stating the impression made upon himself it is impossible to
    state, but it is very probable that he did to some extent influence
    his co-jurors.
    
    Id. at 496
    (opinion of Lord Adam).
    In Rex v. Ryan, 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 32, 101 C.C.C. 101 (Brit. Col. 1951),
    the court required a new trial after conviction because the jury in a mur-
    der case made an out-of-court excursion without the trial judge's permis-
    sion. The Court of Appeal explained:
    The jury is a legal institution in which the people take great
    pride. Through it the people take their responsible part in the
    administration of legal justice. Removal of the jury from all out-
    side influences lies at the very foundation of the confidence that
    has been maintained in it. It is of the highest importance there-
    fore not only that no communication with outsiders shall actually
    in fact occur, but also that nothing shall seem to take place which
    may weaken respect for the jury in the public mind.
    101 C.C.C. at 105 (internal citation omitted).
    21
    crucial photograph, a close-up of the tree, "does not show me any-
    thing on its face." It is therefore impossible to believe that the juror's
    investigation did not impress him and possibly others and impossible
    to say--as one must in finding harmlessness--that the error did not
    have "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
    jury's verdict."9 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
    507 U.S. 619
    , 637 (1993).
    _________________________________________________________________
    9 The majority appears to have forgotten the Supreme Court's exhorta-
    tions not to focus on the guilt of the defendant but on the effect that the
    error had on the jury's verdict. "Harmless-error review looks . . . to the
    basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict . . . not whether, in a
    trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have
    been rendered." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
    113 S. Ct. 2078
    , 2081 (1993)
    (citations omitted); see also O'Neal v. McAninch , 
    115 S. Ct. 992
    , 994
    (1995) (advising appellate judges, when "in grave doubt" about whether
    an error was harmless, to treat the error not as harmless, but as though
    it affected the verdict).
    See generally Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always
    Harmless: When Should Legal Error be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
    1167 (1995). Chief Judge Edwards asserts:
    Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist says that, in any harmless-error
    review, the role of the appellate court is to "determine whether
    it is possible to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did
    not contribute to the jury's verdict."
    Only last term, the Supreme Court offered up its decision in
    O'Neal v. McAninch, [
    115 S. Ct. 992
    (1995)] the crown jewel in
    the decisions moving away from guilt-based applications of the
    harmless-error doctrine. In O'Neal, the Court considered what
    action a federal habeas court must take when, upon review of a
    state-court judgment from a criminal trial, it finds itself left in
    "grave doubt" as to whether a constitutional error was harmless.
    The court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, held that the appellate
    judge in such a case should treat the error not as harmless, but
    rather as though it affected the verdict. This conclusion, the
    Court stated, is consistent with the application of the Kotteakos
    [v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 750
    (1946)] standard, which applies
    even to constitutional errors in habeas proceedings, and which
    admonishes that "``if [a reviewing court] is left in grave doubt [as
    to the harmlessness of an error], the conviction cannot stand.'"
    
    Id. at 1201-02
    (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). How can one
    properly regard as non-structural, or harmless, an error where the defen-
    22
    In any event, I believe that harmlessness review is not appropriate
    here because the error is fundamental and structural. The basic frame-
    work of our trial system requires that evidence be presented and
    _________________________________________________________________
    dant is kept altogether ignorant of a witness he should have been allowed
    to cross-examine about a matter which played such a central part in the
    case?
    Chief Judge Edwards describes Justice Breyer's "common-sense view
    of harmless error focused not on artificial categories of cases, but on
    notions of fundamental fairness." 
    Id. at 1202.
    He notes that O'Neal
    establishes that "the proper measure of harmlessness is whether the error
    ``had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
    jury's verdict,' not whether the record evidence is sufficient absent the
    error to warrant a verdict of guilt." 
    Id. (Emphasis in
    original; citation
    omitted).
    In note 160, Judge Edwards continues:
    In Kyles v. Whitley, 
    115 S. Ct. 1555
    , 1566 (1995), the Court
    ruled that, in determining whether the defendant has been preju-
    diced by a violation of Brady, "[t]he question is not whether the
    defendant would more likely than not have received a different
    verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received
    a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
    confidence." . . . According to the majority[of the Supreme
    Court] "[a] defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting
    the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence,
    there would not have been enough left to convict." . . . Thus, this
    case seems to return to Kotteakos's original focus on the severity
    of the error rather than the cumulative weight of the untainted
    evidence.
    
    Id. at 1203.
    The article describes the Supreme Court as making "it clear
    that ``[a]n error may seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public repu-
    tation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence."
    
    Id. at 1204
    (emphasis in original).
    Judge Edwards concludes by saying that "[t]he mission of the appel-
    late courts in evaluating claims of harmless error should be to address
    significant errors and ensure fundamental fairness." 
    Id. at 1209.
    The
    statement is reminiscent of the Supreme Court's admonition that a prose-
    cutor's interest in a criminal case "is not that it shall win a case but that
    justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 
    295 U.S. 78
    , 88 (1935).
    The interest of the trial judge is at least as great.
    23
    tested in a public courtroom before the jury, the judge and the defen-
    dant. Turner v. Louisiana, 
    379 U.S. 466
    , 472-73 (1965) (stating that
    "[t]he requirement that a jury's verdict``must be based upon the evi-
    dence developed at the trial' goes to the fundamental integrity of all
    that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury" and that
    the Constitution requires "at the very least that the ``evidence devel-
    oped' against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a pub-
    lic courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's
    right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel"); see
    also Pointer v. Texas, 
    380 U.S. 400
    , 405 (1965) ("There are few sub-
    jects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more
    nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of
    confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental
    requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitu-
    tional goal. Indeed, we have expressly declared that to deprive an
    accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is a
    denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of
    law.") Independent and unauthorized jury viewing therefore is prohib-
    ited.
    The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed these fundamental
    principles in a recent opinion. United States v. Noushfar, 
    78 F.3d 1442
    (9th Cir. 1996). Reversing and remanding for a new trial, the
    court held that allowing the jury to listen to matters that had never
    been presented in open court requires reversal because the jury's con-
    sideration of evidence is "a stage of the trial at which the presence of
    the defendant is required." 
    Id. at 1444.
    The court went on to say:
    The court completely abdicated control of the presentation
    of the evidence. . . . In cases where the error is so fundamen-
    tal and defies meaningful review, we have said that harmless
    or plain error analysis may not be applied. Instead, we find
    the error to be a structural error requiring automatic reversal
    . . . . [In an earlier case,] we said that structural error analy-
    sis was the correct approach where there was a "complete
    abdication of judicial control over the process."
    
    Id. at 1445.10
    _________________________________________________________________
    10 The opinion of the majority in the instant case therefore seems to
    create a circuit split inviting the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Per-
    haps then the majority opinion would be shown to have but a short life.
    24
    A mistake that violates basic trial structure and taints the entire
    process is most properly labelled "structural error." See 
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629-30
    (discussing difference between structural and trial
    error);11 Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    499 U.S. 279
    , 306-10 (1991) (same).
    The impact of a juror's personal gathering of evidence outside the
    courtroom by way of an unsupervised--indeed forbidden--viewing is
    difficult to isolate and assess. See Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 307-09
    (explaining that trial error may be "quantitatively assessed . . . in
    order to determine whether its admission was harmless" while struc-
    tural error defies such analysis);12 see also 
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629
    _________________________________________________________________
    11 It should not be overlooked that the Supreme Court in Brecht relied
    very much on the fact that state courts had earlier found the error harm-
    less beyond a reasonable doubt in concluding that the federal court on
    habeas corpus review need not duplicate the analysis set forth in
    
    Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24
    . 
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635
    -38. Here, there was
    never a state court finding pursuant to Chapman , so requiring that
    inquiry may not as easily be viewed duplicative and unnecessary.
    12 Again, there was no opportunity in Sherman's case to determine
    whether the error could be cured and thus deemed harmless. Neither the
    trial judge nor Sherman knew of the site visit and resulting breach of
    Sherman's right of cross-examination until after the jury had rendered its
    verdict. Under different circumstances, the matter might well require a
    different outcome. The fact remains, however, that the error in Sher-
    man's case remained unaddressed and uncured, and thus violated the
    entire structure of the trial.
    Although it concerned somewhat different circumstances, State v.
    Magwood, 
    432 A.2d 446
    (Md. 1981), is instructive. There, the trial judge
    permitted a jury hearing a criminal case to separate overnight despite the
    fact that it was in the midst of deliberations. The defendant's counsel
    agreed to the separation and the defendant did not object, and the judge
    gave the jury the ordinary admonition "not to discuss the case during
    their overnight separation or to consult outside references." 
    Id. at 447.
    In
    analyzing the claim of error, the Maryland Court of Appeals emphasized
    the judge's instruction not to discuss the case and"not to consult outside
    sources." 
    Id. at 451.
    Although it found no demonstration of "any viola-
    tion of this court instruction," the court of appeals declared that if a
    breach of the prohibition had occurred, the remedy would have been "to
    attack the jury verdict as improperly reached." 
    Id. The court
    further
    found that counsel's acceptance of the jury separation waived the defen-
    dant's right to a sequestered jury, but noted that only the defendant could
    25
    (same). Its pervasive nature cannot be discounted in an attempt to
    consider whether it was harmless.
    Even if the information gleaned could be called harmless because
    it did not substantially influence the jury's verdict, the independent
    investigation undermined the integrity of the trial and thus the jury's
    decision.13 The harmful and truly the structural nature of the juror's
    unauthorized and undisclosed visit to the tree becomes clear with the
    realization that Sherman was, as a consequence, deprived of his right
    to cross-examine the undisclosed witness.14 Contained in the Sixth
    _________________________________________________________________
    have waived his right to confront witnesses against him. 
    Id. at 450.
    Here,
    of course, neither Sherman nor his counsel could waive his rights
    because they did not know of the unpermitted jury excursion. Further-
    more, the forbidden juror activity actually occurred.
    It is also helpful to consider State v. Collins , 
    288 A.2d 163
    (Md. 1972).
    There, notice of a deposition was sent to, but not actually received by,
    the defendant. His counsel nevertheless appeared and cross-examined the
    witness. 
    Id. at 168.
    The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the convic-
    tion and remanded for a new trial, noting that it had made "assiduous
    efforts to protect the constitutional guarantee of confrontation at all
    stages of a trial" and that "these efforts would be meaningless if this invi-
    olable right could be circumvented by allowing the deposition of a wit-
    ness, taken while the accused is involuntarily absent, to be admitted in
    evidence at trial." 
    Id. at 170.
    13 In Sutherland, the Scottish court required a new trial although it
    could not be sure whether the improperly behaving juror influenced his
    fellow jurors or himself. 15 R. (Ct. of Sess.) at 495-96. The court essen-
    tially found that the jury's verdict was structurally deficient, ruling that
    it had not been returned "according to their oath." 
    Id. at 495.
    14 The outcome in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
    475 U.S. 673
    (1986), illus-
    trates an essential distinction. Upon review of a reversal of a conviction
    because of a restriction on the defendant's ability to cross-examine a wit-
    ness which violated his Confrontation Clause rights, the Court remanded
    to allow harmlessness to be explored. 
    Id. at 684.
    Unlike Sherman's situa-
    tion, the defense in Van Arsdall was fully aware of the bias issues it
    sought to explore with cross-examination, but was denied the opportu-
    nity. Hence, remand to examine whether prejudice or harm had occurred
    was appropriate, for the error was a trial error. On remand, the Supreme
    Court of Delaware held that the error violated the Delaware Constitution
    and was not harmless. Van Arsdall v. State, 
    524 A.2d 3
    , 6 (Del. 1987).
    26
    Amendment's guarantee that a defendant will be informed of the
    nature of the accusation and confronted with the witnesses against
    him, cross-examination is both a fundamental right and perhaps the
    most critical tool to be employed in the representation of a criminal
    defendant. 
    Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404-05
    . Allowing a juror to conduct
    his own investigation outside the courtroom in an attempt to answer
    questions that arose in the criminal matter before him certainly "af-
    fects the framework within which the trial proceeds" and justifies
    automatic reversal of the conviction. Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 309-10.
    I therefore do not believe that we can say that Sherman's trial "reli-
    ably serve[d] its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
    innocence, and that [the] criminal punishment may be regarded as
    fundamentally fair." 
    Id. at 310
    (quoting Rose v. Clark, 
    478 U.S. 570
    ,
    577-78 (1986)). It is not fundamentally fair to the parties for a juror,
    in effect, to conduct privately his own trial.
    A juror's reliance upon extrinsic information, even if that informa-
    tion is accurate and useful, "would tend to obstruct the administration
    of justice, because even a correct conclusion is not to be reached or
    helped in that way, if our system of trials is to be maintained."15
    _________________________________________________________________
    Sherman, though he would be aware of how vital cross-examination
    of the errant juror would be if he testified, was totally ignorant that the
    juror had in essence become a witness subject to cross-examination.
    Thus, harmlessness could not possibly be found. Under the circum-
    stances of Van Arsdall, knowledge of the witness's presence and the pos-
    sibility of exploration by cross-examination perhaps allowed the error to
    be treated as a "trial" error. In Sherman's case, however, the error was
    clearly "structural" from the moment it occurred. Sherman, altogether
    unaware that he was being denied the right of confrontation, cannot be
    faulted for not attempting to cross-examine. The artificial category of
    cases labelled "Confrontation Clause" cases and deemed amenable to
    harmless-error review should not be permitted to eradicate "notions of
    fundamental fairness."
    15 Again, the principle is fundamental to Anglo justice systems. In
    ordering a new trial after jurors had improperly asked questions of a
    boatman taking them on an authorized view, an Australian court stated:
    It is quite clear that a jury, sworn to find their verdict according
    to the evidence, cannot have any evidence before them except
    27
    Patterson v. Colorado, 
    205 U.S. 454
    , 462 (1907)."The theory of our
    system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced
    only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
    influence." 
    Id. The majority
    here ignores that fundamental precept
    and suggests that, in some cases, jurors may ignore a judge's orders
    and seek whatever information they like about a case from whatever
    source they wish.16 It overlooks the structural character of the error,
    as well as the destructive effect on the public's trust, to allow a jury
    trial to be conducted with such blatant violations of governing rules.
    III.
    Some errors are so egregious that they must be corrected, even if
    the result is to overturn a guilty verdict. "Surely no fair-minded per-
    son will contend that those who have been deprived of their liberty
    without due process of law ought nevertheless to languish in prison.
    . . . For such anomalies, such affronts to the conscience of a civilized
    society, habeas corpus is predestined by its historical role in the strug-
    gle for personal liberty to be the ultimate remedy." Fay v. Noia, 
    372 U.S. 391
    , 441 (1963).
    The result of granting habeas relief in this case would not necessar-
    ily be to let a convicted killer go free. The State of Maryland would
    have an opportunity to retry Sherman properly in an attempt to secure
    _________________________________________________________________
    such as is adduced in open Court, and if such evidence, whether
    it be oral or in writing, come to them the verdict may be avoided
    . . . . Nor is the case altered by the fact that the evidence so given
    out of Court may be true.
    Smith v. Neild, 10 N.S.W.L.R. 171, 173 (Aus. 1889) (citations omitted).
    16 There is no indication that the misbehaving juror here was sanc-
    tioned, or otherwise rebuked or punished, once the error he committed
    became known. The lack of such a response suggests that any juror may
    so violate a court's directions with impunity. The majority underscores
    the message by allowing the error to stand uncorrected. Its decision con-
    trols not only in Harford County, Maryland, but in every city and county
    in the five states comprising the Fourth Circuit. Hereafter jurors will feel
    free to disregard instructions not to perform unsupervised viewing of the
    scene of the crime.
    28
    a conviction from an untainted jury. Here, "[p]ublic confidence in the
    fair and honorable administration of justice, upon which ultimately
    depends the rule of law, is the transcending value at stake." Sherman
    v. United States, 
    356 U.S. 369
    , 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
    ring). Sherman may well have killed his parents, but we are a less civ-
    ilized nation if we do not require the State to prove in a fair trial that
    he did so. It is not enough merely that a defendant committed a crime.
    The fundamental tenets of our justice system require that he be con-
    victed properly.
    IV.
    For the above reasons and those contained in the earlier majority
    opinion of the panel, Sherman v. Smith, 
    70 F.3d 1263
    (4th Cir. 1995)
    (unpublished) (per curiam), vacated and reh'g en banc granted (4th
    Cir. Jan. 18, 1996), I respectfully dissent. I would favor the grant of
    the writ of habeas corpus.
    Judge Ervin and Judge Michael join in this dissent.
    DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dis-
    senting in part:
    As the Supreme Court has specifically recognized, the right at
    stake here, the right to have "a jury's verdict .. . based upon the evi-
    dence developed at trial[,] goes to the fundamental integrity of all that
    is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury." Turner v.
    Louisiana, 
    379 U.S. 466
    , 472 (1965). Unfortunately, the atrocious
    crimes committed and abundant circumstantial evidence pointing to
    Sherman as the perpetrator have led the majority to disregard this
    bedrock principle. Regardless of how much sympathy we have for the
    victims or how certain we may be of Sherman's guilt, we must follow
    the Constitution. Adherence to it does not require that Sherman be
    released but it does require that he be provided a new trial. Accord-
    ingly, although I agree with some of the majority's conclusions, I
    must respectfully dissent from its holding.
    I.
    Most constitutional errors are trial errors and can be harmless, but
    some "will always invalidate the conviction." Sullivan v. Louisiana,
    29
    
    508 U.S. 275
    , 279 (1993). Such "structural defects in the constitution
    of the trial mechanism . . . defy analysis by ``harmless-error' stan-
    dards." Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    499 U.S. 279
    , 309 (1990). Structural
    errors are those that affect "the framework within which the trial pro-
    ceeds." 
    Id. The right
    at issue in this case -- the right to be convicted
    solely on the basis of evidence presented at trial-- seems to me to
    fit squarely within this definition. Thus, an error involving this right,
    like errors involving the related right to a public trial or the right to
    be represented by counsel at trial, should be deemed structural. If we
    were writing on the proverbial clean slate, I would so hold.
    After all, of what consequence is the right to counsel, to an impar-
    tial judge, to a public trial, to a correct reasonable doubt jury instruction,1
    or to a criminal trial at all, if a defendant can be convicted based on
    evidence not presented at trial. The right to have a conviction based
    only on the evidence presented at trial, like other rights whose depri-
    vation constitutes structural error, is one of those protections without
    which "a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle
    for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment
    may be regarded as fundamentally fair." Rose v. Clark, 
    478 U.S. 570
    ,
    577-78 (1986) (citation omitted).
    Permitting a verdict to be based on evidence other than that pres-
    ented at trial, like other structural errors, has repercussions that are
    "necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualif-
    [ying it] as ``structural error.'" 
    Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 282
    . This is par-
    ticularly true in light of the rules of evidence and the restrictions they
    quite legitimately place on any inquiry into jury deliberations. See
    Tanner v. United States, 
    483 U.S. 107
    , 117-125 (1987). Because they
    prohibit any inquiry into the effect that additional, unopposable, and
    possibly inadmissible evidence might have on a jury, a juror's expo-
    sure to such evidence is necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.
    See United States v. Bagley, 
    473 U.S. 667
    , 693 (1985) ("The private
    whys and wherefores of jury deliberations pose an impenetrable bar-
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 Deprivations of each of these rights has been held to be structural
    error. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
    508 U.S. 275
    (1993) (reasonable doubt
    instruction); Waller v. Georgia, 
    467 U.S. 39
    , 49 n.9 (1984) (public trial);
    Gideon v. Wainwright, 
    372 U.S. 335
    (1963) (counsel at trial); Tumey v.
    Ohio, 
    273 U.S. 510
    (1927) (impartial judge).
    30
    rier to our ability to know which piece of information might make, or
    might have made, a difference") (Marshall, J., dissenting).
    "In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case neces-
    sarily implies at the very least that the evidence developed against a
    defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom
    where there is full judicial protection of a defendant's right of con-
    frontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel." 
    Turner, 379 U.S. at 472-73
    .2 Consequently, just as when a jury is given an improper rea-
    sonable doubt instruction, when a verdict is not based solely on evi-
    dence presented at trial, "there has been no jury verdict within the
    meaning of the Sixth Amendment" and so "no object . . . upon which
    harmless error scrutiny can operate." 
    Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280
    . The
    most an appellate court can conclude in the case at hand is that a jury
    would surely have found the defendant guilty based on the evidence
    presented at trial. A court cannot conclude anything about the jury's
    actual finding of guilt, because that finding was based to some
    unknown extent on evidence that was never presented at trial. Cf. 
    id. at 279-80.
    The majority rightly recognizes that an error should not be deemed
    structural unless its presence renders "unfair" every criminal convic-
    tion in which the error occurs. See Maj. Op. at 6. Structural error,
    however, is not merely a "shorthand" form of harmless error analysis,
    rather it involves the broader question of the fundamental fairness of
    the trial process. Accordingly, an error that so infects a trial as to ren-
    der the process fundamentally unfair is structural, regardless of
    whether, looking narrowly at its "actual impact" on the verdict, the
    error might sometimes be deemed harmless.
    For example, the Supreme Court has held that the denial of the
    right to a public trial is structural error, 
    Waller, 467 U.S. at 49
    n.9,
    because it renders the entire process unfair, not because such an error
    can never be "harmless" in terms of its impact on the jury's verdict
    _________________________________________________________________
    2 Significantly, as noted above, the deprivation of a defendant's right
    to a public trial or to counsel is considered structural error. The error in
    this case deprived Sherman of the remaining three components the Court
    recognized in Turner as essential to the fundamental right to trial by jury.
    Surely this error should also be considered structural.
    31
    -- the harm is to the trial process, not necessarily to the specific ver-
    dict reached. Similarly, because a juror's unsupervised and unautho-
    rized site visit, in a case in which the physical characteristics of that
    site are critical to the case, deprives the defendant of the right to be
    convicted solely on the basis of evidence presented at trial, it too ren-
    ders the trial process fundamentally unfair. Such an error would seem
    to me therefore to be structural error, whether or not one can imagine
    factual scenarios in which the information obtained by the juror has
    no impact on the jury's deliberations or verdict.
    Nor would such a holding require reversal in every case in which
    a juror engaged in an unauthorized site visit. The majority convinc-
    ingly explains the difficulties of a holding that would lead to this
    result. However, the majority has created and then defeated a straw
    man. Sherman specifically disavows any request for such a broad rul-
    ing. Instead, he maintains that unauthorized site visits amount to con-
    stitutional error only in cases in which"significant issues were raised
    at trial concerning the physical aspects of the areas visited by the
    juror." Brief of Appellant at 21 (quoting Commonwealth v. Price, 
    344 A.2d 493
    , 494 (Pa. 1975)).
    An analysis that results in finding constitutional error in some cir-
    cumstances but not in others is unusual, but not unprecedented.
    Indeed, as Sherman points out, the Supreme Court has adopted a simi-
    lar approach in examining court orders forbidding criminal defendants
    from consulting with counsel. An order preventing a defendant from
    consulting with counsel during an overnight recess interferes with his
    Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and reversal is required; the error
    is not examined for harmlessness and no proof of prejudice is neces-
    sary. See Geders v. United States, 
    425 U.S. 80
    (1976). In contrast, an
    order preventing a defendant from consulting with counsel briefly
    during his testimony is regarded as so de minimis as not to be consti-
    tutional error at all. Perry v. Leeke, 
    488 U.S. 272
    , 280-84 (1989).
    Between these two extremes, there is "a line of constitutional dimen-
    sion." 
    Id. at 278-80.
    In the same way, unauthorized site visits in cases in which the
    physical aspects of the site are not at issue should be regarded as de
    minimis -- not constitutional error at all. This approach has much to
    32
    recommend it. It protects the fundamental right involved here, yet
    avoids trivialization of the structural error inquiry.
    Because the Supreme Court has never dealt with a case involving
    juror's unauthorized site visit -- let alone such a visit in a case, like
    this, where the physical features of the site are of critical importance,
    no direct precedent prohibits the above approach. However, in those
    cases involving what I regard as the most similar constitutional errors
    -- unauthorized private contacts with jurors during trial -- the
    Supreme Court seems to have applied a harmless error analysis, hold-
    ing that such contacts require reversal of a conviction only if the gov-
    ernment fails to "establish, after notice to and hearing of the
    defendant that such contact was harmless to the defendant." Remmer
    v. United States, 
    347 U.S. 227
    , 229 (1954) (emphasis added).3 See
    also Mattox v. United States, 
    146 U.S. 140
    , 150 (1897) ("Private com-
    munications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons
    . . . are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least
    unless their harmlessness is made to appear.") (emphasis added).
    Both Remmer and Mattox were decided well before 1991, when the
    Supreme Court first began analyzing constitutional error in terms of
    structural error, which is not subject to harmless error analysis, and
    trial error, which is. See Arizona v. Fulminante , 
    499 U.S. 279
    (1991).
    Indeed, Remmer and Mattox predate many of the Court's landmark
    decisions regarding the constitutional protections due to criminal
    _________________________________________________________________
    3 The majority characterizes the instant case as "virtually indistinguish-
    able" from both Remmer and Smith v. Phillips, 
    455 U.S. 209
    (1982). I
    agree that the error involved in this case is very similar to the error in
    Remmer. However, as this court recognized in Stockton v. Virginia, 
    852 F.2d 740
    , 744 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
    489 U.S. 1071
    (1989),
    Phillips involves clearly distinguishable concerns. As we explained in
    Stockton, when, as in Phillips, "some external manifestation of a juror's
    predisposition subsequently calls the juror's impartiality into question,
    the defendant is afforded the opportunity to establish the juror's actual
    
    bias." 852 F.2d at 744
    (emphasis added). On the other hand, where, as
    in the case at hand and Remmer, "the danger is not one of juror impair-
    ment or predisposition, but rather the effect of an extraneous communi-
    cation upon the deliberative process of the jury, the defendant's right to
    an impartial jury requires that the government bear the burden of estab-
    lishing the nonprejudicial character of the contact." 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    33
    defendants. E.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 
    451 U.S. 477
    (1981); Miranda
    v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 
    378 U.S. 478
    (1964). Consequently, if Remmer or Mattox were decided today, the
    Court might well regard the errors in them as structural.
    Alternatively, the Court might conclude that even if harmless error
    analysis applies to unauthorized contacts with jurors, a juror's uns-
    upervised and unauthorized visit to examine for himself the disputed
    physical aspects of a site presents a more fundamental problem merit-
    ing treatment as structural error. A juror's private fact-finding mis-
    sion, which results in new facts being presented to the jury without
    the benefit of cross-examination by (or even the knowledge of) the
    defendant, certainly presents more serious Confrontation Clause prob-
    lems than juror contacts having nothing to do with the facts of the
    case. Thus, when the Supreme Court is presented with an appropriate
    case, it may well conclude, as my dissenting colleagues do, that the
    error involved here is indeed structural.
    However, in view of Remmer and Mattox , the Supreme Court's
    reluctance to classify errors as structural, and the decisions of this
    court extending Remmer to cases involving a jury's exposure to unad-
    mitted evidence, see United States v. Barnes, 
    747 F.2d 246
    , 251 (4th
    Cir. 1984); see also Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 
    81 F.3d 416
    , 427
    (4th Cir. 1996) (following Barnes without citing Remmer), I believe
    that I am bound to treat the error here as trial error, subject to harm-
    less error analysis. I therefore turn to that analysis.
    II.
    On collateral review, we may set aside a conviction only if con-
    vinced that the asserted error "``had substantial and injurious effect or
    influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Brecht v. Abrahamson,
    
    507 U.S. 619
    , 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 750
    , 776 (1946)).4 If we find the issue so close as to leave us "in
    _________________________________________________________________
    4 Like the majority, I believe that our decision in Smith v. Dixon, 
    14 F.3d 956
    (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
    115 S. Ct. 129
    (1994), established that the Brecht standard applies on collateral review,
    even when the state court has failed to find an error harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt.
    34
    virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error," we must resolve
    the question in favor of the petitioner and grant habeas relief. O'Neal
    v. McAninch, ___ U.S. ___, 
    115 S. Ct. 992
    , 994 (1995).
    In the instant case, the state trial court held a hearing on Sherman's
    motion for a new trial, and juror Miller was called to testify on Sher-
    man's behalf. On direct examination, the juror testified that two or
    three days into the trial, he and his wife drove to Gibson Manor,
    "looking for [the] tree that was so involved in the case." He stated that
    he did, in fact, find the tree as well as the house in which the murders
    occurred. Apparently wary of violating the secrecy of the jury's delib-
    erations, and consistent with the State's objections, the court did not
    permit Sherman's counsel to ask the juror why he visited the site.
    On cross-examination by the State, the juror testified that by the
    time he visited the site, he had already seen (in court) the videotape
    of the outside of the Sherman house, but was not sure if he had yet
    seen the aerial photographs of the neighborhood. When asked
    whether, at the time of his site visit, several photographs of the tree
    had been introduced, the juror responded, "Yes, the tree had been in
    question, and that's one of the reasons I went there." Finally, the State
    asked the juror whether other photographs of the scene had been
    introduced by the time he made his visit, to which he responded, "I'm
    not sure, sir. I'm not sure what sequence -- the reason why I went
    there was so I could see the tree that was so much in question." The
    State made no further inquiry into the facts and circumstances sur-
    rounding the juror's site visit.
    All told, the record regarding the asserted error provides the fol-
    lowing information:
    (1) Two or three days into the trial, the juror drove to the
    neighborhood in which the murders occurred, looking for
    the tree in which the murder weapon was found.
    (2) The juror saw the Sherman house and the tree.
    (3) This visit occurred after a videotape of the outside of
    the Sherman house was played for the jury, and after the
    jury saw several photographs of the tree.
    35
    (4) The juror's stated purpose for this site visit was to "see
    the tree that was so much in question."
    To this day, no details of the juror's site visit are known. We do not
    know, nor did the state trial court know, for example, the length of
    the juror's site visit; how close he came to the tree; whether he got
    out of his car and walked to the tree or simply drove past; whether
    he performed "experiments" based on the testimony about the tree or
    merely looked at it to ascertain its size and location. Despite the spar-
    sity of the record, the state trial court determined that Sherman suf-
    fered no prejudice as a result of the juror's site visit.5 I cannot agree.
    Based on the extremely limited information before us regarding the
    juror's site visit, it is simply impossible to ascertain whether and to
    what extent Sherman was prejudiced by the visit. The juror's testi-
    mony is consistent with a visit in which he simply drove through Gib-
    son Manor and looked at the house and the tree as he drove by. Such
    a visit, if properly subject to harmless error analysis, might well be
    found to be harmless.6
    However, the juror's testimony would be equally consistent with a
    scenario in which, dissatisfied with the evidence presented at trial, he
    set out to conduct his own investigation, including taking measure-
    ments of the tree and its distance from the house and attempting to
    hide items in the tree in the manner in which the murder weapon was
    found. Such a visit would certainly be prejudicial. Contrary to the
    majority's suggestion, Maj. Op. at 13, it would not be merely "cumu-
    lative" of the other evidence at trial, as the proper interpretation of
    that evidence was disputed. For example, perhaps confused by the
    parties' conflicting interpretations of Officer Hopkins' testimony, the
    _________________________________________________________________
    5 In my view, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
    1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), does not apply retroac-
    tively to cases like the one at hand. See Landgraf v. USI Films Prods.,
    ___ U.S. ___, 
    114 S. Ct. 1483
    , 1505 (1994).
    6 As noted above, this does not preclude characterization of that error
    as structural. The harmless error inquiry focuses on the impact of an
    error on the verdict rendered. Structural error is concerned with the integ-
    rity and fairness of the trial process, not the impact of a particular error
    on the actual verdict.
    36
    juror sought to resolve for himself whether someone of Sherman's
    height and build could have wedged the gun in the tree in the manner
    in which it was found. Alternatively, perhaps the juror wanted to test
    whether it was possible to hide something in the tree without getting
    sap and pine needles on one's clothing, or wanted to see whether it
    made sense for Sherman to have stopped at the tree en route to his
    grandparents' house. Each of these scenarios would result in the dis-
    covery of new, rather than cumulative, information.
    The State of Maryland seems to concede, as it must, that the record
    in this case with respect to the juror's site visit leaves much to be
    desired. The State argues, however, that "Sherman had the burden to
    show that an error warranting new trial relief had occurred," Brief of
    Appellees at 28, and thus should bear the consequences of the insuffi-
    cient record. This argument is foreclosed by Remmer, which man-
    dates that any private communication with a juror about the matter
    pending before the jury is "presumptively prejudicial," and the
    government bears the heavy burden of rebutting that 
    presumption. 347 U.S. at 229
    . Moreover, we have recognized as recently as a few
    months ago, in a case that the majority neither overrules nor acknowl-
    edges, that this presumption governs when jurors consider evidence
    not admitted at trial. See 
    Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 427
    . See also United
    States v. Brooks, 
    957 F.2d 1138
    , 1142 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    505 U.S. 1228
    (1992); United States v. Greene, 
    834 F.2d 86
    , 88 (4th Cir.
    1987); 
    Barnes, 747 F.2d at 250-51
    . Accordingly, while Sherman bore
    the initial burden of proving that the site visit occurred,7 once that fact
    was established, the burden shifted to the State to"demonstrat[e] the
    absence of prejudice." 
    Stockton, 852 F.2d at 743
    .
    _________________________________________________________________
    7 Remmer requires that the improper jury contact be "about the matter
    pending before the 
    jury." 347 U.S. at 229
    . Stockton likewise requires that
    the defendant establish that the contact "was of such a character as to rea-
    sonably draw into question the integrity of the 
    verdict." 852 F.2d at 743
    .
    Our cases applying the Remmer presumption where the jury has been
    exposed to evidence not admitted at trial suggest that, in such cases, the
    defendant need only establish that the jury has, in fact, been exposed to
    the unadmitted evidence to trigger the presumption. See, e.g., 
    Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 427
    . In any event, in this case, by establishing that a juror had
    engaged in an unauthorized site visit and that the physical characteristics
    of that site were of critical importance, Sherman satisfied the additional
    requirements described in Remmer and Stockton.
    37
    Concededly, due to the significant restrictions the rules of evidence
    place on questioning of jurors, it would have been difficult, if not
    impossible, for the State to prove by direct evidence that the juror's
    site visit did not prejudice Sherman. We have suggested that "the state
    may rebut the presumption of prejudice through whatever circumstan-
    tial evidence is available, including juror testimony on the facts and
    circumstances surrounding the extraneous communication [or receipt
    of unadmitted evidence]." 
    Id. at 744.
    Ultimately, however, because
    "[t]he right to an impartial jury belongs to the defendant," the risk of
    being unable to prove the impact of an improper jury contact or a
    jury's exposure to unadmitted evidence is properly borne by the State.
    
    Id. at 743-44.
    In this case, the State simply failed to meet its burden.
    The only circumstantial evidence the State presented to meet its
    heavy burden was the juror's testimony that at the time he made the
    visit, the jury had already seen a videotape and some photographs of
    the area in question. While the State argues (and a majority of this
    court finds) that the site visit was merely cumulative of the other evi-
    dence presented at trial regarding the tree, the juror's testimony in
    response to the State's questions indicates otherwise. When asked
    whether he had seen the photographs of the tree prior to his visit, the
    juror responded that that was why he went to the site -- because he
    wanted to see the tree "in question." This implies a causal relationship
    between the photographs and the visit; the juror was not satisfied with
    the photographs and visited the site to obtain additional information
    about the tree. As my dissenting colleagues note, the district court,
    which nonetheless found the site visit to be harmless error, remarked
    that the state's close-up photograph of the tree"does not show me
    anything on its face."
    The majority makes much of the "powerful array of evidence pres-
    ented at trial" that supports the jury's guilty verdict. This miscon-
    ceives the appropriate harmless error inquiry, which focuses not on
    the sufficiency of the evidence absent the error, but rather on the
    impact of the error on the jury's verdict. See 
    Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279
    ("Harmless error review looks . . . to the basis on which the jury
    actually rested its verdict. . . . not [to] whether, in a trial that occurred
    without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered.")
    (internal citation and quotation omitted). Accordingly, the majority's
    characterization of Sherman's argument as merely a"roundabout"
    38
    attack on the sufficiency of the evidence against him is off the mark.
    Sherman does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented
    at trial, he challenges the fairness of the trial and "the basis on which
    the jury actually rested its verdict." 
    Id. In summary,
    the record in this case reveals that a juror in Sher-
    man's capital murder trial made an unsupervised and unauthorized
    visit to a site whose physical characteristics were disputed and critical
    to the State's case. Unfortunately, the record does not reveal much
    else about that visit. At the post-trial hearing, the burden was on the
    State to rebut the presumption of prejudice raised by the juror's site
    visit, and the State must therefore bear the consequences of the spar-
    sity of the record. Given the lack of detail as to the juror's site visit
    and the wide range of conduct that his testimony might describe, the
    majority's conclusion that the site visit was harmless is tantamount to
    a conclusion that a juror's unauthorized site visit can never be preju-
    dicial error. I cannot agree with this conclusion. While some of the
    possibilities encompassed by the juror's ambiguous testimony might
    be harmless, many of them would certainly be prejudicial.
    Without any evidence as to the details of the juror's site visit, I find
    myself "in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error."
    
    O'Neal, 115 S. Ct. at 992
    . My "grave doubt as to the harmlessness
    of [the] error" requires me to resolve the issue in Sherman's favor. 
    Id. at 999.
    The "obviousness" of Sherman's guilt to a reviewing court, or
    to the public for that matter, is irrelevant absent a proper jury verdict.
    I would, therefore, grant the writ of habeas corpus, so that Sherman
    could receive a new trial in which the jury returns a proper verdict,
    based solely on the evidence presented at trial. The Constitution
    requires nothing less.
    39