Vessell v. DPS Associates of Charleston, Inc. ( 1998 )


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  • PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    GEORGE VESSELL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    and
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex
    relatio,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    DPS ASSOCIATES OF CHARLESTON,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Remax
    Professional Realty, a/k/a DPS of
    Charleston, Incorporated;
    CANDACE N. PRATT, Broker-In-
    No. 97-1484
    Charge; DAVID FINN; JANINE
    TOWNSEND; FRED RICE,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    THOMAS J. GIBBONS; BILL KONEFAL;
    HOWARD JACKSON; CENTURY PEST
    CONTROL, INCORPORATED; FRANK
    THOMPSON; THOMPSON & SONS;
    PRUDENTIAL CAROLINAS REALTY;
    RESULTS REALTY; AGENT-OWNED
    REALTY; ANITA DUNN,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.
    C. Weston Houck, Chief District Judge.
    (CA-95-1887-2-12)
    Argued: December 4, 1997
    Decided: July 8, 1998
    Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and ERVIN and
    MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Ervin wrote the opinion, in
    which Chief Judge Wilkinson and Judge Michael joined.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Gregg Meyers, PRATT-THOMAS, PEARCE, EPTING
    & WALKER, P.A., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant.
    Charles R. Norris, NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCARBOR-
    OUGH, L.L.P., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON
    BRIEF: Craig E. Burgess, NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCAR-
    BOROUGH, L.L.P., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees.
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    ERVIN, Circuit Judge:
    This case comes before us on the district court's grant of judgment
    as a matter of law for the defendant-appellee, DPS Associates, a real
    estate agency doing business as Re/Max Professional Realty
    ("Re/Max"). The plaintiff-appellant, George Vessell, had claimed
    breach of contract under state law and retaliatory discharge under the
    False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (1994). The district court
    correctly found that any contract between Vessell and Re/Max was
    saturated with fraud and thus unenforceable, and that Vessell, who
    was at best an independent contractor, could not recover for retalia-
    tory discharge under the False Claims Act because its coverage
    extends only to employees. We therefore affirm the district court's
    resolution of Vessell's claims.
    I.
    When the United States decided to close its Navy base in Charles-
    ton, South Carolina, the government, under its Housing Assistance
    2
    Program ("HAP"), acquired the homes of government employees
    forced to sell their homes because of the closing. Under the HAP, the
    United States would manage and sell the homes over time to avoid
    having to sell all of the homes in the depressed market that likely
    would result from the base closing.
    The United States Army Corps of Engineers, which oversaw the
    HAP, contracted with various real estate agencies to manage and sell
    the homes. One of the real estate agencies was the Re/Max agency in
    this case, which operated under the supervision of Broker-In-Charge
    Candace Pratt. The winning Re/Max bid was one of three submitted
    by that Re/Max office, and had been prepared by Re/Max agent Tom
    Gibbons.
    In preparing the bid, Gibbons requested that George Vessell esti-
    mate how much he would charge for the lawn maintenance and
    upkeep on the HAP properties. Vessell had been a Re/Max agent him-
    self at one time, and had since started a landscaping company. His
    company maintained several yards for Gibbons and other Re/Max
    agents. Vessell estimated to Gibbons that it would cost $43 per yard
    for the initial yard cutting and $20 every two weeks to maintain the
    yards. Vessell stated that Gibbons asked him not to provide a quote
    for any of the other agents in the Re/Max office who were preparing
    bids.
    In the bid he submitted to the Corps of Engineers, Gibbons quoted
    $0 for the initial cutting and $12 for recurring cuttings. He stated that
    he did this to "get the contract for Re/Max." In March, 1994, the
    Corps of Engineers opened the sealed bids and awarded one of the
    contracts to Re/Max based on Gibbons's bid. One of the other bidders
    disputed the award; the bid acceptance was not finalized until July,
    1994. The one-year contract had renewal options for two more years.
    Gibbons informed Vessell that he had bid the yardwork at $0/12
    soon after he submitted the bid. Vessell argued with him about the
    amount and prepared a breakdown of his costs to show Gibbons why
    he could not cut the yards for that amount and still make a reasonable
    profit. Vessell refused to cut the lawns at that amount. Gibbons sug-
    gested that Vessell recover the price by bid-rigging and stealing appli-
    ances to make up the difference. When Vessell protested, Gibbons
    3
    said that landscapers were easy to come by and that Vessell would not
    get the HAP job if he did not cooperate.
    Vessell had engaged in a similar enterprise with Gibbons in the
    past. Vessell would remove "abandoned" personal property and appli-
    ances from bank-repossessed homes and sell them at Gibbons's direc-
    tion. Vessell maintained that Gibbons said the removals were
    authorized and that he, Vessell, did not know otherwise, but that the
    current enterprise suggested by Gibbons made Vessell realize that the
    prior actions had probably been illegal.
    Vessell decided to turn Gibbons in to the FBI. He considered, but
    dismissed, the idea of talking to Broker-in-Charge Pratt, because his
    previous experience with her led him to believe she would be ineffec-
    tive in dealing with Gibbons. Vessell contacted FBI agent Quick, with
    whom he worked over the next several months. Quick directed Ves-
    sell to cooperate with Gibbons and not to tell Pratt about Gibbons's
    practices. Vessell thus sold appliances, as suggested by Gibbons, and
    created an apparent "slush fund" out of which Gibbons could pay
    legitimate expenses incurred in the management of the HAP proper-
    ties. The FBI paid Vessell's fees for the lawn maintenance; he did not
    take monies out of the slush fund.
    Vessell started cutting lawns around August 1, 1994. The FBI con-
    ducted its "sting" operation against Gibbons in November. The FBI
    did not direct its investigation against any other members of the
    Re/Max staff, and Re/Max continued to operate under the HAP con-
    tract, which was renewed for the two years permissible under the
    original contract with increased rates awarded for lawn maintenance.
    After the sting, Vessell sought to continue cutting HAP lawns for
    Re/Max, but received no response from the Re/Max office. According
    to Vessell, Re/Max managed and marketed an average of 180 homes
    at a time under the HAP contract. When he could not get the HAP
    work, he gave up landscaping and has since become a private investi-
    gator.
    Vessell brought suit under the False Claims Act against Gibbons,
    Re/Max, and various Re/Max agents. The United States intervened,
    as it is entitled to do in False Claims Act cases, and settled its claims
    4
    against Re/Max, Candace Pratt, Gibbons, and other interested parties
    on February 28, 1997.
    Vessell's primary claim was that he should be permitted to carry
    out the terms of the contract he allegedly made with Re/Max through
    Gibbons. He further argued that Re/Max retaliated against him in vio-
    lation of the False Claims Act by refusing to carry out the terms of
    his contract. Vessell's action went to trial in March, 1997, and the dis-
    trict court directed a verdict against Vessell. The United States chose
    not to intervene in Vessell's appeal from that verdict.
    II.
    The district court had jurisdiction over Vessell's False Claims Act
    claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) and exercised supplemental jurisdic-
    tion over Vessell's state law claims under 28 U.S.C.§ 1367. We have
    jurisdiction over Vessell's timely appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    III.
    Vessell first contends that the district court erred in dismissing his
    breach of contract claim. The district court directed a verdict that no
    contract existed between Vessell and Re/Max because 1) Vessell had
    not demonstrated a meeting of the minds between the parties; 2) there
    was no mutuality of obligation; and 3) Vessell's contract, if any, was
    between him and Tom Gibbons, a Re/Max agent, and not between
    him and the Re/Max agency. The district court further held that any
    contract the parties could be said to have had was saturated with fraud
    and thus unenforceable.
    "Judgment as a matter of law is proper when without weighing the
    credibility of the evidence there can be but one reasonable conclusion
    as to the proper judgment." Benner v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
    93 F.3d 1228
    , 1234 (4th Cir. 1996). Our review of the district court's
    decision is plenary. 
    Id. We must
    view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the non-moving party. Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. Partnership
    v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 
    66 F.3d 669
    , 683 (4th Cir.
    1995).
    5
    In order to have a binding contract, the parties must have a meeting
    of the minds with regard "to all essential and material terms of the
    agreement." Player v. Chandler, 
    382 S.E.2d 891
    , 893 (S.C. 1989).
    These essential terms include price, time, and place. Edens v. Laurel
    Hill, Inc., 
    247 S.E.2d 434
    , 436 (S.C. 1978). The meeting of the minds
    cannot be based on "secret purpose or intention on the part of one of
    the parties, stored away in his mind and not brought to the attention
    of the other party." 
    Player, 382 S.E.2d at 894
    .
    Vessell argues that he and Gibbons had a meeting of the minds. He
    contends that, after wrangling over the difference in price between
    Vessell's proposal and Gibbons's bid, they agreed Vessell would do
    the work for $12 per yard and make up any difference through the
    "slush fund" that would be created by the sale of appliances. He con-
    tends that his actual work cutting the lawns is evidence of this deal,
    and that he further had a deal to cut the lawns at the straight price of
    $26 and $27 per yard once the Corps of Engineers renewed the con-
    tract and agreed to modify the contract price for option years two and
    three.
    Whether the parties have a meeting of the minds is ordinarily a
    question of fact for the jury to decide. Hobgood v. Pennington, 
    387 S.E.2d 690
    , 693 (S.C. App. 1989). In this case, however, the most
    Gibbons and Vessell could be said to have had agreed on was a deal
    whereby Vessell would be minimally paid for mowing lawns, and
    would supplement his lawn-mowing pay by stealing and selling
    household appliances. This court will not set its imprimatur on a con-
    tract permeated with fraud. See W&N Construction Co. v. Williams,
    
    472 S.E.2d 622
    , 623 (S.C. 1996) (construction company cannot
    recover on contract it had entered illegally); Jackson v. Bi-Lo Stores,
    Inc., 
    437 S.E.2d 168
    , 170 (S.C. App. 1993) (contract secured by ille-
    gal conduct cannot be enforced). Thus, even if a jury, taking all the
    evidence in Vessell's favor, could have found that Gibbons and Ves-
    sell had a contract, any such contract was unenforceable and the dis-
    trict court appropriately directed a verdict on Vessell's breach of
    contract claim.
    Vessell cannot show that he had an enforceable contract for the
    first year of the HAP contract. Any argument that his contract was
    6
    effectively renewed by virtue of the Corps of Engineers' renewal of
    Re/Max's HAP contract must therefore fail as well.
    Vessell argues that not enforcing his contract violates public policy
    by penalizing him for cooperating with law enforcement officials.
    This argument has some appeal, but is not ultimately persuasive. It
    ignores the fact that Vessell entered into the alleged contract knowing
    its fraudulent aspects. This is not a situation in which he was already
    working for Gibbons, or Re/Max, under a legitimate contract, which
    Gibbons then "modified" by requiring unlawful behavior. In this
    instance, Vessell could have walked away from the entire business.
    Our holding that Gibbons and Vessell had an unenforceable con-
    tract effectively disposes of Vessell's remaining arguments on his
    contract claim. Even were we to find that Gibbons had actual or
    apparent authority to bind Re/Max to the contract, and that Vessell
    and Re/Max were mutually obligated to perform the terms of the con-
    tract, the fraudulent underpinnings of the contract would defeat its
    enforceability.
    IV.
    The False Claims Act encourages private plaintiffs, acting on
    behalf of the government, to prosecute any person who is attempting
    to defraud the government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729. The False Claims Act
    is also known as the Qui Tam Act, an abbreviation of "qui tam pro
    domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur ," which means
    one "[w]ho sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself." Black's
    Law Dictionary 1251 (6th ed. 1990). It was originally adopted in
    1863, and is based on the premise that private parties are often in a
    better position to detect fraudulent activity than the government itself.
    Congress amended the False Claims Act in 1986 to include an anti-
    retaliation provision to protect "whistle blowers" from adverse
    employment consequences as a result of their cooperation with the
    federal government. False Claims Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
    562, § 4, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)).
    The anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act provides
    that:
    7
    any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended,
    threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated
    against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or
    her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee
    on behalf of the employee or others in furtherance of an
    action under this section, including investigation for, initia-
    tion of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to
    be filed under this section, shall be entitled to all relief nec-
    essary to make the employee whole.
    31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Vessell claims that Re/Max's refusal to use his
    landscaping service after he cooperated with the FBI in exposing Gib-
    bons's scheme violated the anti-retaliation provision of the statute.
    The district court found that Vessell was not an employee of Re/Max
    and therefore was not entitled to protection under the plain language
    of the statute.
    On appeal, Vessell argues that the statute should not be read so nar-
    rowly. He describes himself as a "subcontractor employee," which is
    a defined term in the HAP contract, Joint Appendix at 172, and con-
    tends that the presence of the word "employee" places him under the
    statute's protection. He further argues that the provision should be
    read to protect independent contractors. In addition, Vessell argues
    that public policy dictates that he not be punished for having exposed
    Gibbons's fraud.
    The False Claims Act does not define "employee." No circuit court
    has yet addressed whether the False Claims Act's protection of "em-
    ployees" extends to independent contractors, though the few district
    courts that have addressed the question have all held that it does not.
    In Shapiro v. Sutherland, which involved a consultant who had for-
    merly been an employee of a government contractor, the district court
    applied the common-law agency test to determine whether the qui tam
    plaintiff was an employee entitled to invoke § 3730(h), or an indepen-
    dent contractor who did not fall within the law's ambit. 
    835 F. Supp. 836
    , 837-38 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see also Hardin v. DuPont Scandinavia,
    
    731 F. Supp. 1202
    , 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding in dicta that anti-
    retaliation provision does not extend to independent contractors); cf.
    Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 
    991 F. Supp. 701
    (D.N.J. 1998) (liability under
    qui tam statute does not extend to employer's agents).
    8
    The Shapiro court applied the common-law agency test articulated
    in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden , 
    503 U.S. 318
    (1992), to determine whether the plaintiff had been an employee or
    an independent contractor. In Darden, an ERISA case, the Supreme
    Court reiterated its position that when Congress uses the term "em-
    ployee" without defining it, the Court has concluded that Congress
    intends to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as
    understood by common-law agency 
    doctrine. 503 U.S. at 322-23
    . The
    Court set forth the test as follows:
    In determining whether a hired party is an employee under
    the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring
    party's right to control the manner and means by which the
    product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant
    to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instru-
    mentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration
    of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring
    party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired
    party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when
    and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired
    party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the
    work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
    whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
    employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
    
    Id. at 323-24
    (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
    Reid, 
    490 U.S. 730
    , 751-52 (1989) (internal citations omitted)).
    Applying the common-law agency principles in this case leads to
    the conclusion that Vessell was not Re/Max's employee. Vessell set
    his own schedule for cutting the lawns; he owned his own tools; and
    he hired, fired, and supervised his own assistants. In addition, his
    work was not part of the regular business of the hiring party; he did
    not receive any employee benefits; and his tax status was not that of
    an employee. Vessell had at most a contract to perform services for
    a specified period of time; he was to be paid for each service per-
    formed, not on a salaried basis.
    Vessell's attempt to categorize himself as a "subcontractor
    employee" is unavailing. The term as used in the HAP contract refers
    9
    to employees of subcontractors hired by the main contractor; as such,
    one of Vessell's employees might more properly be termed a "sub-
    contractor employee." That contractual language, however, has no
    effect on the statute's coverage.
    Unless the anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act covers
    independent contractors, Vessell's claim must fail. The plain language
    of the statute includes only employees, and our inquiry generally
    stops there. Other provisions of the False Claims Act, which permit
    anyone with knowledge of wrongdoing to bring a qui tam action and
    to share in the proceeds of the suit, 31 U.S.C.§ 3730(b)-(d), indicate
    that Congress was perfectly capable of extending the statute's cover-
    age as broadly as it desired. In contrast, the anti-retaliation provision
    is limited by its express language to employees. We must presume
    that Congress intended to so limit the anti-retaliation provision.
    Even were we to examine the legislative history, our conclusion
    would not change. The legislative history to the 1986 amendments
    indicates only that the term "employee" is to be read broadly to
    include "[t]emporary, blacklisted, or discharged workers," but says
    nothing about including independent contractors. S. Rep. No. 99-345,
    at 34 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5299.
    Vessell's public policy argument is not wholly unpersuasive. If an
    independent contractor were to learn of, and expose, the fraud of a
    principal contractor, the independent contractor should not lose its
    contract by virtue of having exposed wrongdoing any more than an
    employee should. Nevertheless, the statutory language is plain and
    does not, by its terms, extend to independent contractors. Moreover,
    independent contractors would have a breach of contract remedy,
    whereas an employee-at-will would not have such protection. The
    facts of this particular case demonstrate the principle. Had Vessell's
    contract not been permeated with fraud, he would have had a contrac-
    tual remedy against Gibbons, and potentially against Re/Max, so long
    as he could have established mutuality of obligation and Gibbons's
    apparent authority to bind Re/Max to the contract.
    The anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act does not
    extend to independent contractors, and Vessell is therefore not cov-
    ered.
    10
    V.
    The district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law is
    affirmed. The only contractual arrangement Vessell could be said to
    have had with Re/Max was tainted by fraud and thus unenforceable.
    Vessell is not entitled to recover under the anti retaliation provision
    of the False Claims Act because he was, at most, an independent con-
    tractor and thus is not protected by that provision of the Act.
    AFFIRMED
    11