Goins v. Angelone ( 2000 )


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  • PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    CHRISTOPHER C. GOINS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 99-13
    RONALD ANGELONE, Director,
    Virginia Department of Corrections,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
    T. S. Ellis, III, District Judge.
    (CA-97-1406-A)
    Argued: June 6, 2000
    Decided: August 31, 2000
    Before LUTTIG, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Certificate of appealability denied and appeal dismissed by published
    opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in which Judge Luttig and
    Judge Traxler joined.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Frank Salvato, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Kath-
    erine P. Baldwin, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
    ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON
    BRIEF: Robert E. Lee, Jr., VIRGINIA CAPITAL REPRESENTA-
    TION RESOURCE CENTER, Richmond, Virginia; Robert S. Powell,
    Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Mark J. Earley, Attorney General
    of Virginia, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond,
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    KING, Circuit Judge:
    Appellant Christopher C. Goins, convicted and sentenced to death
    by a Virginia jury for the capital murder of Robert Jones, appeals the
    district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
    Finding no error, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss
    the appeal.
    I.
    A.
    The facts underlying the murder charges against Goins were set
    forth in some detail by the Supreme Court of Virginia in its decision
    on Goins's direct appeal, Goins v. Commonwealth , 
    470 S.E.2d 114
    (Va. 1996), and are quoted below.
    On the morning of October 14, 1994, Goins and his friend
    Barry Scott arrived at the home of Tamika Jones, where
    Tamika and the six other members of her family were pres-
    ent. Both Goins and Scott were friends of the Jones family.
    Tamika, who was 14 years old, was seven months preg-
    nant with Goins' child and recently had returned from the
    hospital after receiving treatment for complications related
    to the pregnancy. When Scott attempted to show Goins an
    ultrasound photograph of the fetus, Goins refused to look
    and became angry.
    Tamika saw Goins in the living room, but was in her bed-
    room when she later heard him participating in a conversa-
    tion in the kitchen. The conversation was interrupted by the
    2
    sound of gunfire. The shots were fired rapidly and were fol-
    lowed by screams, crying, and the sound of a single set of
    footsteps in the hall. Tamika stated that she then heard more
    shots and saw "flashes in the hall."
    Goins appeared in the doorway of Tamika's bedroom and
    shot her nine times. He also shot her 21-month-old sister,
    Kenya, whom Tamika had attempted to shield with her
    body.
    When Tamika believed that Goins had left the apartment,
    she telephoned "911" for emergency assistance. She told the
    operator that Goins had shot her. The operator asked if any-
    one was with her. Tamika responded, "Yes. He shot them
    too."
    When the City of Richmond police arrived at the Jones'
    home, they determined that all the members of the Jones
    family had been shot. Only Tamika and Kenya survived. In
    the kitchen, the police found the body of Tamika's four-
    year-old brother, David, as well as the bodies of her parents,
    Daphne Jones and James Randolph, Jr. In one of the bed-
    rooms, the police found the bodies of Nicole Jones,
    Tamika's nine-year-old sister, and Robert Jones, Tamika's
    three-year-old brother.
    Daphne Jones was shot four times, twice in the head,
    once in the left wrist, and once in the right leg. Both of the
    gunshot wounds to her head were lethal. One of these
    wounds showed evidence of "stippling," consisting of
    burned and unburned gun powder, which indicated that the
    gun was fired within a few feet of her head.
    James Randolph, Jr. was shot nine times, twice in the
    head, three times in the left arm and chest, once in the abdo-
    men, once in the right arm, once in the left leg, and once on
    the chin. Four of these wounds were lethal. The evidence
    showed that some of the shots were fired from less than
    "arm's length" and other shots were fired after Randolph
    had fallen to the ground.
    3
    David died as a result of a lethal gunshot wound to the
    head. This wound also showed evidence of stippling. Nicole
    suffered two lethal gunshot wounds. One bullet passed
    through her heart and a lung. The other bullet was fired into
    her head at close range. Robert sustained two lethal gunshot
    wounds to his head. Kenya sustained a wound, measuring
    between two and three inches long, through her left wrist.
    Tamika was shot three times in the abdomen, three times
    in her thighs, once in her right hand, once in the neck, and
    once in her left shoulder. Her obstetrician performed a hys-
    terectomy on her after the shootings, because multiple bul-
    lets had perforated her uterus and her right ovary and
    fallopian tube. When removed from the uterus, the fetus had
    sustained a gunshot wound to its face and was dead.
    The police retrieved from the kitchen seven .45 caliber
    cartridge casings, various bullets, and bullet jacket frag-
    ments. In the bedroom where Nicole and Robert were shot,
    the police found two .45 caliber cartridge casings, as well as
    two bullets, a bullet jacket, and a lead fragment. In the bed-
    room where Tamika and Kenya had been shot, the police
    recovered six .45 caliber cartridge casings and two bullets.
    No weapon was found.
    James L. Pickelman, a firearms identification expert at
    the Commonwealth's Division of Forensic Science,
    explained that hollow point bullets, such as those used in the
    commission of these offenses, are designed by the manufac-
    turer to explode on impact with the target. Frequently, at the
    point of impact, the bullet core separates from its jacket.
    Pickelman examined the weight and rifling characteristics of
    the bullets, bullet jackets, and jacket fragments recovered
    from the apartment and the victims' bodies. He testified that
    all these items were ".45 auto caliber."
    After examining the rifling marks on the bullet jackets
    and jacket fragments retrieved from Jones' apartment, Pick-
    elman concluded that the bullet jackets were ejected from a
    firearm constructed by a manufacturer who uses polygonal
    4
    rifling. Pickelman also stated that Glock, Inc. is the major
    manufacturer which uses this type rifling in the design of its
    firearms.
    Ann D. Jones, also an expert in firearms identification at
    the Division of Forensic Science, compared the various
    microscopic markings on each cartridge casing that was
    recovered. Her examination of these markings established
    that all the cartridge casings were fired from the same .45
    caliber Glock pistol. Jones stated that .45 caliber Glock pis-
    tols produce an elliptical shape firing pin impression, which
    is unique to that brand and type of pistol. She observed this
    impression on all the cartridge casings recovered from the
    crime scene.
    Jones also testified that she compared the markings on
    one of the cartridge casings found at the crime scene with
    the markings on the unfired .45 caliber cartridge found in
    the home of Monique Littlejohn, Goins' girlfriend. Jones
    observed that these items exhibited the same extractor marks
    and concluded that both items had been in the same weapon.
    On two occasions, the police searched Littlejohn's apart-
    ment. In addition to the unfired .45 caliber cartridge, they
    found an instruction manual for Glock pistols lying on the
    floor near some men's clothing.
    In Littlejohn's automobile, the police found a Sam's Club
    identification card. Although Goins' photograph appeared
    on the card, the card was issued in the name of Derrick
    Reardon. Two other identification cards were also found in
    Littlejohn's car. Both cards were issued in the name of Der-
    rick Reardon, but displayed Goins' picture. Investigators
    also found a high school equivalency diploma issued in the
    name of Derrick Lydell Reardon in Littlejohn's vehicle, as
    well as the business card of a taxicab driver, Parrish Davis.
    Approximately one month after the shootings, Goins was
    apprehended in New York with Monique Littlejohn. At the
    time of his arrest, Goins had shaved his head.
    5
    Parrish Davis, who had known Goins for several months
    prior to the shootings, testified that Goins had been a pas-
    senger in his taxicab approximately once or twice each week
    during those months. Davis stated that, during this time,
    Goins was living with Littlejohn at her apartment.
    Davis also stated that about one week before the shoot-
    ings, he had a conversation with Goins, in which Goins
    stated that he was upset because Tamika was pregnant by
    him. Goins told Davis that "he wanted to do away with her
    and her family." At that time, Davis did not believe that
    Goins intended to harm the Jones family. However, Davis
    stated that he and Goins occasionally discussed the subject
    of .45 caliber pistols.
    Davis also testified that he spoke with Goins on the eve-
    ning of October 14, 1994, after the shootings. During that
    conversation, Goins asked Davis to drive him out of town
    in the trunk of a friend's car. Davis refused to do so.
    After the Commonwealth rested its case, Goins presented
    testimony from two witnesses. Mildred S. Plumber, an
    employee of the taxicab company for which Davis worked,
    testified that company records for October 1994 indicated
    Davis had reported no fares for service to or from the
    address at which Littlejohn and Goins lived. However,
    Plumber conceded that Davis might have provided service
    to that location and not have reported the fares to the com-
    pany.
    Goins also offered the testimony of Jason Lamont Wil-
    liams, who stated that, during the week before the killings,
    he "might have" ridden with Goins in a taxicab driven by
    Davis. Williams stated that Goins never said anything in his
    presence about guns or about "doing away" with Tamika
    Jones or her family. On cross-examination, the Common-
    wealth's attorney asked Williams, "Do you or have you in
    the past sold drugs for Mr. Goins?" The trial court sustained
    Goins' objection to the question. The Commonwealth's
    attorney then asked, "Sir, have you ever told your probation
    6
    officer, Ms. Bircham, that you sold drugs for this defen-
    dant?" Once again, the trial court sustained Goins' objection
    to the question. Finally, the trial court permitted the Com-
    monwealth's attorney to ask Williams, "Did you ever tell
    your probation officer, Ms. Bircham, that you had a business
    relationship with Mr. Goins?" Williams responded,"No."
    During the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth
    offered testimony from Detective John J. Riani of the Hen-
    rico County Police Department, who testified that, in Febru-
    ary 1994, he had encountered Goins while working as a
    narcotics investigator at the Amtrack station on Staples Mill
    Road. Goins had alighted from a train arriving from New
    York when Riani approached and asked him some ques-
    tions. When Goins later consented to a search of his bags
    and clothing, Riani found 55.35 grams of crack cocaine in
    a bag inside Goins' coat pocket. This amount of cocaine had
    a "street value" of approximately $5,500.
    Riani then arrested Goins for possession of cocaine with
    intent to distribute. Goins told Riani that he was addicted to
    crack cocaine.
    Goins never appeared for trial and a capias was issued for
    his arrest. Both the cocaine charge and the capias remained
    outstanding at the time of the present offenses.
    The Commonwealth also presented evidence from Dr.
    Jack Daniel, Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the
    Commonwealth. Dr. Daniel testified that James Randolph,
    Jr., Nicole Jones, and Robert Jones all suffered multiple
    lethal gunshot wounds. He also testified that one of Nicole's
    lethal wounds occurred while she was lying face down. In
    addition, Dr. Daniel stated that the dried blood on Robert's
    face indicated that Robert had not moved after he was shot
    the first time.
    In mitigation of the offenses, Goins presented the testi-
    mony of Paulette Goins Dickerson, his mother's sister.
    Dickerson testified that Goins' mother had used drugs fre-
    7
    quently in front of Goins. Dickerson also testified that Goins
    has an aunt who abuses drugs, and that another of his aunts
    died of AIDS acquired from drug use. Dickerson further
    related that Goins has an uncle who is incarcerated in New
    York. Another uncle is mentally handicapped, as a result of
    a head injury sustained at age two when Goins' mother
    pushed him out of a third-story window.
    Dickerson also testified that, when Goins was 12 years
    old, he moved from Richmond to New York to live with his
    grandmother because his mother had abused him. Dickerson
    stated that Goins' mother never held, hugged, or nurtured
    any of her children. According to Dickerson, Goins was
    devastated when his grandmother died, because she was the
    only person who had shown him any love.
    Goins' cousin, Leah Butler, testified that she had lived
    briefly in the same household with Goins and had observed
    his mother use drugs and neglect her children. Butler also
    testified that Goins is a caring, "giving" man. Butler's son,
    Phillip, age six, testified that he liked Goins, and that Goins
    would often play games with him and bring him candy.
    Goins, 470 S.E.2d at 119-122.
    B.
    On June 13, 1995, a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of Rich-
    mond convicted Goins on one count of capital murder for the killing
    of Robert Jones, four counts of first degree murder, two charges of
    malicious wounding, and seven counts of illegal use of a firearm. At
    the conclusion of the separate sentencing proceeding, the jury found
    both statutory aggravating factors to be present: (1) that Goins's con-
    duct was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman;" and
    (2) that he represented "a continuing serious threat to society." Va.
    Code § 19.2-264.2.1 Based on these findings, the jury fixed Goins's
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 Virginia's capital punishment statute involves a two-step determina-
    tion by the jury in the sentencing phase of the trial. If the defendant has
    8
    punishment at death for the capital murder of Robert Jones. For the
    noncapital offenses, the jury sentenced Goins to four life terms plus
    seventy-eight years in prison. After considering the probation offi-
    cer's report and conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court
    imposed the death penalty, in accordance with the jury's verdicts.2
    Goins appealed his convictions and sentences to the Supreme Court
    of Virginia, which affirmed by published opinion issued on April 19,
    1996. See Goins, 470 S.E.2d at 132. The Supreme Court, on October
    7, 1996, denied Goins's petition for a writ of certiorari. See Goins v.
    Virginia, 
    519 U.S. 887
     (1996).
    On December 6, 1996, Goins, through newly appointed counsel,
    filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of
    Virginia. On December 26, 1996, Goins filed an amended petition to
    comply with a fifty-page limit established by state rules. See Va. Sup.
    Ct. R. 5:7(h). On May 5, 1997, the Supreme Court of Virginia dis-
    missed Goins's amended petition. See Goins v. Warden, No. 962477
    (Va. 1997).
    Thereafter, on August 14, 1997, the Circuit Court scheduled
    Goins's execution for September 15, 1997. However, on September
    5, 1997, Goins filed a motion in the Eastern District of Virginia seek-
    ing a stay of execution and appointment of counsel to prepare a fed-
    eral habeas corpus petition. On September 11, 1997, the district court
    stayed Goins's execution and granted his motion for appointment of
    counsel. On January 7, 1998, Goins filed a motion seeking the
    _________________________________________________________________
    been found guilty in the trial's guilt phase, the jury must decide, in the
    sentencing phase, whether the prosecution has established one or both of
    the statutory aggravating factors. Va. Code Ann.§ 19.2-264.4(C)-(D)
    (1995). If the jury finds neither aggravating factor satisfied, it must
    impose a sentence of life imprisonment. Id. However, if the jury finds
    one or both of the aggravating factors established, it has full discretion
    to impose either a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment. Id.
    2 "Under Virginia's statutory capital sentencing scheme, it is the jury's
    responsibility to ``fix' the punishment of a defendant who has been con-
    victed of a capital offense and it is the court's responsibility to impose
    sentence." Frye v. Commonwealth, 
    345 S.E.2d 267
    , 286 (Va. 1986).
    9
    appointment of experts and an investigator, which the district court
    denied without prejudice. On February 17, 1998, Goins filed his
    application for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, asserting
    thirty-six separate grounds for relief. In a published opinion, the dis-
    trict court rejected these claims and denied habeas corpus relief. See
    Goins v. Angelone, 
    52 F. Supp. 2d 638
     (E.D. Va. 1999). By order of
    August 24, 1999, the district court denied Goin's application for a
    certificate of appealability.
    II.
    On appeal, Goins contends that the district court erred in dismiss-
    ing his petition for habeas corpus relief, asserting that: (1) errors in
    the jury selection process during the guilt phase of his murder trial
    violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2)
    the prosecution failed to produce results of a polygraph examination
    in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963); (3) evidence
    of his parole eligibility was erroneously excluded; (4) the perfor-
    mance of his counsel at trial and on direct appeal was constitutionally
    defective; (5) he was impermissibly excluded from critical stages of
    his trial; and (6) the district court erred in denying his motions for dis-
    covery and an evidentiary hearing.
    Each of these assertions was thoroughly considered and resolved
    by the district court. After careful consideration of the record, the
    applicable legal principles, and the arguments and briefs, we find the
    district court's analysis to be well-reasoned and persuasive. See
    Goins, 
    52 F. Supp. 2d
     at 648-81. As further explained below, we
    therefore deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss Goins's
    appeal.
    III.
    Pursuant to the standards prescribed by Congress at 28 U.S.C.
    § 2254 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), as amended by the Antiterrorism and
    Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
    110 Stat. 1214, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus
    with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court pro-
    ceedings unless the state's adjudication: (1) "resulted in a decision
    that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
    10
    clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
    of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); or (2) "resulted in a
    decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
    in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id.
    § 2254(d)(2). A state court adjudication is"contrary to" clearly estab-
    lished federal law if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite
    to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the
    state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on
    a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.
    Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). A state court decision unreasonably applies
    clearly established federal law if the state court, despite correctly
    identifying the governing legal principle, "unreasonably applies that
    principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id.
    IV.
    A.
    During the jury selection proceedings of Goins's murder trial,
    Goins's counsel requested that the trial court voir dire potential jurors
    on a number of topics, including two race-related inquiries: (1) "Have
    you ever experienced fear of a person of another race? If so, what
    were the circumstances?" and (2) "Do you think that African-
    Americans are more likely to commit crimes than whites? If so,
    why?" The trial court declined to ask either of these voir dire ques-
    tions. On direct appeal, Goins contended that "the trial court erred in
    refusing to ask these questions because they were relevant to estab-
    lishing relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice." 470 S.E.2d at
    124-25. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this conten-
    tion on the merits, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
    cretion in refusing to allow Goins to ask the race-related questions.
    Finding that the questions permitted during voir dire were sufficient
    to preserve Goins's right to a fair and impartial jury, the Supreme
    Court of Virginia held that the trial court's "refusal to ask [the addi-
    tional] questions during voir dire did not violate Goins' rights under
    the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
    Constitution." Id. at 125. This adjudication on the merits may not be
    overturned on federal habeas review unless the state court's determi-
    nation "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
    11
    clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
    of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
    3 Barb. 1
    .
    The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a criminal defen-
    dant the right to a trial by an impartial jury. Turner v. Murray, 
    476 U.S. 28
    , 36 n.9 (1986). A principal mechanism used to safeguard this
    right is the voir dire of prospective jurors. Indeed, voir dire "plays a
    critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth
    Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored." Rosales-
    Lopez v. United States, 
    451 U.S. 182
    , 188 (1981) (plurality opinion).
    Voir dire "serves the dual purpose" of (1) identifying those individu-
    als in the venire who are incapable of following the court's instruc-
    tions and evaluating the evidence, and (2) assisting lawyers in the
    exercise of peremptory strikes. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 
    500 U.S. 415
    , 431
    (1991).
    Because the adequacy of voir dire frequently turns on the trial
    judge's evaluation of the responses and demeanor of prospective
    jurors, the conduct of voir dire "must be committed to the good judg-
    ment of the trial judge whose ``immediate perceptions' determine what
    questions are appropriate for ferreting out relevant prejudices." United
    States v. Barber, 
    80 F.3d 964
    , 967 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing
    Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189). As the plurality in Rosales-Lopez
    observed:
    The trial judge's function as this point in the trial is not
    unlike that of the jurors later on in the trial. Both must reach
    _________________________________________________________________
    3 Pursuant to Hawks v. Cox, 
    175 S.E.2d 271
    , 274 (Va. 1970), which
    established that state habeas review is not available for claims raised and
    decided against petitioner on direct review, the Supreme Court of Vir-
    ginia dismissed Goins's state habeas claims asserting constitutional error
    in the jury selection process of his capital murder trial. See Goins v. War-
    den, No. 962477 (Va. May 5, 1997). The rule articulated in Hawks does
    not however, prevent federal habeas review of otherwise properly raised
    claims. See Correll v. Thompson, 
    63 F.3d 1279
    , 1289 n.8 (4th Cir. 1995).
    12
    conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on
    their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of
    responses to questions. In neither instance can an appellate
    court easily second-guess the conclusions of the decision-
    maker who heard and observed the witnesses.
    451 U.S. at 188. For these reasons, trial courts"retain[ ] great latitude
    in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire." Mu'Min,
    500 U.S. at 424; see also Ham v. South Carolina , 
    409 U.S. 524
    , 528
    (1973) (recognizing "the traditionally broad discretion accorded to the
    trial judge in conducting voir dire . . . .") (citation omitted).
    2.
    Despite this broad discretion, trial courts are constitutionally
    required, under certain circumstances, to allow a criminal defendant
    to voir dire potential jurors concerning racial or ethnic bias. Indeed,
    "some cases may present circumstances in which an impermissible
    threat to the fair trial guaranteed by due process is posed by a trial
    court's refusal to question prospective jurors specifically about racial
    prejudice during Voir dire." Ristaino v. Ross , 
    424 U.S. 589
    , 595
    (1976). Thus, when "special circumstances" indicate that racial issues
    are "inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial," an accused's
    constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury prohibits a trial court
    from refusing a request for voir dire directed to racial prejudice. Id.
    at 597. The critical inquiry is whether the circumstances in a given
    case demonstrate a "constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent
    questioning about racial prejudice, the jurors would not be as ``indif-
    ferent as (they stand) unsworne.'" Ristaino , 424 U.S. at 596 (citation
    omitted).
    A review of the Supreme Court's decisions in this regard is instruc-
    tive. In Ristaino, supra, the Supreme Court described the "special cir-
    cumstances" under which a trial court is constitutionally required to
    permit voir dire relating to racial bias. The Ristaino Court contrasted
    the facts of that case with those in Ham, supra, where the Court
    reversed the defendant's conviction based on the state trial court's
    failure to honor such a request. In Ham, an African-American defen-
    dant was charged with possession of marijuana, and his defense was
    based on his assertion that law enforcement officers had "framed" him
    13
    in retaliation for his active and widely known participation in local
    civil rights activities. Under those facts, the Court held that "special
    circumstances" existed such that the defendant was constitutionally
    entitled to explore the racial attitudes of the venire. 409 U.S. at 527.
    By contrast, in Ristaino, an African-American defendant was charged
    with a violent crime against a Caucasian victim. The Court in Ristaino
    concluded that those facts did not create a similar need of "constitu-
    tional dimensions" to inquire into the racial prejudices of potential
    jurors. 424 U.S. at 597.
    The critical factor present in Ham, but not present in Ristaino, was
    that the racial issues in Ham were "inextricably bound up with the
    conduct of the trial." Id. As a result, voir dire inquiries specifically
    directed to the potential racial biases of prospective jurors were neces-
    sary to assure an impartial jury in that case. Id. Conversely, the black-
    on-white crime alleged in Ristaino, standing alone, did not suggest a
    "significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect [the defen-
    dant's] trial." Id. at 598.
    A third Supreme Court decision also informs our analysis. In Tur-
    ner, 476 U.S. at 36-37, an interracial crime formed the basis of a capi-
    tal prosecution. The Supreme Court distinguished Ristaino and
    concluded that the trial court was constitutionally required to permit
    voir dire into the possible racial prejudices of the venire. The Court
    recognized that capital sentencing proceedings require jurors to make
    a "highly subjective, unique, individualized judgment regarding the
    punishment that a particular person deserves." Id. at 33-34 (citations
    and internal quotations omitted). As a result of"the range of discre-
    tion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a
    unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain unde-
    tected." Id. at 35. Moreover, the Court found that the absolute finality
    of the death penalty renders the danger of racial bias infecting a capi-
    tal sentencing proceeding especially serious. Id. Given the danger of
    racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing proceeding, coupled
    with the underlying interracial crime, the Court concluded that "spe-
    cial circumstances" existed to implicate the defendant's constitutional
    rights: "[A] capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is enti-
    tled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and
    questioned on the issue of racial bias." Id. at 36-37.
    14
    C.
    Asserting that such "special circumstances" existed during his mur-
    der trial, Goins contends that racial issues were"inextricably bound
    up with the conduct of the trial." Goins's argument in this regard is
    based principally on the fact that he was tried by a predominantly
    white jury from rural Gloucester County, Virginia. 4 That is, Goins
    asserts that racial issues were "inextricably bound up" with his murder
    trial because the proceedings involved an African-American defen-
    dant and a predominantly white jury. As Goins's trial counsel argued
    during jury selection,
    Race actually is an issue in this case; and that is-- that's
    because we have the -- while we have an African American
    defendant and African American victims, we have a number
    of white jurors. And if they feel that blacks are more violent
    in nature, then they're liable to look at the defendant and
    assume, yes; he is a more violent person . . . .[Moreover,]
    [i]f people have attitudes about African Americans that are
    _________________________________________________________________
    4 The venire was selected from Gloucester County as a result of the
    trial court's decision to grant Goins's motion for change of venue.
    Despite having moved for the change of venue, Goins asserted in his
    state habeas petition that the trial court's decision to select the venire
    from Gloucester County denied him the right to an impartial jury and a
    fair trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia found this claim to be procedur-
    ally defaulted under the rule of Slayton v. Parrigan, 
    205 S.E.2d 680
    , 682
    (Va. 1974), which prohibits state habeas review of claims that were
    available to petitioner at trial or on direct appeal and that petitioner failed
    to raise at that time.
    Because the rule of Slayton qualifies as an independent and adequate
    state procedural rule for the purposes of federal habeas procedural
    default analysis, see, e.g., Fisher v. Angelone, 
    163 F.3d 835
    , 844 (4th
    Cir. 1998), federal review of this defaulted claim is barred unless Goins
    can show that: (1) there is cause for, and actual prejudice from, the
    default; or (2) the failure to review the claim would result in a fundamen-
    tal miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson , 
    501 U.S. 722
    , 750
    (1991). Because Goins cannot make either showing, the district court
    properly concluded that "there is no obligation here to consider the appli-
    cation of either exception to the procedural default rule." Goins, 52 F.
    Supp. 2d at 650.
    15
    based on racial prejudice, then they're more likely to render
    a more severe punishment; i.e., the death penalty, than
    someone who isn't a racist.
    J.A. 24-25.
    We must reject this argument. As the district court correctly
    observed, "[t]here is no constitutional presumption of juror bias for or
    against members of any particular racial or ethnic group, presumably
    even when a jury pool is predominantly white." Goins, 
    52 F. Supp. 2d
     at 671 (citation and internal quotation omitted). Indeed, the
    Supreme Court has cautioned trial courts to avoid entertaining the "di-
    visive assumption -- as a per se rule -- that justice in a court of law
    may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the
    choice of religion." Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596 n.8.
    Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Turner -- although
    based largely on the unique responsibilities of jurors in a death pen-
    alty case -- is of little assistance to Goins. Turner was based on the
    confluence of three separate, but equally critical, factors: (1) the broad
    discretion given to capital sentencing jurors; (2) the serious risk of
    improper sentencing in a capital case; and (3) the charged offense
    involved interracial violence. 476 U.S. at 37. The crucial factor absent
    from this case, of course, is an underlying interracial crime. As the
    district court aptly noted,
    [Turner] has no application here, as both Goins and the vic-
    tims were African-American. Moreover, no Supreme Court
    or Fourth Circuit decision has held that capital defendants
    accused of crimes against victims of their own race have a
    right to question prospective jurors on the issue of racial
    bias.
    Goins, 
    52 F. Supp. 2d
     at 671.
    Put simply, Goins's presumptions as to the racial attitudes of the
    jurors fail to demonstrate a "significant likelihood" that racial preju-
    dice influenced their deliberations. None of the charges against Goins
    -- one count of capital murder, four counts of first degree murder,
    16
    two counts of malicious wounding, and seven counts of illegal use of
    a firearm -- involved any element relating to race. See Barber, 80
    F.3d at 968 (recognizing that racial issues may become "inextricably
    bound up" with the trial when "race is an issue to be tried either as
    an element of the offense or a defense or where racial issues are con-
    nected with the resolution of relevant facts"). Likewise, race was not
    an element of any legitimate defense advanced by Goins. See id. Fur-
    thermore, none of the evidence adduced during the guilt phase of
    Goins's murder trial suggested race as an issue in the case. See id.
    Indeed, race became an issue only when Goins sought to explore the
    racial attitudes of prospective jurors. On this basis alone, we cannot
    conclude that racial issues were "inextricably bound up with the con-
    duct of the trial."5 The racial makeup of the jury panel, even when
    coupled with the capital charge at issue, "did not create a need of
    ``constitutional dimensions' to question the jury concerning racial
    prejudice." Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190. Accordingly, the state
    trial court was not constitutionally required to ask the questions
    requested by Goins.
    Of course, we agree that "the wiser course generally is to propound
    appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested
    by the defendant." Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597 n.9. Indeed, the Supreme
    Court, pursuant to its supervisory authority over the federal courts,
    has required the district courts to permit voir dire directed to the dis-
    covery of racial bias under circumstances in which such an inquiry
    would not be constitutionally required. Id. Under this "nonconstitu-
    tional" standard, a plurality of the Supreme Court in Rosales-Lopez
    stated that a federal district court's "[f]ailure to honor [a defendant's]
    request [to examine the racial prejudices of potential jurors] . . . will
    be reversible error only where the circumstances of the case indicate
    _________________________________________________________________
    5 Additionally, Goins contends he was entitled to voir dire jurors
    regarding racial bias because some jurors had given false answers during
    voir dire in an attempt to be excluded from serving on the jury. However,
    as the district court recognized, "there is no evidence or offer of evidence
    that any jurors gave false answers to disguise racial prejudice, and thus
    the allegation that jurors were lying does not suggest that racial issues
    were ``inextricably bound up in the trial.'" Goins, 
    52 F. Supp. 2d
     at 671-
    72.
    17
    that there is a reasonable probability that racial or ethnic prejudice
    might have influenced the jury." 451 U.S. at 191. 6
    A trial court in the Commonwealth of Virginia, however, is not
    bound by this "nonconstitutional" standard. As the Supreme Court
    recently observed in Dickerson v. United States , 
    2000 WL 807223
    (June 26, 2000), "With respect to proceedings in state courts, our
    ``authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States
    Constitution.'" Id. at *7 (quoting Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 422); see also
    Harris v. Rivera, 
    454 U.S. 339
    , 344-345 (per curiam) ("Federal
    judges have no general supervisory power over state trial judges; they
    may not require the observance of any special procedures except
    when necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal
    Constitution."). Moreover, a federal habeas court's review is "limited
    to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or
    treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 
    502 U.S. 62
    , 68
    (1991). Therefore, in the absence of "special circumstances" that trig-
    ger an accused's constitutional right to inquire into racial prejudice,
    the "conduct of voir dire [is left] to the sound discretion of state trial
    judges," Turner, 476 U.S. at 38 n.12 (1986), in which case a "general-
    ized but thorough inquiry into the impartiality of the veniremen" will
    be constitutionally sufficient. Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 598.
    As noted, federal habeas corpus relief is available only where a
    petitioner demonstrates that state court proceedings resulted in a deci-
    sion that was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of
    clearly established Federal law" or was based on an unreasonable
    determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). With respect to his
    voir dire claim, Goins has failed to establish the existence of "special
    circumstances" indicating that racial issues were"inextricably bound
    up in the trial." Accordingly, Goins was not constitutionally entitled
    _________________________________________________________________
    6 The circumstances necessary to implicate the "nonconstitutional"
    standard differ in degree from those necessary to trigger the constitu-
    tional standard. To prompt the application of the constitutional standard,
    the facts must demonstrate a "significant likelihood" that racial bias
    might infect the proceedings. Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 598. By contrast, to
    implicate the "nonconstitutional" standard in federal courts, a defendant
    need demonstrate only a "reasonable possibility" that racial prejudice
    might influence the jury. Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 191.
    18
    to ask prospective jurors the specific questions requested. In this
    regard then, we find that the Supreme Court of Virginia correctly
    rejected this claim and, by definition, its conclusion was not "unrea-
    sonable" in the Williams sense. See Tucker v. Catoe, Nos. 99-14, 99-
    15, 
    2000 WL 763597
    , *15 (4th Cir. June 13, 2000). Goins's claim in
    this regard therefore fails.
    V.
    Goins also asserts other bases for his claim to federal habeas cor-
    pus relief, which we discuss below.
    A.
    First, Goins contends that the trial court failed to fulfill its obliga-
    tion to select a fair and impartial jury by refusing to allow him to con-
    duct voir dire of the jurors individually. After initially questioning
    jurors in groups of three and five, the trial court decided to conduct
    the remainder of voir dire in groups of thirteen. Goins maintains that
    individual voir dire was necessary -- particularly in light of extensive
    pretrial publicity -- to preserve his constitutional right to a fair and
    impartial jury.
    We reject this argument. As we observed in United States v. Bak-
    ker, 
    925 F.2d 728
    , 734 (4th Cir. 1991), it "is well established that a
    trial judge may question prospective jurors collectively rather than
    individually." Of course, in federal court, if the district judge deter-
    mines that a member of the venire has been exposed to prejudicial
    pretrial publicity, that juror "must then be examined, individually and
    outside the presence of the other jurors, to determine the effect of the
    publicity." United States v. Hankish, 
    502 F.2d 71
    , 77 (4th Cir. 1974)
    (quoting Margoles v. United States, 
    407 F.2d 727
    , 735 (7th Cir.
    1969)). As the district court recognized, we have never held that
    "such safeguards are constitutionally required of state courts, rather
    than simply observed as a matter of prudent procedure in federal
    courts." Goins, 
    52 F. Supp. 2d
     at 669. Accordingly, the district court
    correctly concluded that Goins was not entitled to relief on this claim.
    Id. (citing Teague v. Lane, 
    489 U.S. 288
    , 309 (1989) ("[N]ew consti-
    tutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those
    19
    cases which have become final before the new rules are
    announced.")).
    B.
    Next, Goins asserts that the prosecutor's failure to reveal the results
    of a polygraph examination administered to Barry Scott -- who
    accompanied Goins to Tamika Jones's apartment on the day of the
    murders -- violated Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963). Under
    Brady, a prosecutor's failure to disclose "evidence favorable to an
    accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
    material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
    or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87. Evidence is "favor-
    able" if it is exculpatory or if it could be used to impeach prosecution
    witnesses. See United States v. Ellis, 
    121 F.3d 908
    , 914 (4th Cir.
    1997) (citation omitted). Evidence is "material" under Brady if "there
    exists a ``reasonable probability' that had the evidence been disclosed
    the result at trial would have been different." Wood v. Bartholomew,
    
    516 U.S. 1
    , 5 (1995) (per curiam).
    The defense trial theory was that Scott -- rather than Goins -- was
    the murderer. Goins maintains that Scott failed his polygraph exami-
    nation and that the results of the examination were therefore exculpa-
    tory evidence which should have been disclosed. However, as the
    district court correctly observed, the record does not reveal whether
    Barry Scott "in fact failed his polygraph examination or, if he failed,
    what statements he made were judged to be untruthful." Goins, 52 F.
    Supp. 2d at 675 n.31. Accordingly, there is simply no basis in the
    record upon which to conclude that the results of Scott's polygraph
    examination were "favorable" to Goins.
    Moreover, Goins cannot show that the polygraph results were "ma-
    terial" to either his guilt or punishment. Because polygraph results are
    inadmissible -- even for impeachment purposes-- in Virginia, see
    e.g., Robinson v. Commonwealth, 
    341 S.E.2d 159
    , 167 (Va. 1986), the
    non-disclosure of Scott's results could not have had any direct impact
    on the trial. See Wood, 516 U.S. at 6. Therefore, Scott's polygraph
    results could be "material" -- within the meaning of Brady -- only
    if their disclosure "would have been ``reasonably likely' to result indi-
    rectly in a different trial outcome -- for instance, if disclosure would
    20
    have led trial counsel to conduct additional discovery that would have
    led to important admissible evidence." Goins , 
    52 F. Supp. 2d
     at 675
    (citing Wood, 516 U.S. at 6-8). Goins cannot demonstrate any such
    indirect impact in this case. As the district court aptly stated,
    In this instance, it is unlikely that trial counsel's strategy
    would have been significantly different had they learned that
    Scott failed the polygraph examination, if in fact he did.
    Goins' attorneys had already decided to base their defense
    on the theory that Scott was the murderer, in reliance on
    Goins' representations to them that Scott did the killings.
    Even without the polygraph results, counsel had ample
    motivation to investigate this theory. It does not appear that
    the polygraph results would have assisted trial counsel in
    marshaling their evidence or arguments. Thus, it does not
    seem that there is any reasonable likelihood that disclosure
    of the results would have changed the outcome of the trial.
    Goins, 
    52 F. Supp. 2d
     at 675.
    Because the record fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor with-
    held exculpatory and material evidence, Goins cannot demonstrate
    that the Virginia Supreme Court's rejection of this claim was contrary
    to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
    See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).7
    C.
    Goins also alleges that he had a right to inform the jury during voir
    dire and during his capital sentencing proceeding of the nature and
    possibility of parole. These claims have been resolved on the merits
    on direct appeal, and they are therefore subject to review pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). However, because the Supreme Court of Vir-
    _________________________________________________________________
    7 Goins further argues that results of Scott's polygraph examination
    should have been admissible as relevant mitigating evidence during his
    capital sentencing proceeding. As the district court noted, however,
    "[U]nder current controlling precedent, the Constitution does not man-
    date admission of polygraph results in capital sentencing proceedings."
    Goins, 
    52 F. Supp. 2d
     at 675.
    21
    ginia decided these claims without written analysis, the distinction
    between section 2254(d) "reasonableness" review and de novo review
    becomes insignificant. See Cardwell v. Greene , 
    152 F.3d 331
    , 339
    (4th Cir. 1998).
    1.
    Goins initially argues that the trial court's refusal to allow voir dire
    regarding the jurors' perceptions of a life sentence deprived him of a
    fair and impartial jury. Goins's trial counsel sought to voir dire pro-
    spective jurors on the meaning of a life sentence in Virginia, namely
    that if Goins were convicted of a Class 1 felony in Virginia and sen-
    tenced to two or more life sentences, he would be eligible for parole
    only after he served thirty years in prison. See Va. Code § 53.1-
    151(D). Goins alleges that the trial court's refusal to permit this line
    of voir dire deprived him of a fair and impartial jury, because "it left
    him unable to determine which jurors held mistaken impressions
    regarding the meaning of a life sentence in this case." Goins, 52 F.
    Supp. 2d at 672. Additionally, Goins asserts that the Due Process
    Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that he be permitted to
    present evidence regarding the nature of a life sentence during his
    capital sentencing proceeding.
    In Simmons v. South Carolina, 
    512 U.S. 154
     (1994), the Supreme
    Court held that a capital defendant must be permitted to instruct the
    jury as to his parole ineligibility in situations where: (1) if sentenced
    to life imprisonment, he will never become eligible for parole; and (2)
    the prosecution argues that he presents a future danger. Id. at 171
    (emphasis added). Goins contends that the rule in Simmons is equally
    applicable to his situation -- where if sentenced to a life term, he
    would not be eligible for parole for thirty years. However, we have
    repeatedly held that "Simmons does not require that a jury be
    instructed on the effects of parole for a parole-eligible defendant."
    Clagett v. Angelone, 
    209 F.3d 370
    , 375 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000); see also
    Wilson v. Greene, 
    155 F.3d 396
    , 408 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding that
    Simmons does not entitle a capital defendant to an instruction about
    when he would become eligible for parole). Accordingly, because the
    result urged by Goins is not dictated by clearly established federal
    law, his Fourteenth Amendment claims must fail.
    22
    2.
    Additionally, Goins contends that he should have been permitted
    to introduce mitigating evidence regarding his life sentence under the
    Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
    This claim is premised on the Eighth Amendment guarantee that the
    jury should "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating fac-
    tor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the cir-
    cumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
    sentence less than death." Eaton v. Angelone , 
    139 F.3d 990
    , 996 (4th
    Cir. 1998) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 
    438 U.S. 586
    , 604 (1978) (plural-
    ity opinion)). As the district court recognized, however, Goins's con-
    tention -- that the trial court had a duty, under the Eighth
    Amendment, to instruct the jury that Goins would not be eligible for
    parole until he served at least thirty years of a life sentence -- would
    require the announcement of a "new rule" inapplicable to Goins on
    federal habeas corpus review. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 
    95 F.3d 1214
    , 1238 n.13 (4th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 
    521 U.S. 151
     (1997). Accord-
    ingly, the district court correctly dismissed Goins's Eighth Amend-
    ment claim.
    D.
    Next, Goins asserts numerous errors by his trial and appellate
    counsel that allegedly deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.
    Specifically, Goins contends that: (1) his trial counsel inadequately
    investigated his case; (2) he was denied effective assistance during
    voir dire; (3) after the trial court granted Goins's motion for change
    of venue, his trial attorneys "simply acquiesced to the trial court's
    selection of a group of jurors with little understanding or exposure to
    the type of environment Goins was from," Br. for Appellant at 48
    n.14; (4) he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel during the
    guilt phase of his murder trial by his attorneys' failure to call Barry
    Scott as a defense witness; and (5) his attorneys failed to introduce
    sufficient mitigating evidence and render an effective closing argu-
    ment during Goins's capital sentencing proceeding.
    The district court carefully considered Goins's ineffective assis-
    tance claims and concluded that the claims must fail"both because in
    some instances Goins cannot establish that trial counsel's perfor-
    23
    mance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
    because, even assuming this were established, Goins, in all instances,
    fails to show that any such deficiencies prejudiced either the trial or
    the sentencing." Goins, 
    52 F. Supp. 2d
     at 652. Likewise, we have
    carefully reviewed Goins's asserted instances of ineffective assistance
    and we are unable to conclude that the Supreme Court of Virginia's
    dismissal of these claims was unreasonable under Williams, supra.
    E.
    In addition, Goins asserts that he was improperly excluded from
    numerous bench conferences during the guilt phase of his murder
    trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia held this claim to be procedur-
    ally defaulted under the rule of Slayton v. Parrigan, 
    205 S.E.2d 680
    (Va. 1974). Slayton proscribes state habeas review of claims that were
    available to petitioner at trial or on direct appeal, if petitioner failed
    to raise them at that time. Id. at 682.
    We have consistently found the rule of Slayton to constitute an
    independent and adequate state procedural rule for the purposes of
    federal habeas procedural default analysis. See , e.g., Fisher v. Ange-
    lone, 
    163 F.3d 835
    , 844 (4th Cir. 1998). As a result, federal habeas
    corpus review of this claim is barred unless Goins can show that: (1)
    there is cause for, and actual prejudice from, the default; or (2) the
    failure to review the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage
    of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 
    501 U.S. 722
    , 749-50 (1991).
    Because Goins cannot make either showing, we affirm the district
    court's dismissal of this claim.
    F.
    Finally, Goins contends that the district court erred in denying his
    motion for an evidentiary hearing on his preserved claims. Pursuant
    to our decision in Cardwell, supra, a federal habeas corpus petitioner
    -- when denied the opportunity to develop an evidentiary basis for
    his claims in state court -- is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he
    is able to allege "additional facts that, if true, would entitle him to
    relief." Id. at 338 (citation omitted). As the foregoing discussion indi-
    cates, however, Goins has not alleged facts that, if true, would war-
    24
    rant relief. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Goins's
    motion for an evidentiary hearing.
    VI.
    Pursuant to the foregoing, we conclude that Goins has failed to
    make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional
    right with regard to any of his assertions of error. See 28 U.S.C.
    § 2253(c)(2). Therefore, we decline to award Goins a certificate of
    appealability and we dismiss his appeal.
    CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
    DENIED AND APPEAL DISMISSED
    25