United States v. Robinson ( 2002 )


Menu:
  •                                               Filed:   January 7, 2002
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    Nos. 00-4851(L)
    (CR-98-442)
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    Joseph Brooks Robinson, et al.,
    Defendants - Appellants.
    O R D E R
    Upon consideration of appellants’ petition for rehearing,
    IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is granted for
    the limited purpose of making one revision to the opinion.
    The court amends its opinion filed December 17, 2001, as
    follows:   On page 14, first full paragraph, lines 4-8 -- the
    sentence beginning “In the first place” is deleted, and is replaced
    with the following sentence:
    - 2 -
    In the first place, while Longshore testified that both
    Appellants participated in telling the story of the
    murder, she did not state that their voices were jumbled
    together in such a way as to prevent her or each
    Appellant from hearing and understanding what was being
    said.
    Entered   at   the   direction   of    Judge   Wilkins,   with   the
    concurrence of Judge Williams and Judge Michael.
    For the Court
    /s/ Patricia S. Connor
    Clerk
    Rehearing granted for limited purpose
    of making one revision to opinion, by
    order filed 1/7/02
    PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                         No. 00-4851
    JOSEPH BROOKS ROBINSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                         No. 00-4853
    STANLEY LEON OBANION, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
    Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.
    (CR-98-442)
    Argued: October 29, 2001
    Decided: December 17, 2001
    Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    ____________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkins wrote the
    opinion, in
    which Judge Williams and Judge Michael joined.
    ____________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Fred Warren Bennett, Greenbelt, Maryland; Martin
    Greg-
    ory Bahl, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, Baltimore,
    Maryland, for Appellants. Jan Paul Miller, Assistant United
    States
    Attorney, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Greenbelt,
    Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal
    Public
    Defender, Denise C. Barrett, Assistant Federal Public
    Defender, Balti-
    more, Maryland, for Appellants. Stephen M. Schenning,
    United States
    Attorney, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Greenbelt,
    Maryland, for Appellee.
    ____________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    WILKINS, Circuit Judge:
    Joseph Brooks Robinson and Stanley Leon Obanion, Jr.
    (collec-
    tively, "Appellants") appeal their convictions on various
    charges
    stemming from a series of violent carjackings committed
    between
    December 29, 1997 and January 2, 1998. Appellants maintain
    that
    venue on one of the counts was improper; that evidence
    obtained dur-
    ing searches of their homes should have been suppressed;
    and that the
    district court abused its discretion in admitting the
    testimony of Crys-
    tal Longshore. Additionally, Robinson maintains that he was
    deprived
    of his statutory right to the assistance of two attorneys.
    For the rea-
    sons set forth below, we affirm.
    I.
    On the evening of December 29, 1997, Appellants and two
    com-
    panions, Larry Erby and Brian Brown, were walking through
    their
    neighborhood in Fort Washington, Maryland, when Robinson
    stated
    that "he needed a car for the night" and that he planned to
    rob some-
    one. J.A. 475. After Obanion and Erby indicated assent to this
    plan
    (Brown did not wish to participate), Robinson, who was armed
    with
    a semi-automatic pistol, stepped into the street and
    attempted, unsuc-
    cessfully, to flag down passing motorists. While these
    efforts were
    ongoing, the group observed a green Acura pull into a
    driveway a
    2
    short distance down the street. Obanion took the firearm
    from Robin-
    son and ran over to the vehicle, with Robinson and Erby
    following.
    As the driver, Louis Perkins, exited, Obanion pointed the gun
    at his
    head and demanded his keys and his wallet. While Perkins
    complied,
    Robinson and Erby got into the automobile; once he had
    Perkins'
    keys and wallet, Obanion entered the driver's seat and
    drove away.
    Obanion drove the group to southeast Washington, D.C.,
    where
    they came upon a man walking on the side of the road.
    Obanion
    pulled over and Robinson exited, holding the gun. He
    demanded
    money from the man, and when the man said he had none,
    Robinson
    shot him. After Robinson returned to the vehicle and
    Obanion drove
    away, Robinson said that he had shot the man "because he
    felt like
    it" and because he needed to kill someone in order to "earn
    his
    stripes," a tattoo to which one becomes entitled upon
    killing someone.
    J.A. 489.
    As Appellants and Erby headed back toward Maryland,
    two of the
    tires on the stolen Acura blew out. As the men were trying
    to deter-
    mine what to do, a tow truck driven by Matthew Dozier
    happened
    upon them and pulled over. Dozier towed the Acura to a
    neighbor-
    hood in the District of Columbia, where he unhooked the
    vehicle and
    began to fill out some paperwork in the cab of the tow
    truck. Robin-
    son and Obanion, who were standing at the back of the Acura
    with
    Erby, began to argue about who should kill Dozier. Obanion
    won the
    argument by reminding Robinson that Robinson had already
    killed
    someone that night and that it was Obanion's turn to earn his
    stripes.
    Obanion shot Dozier four times as Dozier begged for his
    life. Appel-
    lants and Erby then got into the tow truck and began to
    drive away.
    As they pulled away from the curb, Robinson observed that
    Dozier
    was still moving. Obanion jumped out of the truck, ran back
    to
    Dozier, and shot him once more. Obanion returned to the
    truck,
    excited and singing. Dozier later died of the gunshot
    wounds inflicted
    by Obanion.
    The group again headed toward Maryland, with Robinson
    driving
    the tow truck. On the way, Robinson stated that the group
    needed to
    steal another car for use the next day in more carjackings
    and rob-
    beries. As they were driving through a residential
    neighborhood in
    Maryland, they observed a white Nissan Maxima, which was
    driven
    3
    by Hurley Enoch. Robinson followed Enoch, eventually
    trapping him
    in a cul-de-sac. Robinson stole Enoch's wallet at gunpoint
    and he and
    Erby drove off in the Maxima; Obanion followed in the tow
    truck.
    Shortly thereafter, Obanion abandoned the tow truck and
    joined Rob-
    inson and Erby in the Maxima.
    Appellants drove Erby home, then proceeded to the home
    of Crys-
    tal Longshore, arriving at about 3:00 a.m. on the morning of
    Decem-
    ber 30. Longshore and her boyfriend—whom Appellants had
    come to
    see—were asleep on the couch in the living room. From her
    position
    on the couch, Longshore listened as Robinson and Obanion
    described
    the murder of Dozier. She then watched as they acted out
    the scene,
    with Obanion playing the part of the doomed victim.
    Appellants also
    showed Longshore Dozier's wallet and driver's license.
    Later that
    morning, Longshore observed Appellants leave in a white
    Nissan
    Maxima.
    At approximately 8:45 that evening, Corporal Copeland of
    the
    Prince George's County Police Department spotted the
    stolen Max-
    ima. When Copeland turned on his emergency lights, the
    driver of the
    Maxima accelerated suddenly. Copeland chased the vehicle
    until it
    crashed into a parked automobile; as Copeland exited his
    patrol car,
    he observed the driver of the Maxima running away from the
    scene.
    Copeland called for assistance, and Corporal Landers
    responded to
    the scene with a police dog. Landers swept the area, leaving
    his patrol
    car running so that the vehicle would be warm when he and
    the dog
    returned to it. Upon returning to his starting point, Landers
    realized
    that his patrol car was gone. The vehicle was found
    approximately 40
    minutes later, but several items, including a police jump
    suit, a rain-
    coat, a neoprene mask, and a pair of gloves, were missing
    from the
    trunk.
    Shortly after this incident, Obanion returned to
    Longshore's apart-
    ment carrying a police duffel bag. Obanion emptied the
    contents of
    the bag onto the living room floor, revealing the items
    stolen from the
    police vehicle. Robinson arrived at the apartment
    approximately 20
    minutes later, out of breath. Robinson told those present
    that he had
    just finished running from the police.
    Three days later, on January 2, 1998, Appellants again
    met up with
    Erby. Also present were Erby's brother, Leroy Erby (Leroy),
    and
    4
    Kenneth Maxwell. Obanion announced that he wanted to
    commit
    another carjacking and robbery that evening, and persuaded
    the others
    to help him by promising them a share of the proceeds of the
    robbery.
    Using a Datsun belonging to the Erbys' sister and driven by
    Leroy,
    the group proceeded to a suburban Maryland neighborhood,
    where
    Appellants and Maxwell exited the vehicle and began
    running
    through the yards. The three came upon Bruce Chase, who
    was
    removing packages and purses from his girlfriend's
    automobile. Rob-
    inson approached Chase and demanded the purses at
    gunpoint. Chase
    handed the purses to Robinson and began to back away,
    turning
    briefly to shout at his girlfriend, who had come outside, to
    get back
    in the house. When Chase turned around again, Obanion was
    pointing
    the gun at him. Chase's girlfriend then activated the panic
    alarm in
    the house, which could be heard outside. Upon hearing the
    alarm,
    Appellants and Maxwell ran back to the Datsun and all five
    men
    drove off.
    Chase got into his own vehicle and pursued the Datsun.
    The pursuit
    eventually led to another neighborhood, where Chase
    briefly lost sight
    of the Datsun. While they were out of sight, Obanion exited
    the Dat-
    sun with the gun. When Chase drove into the neighborhood,
    Obanion
    shot at Chase's vehicle, striking Chase in the leg. Chase was
    able to
    drive away and get medical treatment.
    Leroy drove the Datsun to another part of the same
    neighborhood,
    where Appellants exited. Appellants ran through the
    neighborhood
    and came upon Gloria Ryan, who was backing her minivan out
    of her
    garage. In the van were Ryan's two children, aged six and
    five, and
    an infant whom Ryan was babysitting. Ryan heard a thump
    behind
    her and stopped, believing that she had hit someone or
    something.
    She turned to find Robinson standing next to the driver's
    side door,
    pointing a gun at her head. Robinson demanded that she get
    out of the
    minivan and hand over the keys. After telling her children
    to get out
    of the vehicle, Ryan exited as well. Obanion removed the car
    seat
    holding the infant and threw it on the lawn.
    Appellants then drove to where the Erbys and Maxwell
    were wait-
    ing and picked them up. As they were driving away, they were
    spot-
    ted by police, who pursued them to their neighborhood in
    Fort
    Washington. Obanion, who was driving, crashed the minivan
    into a
    5
    mailbox and all five men fled on foot. They were
    subsequently appre-
    hended.
    Based on these events, Appellants were charged with
    conspiracy to
    commit carjackings, see 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 371
     (West 2000); using
    and
    carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
    violence (the
    carjacking conspiracy), see 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (c)(1) (West 2000);
    causing death by use of a firearm during the course of the
    § 924(c)
    offense, see 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (j) (West 2000); three counts of
    car-
    jacking and one count of attempted carjacking, see 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 2119
     (West 2000); and four counts of using and carrying a
    firearm
    during a crime of violence (the substantive carjacking
    offenses), see
    
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (c)(1). Following a jury trial, Appellants
    were con-
    victed of all charges. Both were sentenced to life
    imprisonment.
    II.
    Appellants' primary contention on appeal is that venue on
    the
    § 924(j) count was improper in the District of Maryland.
    Appellants
    maintain that because the carjacking and murder of Matthew
    Dozier
    took place solely in the District of Columbia, venue was
    proper only
    in that jurisdiction. We hold that the logic of United States
    v.
    Rodriguez-Moreno, 
    526 U.S. 275
     (1999), compels the
    conclusion that
    venue on the § 924(j) count was proper in the District of
    Maryland.
    Article III of the Constitution provides, as is relevant
    here, that
    "[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State
    where the said
    Crimes shall have been committed." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2,
    cl. 3.
    The Sixth Amendment reinforces this command, stating that
    "[i]n all
    criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
    a speedy
    and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
    district wherein
    the crime shall have been committed." U.S. Const. amend. VI;
    see
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 ("Except as otherwise permitted by
    statute or by
    these rules, the prosecution shall be had in a district in
    which the
    offense was committed."). When multiple counts are alleged
    in an
    indictment, venue must be proper on each count. See United
    States v.
    Bowens, 
    224 F.3d 302
    , 308 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    121 S. Ct. 1408
     (2001). Venue on a count is proper only in a district in
    which
    an essential conduct element of the offense took place. See
    
    id. at 309
    .
    The burden is on the Government to prove venue by a
    preponderance
    6
    of the evidence. See United States v. Barsanti, 
    943 F.2d 428
    ,
    434 (4th
    Cir. 1991).
    In order to understand Appellants' venue challenge and
    our resolu-
    tion of that challenge, it is necessary to examine the first
    three counts
    of the indictment against Appellants. Count One of the
    indictment
    charged Appellants with conspiracy to commit carjackings;
    this count
    identified all of the carjackings and the murder of Dozier
    as overt acts
    in furtherance of the conspiracy. Count Two charged
    Appellants with
    using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a
    crime of vio-
    lence, namely, the conspiracy to commit carjackings "as set
    forth in
    Count One of this Indictment." Supp. J.A. 5. Count Three, the
    § 924(j) count, charged Appellants with causing the death of
    a person
    through the use of a firearm "in the course of the violation
    of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) as set forth in Count Two of this Indictment."
    
    Id. at 6
    .
    In determining where a crime was committed for purposes
    of
    venue, "a court must initially identify the conduct
    constituting the
    offense (the nature of the crime) and then discern the
    location of the
    commission of the criminal acts." Rodriguez-Moreno, 
    526 U.S. at 279
    ; see United States v. Anderson, 
    328 U.S. 699
    , 703 (1946).
    Sec-
    tion 924(j) applies to "[a] person who, in the course of a
    violation of
    [§ 924(c)], causes the death of a person through the use of
    a firearm."
    
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (j). Thus, the conduct elements of a § 924(j)
    viola-
    tion are (1) the use of a firearm to cause the death of a
    person and (2)
    the commission of a § 924(c) violation. The conduct elements
    of the
    § 924(c) violation, in turn, are (a) the use of a firearm and (b)
    the
    commission of a crime of violence. See Rodriguez-Moreno, 
    526 U.S. at 280
    .
    In Rodriguez-Moreno, the Court addressed the question
    of the
    proper venue for a charge of using or carrying a firearm
    during a
    crime of violence, kidnaping, under § 924(c)(1). The
    defendant kid-
    naped the victim in Texas and subsequently took him to New
    Jersey,
    New York, and Maryland. See id. at 276-77. While in
    Maryland, the
    defendant obtained a gun and threatened the victim with it.
    See id. at
    277. The defendant was subsequently convicted in the
    District of New
    Jersey of kidnaping and violating § 924(c)(1). See id. The
    Supreme
    Court rejected the defendant's argument that venue on the
    latter count
    7
    was improper in New Jersey because the use of the firearm
    occurred
    only in Maryland. The Court reasoned that in § 924(c)(1),
    "Congress
    proscribed both the use of the firearm and the commission
    of acts that
    constitute a violent crime" and that when the underlying
    crime of vio-
    lence is a continuing offense that may be prosecuted in more
    than one
    jurisdiction, the related § 924(c)(1) charge is also a
    continuing
    offense. Id. at 281. Thus, the Court concluded that venue on
    the
    § 924(c)(1) offense was proper in any jurisdiction in which
    the under-
    lying crime of violence may be prosecuted. See id. at 281-82.
    The logic of Rodriguez-Moreno compels us to conclude
    that venue
    on the § 924(j) count was proper in the District of Maryland.
    The rele-
    vant conduct elements of the crime alleged in Count Three
    of the
    indictment were that Appellants caused the death of
    Matthew Dozier
    through the use of a firearm during the course of violating
    § 924(c)(1), i.e., while using or carrying a firearm during a
    conspiracy
    to commit carjackings. Under the logic of Rodriguez-Moreno,
    because conspiracy to commit carjackings is a continuing
    offense, see
    United States v. Meitinger, 
    901 F.2d 27
    , 28 (4th Cir. 1990), so
    too is
    the § 924(c)(1) violation alleged in Count Two of the
    indictment.
    And, because the continuing § 924(c)(1) violation underlies
    the
    § 924(j) charge and is a necessary conduct element of that
    charge,
    venue on the § 924(j) count was proper in any jurisdiction
    where the
    § 924(c)(1) count could have been prosecuted. Since venue on
    the
    § 924(c)(1) count was undisputedly proper in the District of
    Mary-
    land, the district court did not err in denying Appellants'
    motion to
    dismiss the § 924(j) count for improper venue.
    III.
    During the course of the investigation, law enforcement
    officers
    executed search warrants at Robinson's and Obanion's homes.
    The
    applications for the warrants were supported by an
    affidavit by Spe-
    cial Agent Michael McCoy of the FBI.1 McCoy's affidavit
    stated that
    he was involved in a joint federal-state investigation of "a
    racketeer-
    ing enterprise responsible for the distribution of narcotics
    and the
    commission of numerous violent crimes to include murders,
    assaults
    ____________________________________________________________
    1
    McCoy submitted the same affidavit in support of both
    search war-
    rants.
    8
    with intent to murder, armed carjackings, and armed
    robberies." J.A.
    41. The affidavit set forth allegations regarding the
    carjackings and
    murder of Matthew Dozier, as well as numerous other
    violent crimes
    committed by members of the self-titled "Fort Washington
    Crew," id.
    at 43, which was alleged to consist of Appellants, the
    Erbys, Max-
    well, and others. In conclusion, McCoy attested that the
    crimes
    described in the affidavit "are racketeering acts [as] defined
    in Title
    18 U.S.C. Section 1961" and that "the combination of these
    acts com-
    mitted by this group constitutes participating in the affairs
    of an enter-
    prise, the activity of which affects interstate commerce
    through a
    pattern of racketeering." Id. at 46. Attachment A to the
    affidavit iden-
    tified particular items to be seized during the search,
    including items
    of clothing worn during the carjackings and items taken
    from Corpo-
    ral Landers' patrol car and from the victims of the
    carjackings.
    Attachment A also identified as items to be seized"[b]ooks,
    ledgers,
    journals, notations, letters, photographs, graffiti, news
    articles, tele-
    phone books and other items of evidentiary value." Id. at 48.
    Prior to trial, Appellants moved to suppress the fruits
    of the
    searches. As to both searches, Appellants maintained that
    the search
    warrants were not supported by probable cause. As to the
    search of
    Obanion's home in particular, Appellants maintained that the
    search-
    ing officers flagrantly disregarded the terms of the
    warrant and that
    the appropriate remedy for this violation was blanket
    suppression of
    all items seized. The district court denied the motion to
    suppress. In
    considering Appellants' challenge to the validity of the
    warrants, we
    review the legal conclusions of the district court de novo
    and its fac-
    tual findings for clear error. See United States v.
    Photogrammetric
    Data Servs., Inc., 
    259 F.3d 229
    , 237 (4th Cir. 2001). We review
    the
    denial of the request for blanket suppression for abuse of
    discretion.
    See United States v. Borromeo, 
    954 F.2d 245
    , 246 (4th Cir.
    1992).
    A.
    The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part
    that"[t]he right
    of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
    and effects,
    against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
    violated, and
    no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." U.S.
    Const.
    amend. IV. "This fundamental right is preserved by a
    requirement that
    searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an
    independent
    9
    judicial officer." California v. Carney, 
    471 U.S. 386
    , 390
    (1985).
    Although we review de novo the denial of the motion to
    suppress by
    the district court, the determination of probable cause by
    the issuing
    magistrate is entitled to great deference from this court.
    See United
    States v. Wilhelm, 
    80 F.3d 116
    , 118-19 (4th Cir. 1996).
    As the Supreme Court has noted, "probable cause is a
    fluid concept
    — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
    factual
    contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat
    set of legal
    rules." Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 232 (1983). In
    evaluating
    whether probable cause exists, it is the task of the issuing
    magistrate
    "to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
    all the
    circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair
    probability
    that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
    particular
    place." 
    Id. at 238
    ; see Mason v. Godinez, 
    47 F.3d 852
    , 855 (7th
    Cir.
    1995) ("Probable cause means more than bare suspicion but
    less than
    absolute certainty that a search will be fruitful."). The
    probable cause
    standard does not
    require officials to possess an airtight case before
    taking
    action. The pieces of an investigative puzzle will
    often fail
    to neatly fit, and officers must be given leeway to
    draw rea-
    sonable    conclusions     from     confusing    and
    contradictory infor-
    mation, free of the apprehension that every
    mistaken search
    or seizure will present a triable issue of probable
    cause.
    Taylor v. Farmer, 
    13 F.3d 117
    , 121-22 (4th Cir. 1993). Indeed,
    the
    Supreme Court in Gates specifically cautioned against
    "hypertechni-
    cal" scrutiny of affidavits lest police officers be
    encouraged to forgo
    the warrant application process altogether. Gates, 
    462 U.S. at 236
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Appellants' first argument regarding the existence of
    probable
    cause is that the affidavit failed to set forth any facts
    tying them to
    the carjackings or to the racketeering enterprise alleged
    in the affida-
    vit. We disagree. Even if the affidavit was not a model of
    precision,
    it was nevertheless constitutionally adequate. First,
    McCoy's affidavit
    informed the magistrate that Obanion's fingerprints had
    been found
    in the carjacked Maxima and in Landers' patrol car.
    Additionally, the
    affidavit stated that the Erbys and Maxwell had provided
    investigat-
    10
    ing officers with information regarding the involvement of
    themselves
    and Appellants in the carjackings and various other crimes
    alleged to
    be involved in the racketeering enterprise.
    In the same vein, Appellants maintain that the affidavit
    does not
    provide any facts to support a conclusion that evidence of
    racketeer-
    ing or any other crime would be found in the Robinson or
    Obanion
    homes. We reject this contention as well. The affidavit and
    Attach-
    ment A identified specific items of clothing worn by
    Appellants and
    specific items taken during the various carjackings and
    robberies.
    Additionally, McCoy attested that in his experience many
    perpetrators
    of criminal acts do not dispose of the clothing worn during
    the crime.
    McCoy's personal experience was unquestionably relevant to
    the
    existence of probable cause. See United States v. Faison, 
    195 F.3d 890
    , 893 (7th Cir. 1999). These facts, taken together, are
    sufficient to
    create a fair probability that evidence of the crimes would
    be located
    in Robinson's and Obanion's homes.2
    B.
    During the search of Obanion's home, law enforcement
    officers
    seized a number of items that were arguably not within the
    scope of
    the search warrant. For example, the officers seized
    various docu-
    ments related to a dispute between Obanion, his mother, and
    the
    Prince George's County school board; some of Obanion's
    juvenile
    court records; pages of homework; and a list of names and
    addresses
    for a family reunion. Appellants argue that the seizure of
    these and
    other items constituted a flagrant disregard of the terms
    of the warrant
    ____________________________________________________________
    2
    Appellants also argue that the affidavit did not set
    forth probable
    cause to believe that Appellants had engaged, or were
    engaged, in the
    crime of racketeering. Having reviewed the affidavit, we
    conclude that
    it did set forth probable cause to believe that Appellants
    were guilty of
    racketeering.
    In light of our conclusion that the search warrants were
    based upon
    probable cause, we do not address the Government's
    alternative conten-
    tion that the searches were sustainable under the "good
    faith" exception
    to the warrant requirement. See United States v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 913
    (1984).
    11
    justifying blanket suppression of all items seized, including
    those that
    were within the scope of the warrant.
    In order to be valid under the Fourth Amendment, a
    search warrant
    must, inter alia, "particularly describ [e] the place to be
    searched, and
    the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
    pur-
    pose of this particularity requirement is to avoid "a
    general, explor-
    atory rummaging in a person's belongings." Andresen v.
    Maryland,
    
    427 U.S. 463
    , 480 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    See gen-
    erally Stanford v. Texas, 
    379 U.S. 476
    , 481-85 (1965)
    (describing his-
    tory and purpose of particularity requirement). A
    sufficiently
    particular warrant describes the items to be seized in such
    a manner
    that it leaves nothing to the discretion of the officer
    executing the
    warrant. See Marron v. United States, 
    275 U.S. 192
    , 196
    (1927).
    A search is not invalidated in its entirety merely because
    some
    seized items were not identified in the warrant. See United
    States v.
    Hargus, 
    128 F.3d 1358
    , 1363 (10th Cir. 1997). Rather,
    invalidation
    of an entire search based on a seizure of items not named in
    the war-
    rant is an "extraordinary remedy" that "should be used only
    when the
    violations of the warrant's requirements are so extreme
    that the search
    is essentially transformed into an impermissible general
    search."
    United States v. Chen, 
    979 F.2d 714
    , 717 (9th Cir. 1992). Put
    another
    way, searching officers may be said to have flagrantly
    disregarded the
    terms of a warrant when they engage in "indiscriminate
    fishing" for
    evidence. 
    Id.
     For example, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a
    finding of fla-
    grant disregard when law enforcement officers, acting
    pursuant to a
    warrant that authorized seizure of marijuana and several
    specifically
    identified firearms, seized "anything of value," including
    televisions,
    VCRs, stereos, a lawn mower, cameras, a clock radio, and a
    screw-
    driver set. United States v. Foster, 
    100 F.3d 846
    , 848 & n.1,
    850-51
    (10th Cir. 1996); see United States v. Medlin, 
    842 F.2d 1194
    ,
    1198-
    99 (10th Cir. 1988) (concluding that seizure of 667 items of
    property
    not identified in warrant authorizing search for stolen
    firearms consti-
    tuted flagrant disregard of the terms of the warrant).
    We conclude that the extraordinary remedy of blanket
    suppression
    is not warranted here. Simply put, the record does not
    demonstrate the
    kind of wholesale seizure that prompted the holdings in
    Foster and
    Medlin. In many cases, items that were not identified in the
    warrant
    12
    were seized because they were part of a larger item of
    evidentiary
    value. For example, a grocery list was seized because it was
    found
    inside a date book containing names and addresses; Obanion
    does not
    dispute that the date book was an item within the scope of
    the war-
    rant. Similarly, a page of Spanish homework was seized not
    for the
    evidentiary value of the homework, but rather because the
    back of the
    page contained notations and telephone numbers relevant to
    the inves-
    tigation. Furthermore, we note that the officers suspended
    the search
    and obtained a second warrant before seizing an item found
    above the
    ceiling tiles in Obanion's bedroom. Such scrupulous regard
    for the
    protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment belies any
    intent to
    disregard the terms of the warrant. We therefore affirm
    the denial of
    blanket suppression.
    IV.
    Appellants next challenge the admission of Longshore's
    testimony
    regarding Appellants' verbal description of the murder of
    Matthew
    Dozier. Longshore testified that although she was not
    looking at
    Appellants as they described the murder and could not
    identify which
    Appellant made any given statement, she could discern two
    separate
    voices and knew that Robinson and Obanion were jointly
    describing
    the crime. Further, Longshore testified that at no point did
    either indi-
    vidual contradict or deny the other's portion of the
    account. The dis-
    trict court admitted Longshore's testimony, reasoning that
    to the
    extent statements by Robinson were admitted against
    Obanion and
    vice-versa, the statements were adoptive admissions under
    Federal
    Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B), and thus were not excludable
    hearsay.3
    Rule 801(d)(2)(B) provides that "[a] statement is not
    hearsay" if the
    statement is offered against a party and if the party against
    whom the
    statement is offered "has manifested an adoption [of] or
    belief in" the
    truth of the statement.
    ____________________________________________________________
    3
    To the extent the statements were introduced against
    the Appellant
    who made them, they were admissible pursuant to Federal
    Rule of Evi-
    dence 801(d)(2)(A) (providing that a party's own statement is
    not hear-
    say when introduced against that party).
    13
    When a statement is offered as an adoptive
    admission, the
    primary inquiry is whether the statement was such
    that,
    under the circumstances, an innocent defendant
    would nor-
    mally be induced to respond, and whether there are
    suffi-
    cient foundational facts from which the jury could
    infer that
    the defendant heard, understood, and acquiesced in
    the state-
    ment.
    United States v. Jinadu, 
    98 F.3d 239
    , 244 (6th Cir. 1996). A
    party
    may manifest adoption of a statement in any number of ways,
    includ-
    ing [through] words, conduct, or silence. See Marshall v.
    Young, 
    833 F.2d 709
    , 716 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987). We review the admission of
    evi-
    dence by the district court for abuse of discretion. See
    United States
    v. D'Anjou, 
    16 F.3d 604
    , 610 (4th Cir. 1994).
    Appellants maintain that because Longshore could not
    identify
    which Appellant said what, "the record does not
    sufficiently show that
    either [Appellant] heard, understood, or acquiesced in the
    statements
    of the other." Appellants' Br. at 46. We disagree. In the first
    place,
    while Longshore testified that both Appellants
    participated in telling
    the story of the murder, she did not state that their voices
    were jum-
    bled together in such a way as to prevent her or each
    Appellant
    from hearing and understanding what was being said. We
    there-
    fore conclude that the circumstances were such that, had
    either
    Appellant disagreed with a statement by the other, he
    would have
    made his disagreement known. Moreover, the scenario
    described by
    Longshore, in which both Appellants provided parts of the
    tale, con-
    tained ample facts from which a jury could conclude that
    each Appel-
    lant adopted the statements of the other.
    V.
    Finally, Robinson maintains that he is entitled to
    reversal of his
    § 924(j) conviction under United States v. Boone, 
    245 F.3d 352
     (4th
    Cir. 2001). In Boone, a panel of this court held that a
    defendant
    charged with a death-eligible crime is entitled, under 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3005
     (West 2000), to representation by two attorneys
    regardless of
    whether the Government actually seeks the death penalty.
    See Boone,
    
    245 F.3d at 358
    . In light of that holding, Boone's conviction
    was
    vacated. See 
    id. at 364
    .
    14
    Because Robinson did not object to the asserted violation
    of
    § 3005, our review is for plain error.4 See Fed. R. Crim. P.
    52(b);
    United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 731-32 (1993). In order
    to dem-
    onstrate plain error, Robinson must show that an error
    occurred, that
    the error was plain, and that the error affected his
    substantial rights.
    See Olano, 
    507 U.S. at 732
    ; United States v. Jackson, 
    124 F.3d 607
    ,
    614 (4th Cir. 1997). Even if Robinson can satisfy these
    requirements,
    correction of the error remains within our discretion,
    which we
    "should not exercise . . . unless the error ``seriously
    affect[s] the fair-
    ness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings.'" Olano,
    
    507 U.S. at 732
     (second alteration in original) (quoting
    United States
    v. Young, 
    470 U.S. 1
    , 15 (1985)).
    Applying Boone — as we must, see Baker v. Corcoran, 
    220 F.3d 276
    , 290 n.11 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    121 S. Ct. 1194
    (2001) —
    we conclude that Robinson has satisfied the first three
    prongs of plain
    error analysis. While Robinson was provided with two
    attorneys dur-
    ing pretrial proceedings, one of those attorneys was
    relieved of his
    duties after the Government elected not to seek the death
    penalty
    against Robinson. Under Boone, the failure to provide
    Robinson with
    two attorneys throughout trial was plain error even
    though the Gov-
    ernment withdrew its notice of intent to seek the death
    penalty. More-
    over, because a violation of § 3005 is not reviewable for
    harmlessness, see Boone, 
    245 F.3d at
    361 n.8, the error
    necessarily
    affected Robinson's substantial rights, see United States v.
    David, 
    83 F.3d 638
    , 647 (4th Cir. 1996).
    We decline, however, to exercise our discretion to notice
    the error.
    Simply put, the error here — the failure to provide a
    non-capital
    defendant with the benefit of a provision designed to
    provide addi-
    ____________________________________________________________
    4
    Robinson asserts that plain error review does not apply
    because a vio-
    lation of § 3005 is a structural defect. We disagree. Even if
    a violation
    of § 3005 is a structural defect, cf. Boone, 
    245 F.3d at
    361
    n.8 (noting
    that a violation of § 3005 is not amenable to harmless-error
    analysis), it
    is well settled in this circuit that plain error review
    applies to forfeited
    structural errors. See, e.g., United States v. David, 
    83 F.3d 638
    , 647-48
    (4th Cir. 1996) (applying plain error analysis to forfeited
    structural
    error).
    15
    tional protection to capital defendants—did not affect the
    fairness,
    integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.5
    VI.
    For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that none
    of Appel-
    lants' challenges to their convictions have merit.
    Accordingly, we
    affirm.
    AFFIRMED
    ____________________________________________________________
    5
    To the extent that § 3005 benefits even non-capital
    defendants during
    the period when the Government is deciding whether to seek
    the death
    penalty, see Boone, 
    245 F.3d at 360
    , Robinson received that
    benefit.
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-4851

Filed Date: 1/7/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/22/2015

Authorities (25)

wesley-eugene-baker-v-thomas-r-corcoran-warden-of-the-maryland , 220 F.3d 276 ( 2000 )

United States v. Anderson , 66 S. Ct. 1213 ( 1946 )

united-states-v-teri-ann-meitinger-aka-gregory-lewis-meitinger-aka , 901 F.2d 27 ( 1990 )

Marron v. United States , 48 S. Ct. 74 ( 1927 )

United States v. Adolph J. Barsanti, United States of ... , 943 F.2d 428 ( 1991 )

Lester B. Mason v. Salvador Godinez, Warden, Stateville ... , 47 F.3d 852 ( 1995 )

United States v. Arnold Jackson , 124 F.3d 607 ( 1997 )

United States v. Robert Augustine D'anjou, A/K/A Dennis ... , 16 F.3d 604 ( 1994 )

United States v. Anthony W. Faison , 195 F.3d 890 ( 1999 )

United States v. Spencer Bowens, A/K/A Scooter, A/K/A Clyde,... , 224 F.3d 302 ( 2000 )

James E. Taylor, Administrator for the Estate of Brenda K. ... , 13 F.3d 117 ( 1993 )

United States v. Lauren Eric Wilhelm , 80 F.3d 116 ( 1996 )

United States v. Olayemi Dele Jinadu (95-3833), Moruf ... , 98 F.3d 239 ( 1996 )

United States v. Leon , 104 S. Ct. 3405 ( 1984 )

United States v. Charley Hargus , 128 F.3d 1358 ( 1997 )

United States v. Foster , 100 F.3d 846 ( 1996 )

United States v. Abel Parama Borromeo , 954 F.2d 245 ( 1992 )

United States v. Karl v. David , 83 F.3d 638 ( 1996 )

United States v. Gary Dean Boone , 245 F.3d 352 ( 2001 )

united-states-v-jim-juichang-chen-aka-jui-chang-chen-lucy-chen-aka-hseuh , 979 F.2d 714 ( 1992 )

View All Authorities »