In re American Honda Lit v. ( 2003 )


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  •                                              Filed:   January 28, 2003
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    Nos. 01-2194(L)
    (CA-95-1069-MDL)
    In Re: American Honda Litigation
    Roger Miller, et al.,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    versus
    Lawrence Silver, et al.,
    Movants - Appellees.
    O R D E R
    The court amends its opinion filed January 17, 2003, as
    follows:
    On page 36, first full paragraph, line 5 -- the word “mislead”
    is corrected to read “misled.”
    For the Court - By Direction
    /s/ Patricia S. Connor
    Clerk
    PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
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    In Re: AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR
    COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
    Dealerships Relations Litigation
    ROGER MILLER; RUTH MILLER,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    and
    BERNARDI'S INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Bernardi Honda, a Massachusetts
    Corporation (JFM-95-3314); PYE
    AUTOMOBILE SALES, INCORPORATED,
    (JFM-99-3136); RICHARD C.D.
    HUNT, III, (JFM-94-3499); PEGGY
    HUNT, (JFM-94-3499); RICK HUNT           No. 01-2194
    FORD, INCORPORATED,
    (JFM-94-3499); ROBERT J. VATLAND,
    (JFM-95-2415); METRO AUTO,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Metro Honda,
    (JFM-95-2493) formerly; DOMINICK
    ROCCO, (JFM-95-2493); SHIRLEY
    ROCCO, (JFM-95-2493); FLYNN
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    American Honda of Hammonton,
    (JFM-95-2494); JOHN J. FLYNN, JR.,
    (JFM-95-2494); JANE MENDELSOHN,
    a/k/a Robert W. Mendelsohn, solely
    in her capacity as Executrix of the
    Estate of (JFM-95-2494); ROBBIN
    LINDSAY TORESCO, (JFM-95-2495);
    JACK REVELLE, (JFM-95-2517);
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    ROCHESTER WORLD CAR
    CORPORATION, (JFM-95-2517);
    LIVERPOOL WORLD CAR CORPORATION,
    d/b/a Honda City, d/b/a Honda City,
    (JFM-95-2517); BILL MCDAVID
    PONTIAC, GMC TRUCKS, HONDA,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Bill McDavid
    Honda, (JFM-95-2584); BILL
    MCDAVID MOTORS, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Bill McDavid Acura of
    Arlington, (JFM-95-2584); BILL
    MCDAVID, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Bill
    McDavid Acura of Fort Worth; VIC
    BAILEY HONDA, INCORPORATED,
    (JFM-95-2598); CLAUDIA CLOSE,
    d/b/a Jim Close House of Honda,
    d/b/a House of Honda, as Executrix
    of the Estate of James R. Close,
    Humphrey Motors, Inc.; HUMPHREY
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED, a/k/a Jim
    Close House of Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-95-2713); SIERRA
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Sierra
    Motors, Incorporated, a Nevada
    Corporation (JFM-95-2712); JAMES
    MCKOANE ENTERPRISES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Clawson Honda
    of Fresno, a California corporation
    (JFM-95-2728); BREAKAWAY
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Breakaway
    Honda, a South Carolina
    corporation (JFM-95-2804)
    (JFM-95-2728); CENTURY
    LINCOLN-MERCURY, INCORPORATED, a
    South Carolina corporation
    (JFM-95-2728); INTERNATIONAL
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    MOTOR WERKS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Honda Motor Works, a Wisconsin
    Corporation (JFM-95-3043); AUSTIN
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Honda
    City, a New York Corporation
    (JFM-95-3044); STAFFORD HONDA,
    INCORPORATED, a Texas Corporation
    (JFM-95-3045); CITY MOTORS SALES
    COMPANY, a New Jersey Corporation
    (JFM-95-3046); PACE OLDSMOBILE,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Pace Honda, a
    New York Corporation
    (JFM-95-3047); AUTOSPORT,
    INCORPORATED, a New Jersey
    Corporation (JFM-95-3048);
    PENSACOLA AUTO MART,
    INCORPORATED, a Florida Corporation
    (JFM-95-3065); FRANK BORMAN,
    Col., a New Mexico resident
    (JFM-95-2716); FRED BORMAN, a
    North Carolina resident
    (JFM-95-2716); JEFF CONNOLE, d/b/a
    Borman Motor Company, a New
    Mexico resident, individually and
    doing business as (JFM-95-2716);
    WILLIAM M. VAN DALSEN, a
    California resident (JFM-95-2716);
    WILLIAM J. BRONSON, an Oregon
    resident (JFM-95-2716); AL REILLY,
    a California resident
    (JFM-95-2716); MILDRED RADER,
    d/b/a Pioneer Honda, a California
    resident, individually and on behalf
    of all others similarly situated
    (JFM-95-2716); BORMAN MOTOR
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    COMPANY, LIMITED LIABILITY
    COMPANY, (JFM-95-2716); PRECISION
    IMPORTS OF FARMINGTON,
    INCORPORATED, a New Mexico
    corporation (JFM-95-2714);
    RANCOURT, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Carmichael Honda, (JFM-95-2715);
    TRANS OCEANIC MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Cardinal
    Honda, (JFM-95-2695); CLAIR
    INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Clair Honda, (JFM-95-3315);
    CLAIR'S INCORPORATED, d/b/a Clair
    Acura, (JFM-95-3315); JAMES E.
    CLAIR, (JFM-95-3315); RICHARD
    LUNDGREN, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Lundgren Honda, a Massachusetts
    Corporation (JFM-95-3313); BILL
    KRAUSE AUTOMOTIVE, INCORPORATED,
    a California corporation
    (JFM-95-3414); WILLIAM A.
    KRAUSE, (JFM-95-3414); SAWYER
    AUTO IMPORTS, INCORPORATED, a
    Delaware corporation
    (JFM-95-3417); BAY RIDGE HONDA,
    a New York corporation
    (JFM-95-3418); RENSSELAER AUTO
    PLAZA, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Rensselaer Honda, (JFM-95-3416);
    ROMOR INVESTMENTS, INCOPORATED,
    formerly Crown Motors which did
    business as Century Motors, a
    California corporation
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    (JFM-95-3729); COOPER,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Selma Honda, a
    disolved California corporation
    (JFM-95-53); MILLER AUTO SALES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Miller
    Honda-Volkswagon-Isuzu-Suzuki, a
    Virginia corporation (JFM-96-382);
    KACHINA INVESTMENTS, INCOPORATED,
    a/k/a Wayne L. Culiver, a/k/a
    Wanyne Culliver Ford,
    Incorporated, a/k/a Hacienda Motor
    Company, Incorporated, an Arizona
    corporation, as sucessor in interest
    to (JFM-96-602); BLW,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Luby Chevrolet
    Company, Incorporated, formerly
    (JFM-96-637); FAIRFIELD MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, a New Hampshire
    Corporation (JFM-96-1438); JACK
    BROWN IMPORTS, INCORPORATED, an
    Illinois Corporation (JFM-96-1506);
    SIERRA AUTO CARS, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Sierra Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-96-1504);
    POMONA VALLEY IMPORTS,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation (JFM-96-1504);
    MAJESTIC PONTIAC, d/b/a Majestic
    Honda, d/b/a Majestic Pontiac &
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); KAISER BROTHERS,
    d/b/a Kaiser Brothers Oldsmobile &
    Honda, a California corporation
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    (JFM-96-1504); BOB JACKSON &
    SON, d/b/a Honda Santa Ana, a
    California corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); COMMUNITY
    PONTIAC, d/b/a Community Pontiac
    Honda, d/b/a Community Honda, a
    California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1054); NELSON PONTIAC,
    d/b/a Nelson Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-96-1504); OTOBAI
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Honda of
    Pasadena, a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); JOHN BRYANT
    MOTORS, d/b/a Bryant Honda, a
    California corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); VINCI,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Las Vegas
    Honda, a Nevada Corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); STEWART OLDS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Stewart Honda,
    a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); GOODWIN MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Goodwin
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); GARSTEN MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Garsten Honda,
    a New York Corporation
    (JFM-96-1507); JUNE JENSEN,
    (JFM-96-1505); BYRNES-MCCARTHY,
    INCORPORATED, a New Hampshire
    Corporation (JFM-96-1724);
    PARADISE PONTIAC, INCORPORATED, an
    Ohio corporation
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    (JFM-96-1702); NAULT ENTERPRISES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Nault's Honda,
    a New Hampshire Corporation
    (JFM-96-1774); JAMES MCKOANE
    ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED, a
    California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1915); HARDIN OLDSMOBILE,
    d/b/a Hardin Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-96-1838); RULE,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Rule Honda, a
    Virginia Corporation
    (JFM-96-2757); COASTAL IMPORTS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Vista Honda
    126 East, a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-2758); INTERNATIONAL
    AUTOMOBILES, INCORPORATED, a New
    Jersey Corporation (JFM-96-2778);
    PHILIP WINTER, an Oregon resident
    (JFM-96-2716); FREDERICK H.
    POWELL, (JFM-96-1489); POWELL'S
    AUTO CENTER, INCORPORATED,
    (JFM-96-1489); G. MARSHALL
    BUTLER, (JFM-96-3447); M. BUTLER,
    INCORPORATED, (JFM-96-3447); PHC
    AUTOMOTIVE, INCORPORATED, a
    Georgia Corporation
    (JFM-96-3448); FIRST INTERNATIONAL
    MOTORS INCORPORATED AND
    SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO
    D'IMPORTS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a D'
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-3743); PORTER CHEVROLET,
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    INCORPORATED, (JFM-96-3893);
    CLARENCE B. SMAIL, an individual
    (JFM-96-3932); JAMES A. SMAIL, an
    individual (JFM-96-3932); BUD AND
    JIM SMAIL, INCORPORATED, a
    Pennsylvania Corporation
    (JFM-96-3932); JOHNSON MOTOR
    COMPANY, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Johnson Honda-Nissan, an Ohio
    corporation (JFM-96-726); D & C
    CHEVROLET COMPANY, d/b/a D & C
    Honda, a New Jersey Corporation in
    case (JFM-96-3858); BILL RULE,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Honda Nissan
    of Covington, a Virginia
    Corporation (JFM-96-4026);
    WOODSON PONTIAC, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Richard Woodson Honda, a
    Virginia Corporation (JFM-97-186);
    ALVIN'S ENTERPRISES, INCOPORATED,
    d/b/a Alvin's Honda Sales, a
    Pennsylvania Corporation
    (JFM-97-201); COLONIAL LIMITED,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Colonial
    Honda; S & R AUTO SALES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Roger Miller
    Honda of Huntington Beach, a
    California Corporation; ROGER
    MILLER IMPORTS, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Roger Miller Acura of
    Beverly Hills, a California
    Corporation; BEVERLY HILLS R & R,
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    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Roger Miller
    Honda of Beverly Hills; C.H.
    JORGENSEN, d/b/a Jorgensen's Honda,
    a corporation (JFM-97-1624);
    YONKERS MOTORS CORPORATION,
    d/b/a Yonkers Motors, a New York
    Corporation (JFM-95-3271); JOY
    LIBERT GELB, (JFM-95-3271)
    Yonkers Motors Corporation; BILL
    EDWARDS OLDSMOBILE,
    INCORPORATED, a Virginia
    Corporation (JFM-97-2945);
    WILLIAM EDWARDS, SR.,
    (JFM-97-2945); WILLIAM EDWARDS,
    JR., (JFM-97-2945); KLEIN FOREMAN
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Foreman Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-97-852); FRAHM
    HONDA, a California Corporation
    (JFM-97-3006); GENE GABBARD,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Gene Gabbard
    Lincoln Mercury, d/b/a Gene
    Gabbard's Stockton Lincoln
    Mercury Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-97-3224); GENE
    GABBARD, (JFM-97-3224); JAMES
    GABBARD, (JFM-97-3224); GARY
    GABBARD, (JFM-97-3224); HARVEY
    & MADDING, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Dublin Honda, a California
    Corportion (JFM-97-3212); HARVEY
    & SONS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
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    Hayward Acura, a California
    Corporation (JFM-97-3212); KEN
    HARVEY, (JFM-97-3212); HARRY
    CRAMER HONDA; STANFORD A.
    CRAMER, individually in
    JFM-97-1330; WPS, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Honda Cars of Columbia,
    JFM-97-1288; DOROTHY VAN
    DALSEM, as Executrix of the Estate
    of William M. Van Dalsem
    (JFM-95-2716); COLONIAL LIMITED,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Colonial
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-97-1136); BALISE MOTOR
    SALES COMPANY, d/b/a Balise Honda,
    a Massachusetts Corporation
    (JFM-98-1286); BARR MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Barr Honda, a
    Pennsylvania Corporation
    (JFM-98-1299); STEVE HOPKINS,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corportion (JFM-98-1497); LARRY
    HOPKINS, INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation (JFM-98-1497); STEVE
    HOPKINS, a California resident
    (JFM-98-1497); MENARD &
    HOLMBERG, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Menard & Holmberg Honda/Isuzu,
    a Massachusettes Corporation
    (JFM-98-933); PIONEER EDSEL SALES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Pioneer Honda,
    Honda, a California corporation
    (JFM-98-828); SOUTH CITY,
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    INCORPORATED, d/b/a South City
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-98-1023); ED WITTMEIER
    FORD, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Wittmeier Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-98-1025);
    SHERWOOD IMPORTS, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Sherwood Honda,
    (JFM-98-1755); TAMAROFF BUICK,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Tamaroff
    Honda, (JFM-98-1756); LESLIE
    SEGEL, an Oregon resident
    (JFM-98-2315); SEGEL ENTERPRISES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Town &
    Country Cadillac Oldsmobile
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-98-2315); FRANK MITCHELL,
    JFM-98-2438; JAY MITCHELL, a
    California resident (JFM-98-2438);
    B-J MARCHESE MOTOR COMPANY, a
    Pennsylvania Corporation
    (JFM-98-2812); B.J. MARCHESE
    HONDA, (JFM-98-2812); B. J.
    MARCHESE, (JFM-98-2812);
    MARSHALL CHEVROLET, VOLVO,
    HONDA, INCORPORATED, a
    Pennsylvania Corporation
    (JFM-98-3821); HENRY C.
    MARSHALL, individually
    (JFM-98-3821); GLOBE AUTO
    IMPORTS, d/b/a Globe Honda, a
    Florida Corporation (JFM-98-4064);
    JAMES MCFREDERICK, a Florida
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    resident (JFM-98-4064); CALE
    YARBOROUGH MOTORS OF SOUTH
    CAROLINA, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Cale
    Yarborough Honda-Mazda,
    (JFM-98-1828); CALE YARBOROUGH
    MOTORS OF GA, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Cale Yarborough Honda,
    JFM-98-1827; GOODWIN
    VOLKSWAGEN, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Goodwin Honda; ALAN L. STROUSE;
    CLOVIS HONDA,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    RICHARD H. BROOKS; STANLEY JAMES
    CARDIGES; HUGH P COOPER; DENNIS
    R. JOSLEYN; ROBERT N. RIVERS;
    ROBERT A. MAZATELLI; EDWARD A.
    TEMPLE; BLAKELY CONSULTANTS &
    DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED; HONDA
    MOTOR COMPANY, LTD.; RAYMOND
    W. HOVSEPIAN; COMMONWEALTH
    INSURANCE COMPANY; JOHN W.
    BILLMYER; ROGER NOVELLY; RICHARD
    DITARANTO; DOES 1-50; KOICHI
    AMEMIYA; YOSHIDE MUNEKUNI; MARK
    L. BENSON; DAMIEN C. BUDNICK;
    DAVID L. PEDERSEN; THOMAS A.
    CAULFIELD, a California Resident;
    JOHN J. CONWAY, a New Jersey
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    Resident; LYON & LYON, a
    California Partnership; ROLAND N.
    SMOOT, a California Resident;
    FREDERICK W. MEIS, JR., a Texas
    Resident; FRANK PISANO, a Colorado
    Resident; BEATRICE SIKORA; LARRY
    C. FINLEY; PETER EPSTEEN; JOSEPH R.
    HENDRICK, III, a North Carolina
    Resident; ANGELO FALCONI, a
    Pennsylvania Resident; CLIFF PECK;
    JOHN ROSATTI; WILLIAM SCHUILING;
    JOSEPH POPE, a California Resident;
    SHAU WAI LAM, a New Jersey
    Resident; HENRY KHACHATURIAN,
    d/b/a Hank Torian, a California
    Resident; MID PENINSULA MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation; AUTO CAR,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation; EDGREN MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation; MARTIN LUSTGARTEN;
    DOES 1-100, inclusive; JOHN L.
    HENDRICK, a North Carolina
    Resident; HENDRICK AUTOMOTIVE
    GROUP, a North Carolina
    Corporation; DAH CHONG HONG,
    LTD., a California Corporation; DAH
    CHONG HONG TRADING CORPORATION,
    a/k/a DCH, a New York
    Corporation; HONDA NORTH
    AMERICA, INCORPORATED; HENDRICK
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    MANAGEMENT CORPORATION; L.L.L.
    SALES COMPANY, INCORPORATED;
    DCH (OXNARD) INCORPORATED;
    DAVID MCDAVID; VINCENT PIAZZA;
    SANTO GEORGE POLING; J.R.H.,
    INCORPORATED; WILLIAM O.
    MUSGRAVE; CHARLES V. RICKS;
    WESH, INCORPORATED; CANYON
    HONDA, a California Corporation;
    CANYON ACURA, a California
    Corporation; RICK HINES, an
    individual; CORONA HONDA, a
    California Corporation; DAVID
    CONANT; VIRGINIA'S FIRST FAMILY OF
    FINE CARS INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Brown Oldsmobile Honda Saab, a
    Virginia Corporation; AL SHENG, an
    individual; EARL PILCHER,
    (JFM-96-3447); B.D.A. ENTERPRISES
    CORPORATION, formerly known as
    Town & Country Automotive,
    Incorporated, a Georgia Corporation
    (JFM-96-3448); BARRY ALEXANDER,
    (JFM-96-3448); RICK HENDRICK, a
    New Jersey Resident
    (JFM-96-3858); LYON & LYON, a
    California Partnership; ROLAND N.
    SMOOT, a California Resident; NFI
    INCORPORATED, a Corporation
    (JFM-96-4026); BIRD, BETHEA,
    JORDAN & GRIFFIN, P.A.; IRVING H.
    LASEROW, JFM-95-2492 Metro Auto,
    Incorporated; I.H. LASEROW AND
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    COMPANY, P.C., JFM-95-2493 Metro
    Auto, Incorporated; EDWIN R.
    TAYLOR; DOES 8-50; TASHA,
    INCORPORATED; RICK HENDRICK
    HONDA CARS COMPANY,
    JFM-97-1288; TOWER H. LTD.; DCH
    INVESTMENTS, INCORPORATED,
    (California); CIVIC CENTER MOTORS,
    LTD., d/b/a White Plains Honda, a
    New York Corporation; 31-37
    NORTH MOORE STREET CORPORATION;
    RICK HEINZ, Hardin Oldsmobile
    JFM-96-1838; PAUL T. BOHLANDER;
    SUNSHINE HONDA; RICHARD H.
    BROOKS; CLARENCE FINCHER; TETSUO
    CHINO, former California Resident
    and now residing in the Nation of
    Japan; HENDRICK MANAGEMENT
    COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;
    HENDRICK CORPORATION; HENDRICK
    AUTOMOTIVE GROUP; HENDRICK
    MANAGEMENT CORPORATION; THOMAS
    DEL FRANCO; WILLIAM KUTCHERA;
    JAMES A. THOMPSON, a Florida
    Resident; LINDA LUSTGARTEN, a
    Pennsylvania Resident; SCOTT
    LUSTGARTEN, a Pennsylvania
    Resident; CLASSIC AUTO GROUP,
    INCORPORATED, a New Jersey
    Corporation; SCOTT IMPORTS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Main Line
    Honda, a Pennsylvania Corporation;
    MARTIN NEWARK DEALERSHIPS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Martin Honda,
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    15
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    a Delaware Corporation; THE TED
    STEVENS CAR COMPANY,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation; THEODORE J. STEVENS, a
    California Resident; WHITE PLAINS
    HONDA, a New York sole
    proprietorship; PAUL SINGER; JOHN
    D'ELIA,
    Defendants,
    AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY,
    INCORPORATED,
    Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff,
    v.
    LAWRENCE SILVER; SILVER & FIELD,
    Movants-Appellees,
    and
    MIDDLETOWN MOTORS, INCORPORATED;
    RICHARD CATENA; IMPORTS OF
    FREEHOLD, INCOPORATED; GRAND
    MOTOR CAR COMPANY,
    INCORPORATED; R.C. CALDWELL
    IMPORTS, INCORPORATED; DAVID
    TRAINER; HOLLYWOOD IMPORTS
    LIMITED; PLAZA MOTORS OF
    BROOKLYN, INCORPORATED;
    HEMPSTEAD MOTORS, LIMITED; NORTH
    PALM IMPORTS, LIMITED; CRYTAL BAY
    IMPORTS, LIMITED; PARAMUS WORLD
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED; DARON
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED; DCH
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED; DCH
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    16
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    MANHATTAN; STEPHEN S. BIRD;
    BETHEA, JORDAN & GRIFFIN, P.A.;
    JOHN W. BILLMYER; S. JAMES
    CARDIGES; ROBERT A. MAZZITELLI;
    ROGER NOVELLY; DAMIEN C.
    BUDNICK; DAVID L. PEDERSEN; MARK
    L. BENSON; JOHN J. CONWAY;
    CLARENCE FINCHER; JOHNNY R.
    FINCHER; WILLIAM VINCE; WAYNE
    VINCE; W. RODMAN RYAN; WILLIAM
    LIA, JR.; DON LIA; DENNIS R.
    JOSLEYN; HUGH P COOPER; ROBERT
    N. RIVERS; FREDERICK W. MEIS, JR.;
    BEATRICE SIKORA; WILLIAM
    SCHUILING; DAVID TRAINOR; SANTO
    GEORGE POLING; VINCENT RADLEY;
    KAREN RADLEY; FRANK PISANO;
    LARRY C. FINLEY; THOMAS A.
    CAULFIELD; PETER EPSTEEN; HENDRICK
    CORPORATION; ANGELO FALCONI; MID-
    PENINSULA MOTORS, INCORPORATED;
    AUTO CAR, INCORPORATED; EDGREN
    MOTOR COMPANY; DON CARLTON;
    RICHARD CATENA; JOHN ROSATTI;
    DAH CHONG HONG, LTD.; L.L.L.
    SALES COMPANY, INCORPORATED;
    DCH (OXNARD) INCORPORATED;
    RAYMOND HOVSEPIAN; IRVING H.
    LASEROW; I.H. LASEROW AND
    COMPANY, P.C.,
    Third Party Defendants.
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    17
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    In Re: AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR
    COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
    Dealerships Relations Litigation
    ROGER MILLER; RUTH MILLER,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    and
    BERNARDI'S INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Bernardi Honda, a Massachusetts
    Corporation (JFM-95-3314); PYE
    AUTOMOBILE SALES, INCORPORATED,
    (JFM-99-3136); RICHARD C.D.
    HUNT, III, (JFM-94-3499); PEGGY
    HUNT, (JFM-94-3499); RICK HUNT           No. 01-2229
    FORD, INCORPORATED,
    (JFM-94-3499); ROBERT J. VATLAND,
    (JFM-95-2415); METRO AUTO,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Metro Honda,
    (JFM-95-2493) formerly; DOMINICK
    ROCCO, (JFM-95-2493); SHIRLEY
    ROCCO, (JFM-95-2493); FLYNN
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    American Honda of Hammonton,
    (JFM-95-2494); JOHN J. FLYNN, JR.,
    (JFM-95-2494); JANE MENDELSOHN,
    a/k/a Robert W. Mendelsohn, solely
    in her capacity as Executrix of the
    Estate of (JFM-95-2494); ROBBIN
    LINDSAY TORESCO, (JFM-95-2495);
    JACK REVELLE, (JFM-95-2517);
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    18
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    ROCHESTER WORLD CAR
    CORPORATION, (JFM-95-2517);
    LIVERPOOL WORLD CAR CORPORATION,
    d/b/a Honda City, d/b/a Honda City,
    (JFM-95-2517); BILL MCDAVID
    PONTIAC, GMC TRUCKS, HONDA,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Bill McDavid
    Honda, (JFM-95-2584); BILL
    MCDAVID MOTORS, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Bill McDavid Acura of
    Arlington, (JFM-95-2584); BILL
    MCDAVID, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Bill
    McDavid Acura of Fort Worth; VIC
    BAILEY HONDA, INCORPORATED,
    (JFM-95-2598); CLAUDIA CLOSE,
    d/b/a Jim Close House of Honda,
    d/b/a House of Honda, as Executrix
    of the Estate of James R. Close,
    Humphrey Motors, Inc.; HUMPHREY
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED, a/k/a Jim
    Close House of Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-95-2713); SIERRA
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Sierra
    Motors, Incorporated, a Nevada
    Corporation (JFM-95-2712); JAMES
    MCKOANE ENTERPRISES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Clawson Honda
    of Fresno, a California corporation
    (JFM-95-2728); BREAKAWAY
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Breakaway
    Honda, a South Carolina
    corporation (JFM-95-2804)
    (JFM-95-2728); CENTURY
    LINCOLN-MERCURY, INCORPORATED, a
    South Carolina corporation
    (JFM-95-2728); INTERNATIONAL
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    19
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    MOTOR WERKS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Honda Motor Works, a Wisconsin
    Corporation (JFM-95-3043); AUSTIN
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Honda
    City, a New York Corporation
    (JFM-95-3044); STAFFORD HONDA,
    INCORPORATED, a Texas Corporation
    (JFM-95-3045); CITY MOTORS SALES
    COMPANY, a New Jersey Corporation
    (JFM-95-3046); PACE OLDSMOBILE,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Pace Honda, a
    New York Corporation
    (JFM-95-3047); AUTOSPORT,
    INCORPORATED, a New Jersey
    Corporation (JFM-95-3048);
    PENSACOLA AUTO MART,
    INCORPORATED, a Florida Corporation
    (JFM-95-3065); FRANK BORMAN,
    Col., a New Mexico resident
    (JFM-95-2716); FRED BORMAN, a
    North Carolina resident
    (JFM-95-2716); JEFF CONNOLE, d/b/a
    Borman Motor Company, a New
    Mexico resident, individually and
    doing business as (JFM-95-2716);
    WILLIAM M. VAN DALSEN, a
    California resident (JFM-95-2716);
    WILLIAM J. BRONSON, an Oregon
    resident (JFM-95-2716); AL REILLY,
    a California resident
    (JFM-95-2716); MILDRED RADER,
    d/b/a Pioneer Honda, a California
    resident, individually and on behalf
    of all others similarly situated
    (JFM-95-2716); BORMAN MOTOR
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    20
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    COMPANY, LIMITED LIABILITY
    COMPANY, (JFM-95-2716); PRECISION
    IMPORTS OF FARMINGTON,
    INCORPORATED, a New Mexico
    corporation (JFM-95-2714);
    RANCOURT, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Carmichael Honda, (JFM-95-2715);
    TRANS OCEANIC MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Cardinal
    Honda, (JFM-95-2695); CLAIR
    INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Clair Honda, (JFM-95-3315);
    CLAIR'S INCORPORATED, d/b/a Clair
    Acura, (JFM-95-3315); JAMES E.
    CLAIR, (JFM-95-3315); RICHARD
    LUNDGREN, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Lundgren Honda, a Massachusetts
    Corporation (JFM-95-3313); BILL
    KRAUSE AUTOMOTIVE, INCORPORATED,
    a California corporation
    (JFM-95-3414); WILLIAM A.
    KRAUSE, (JFM-95-3414); SAWYER
    AUTO IMPORTS, INCORPORATED, a
    Delaware corporation
    (JFM-95-3417); BAY RIDGE HONDA,
    a New York corporation
    (JFM-95-3418); RENSSELAER AUTO
    PLAZA, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Rensselaer Honda, (JFM-95-3416);
    ROMOR INVESTMENTS, INCOPORATED,
    formerly Crown Motors which did
    business as Century Motors, a
    California corporation
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    21
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    (JFM-95-3729); COOPER,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Selma Honda, a
    disolved California corporation
    (JFM-95-53); MILLER AUTO SALES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Miller
    Honda-Volkswagon-Isuzu-Suzuki, a
    Virginia corporation (JFM-96-382);
    KACHINA INVESTMENTS, INCOPORATED,
    a/k/a Wayne L. Culiver, a/k/a
    Wanyne Culliver Ford,
    Incorporated, a/k/a Hacienda Motor
    Company, Incorporated, an Arizona
    corporation, as sucessor in interest
    to (JFM-96-602); BLW,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Luby Chevrolet
    Company, Incorporated, formerly
    (JFM-96-637); FAIRFIELD MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, a New Hampshire
    Corporation (JFM-96-1438); JACK
    BROWN IMPORTS, INCORPORATED, an
    Illinois Corporation (JFM-96-1506);
    SIERRA AUTO CARS, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Sierra Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-96-1504);
    POMONA VALLEY IMPORTS,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation (JFM-96-1504);
    MAJESTIC PONTIAC, d/b/a Majestic
    Honda, d/b/a Majestic Pontiac &
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); KAISER BROTHERS,
    d/b/a Kaiser Brothers Oldsmobile &
    Honda, a California corporation
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    22
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    (JFM-96-1504); BOB JACKSON &
    SON, d/b/a Honda Santa Ana, a
    California corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); COMMUNITY
    PONTIAC, d/b/a Community Pontiac
    Honda, d/b/a Community Honda, a
    California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1054); NELSON PONTIAC,
    d/b/a Nelson Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-96-1504); OTOBAI
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Honda of
    Pasadena, a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); JOHN BRYANT
    MOTORS, d/b/a Bryant Honda, a
    California corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); VINCI,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Las Vegas
    Honda, a Nevada Corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); STEWART OLDS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Stewart Honda,
    a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); GOODWIN MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Goodwin
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1504); GARSTEN MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Garsten Honda,
    a New York Corporation
    (JFM-96-1507); JUNE JENSEN,
    (JFM-96-1505); BYRNES-MCCARTHY,
    INCORPORATED, a New Hampshire
    Corporation (JFM-96-1724);
    PARADISE PONTIAC, INCORPORATED, an
    Ohio corporation
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    23
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    (JFM-96-1702); NAULT ENTERPRISES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Nault's Honda,
    a New Hampshire Corporation
    (JFM-96-1774); JAMES MCKOANE
    ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED, a
    California Corporation
    (JFM-96-1915); HARDIN OLDSMOBILE,
    d/b/a Hardin Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-96-1838); RULE,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Rule Honda, a
    Virginia Corporation
    (JFM-96-2757); COASTAL IMPORTS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Vista Honda
    126 East, a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-2758); INTERNATIONAL
    AUTOMOBILES, INCORPORATED, a New
    Jersey Corporation (JFM-96-2778);
    PHILIP WINTER, an Oregon resident
    (JFM-96-2716); FREDERICK H.
    POWELL, (JFM-96-1489); POWELL'S
    AUTO CENTER, INCORPORATED,
    (JFM-96-1489); G. MARSHALL
    BUTLER, (JFM-96-3447); M. BUTLER,
    INCORPORATED, (JFM-96-3447); PHC
    AUTOMOTIVE, INCORPORATED, a
    Georgia Corporation
    (JFM-96-3448); FIRST INTERNATIONAL
    MOTORS INCORPORATED AND
    SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO
    D'IMPORTS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a D'
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-96-3743); PORTER CHEVROLET,
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    24
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    INCORPORATED, (JFM-96-3893);
    CLARENCE B. SMAIL, an individual
    (JFM-96-3932); JAMES A. SMAIL, an
    individual (JFM-96-3932); BUD AND
    JIM SMAIL, INCORPORATED, a
    Pennsylvania Corporation
    (JFM-96-3932); JOHNSON MOTOR
    COMPANY, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Johnson Honda-Nissan, an Ohio
    corporation (JFM-96-726); D & C
    CHEVROLET COMPANY, d/b/a D & C
    Honda, a New Jersey Corporation in
    case (JFM-96-3858); BILL RULE,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Honda Nissan
    of Covington, a Virginia
    Corporation (JFM-96-4026);
    WOODSON PONTIAC, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Richard Woodson Honda, a
    Virginia Corporation (JFM-97-186);
    ALVIN'S ENTERPRISES, INCOPORATED,
    d/b/a Alvin's Honda Sales, a
    Pennsylvania Corporation
    (JFM-97-201); COLONIAL LIMITED,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Colonial
    Honda; S & R AUTO SALES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Roger Miller
    Honda of Huntington Beach, a
    California Corporation; ROGER
    MILLER IMPORTS, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Roger Miller Acura of
    Beverly Hills, a California
    Corporation; BEVERLY HILLS R & R,
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    25
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Roger Miller
    Honda of Beverly Hills; C.H.
    JORGENSEN, d/b/a Jorgensen's Honda,
    a corporation (JFM-97-1624);
    YONKERS MOTORS CORPORATION,
    d/b/a Yonkers Motors, a New York
    Corporation (JFM-95-3271); JOY
    LIBERT GELB, (JFM-95-3271)
    Yonkers Motors Corporation; BILL
    EDWARDS OLDSMOBILE,
    INCORPORATED, a Virginia
    Corporation (JFM-97-2945);
    WILLIAM EDWARDS, SR.,
    (JFM-97-2945); WILLIAM EDWARDS,
    JR., (JFM-97-2945); KLEIN FOREMAN
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Foreman Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-97-852); FRAHM
    HONDA, a California Corporation
    (JFM-97-3006); GENE GABBARD,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Gene Gabbard
    Lincoln Mercury, d/b/a Gene
    Gabbard's Stockton Lincoln
    Mercury Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-97-3224); GENE
    GABBARD, (JFM-97-3224); JAMES
    GABBARD, (JFM-97-3224); GARY
    GABBARD, (JFM-97-3224); HARVEY
    & MADDING, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Dublin Honda, a California
    Corportion (JFM-97-3212); HARVEY
    & SONS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    26
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    Hayward Acura, a California
    Corporation (JFM-97-3212); KEN
    HARVEY, (JFM-97-3212); HARRY
    CRAMER HONDA; STANFORD A.
    CRAMER, individually in
    JFM-97-1330; WPS, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Honda Cars of Columbia,
    JFM-97-1288; DOROTHY VAN
    DALSEM, as Executrix of the Estate
    of William M. Van Dalsem
    (JFM-95-2716); COLONIAL LIMITED,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Colonial
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-97-1136); BALISE MOTOR
    SALES COMPANY, d/b/a Balise Honda,
    a Massachusetts Corporation
    (JFM-98-1286); BARR MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Barr Honda, a
    Pennsylvania Corporation
    (JFM-98-1299); STEVE HOPKINS,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corportion (JFM-98-1497); LARRY
    HOPKINS, INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation (JFM-98-1497); STEVE
    HOPKINS, a California resident
    (JFM-98-1497); MENARD &
    HOLMBERG, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Menard & Holmberg Honda/Isuzu,
    a Massachusettes Corporation
    (JFM-98-933); PIONEER EDSEL SALES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Pioneer Honda,
    Honda, a California corporation
    (JFM-98-828); SOUTH CITY,
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    27
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a South City
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-98-1023); ED WITTMEIER
    FORD, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Wittmeier Honda, a California
    Corporation (JFM-98-1025);
    SHERWOOD IMPORTS, INCORPORATED,
    d/b/a Sherwood Honda,
    (JFM-98-1755); TAMAROFF BUICK,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Tamaroff
    Honda, (JFM-98-1756); LESLIE
    SEGEL, an Oregon resident
    (JFM-98-2315); SEGEL ENTERPRISES,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Town &
    Country Cadillac Oldsmobile
    Honda, a California Corporation
    (JFM-98-2315); FRANK MITCHELL,
    JFM-98-2438; JAY MITCHELL, a
    California resident (JFM-98-2438);
    B-J MARCHESE MOTOR COMPANY, a
    Pennsylvania Corporation
    (JFM-98-2812); B.J. MARCHESE
    HONDA, (JFM-98-2812); B. J.
    MARCHESE, (JFM-98-2812);
    MARSHALL CHEVROLET, VOLVO,
    HONDA, INCORPORATED, a
    Pennsylvania Corporation
    (JFM-98-3821); HENRY C.
    MARSHALL, individually
    (JFM-98-3821); GLOBE AUTO
    IMPORTS, d/b/a Globe Honda, a
    Florida Corporation (JFM-98-4064);
    JAMES MCFREDERICK, a Florida
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    28
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    resident (JFM-98-4064); CALE
    YARBOROUGH MOTORS OF SOUTH
    CAROLINA, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Cale
    Yarborough Honda-Mazda,
    (JFM-98-1828); CALE YARBOROUGH
    MOTORS OF GA, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Cale Yarborough Honda,
    JFM-98-1827; GOODWIN
    VOLKSWAGEN, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Goodwin Honda; ALAN L. STROUSE;
    CLOVIS HONDA,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    RICHARD H. BROOKS; STANLEY JAMES
    CARDIGES; HUGH P COOPER; DENNIS
    R. JOSLEYN; ROBERT N. RIVERS;
    ROBERT A. MAZATELLI; EDWARD A.
    TEMPLE; BLAKELY CONSULTANTS &
    DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED; HONDA
    MOTOR COMPANY, LTD.; RAYMOND
    W. HOVSEPIAN; COMMONWEALTH
    INSURANCE COMPANY; JOHN W.
    BILLMYER; ROGER NOVELLY; RICHARD
    DITARANTO; DOES 1-50; KOICHI
    AMEMIYA; YOSHIDE MUNEKUNI; MARK
    L. BENSON; DAMIEN C. BUDNICK;
    DAVID L. PEDERSEN; THOMAS A.
    CAULFIELD, a California Resident;
    JOHN J. CONWAY, a New Jersey
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    29
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    Resident; LYON & LYON, a
    California Partnership; ROLAND N.
    SMOOT, a California Resident;
    FREDERICK W. MEIS, JR., a Texas
    Resident; FRANK PISANO, a Colorado
    Resident; BEATRICE SIKORA; LARRY
    C. FINLEY; PETER EPSTEEN; JOSEPH R.
    HENDRICK, III, a North Carolina
    Resident; ANGELO FALCONI, a
    Pennsylvania Resident; CLIFF PECK;
    JOHN ROSATTI; WILLIAM SCHUILING;
    JOSEPH POPE, a California Resident;
    SHAU WAI LAM, a New Jersey
    Resident; HENRY KHACHATURIAN,
    d/b/a Hank Torian, a California
    Resident; MID PENINSULA MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation; AUTO CAR,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation; EDGREN MOTORS,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation; MARTIN LUSTGARTEN;
    DOES 1-100, inclusive; JOHN L.
    HENDRICK, a North Carolina
    Resident; HENDRICK AUTOMOTIVE
    GROUP, a North Carolina
    Corporation; DAH CHONG HONG,
    LTD., a California Corporation; DAH
    CHONG HONG TRADING CORPORATION,
    a/k/a DCH, a New York
    Corporation; HONDA NORTH
    AMERICA, INCORPORATED; HENDRICK
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    30
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    MANAGEMENT CORPORATION; L.L.L.
    SALES COMPANY, INCORPORATED;
    DCH (OXNARD) INCORPORATED;
    DAVID MCDAVID; VINCENT PIAZZA;
    SANTO GEORGE POLING; J.R.H.,
    INCORPORATED; WILLIAM O.
    MUSGRAVE; CHARLES V. RICKS;
    WESH, INCORPORATED; CANYON
    HONDA, a California Corporation;
    CANYON ACURA, a California
    Corporation; RICK HINES, an
    individual; CORONA HONDA, a
    California Corporation; DAVID
    CONANT; VIRGINIA'S FIRST FAMILY OF
    FINE CARS INCORPORATED, d/b/a
    Brown Oldsmobile Honda Saab, a
    Virginia Corporation; AL SHENG, an
    individual; EARL PILCHER,
    (JFM-96-3447); B.D.A. ENTERPRISES
    CORPORATION, formerly known as
    Town & Country Automotive,
    Incorporated, a Georgia Corporation
    (JFM-96-3448); BARRY ALEXANDER,
    (JFM-96-3448); RICK HENDRICK, a
    New Jersey Resident
    (JFM-96-3858); LYON & LYON, a
    California Partnership; ROLAND N.
    SMOOT, a California Resident; NFI
    INCORPORATED, a Corporation
    (JFM-96-4026); BIRD, BETHEA,
    JORDAN & GRIFFIN, P.A.; IRVING H.
    LASEROW, JFM-95-2492 Metro Auto,
    Incorporated; I.H. LASEROW AND
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    31
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    COMPANY, P.C., JFM-95-2493 Metro
    Auto, Incorporated; EDWIN R.
    TAYLOR; DOES 8-50; TASHA,
    INCORPORATED; RICK HENDRICK
    HONDA CARS COMPANY,
    JFM-97-1288; TOWER H. LTD.; DCH
    INVESTMENTS, INCORPORATED,
    (California); CIVIC CENTER MOTORS,
    LTD., d/b/a White Plains Honda, a
    New York Corporation; 31-37
    NORTH MOORE STREET CORPORATION;
    RICK HEINZ, Hardin Oldsmobile
    JFM-96-1838; PAUL T. BOHLANDER;
    SUNSHINE HONDA; RICHARD H.
    BROOKS; CLARENCE FINCHER; TETSUO
    CHINO, former California Resident
    and now residing in the Nation of
    Japan; HENDRICK MANAGEMENT
    COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;
    HENDRICK CORPORATION; HENDRICK
    AUTOMOTIVE GROUP; HENDRICK
    MANAGEMENT CORPORATION; THOMAS
    DEL FRANCO; WILLIAM KUTCHERA;
    JAMES A. THOMPSON, a Florida
    Resident; LINDA LUSTGARTEN, a
    Pennsylvania Resident; SCOTT
    LUSTGARTEN, a Pennsylvania
    Resident; CLASSIC AUTO GROUP,
    INCORPORATED, a New Jersey
    Corporation; SCOTT IMPORTS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Main Line
    Honda, a Pennsylvania Corporation;
    MARTIN NEWARK DEALERSHIPS,
    INCORPORATED, d/b/a Martin Honda,
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    32
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    a Delaware Corporation; THE TED
    STEVENS CAR COMPANY,
    INCORPORATED, a California
    Corporation; THEODORE J. STEVENS, a
    California Resident; WHITE PLAINS
    HONDA, a New York sole
    proprietorship; PAUL SINGER; JOHN
    D'ELIA,
    Defendants,
    AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY,
    INCORPORATED,
    Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff,
    v.
    LAWRENCE SILVER; SILVER & FIELD,
    Movants-Appellants,
    and
    MIDDLETOWN MOTORS, INCORPORATED;
    RICHARD CATENA; IMPORTS OF
    FREEHOLD, INCOPORATED; GRAND
    MOTOR CAR COMPANY,
    INCORPORATED; R.C. CALDWELL
    IMPORTS, INCORPORATED; DAVID
    TRAINER; HOLLYWOOD IMPORTS
    LIMITED; PLAZA MOTORS OF
    BROOKLYN, INCORPORATED;
    HEMPSTEAD MOTORS, LIMITED; NORTH
    PALM IMPORTS, LIMITED; CRYTAL BAY
    IMPORTS, LIMITED; PARAMUS WORLD
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED; DARON
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED; DCH
    MOTORS, INCORPORATED; DCH
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    33
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
    MANHATTAN; STEPHEN S. BIRD;
    BETHEA, JORDAN & GRIFFIN, P.A.;
    JOHN W. BILLMYER; S. JAMES
    CARDIGES; ROBERT A. MAZZITELLI;
    ROGER NOVELLY; DAMIEN C.
    BUDNICK; DAVID L. PEDERSEN; MARK
    L. BENSON; JOHN J. CONWAY;
    CLARENCE FINCHER; JOHNNY R.
    FINCHER; WILLIAM VINCE; WAYNE
    VINCE; W. RODMAN RYAN; WILLIAM
    LIA, JR.; DON LIA; DENNIS R.
    JOSLEYN; HUGH P COOPER; ROBERT
    N. RIVERS; FREDERICK W. MEIS, JR.;
    BEATRICE SIKORA; WILLIAM
    SCHUILING; DAVID TRAINOR; SANTO
    GEORGE POLING; VINCENT RADLEY;
    KAREN RADLEY; FRANK PISANO;
    LARRY C. FINLEY; THOMAS A.
    CAULFIELD; PETER EPSTEEN; HENDRICK
    CORPORATION; ANGELO FALCONI; MID-
    PENINSULA MOTORS, INCORPORATED;
    AUTO CAR, INCORPORATED; EDGREN
    MOTOR COMPANY; DON CARLTON;
    RICHARD CATENA; JOHN ROSATTI;
    DAH CHONG HONG, LTD.; L.L.L.
    SALES COMPANY, INCORPORATED;
    DCH (OXNARD) INCORPORATED;
    RAYMOND HOVSEPIAN; IRVING H.
    LASEROW; I.H. LASEROW AND
    COMPANY, P.C.,
    Third Party Defendants.
    4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
    (CA-95-1069-MDL)
    34
    Argued: September 25, 2002
    Decided: January 17, 2003
    Before TRAXLER, Circuit Judge,
    HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and
    Claude M. HILTON, Chief United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
    ____________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Hamilton wrote the
    opinion, in which Chief Judge Hilton joined. Judge Traxler wrote a
    dissenting opinion.
    ____________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Paul Mogin, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY, L.L.P., Wash-
    ington, D.C., for Appellants. James Patrick Ulwick, KRAMON &
    GRAHAM, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
    Barry S. Simon, Joseph M. Terry, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY,
    L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; Herbert J. Patt, ANDRES & ANDRES,
    Santa Ana, California, for Appellants.
    ____________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge:
    The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
    enjoined a husband and wife, both citizens of California, from seeking
    enforcement of a multi-million dollar arbitration award for legal mal-
    practice that the couple had obtained in California against their former
    attorney, who was also a citizen of California. In entering its injunc-
    tion (the Injunction), the district court relied upon the All Writs Act,
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    (a), which provides that "[t]he Supreme Court and
    all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs neces-
    sary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agree-
    35
    able to the usages and principles of law." 
    Id.
     The district court
    believed the Injunction was necessary "to protect the integrity of [its]
    processes and prevent the Honda [multi-district litigation] proceed-
    ings [that had been before it] from being used for an improper pur-
    pose . . . ." In re: American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Dealerships
    Relations Litig., 
    162 F. Supp. 2d 387
    , 396 (D. Md. 2001).
    The couple are parties to a multi-district litigation (MDL) settle-
    ment agreement that was formally approved by the district court and
    over which the district court expressly retained exclusive jurisdiction
    to rule upon interpretive questions. The district court found the couple
    had intentionally misled the California arbitrator about the actual
    nature of the MDL proceedings, and that the couple had knowingly
    and intentionally pressed an argument before the arbitrator that neces-
    sarily required the arbitrator to resolve a significant interpretive ques-
    tion involving substantive provisions of the MDL settlement
    agreement.
    For reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's order entering
    the Injunction.
    I.
    The couple to which we have just referred are Ruth and Roger Mil-
    ler (the Millers).1 At the end of 1986, the Millers purchased Hunting-
    ton Beach Honda Automobile Dealership, partly through owner
    financing. The Millers later defaulted on their financing obligations
    under the purchase deal, and as a result, the widow of one of the two
    former owners of the dealership filed a civil action against the Millers
    in California state court in March 1994 (the 1994 State Court Action).
    The Millers, who were not then represented by legal counsel, filed a
    cross-complaint, and joined the widow of the other former owner as
    a defendant on the cross-complaint.
    ____________________________________________________________
    1
    Many of the facts set forth in this opinion are taken directly from the
    district court's memorandum opinion of August 24, 2000. In re: Ameri-
    can Honda, 
    162 F. Supp. 2d at 388-90
    . Where facts are disputed, we will
    so state.
    36
    In July 1994, California attorney Lawrence Silver (Silver) under-
    took legal representation of the Millers in the 1994 State Court
    Action. In this regard, Silver and the Millers entered into a retain-
    er/fee agreement for legal services, under which Silver and the Mill-
    ers agreed that any disputes between them "shall be subject to
    mandatory arbitration." (J.A. 587).
    In April 1995, Silver filed an amended cross-complaint on behalf
    of the Millers naming American Honda Motor Company, Incorpo-
    rated (American Honda) as a defendant, asserting claims against the
    company under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
    Act (RICO), 
    18 U.S.C. § 1961
     et seq., and under California common
    law. All such claims arose from the Honda bribery scandal that even-
    tually became the subject of the MDL proceedings before the district
    court in Maryland (the Honda MDL Proceedings).2 The crux of the
    bribery scandal was that Honda received kickbacks and bribes from
    certain Honda dealerships throughout the United States in return for
    increased allocations of selective new cars.
    American Honda filed a demurrer to the RICO claim in the Mill-
    ers' amended cross-complaint, in the 1994 State Court Action, on the
    ground that the Millers had failed to plead legally sufficient damages
    under RICO. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, but
    without prejudice to the Millers' ability to file a motion to reconsider
    the court's decision denying leave to amend. In accordance with this
    order, Silver, on behalf of the Millers, filed a motion for reconsidera-
    tion, which was denied.
    The relationship between the Millers and Silver subsequently dete-
    riorated, and after the Millers threatened to assert claims for legal
    malpractice against Silver, Silver withdrew his appearance as counsel
    for the couple in the 1994 State Court Action. Thereafter, against Sil-
    ver's advice, the Millers voluntarily dismissed their remaining claims
    in the 1994 State Court Action and refiled them in the United States
    District Court for the Central District of California. The Millers'
    claims were then transferred to the district court (for the District of
    Maryland) as part of the Honda MDL Proceedings. Once the Millers'
    ____________________________________________________________
    2
    We refer to American Honda Motor Company, Incorporated and its
    affiliates collectively as "Honda" throughout this opinion.
    37
    claims became part of the Honda MDL Proceedings, Honda moved
    to dismiss them on the basis that the Millers' voluntary dismissal of
    those same claims in the 1994 State Court Action constituted dis-
    missal with prejudice.
    The law firm of Duane, Morris & Heckscher (Duane/Morris) repre-
    sented the Millers as well as several other plaintiffs in the Honda
    MDL Proceedings. Members of Duane/Morris served on the plain-
    tiffs' executive committee, and the Millers personally participated in
    the settlement approval process. Ultimately, the Millers opted to
    accept the settlement agreement which concluded the Honda MDL
    Proceedings. Hereafter, we will refer to this settlement agreement as
    "the MDL Settlement Agreement." Under the MDL Settlement
    Agreement, the Millers received the largest amount of damages of
    any dealership—$6.32 million. But according to the district court's
    memorandum opinion that accompanied its injunction order presently
    under review, $6.32 million "was $1 million too high under the allo-
    cation formula that was used in determining the amounts to be paid
    to settling class members." In re: American Honda, 
    162 F. Supp. 2d at 389
    . In this regard, the district court explained as follows:
    The formula contemplated that each dealer would be paid
    $4,000 for each car which, as determined by a regression
    analysis, the dealer had not received because of the bribery
    scheme. Some dealers, like the Millers, purchased their
    dealership during the class period, and were entitled to com-
    pensation only for those cars that were apportioned under
    the settlement formula to the dealership after the date of
    their purchase. This apportionment ordinarily was easy to
    accomplish because—apparently in all cases other than the
    Millers—Honda assigned a new dealer number when the
    dealership changed hands. The Millers, however, were given
    the same dealer number as their predecessors and therefore
    received an apportionment of all of the cars to which their
    dealership was entitled in 1986 despite the fact that they did
    not purchase the dealership until mid-December of that year.
    This resulted in a misapportionment to them of 250 cars,
    which in turn resulted in an excess recovery of $1 million.
    The error apparently was known both to the Millers and
    38
    Duane/Morris when the Millers decided to accept the MDL
    settlement.
    
    Id. at 389-390
     (emphasis added).
    In March 1997, the Millers sued Silver for legal malpractice in Cal-
    ifornia state court. The Millers alleged that Silver had acted negli-
    gently in the 1994 State Court Action. The parties subsequently
    agreed that the malpractice action would be dismissed without preju-
    dice and that the statute of limitations would be tolled until April
    1999.
    On October 9, 1998, the district court entered its "Order of Final
    Settlement Approval and Judgment of Dismissal of Settled Claims"
    in connection with the MDL Proceedings.3 In this order, the district
    court formally approved the MDL Settlement Agreement. In so
    approving, the district court expressly found that the total amount of
    settlement to be paid the plaintiffs' class under the MDL Settlement
    Agreement was "fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in the best inter-
    ests of [the] Plaintiff[s'] Class as a whole." (J.A. 548). Likewise, the
    district court found that the plan of distribution to individual class
    members under the MDL Settlement Agreement was "fair and reason-
    able, [and] is in the best interest of the Plaintiff[s'] settlement class
    . . . ." (J.A. 550). Of significant relevance in the present appeal, the
    district court's Settlement Approval Order states that the district court
    "shall have and retain exclusive jurisdiction with respect to (i) imple-
    mentation, interpretation and enforcement of the Settlement Agree-
    ment; (ii) supervision, allocation and distribution of the settlement
    fund; and (iii) any applications or disputes concerning attorneys' fees,
    costs, and expenses which may arise." (J.A. 551).
    After the district court entered its Settlement Approval Order, Sil-
    ver filed a notice of lien in the district court against the Millers' share
    of the settlement proceeds. Silver based his lien upon his claim that
    he deserved compensation for the work that he had performed for the
    Millers in the 1994 State Court Action.
    ____________________________________________________________
    3
    Hereafter, we will refer to the district court's "Final Order of Settle-
    ment Approval and Final Judgment of Dismissal of Settled Claims" as
    "the district court's Settlement Approval Order."
    39
    On the eve of expiration of the tolling agreement between the Mill-
    ers and Silver, the Millers filed a malpractice action against Silver in
    California state court (the 1999 State Court Action). In their com-
    plaint, the Millers acknowledged that they had partially mitigated
    their damages through the MDL Settlement Agreement. Nevertheless,
    the Millers alleged that but for Silver's negligence, they would have
    recovered an additional $7 million in connection with the Honda brib-
    ery scheme. Silver filed a counterclaim for approximately $1.8 mil-
    lion in attorney's fees.
    Silver next made a motion before the district court requesting that
    the district court adjudicate the merits of his lien against the Millers'
    share of the proceeds under the MDL Settlement Agreement. He con-
    comitantly requested that the district court adjudicate the merits of the
    Millers' malpractice claim against him pending in the 1999 State
    Court Action and his counterclaim for attorney's fees in the same
    action.
    The Millers vehemently opposed the motion on the ground that
    California state law issues would predominate in their dispute with
    Silver. Notably, as found by the district court, the Millers did not dis-
    close before the district court that they intended to assert a legal mal-
    practice theory in the 1999 State Court Action that would require an
    intimate knowledge of the legal issues involved in the Honda MDL
    Proceedings and the MDL Settlement Agreement. They also did not
    disclose before the district court that they intended to argue in such
    action that the damages they were seeking from Silver were distinct
    from the damages due them under the MDL Settlement Agreement.
    Based upon the Millers' representation that issues of California
    state law would predominate in all of the disputes between themselves
    and Silver, the district court initially declined to exercise jurisdiction
    to adjudicate the merits of Silver's lien against the settlement pro-
    ceeds due the Millers under the MDL Settlement Agreement, as well
    as the merits of the Millers' malpractice claim against Silver in the
    1999 State Court Action and his counterclaim for attorney's fees.
    Having lost his motion to have the district court adjudicate the mer-
    its of his malpractice/fee dispute with the Millers, Silver relied upon
    the mandatory arbitration provision in the retainer/fee agreement
    40
    between himself and the Millers to move in the 1999 State Court
    Action for mandatory arbitration. The California state court granted
    the motion.
    The arbitration, which lasted a total of fifteen days, took place in
    California before a retired California state court judge. A key issue in
    the arbitration was whether, but for Silver's alleged negligence, the
    Millers would have obtained a greater recovery from American
    Honda in the 1994 State Court Action than they did under the MDL
    Settlement Agreement. Of relevance on appeal, the Millers contended
    that, if their case had been handled properly, they would have recov-
    ered $7,475,000 in so-called "blue sky damages" from American
    Honda for having greatly overpaid for goodwill at the time they pur-
    chased their dealership. The Millers denied before the arbitrator that
    the MDL Settlement Agreement compensated them for such "blue sky
    damages." The Millers referred to the damages due them under the
    MDL Settlement Agreement as "allocation damages." According to
    the Millers, these damages only compensated them for their lost prof-
    its as a result of not receiving their fair allocation of automobiles from
    Honda.
    On January 10, 2001, the arbitrator issued an award heavily in
    favor of the Millers. Finding that the MDL Settlement Agreement did
    not compensate the Millers at all for the amount they had overpaid in
    goodwill when they purchased their dealership, the arbitrator awarded
    the Millers $7,475,000 as damages for such overpayment.4 The arbi-
    trator declined to award the Millers any amount of "allocation dam-
    ages" on the basis that the Millers were awarded an adequate amount
    of "allocation damages" under the MDL Settlement Agreement. The
    arbitrator ruled against Silver on his counterclaim for attorney's fees.
    In a supplemental award issued at a later date, the arbitrator awarded
    the Millers $871,474.96 in attorney's fees in connection with their
    prosecution of their malpractice claim.
    ____________________________________________________________
    4
    The arbitrator also awarded the Millers $475,567.51 in damages for
    malpractice on the part of Silver that was not directly related to Silver's
    representation of the Millers with respect to their claims arising from the
    Honda bribery scheme.
    41
    After issuance of the arbitration award, Silver filed a motion in the
    Maryland district court for reconsideration of the district court's deci-
    sion not to adjudicate the merits of his malpractice/fee dispute with
    the Millers. Silver also sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the
    Millers from enforcing their arbitration award in California state
    court. The parties fully briefed and argued the motion before the dis-
    trict court, and the Millers agreed not to seek judicial enforcement of
    their arbitration award pending a decision by the district court.
    On August 24, 2001, the district court issued an order and memo-
    randum opinion granting Silver's motion and permanently enjoining
    the Millers from enforcing their arbitration award to the extent that it
    awarded them $7,475,000 for so-called "blue sky damages." In re:
    American Honda, 
    162 F. Supp. 2d at 387-396
    . The district court also
    enjoined the Millers from enforcing the supplemental award of attor-
    ney's fees with the proviso that the Millers had the opportunity to file
    a motion with the district court for a determination regarding the
    amount of attorney's fees and costs that they had incurred in the arbi-
    tration proceedings in connection with their "blue sky damages"
    claim. 
    Id. at 396
    . The district court ruled that after determining such
    amount, it would modify the Injunction to permit the Millers to
    enforce the remaining portion of the supplemental award. 
    Id.
    Because we review on appeal the district court's entry of the
    Injunction for abuse of discretion, In re March, 
    988 F.2d 498
    , 500
    (4th Cir. 1993), we will next set forth the district court's expressed
    reasons for entering the Injunction. The district court began the analy-
    sis portion of its August 24, 2001 memorandum opinion by setting
    forth the Millers' first theory as to why the district court should not
    enter the Injunction. In this regard, the district court stated as follows:
    The theory espoused by the Millers during the arbitration
    proceedings in support of their claim for blue sky damages
    was relatively straightforward. According to the Millers,
    [the judge in the 1994 State Court Action] had sustained
    Honda's demurrer in the litigation . . . because Silver had
    misplead RICO damages by not claiming "concrete financial
    loss" as required by the decision in Sheperd v. American
    Honda Motor Co., 
    822 F. Supp. 625
     (N.D. Cal. 1993). Fur-
    ther, according to the Millers, Silver knew how to plead
    42
    damages properly because in the case of Austin Motors v.
    American Honda, which he filed on behalf of other clients
    in the Central District of California and which was trans-
    ferred here as a part of the MDL proceedings, I overruled
    a motion to dismiss filed by the Honda defendants on
    Sheperd grounds. The sustaining of the demurrer in the Cali-
    fornia case led to the Millers' decision to dismiss that
    action. That dismissal, in turn, led to the motion to dismiss
    the Millers' claims filed by Honda in this court. Honda's
    motion was still pending before me when the MDL settle-
    ment was reached, and the Millers assert that their fear that
    I would grant the motion lead them to accept the settlement
    instead of opting out. Finally, they contend, that if they had
    opted out, they would have pursued their case against Honda
    and received both the allocation damages they received as
    part of the MDL settlement and the blue sky damages they
    allegedly suffered as a result of having overpaid for their
    dealership.
    In re: American Honda, 
    162 F. Supp. 2d at 390-91
     (footnote omitted).
    The district court identified what it believed to be five flaws in the
    Millers' causation theory. The first flaw the district court identified
    was that no one familiar with the Honda bribery scheme litigation
    could reasonably conclude that Silver's alleged malpractice in not
    pleading RICO damages properly in the 1994 State Court Action is
    what caused the state court judge to sustain Honda's demurrer. The
    second flaw the district court identified was that even assuming that
    Silver misplead the RICO damages in the 1994 State Court Action,
    that misfeasance was not the precipitating event which allegedly
    placed the Millers on the horns of a dilemma in deciding whether to
    accept the MDL Settlement Agreement. Rather, the district court rea-
    soned, "their predicament was caused by their voluntary dismissal of
    the California action after Silver no longer represented them and
    against his advice." 
    Id. at 392
    .
    The third flaw the district court identified in the Millers' causation
    theory was that, to the extent the Millers prompted the arbitrator to
    award them so-called "blue sky damages" by arguing that such dam-
    ages were something different than "allocation damages," the Millers
    43
    caused the arbitrator to usurp the district court's exclusive jurisdiction
    to interpret the MDL Settlement Agreement. With regard to the merits
    of the interpretive issue itself, the district court held that the Millers'
    argument was off the mark, reasoning as follows:
    As I have earlier indicated, the blue sky damages award was
    intended to compensate the Millers for overpaying . . . for
    the goodwill of their dealership. Goodwill had been calcu-
    lated for purposes of the purchase agreement as a multiple
    of the dealership's prior earnings. Its value was found by the
    arbitrator to have been inflated because the earnings on
    which it was based were themselves inflated by the sale of
    cars that had been allocated to the dealership by corrupt
    Honda executives in return for bribes that [the previous
    owners] had paid. Although the damage for overpayment of
    goodwill is somewhat conceptually different from damages
    that the Millers suffered by misallocation of automobiles to
    them after they had purchased the dealership, the two types
    of damage are economically interrelated. From one perspec-
    tive, the recovery the Millers received through the MDL set-
    tlement for automobiles they should have received but for
    the bribery scheme substantially compensated them for the
    full revenue stream for which they had paid when they pur-
    chased the dealership. In any event, economics aside, the
    settlement agreement in the MDL settlement defined "allo-
    cation claims" to encompass "any claim, allegation or asser-
    tion arising in any way from the allocation or distribution of
    Honda automobiles . . . ." Under this definition the blue sky
    damages the Millers received in the arbitration proceeding
    clearly were not distinct from, but one of the aspects of,
    allocation damages.
    
    Id. at 393
     (second ellipses in original).
    The fourth flaw the district court identified in the Millers' causa-
    tion theory was that the Millers received $1 million more under the
    MDL Settlement Agreement than they were actually entitled to for
    allocation damages as the Millers restrictively define it, yet the Mill-
    ers failed to disclose such overpayment to the arbitrator. The fifth and
    final flaw in the Millers' causation theory identified by the district
    44
    court was that in awarding the Millers so-called "blue sky damages,"
    the arbitrator made a speculative assumption that the Millers would
    have recovered "blue sky damages" in state court if they had not
    accepted the MDL Settlement Agreement.
    The district court next addressed the Millers' argument that how-
    ever great the injustice their fallacious arguments in the arbitration
    proceeding may have created, the district court was powerless to rem-
    edy it because of the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, and
    because the district court lacked jurisdiction to review an arbitration
    award entered in a California state proceeding. In response, the dis-
    trict court acknowledged that the general propositions of law upon
    which the Millers relied were sound, but stressed that this case "turns
    not upon general principles but on its particulars." 
    Id. at 395
    . The dis-
    trict court then went on to state:
    Were I not to grant relief to Silver, I would be permitting the
    MDL proceedings over which I presided to become a vehi-
    cle for the commission of a substantial injustice. The Millers
    actively participated, both through their counsel and in a pro
    se capacity, in the MDL proceedings. They received a sub-
    stantial settlement from it, including $1 million more than
    they were entitled to under the allocation formula. They
    knew that in order to approve the settlement, I would have
    to find that it was "fair, adequate and reasonable" for all
    members of the class, including persons, such as them-
    selves, who had allegedly overpaid for their dealerships
    because of the bribes paid by their predecessors. They never
    disclosed at the time they accepted the settlement their own
    view that the settlement was, in fact, unfair, inadequate, and
    unreasonable because it did not compensate them and simi-
    larly situated class members for their blue sky damages. Nor
    did they reveal that they were reserving their right to pursue
    such a claim against their former attorney.
    Moreover, when opposing Silver's original motion
    requesting that I exercise jurisdiction over this dispute, the
    Millers misrepresented that issues of state law would pre-
    dominate in resolution of the dispute. They did not disclose
    that they would be asserting in the arbitration proceeding a
    45
    legal malpractice theory that would require an intimate
    knowledge of the legal issues involved in the Honda MDL
    proceedings. They also did not reveal that one of the conten-
    tions they intended to make in the arbitration proceeding
    was that the blue sky damages they were seeking were dis-
    tinct from the allocation damages they had recovered in the
    MDL settlement. Resolution of that issue involved interpre-
    tation of the MDL settlement agreement and, as the Millers
    knew, the settlement agreement conferred exclusive juris-
    diction upon this court to interpret its terms.
    Most importantly, for the reasons I have previously
    stated, the Millers made arguments before the arbitrator
    about the Honda-related litigation that were so totally with-
    out merit that they can only be characterized as untrue. They
    also withheld from the arbitrator that they received $1 mil-
    lion for 250 cars apportioned to them before they purchased
    their dealership.
    
    Id. at 395-96
    . In a footnote, the district court added that it was enjoin-
    ing the arbitration award "not because of any mistake [the arbitrator]
    made but because the Millers had no right to make before him the
    deceptive arguments they did, misrepresenting what had occurred
    during the Honda bribery litigation." 
    Id.
     at 395 n.7.
    To summarize, the district court viewed "the global settlement of
    the claims arising from the Honda bribery scheme [ ]as an asset, both
    financial and judicial in nature, created under the auspices of the
    MDL proceedings." 
    Id. at 396
    . The district court believed that
    "[t]hose who accepted its benefits have no right to obtain further
    recovery (either from Honda or any third parties) by misrepresenting
    to another tribunal that which led to its accomplishment." 
    Id. at 396
    .
    The district court found that "[t]his is what the Millers have done."
    
    Id.
    Based upon its findings of misconduct by the Millers and the usur-
    pation of its exclusive jurisdiction to resolve interpretative questions
    under the MDL Settlement Agreement, the district court expressly
    invoked the All Writs Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    (a), to enter the Injunc-
    tion. According to the district court, such invocation was necessary
    46
    "to protect the integrity of [its] processes and prevent the Honda MDL
    proceedings from being used for an improper purpose . . . ." 
    Id. at 396
    .
    This timely appeal by the Millers followed in which the Millers
    challenge the Injunction on the ground that the district court lacked
    the authority to enter it. Also, Silver has filed a cross-appeal on the
    ground that the district court erred by declining to adjudicate the mer-
    its of his lien on the Millers' portion of the settlement funds.
    II.
    The overarching question presented in this appeal is whether the
    All Writs Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    (a), gives a federal district court
    authority to enjoin judicial enforcement of an arbitration award,
    issued pursuant to state arbitration procedures, when: (1) the underly-
    ing arbitration resolved an issue over which the district court retained
    exclusive jurisdiction to resolve pursuant to an order by that district
    court approving a settlement agreement in MDL proceedings over
    which the district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction; and (2)
    the parties enjoined engaged in misconduct before the district court
    and the arbitrator in connection with the subject of the injunction.5
    We begin our resolution of this question by setting forth the actual
    language of the All Writs Act and the established jurisprudence sur-
    rounding it.
    The All Writs Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    (a), provides that "[t]he
    Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
    ____________________________________________________________
    5
    We note that the district court's August 24, 2001 memorandum opin-
    ion identifies several issues regarding the merits of the Millers' malprac-
    tice claim about which the district court disagreed with the arbitrator's
    resolution. However, with one exception, we do not read such memoran-
    dum opinion to establish that the district court entered the Injunction
    because it disagreed with the arbitrator's resolution of the merits of the
    Millers' malpractice claim. The one exception is the arbitrator's resolu-
    tion of the interpretive question under the MDL Settlement Agreement
    pertaining to the nature of the damages covered by that agreement, which
    interpretive question the district court retained exclusive jurisdiction to
    resolve pursuant to its Settlement Approval Order.
    47
    issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective juris-
    dictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 
    Id.
    Although the All Writs Act does not independently confer subject
    matter jurisdiction on federal courts, Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc.
    v. Henson, 
    123 S. Ct. 366
    , 370 (2002), it does "authorize a federal
    court `to issue such commands . . . as may be necessary or appropriate
    to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously
    issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained,'" Pennsylva-
    nia Bureau of Corr. v. United States Marshals Serv., 
    474 U.S. 34
    , 40
    (1985) (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 
    434 U.S. 159
    ,
    172 (1977)). Such authorization, however, does not control "[w]here
    a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand . . . ."
    Pennsylvania Bureau of Corr., 
    474 U.S. at 43
    . For example, a party
    "may not, by resorting to the All Writs Act, avoid complying with the
    statutory requirements for removal" of a case in state court to federal
    court. Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., 
    123 S. Ct. at 370
    .
    Here, the district court enjoined the Millers from enforcing that
    portion of the arbitration award relating to their so-called "blue sky
    damages" in large measure to protect its exclusive jurisdiction to
    resolve interpretive questions under the MDL Settlement Agreement.
    The district court was also moved to action by its desire to rectify the
    injustice the district court found the Millers had perpetrated by engag-
    ing in misconduct in order to defeat such jurisdiction. We find no
    abuse of discretion in this regard.6
    The district court's possession of subject matter jurisdiction over
    the claims of the Plaintiffs' Class in the MDL Proceedings is not in
    dispute.7 Neither is it disputed that, pursuant to the district court's Set-
    tlement Approval Order, the district court retained exclusive jurisdic-
    tion to interpret the terms of the MDL Settlement Agreement should
    any dispute over its meaning arise. The record in this case leaves no
    ____________________________________________________________
    6
    As previously stated, we review the district court's entry of the
    Injunction for abuse of discretion. In re: March, 
    988 F.2d at 500
    .
    7
    The class action complaint in the MDL Proceedings raised claims
    under several federal statutory sections and state law. Thus, the district
    court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the MDL Proceedings
    under the federal question statute and the supplemental jurisdiction stat-
    ute. 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
    , 1367(a).
    48
    doubt that one of the key issues before the arbitrator was whether the
    MDL Settlement Agreement compensated the Millers for the inflated
    portion of the purchase price of their dealership attributable to the
    misallocation of Honda automobiles prior to their purchase of such
    dealership. Indeed, in order to establish the damages element of their
    legal malpractice claim against Silver, the Millers had to prove that
    but for Silver's malpractice, they would have recovered the inflated
    portion of the purchase price of their dealership attributable to the
    misallocation of Honda automobiles prior to their purchase of such
    dealership. Coscia v. McKenna & Cueno, 
    25 P.3d 670
    , 672 (Ca.
    2001) ("In a legal malpractice action arising from a civil proceeding,
    the elements are (1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill, pru-
    dence, and diligence as members of his or her profession commonly
    possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal
    connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual
    loss or damage resulting from the attorney's negligence.").
    Whether the Millers had already received full or partial compensa-
    tion for the inflated portion of the purchase price of their dealership
    attributable to the misallocation of Honda automobiles prior to their
    purchase of such dealership undeniably raised an interpretive question
    under the MDL Settlement Agreement. Specifically, the Millers'
    argument regarding "blue sky damages" versus "allocation damages"
    raised an interpretive question regarding what damages the Millers
    received for their "allocation claims" under the MDL Settlement
    Agreement. However, in flagrant disregard of the district court's
    exclusive jurisdiction to resolve such interpretative question, the Mill-
    ers argued before the arbitrator that they were not compensated under
    the MDL Settlement Agreement for what they termed "blue sky dam-
    ages." Accordingly, under all of the facts and circumstances that we
    have just outlined, we have no hesitancy in concluding that the
    Injunction was necessary to prevent direct frustration of the district
    court's Settlement Approval Order, for which the district court unde-
    niably possessed subject matter jurisdiction to issue.8 We also have no
    ____________________________________________________________
    8
    My dissenting colleague writes that "there is simply no reason to
    believe the MDL settlement order would be undermined by the enforce-
    ment of the arbitration award against Silver." Post at 58. Quite to the
    contrary, enforcement of the arbitration award against Silver would allow
    49
    trouble in concluding that the Injunction was necessary to cure the
    injustices created by the Millers through their abuse of the MDL pro-
    cess.
    The Millers argue that, assuming arguendo the validity of these
    conclusions, the district court still abused its discretion in entering the
    Injunction because the Injunction did not meet any of the statutory
    requirements of the Anti-Injunction Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 2283
    . Syngenta
    Crop Protection, Inc., 
    123 S. Ct. at 370
     (a party may not, by resorting
    to the All Writs Act, avoid compliance with the requirements of a
    statute that specifically addresses the particular issue at hand).
    The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from enjoining
    "proceedings" in a state court "except as expressly authorized by Act
    of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect
    or effectuate its judgments." 
    28 U.S.C. § 2283
    . This prohibition
    extends to indirect injunctions against parties. Atlantic Coast Line
    R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 
    398 U.S. 281
    , 287
    (1970) ("It is well settled that the prohibition of § 2283 cannot be
    evaded by addressing the order to the parties or prohibiting utilization
    of the results of a completed state proceeding."). For purposes of the
    Anti-Injunction Act, the term "proceedings" includes "all steps taken
    or which may be taken in the state court or by its officers from the
    institution to the close of the final process." Hill v. Martin, 
    296 U.S. 393
    , 403 (1935).
    ____________________________________________________________
    the Millers to recover money damages based upon an arbitrator's inter-
    pretation of the term "allocation claim" under the MDL Settlement
    Agreement, the existence of which interpretation is in direct contraven-
    tion of the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court to resolve interpre-
    tive questions under the MDL Settlement Agreement, as expressly
    provided in the Settlement Approval Order. The obvious purpose of the
    district court retaining exclusive jurisdiction to resolve interpretive ques-
    tions under the MDL Settlement Agreement is to require, in the interests
    of fairness and justice, that all parties to the MDL Settlement Agreement
    be bound by the same interpretation of its terms. Under this circum-
    stance, the undermining of the Settlement Approval Order by enforce-
    ment of the arbitration award against Silver is self-evident.
    50
    For over two-hundred years, the Anti-Injunction Act "has helped to
    define our nation's system of federalism." Employers Res. Mgmt. Co.,
    Inc. v. Shannon, 
    65 F.3d 1126
    , 1130 (4th Cir. 1995). The three excep-
    tions to the Anti-Injunction Act's prohibition against enjoining state
    court proceedings "are construed narrowly, . . . and are not [to] be
    enlarged by loose statutory construction." 
    Id.
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted) (alteration in original). The "necessary in aid of its
    jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is widely under-
    stood to apply most often when a federal court was the first in obtain-
    ing jurisdiction over a res in an in rem action and the same federal
    court seeks to enjoin suits in state courts involving the same res. In
    re: Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 
    261 F.3d 355
    , 365
    (3d Cir. 2001); 17 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and
    Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 2d, § 4225 (2d
    ed. 1988). However, support for a broader application of the "neces-
    sary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception can be found in the Supreme
    Court's statement that both this exception and the third exception to
    the Anti-Injunction Act allow federal injunctive relief against state
    court proceedings where it is "necessary to prevent a state court from
    so interfering with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a
    case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority
    to decide that case." Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 
    398 U.S. at 295
    .
    And as some legal scholars have pointed out, "[t]here have been some
    signs of such flexibility in the recent cases." Federal Practice and
    Procedure 2d § 4225 at 531.
    The most prominent area of such flexibility is school desegregation
    cases. "In the school desegregation area the federal court typically
    takes a controversy in hand, modifying its orders as need be from
    time to time, and it has been held that the court can enjoin state pro-
    ceedings that would interfere with the federal court's continuing juris-
    diction." Id. Indeed, in a school desegregation case, we have relied
    upon the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-
    Injunction Act in upholding an injunction restraining a state court
    suit: (1) in which the plaintiffs claimed that the school board was dis-
    criminating against white children with respect to the statutory stan-
    dards applicable to exceptionally talented children; and (2) where
    plaintiffs' claims could not be separated from the order previously
    entered by the district court. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
    Educ., 
    501 F.2d 383
     (4th Cir. 1974). Especially relevant to the appeal
    51
    before us is the fact that, in the multi-district litigation area, some
    courts have permitted injunctions against parallel state court proceed-
    ings under the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception where
    such state court proceedings threatened to frustrate multi-district liti-
    gation proceedings and disrupt the orderly resolution of those pro-
    ceedings. In re: Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 
    261 F.3d at 365
     (collecting cases); Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
    101 F.3d 1196
    , 1202 (7th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases) ("We agree that the nec-
    essary in aid of jurisdiction exception [to the Anti-Injunction Act]
    should be construed to empower the federal court to enjoin a concur-
    rent state proceeding that might render the exercise of the federal
    court's jurisdiction nugatory." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The "to protect or effectuate its judgments," language of the Anti-
    Injunction Act has come to be known as "the relitigation exception"
    to the Anti-Injunction Act. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]he
    relitigation exception was designed to permit a federal court to pre-
    vent state litigation of an issue that previously was presented to and
    decided by the federal court. It is founded in the well-recognized con-
    cepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel." Chick Kam Choo v.
    Exxon Corp., 
    486 U.S. 140
    , 147 (1988). An injunction may issue
    under the relitigation exception only if the claims or issues subject to
    the injunction have actually been decided. 
    Id. at 148
     (stating that the
    court must look to what the previous order "actually said" and may
    not "render a post hoc judgment as to what the order was intended to
    say"); LCS Servs., Inc. v. Hamrick, 
    925 F.2d 745
    , 749 (4th Cir. 1991)
    ("a complainant seeking to avail himself of the relitigation exception
    to the [Anti-Injunction] statute must make a strong and unequivocal
    showing of relitigation of the same issues") (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    Because the Millers failed to argue below that the Injunction did
    not fall within one of the express exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
    Act, we are constrained to review any alleged error on the part of the
    district court with respect to the Anti-Injunction Act under the plain
    error standard of review. In re: Celotex Corp., 
    124 F.3d 619
    , 630-31
    (4th Cir. 1997) (adopting plain error standard of review used in crimi-
    nal cases, as set forth in United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
     (1993),
    for application in civil cases). Under the plain error standard of
    review, we may only exercise our discretion to correct a forfeited
    52
    error, if we: (1) find error; (2) find the error is plain; (3) find the error
    affects the substantial rights of the party or parties alleging the error;
    and (4) after examining the particulars of the case, we find the error
    seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings. Id. at 630-31.
    Our application of the plain error test to the alleged error by the
    district court reveals that the Millers are not entitled to vacature of the
    Injunction on the basis of the Anti-Injunction Act. Assuming
    arguendo that the first element of the plain error test is met, i.e., the
    Injunction violates the Anti-Injunction Act because it enjoins a state
    court proceeding and each of the Act's three exceptions are inapplica-
    ble, the second element of the plain error test is not met, i.e., the error
    is not plain. For purposes of the plain error test, the term "`[p]lain'
    is synonymous with `clear' or, equivalently,`obvious,'" Olano 
    507 U.S. at 734
    , under the law at the time of our appellate consideration,
    Johnson v. United States, 
    520 U.S. 461
    , 468 (1997). At the present
    time, the law is not clear or equivalently obvious that the "necessary
    in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act's general
    prohibition against a federal court enjoining a state court proceeding
    is inapplicable to the Injunction. First, we have already concluded
    under our discussion of the All Writs Act that the Injunction was nec-
    essary to vindicate the district court's exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
    interpretive questions under the MDL Settlement Agreement. Thus,
    the plain text of the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception is
    applicable. Second, as we have already set forth, some federal appel-
    late courts have permitted injunctions under the same exception
    where a parallel state court action threatens to frustrate federal multi-
    district litigation proceedings and disrupt the orderly resolution of
    those proceedings. E.g., Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc., 
    10 F.3d 189
    , 202-03 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that it was appropriate as neces-
    sary in aid of the district court's jurisdiction in class action asbestos
    suit to enjoin absent members of plaintiff class from seeking a ruling
    from state court permitting mass opting out of all plaintiffs in that
    state, at mature phase of federal settlement proceedings and after
    years of pretrial negotiation). Here, a strong argument can be made
    that enforcement of the arbitration award in favor of the Millers
    threatens to frustrate the district court's ability to provide a universal
    interpretation of the term "allocation claim" under the MDL Settle-
    ment Agreement, which interpretive question may also arise in the
    53
    future pursuant to litigation involving other parties to the MDL. In
    sum, assuming the existence of error, the error is not plain.
    Moreover, assuming arguendo that the first three elements of the
    plain error test are satisfied, several factors strongly weigh against our
    finding that the assumed error seriously affects the fairness, integrity
    or public reputation of judicial proceedings and will continue to do so
    unless the assumed error is corrected. First, the Millers do not claim
    that they in any way lacked the opportunity to raise the Anti-
    Injunction Act below as a defense to the Injunction. Second, the Mill-
    ers, as found by the district court and supported by the record on
    appeal, intentionally mislead the district court at a critical motion
    stage into believing that they did not intend to make any arguments
    before the arbitrator that would raise interpretive questions under the
    MDL Settlement Agreement. Third, despite the Millers' knowledge
    that the district court retained exclusive jurisdiction to resolve inter-
    pretive questions under the MDL Settlement Agreement, the Millers
    intentionally made arguments before the arbitrator that they knew
    necessarily raised interpretive questions under the MDL Settlement
    Agreement. Fourth and finally, as determined by the district court, the
    Millers were already compensated, under the MDL Settlement Agree-
    ment, for their so-called "blue sky damages." In sum, we cannot con-
    clude that the facts here call for us to exercise our discretion to correct
    an assumed error not raised below.9
    III.
    As we previously stated, under all of the facts and circumstances
    of this case, we have no difficulty in concluding that the Injunction
    was necessary to prevent direct frustration of the district court's Set-
    tlement Approval Order and to cure injustice created by the Millers
    through their abuse of the MDL process. Accordingly, we find no
    abuse of discretion with respect to the district court's invocation of
    the All Writs Act to enjoin the Millers from enforcing the "blue sky
    damages" portion (including related attorneys' fees) of their multi-
    ____________________________________________________________
    9
    We have also reviewed the Millers' remaining arguments in challenge
    to the Injunction, and conclude that none warrant vacature of the Injunc-
    tion.
    54
    million dollar arbitration award. Therefore, we affirm the district
    court's order entering the Injunction.10
    AFFIRMED
    TRAXLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    My colleague Judge Hamilton has done an admirably thorough job
    of distilling and setting forth the applicable legal principles from deci-
    sions interpreting the All Writs Act. See 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 1651
    (a) (West
    1994). I differ only in the conclusion I would reach after applying
    those principles.
    In enjoining the Millers from enforcing their arbitration award
    through the California court system, the district court exercised juris-
    diction pursuant to the All Writs Act.* The All Writs Act grants dis-
    trict courts the power to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
    aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
    principles of law." 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 1651
    (a). The All Writs Act does not
    provide an independent source of federal jurisdiction over claims that
    otherwise would not fall within the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
    like those filed by the Millers under state law against Silver, a non-
    diverse defendant. See Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 
    123 S. Ct. 366
    , 370 (2002) ("[P]etitioners must demonstrate that original
    ____________________________________________________________
    10
    With respect to Silver's cross-appeal, we also affirm, as not an abuse
    of discretion, the district court's denial of that portion of Silver's motion
    requesting the district court to adjudicate the merits of his attorneys' fees
    claim. We find Silver's arguments in support of his cross-appeal without
    merit.
    *Although the court also referred to its "inherent jurisdiction to pre-
    vent the MDL proceedings from being used to effect the miscarriage of
    justice," In re: American Honda Motor Co. Litigation, 
    162 F.Supp.2d 387
    , 395 (D. Md. 2001), the order, viewed as a whole, does not purport
    to rest on its inherent powers as an additional jurisdictional basis. See
    Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 
    203 F.3d 291
    , 299 (4th Cir.) (recognizing the inherent authority of a district court
    to enforce a settlement agreement against the parties where the terms of
    the agreement have been incorporated into a court order), cert. denied,
    
    531 U.S. 918
     (2000).
    55
    subject-matter jurisdiction lies in the federal courts . . . . [T]he All
    Writs Act does not, by its specific terms, provide federal courts with
    an independent grant of jurisdiction." (internal quotation marks omit-
    ted)); see also Hillman v. Webley, 
    115 F.3d 1461
    , 1469 (10th Cir.
    1997) ("[T]he [All Writs] Act does not allow a court to acquire juris-
    diction over an individual or property not otherwise subject to its
    jurisdiction, and does not operate to confer jurisdiction." (internal
    quotation marks omitted)). Thus, a court may issue a writ or injunc-
    tion under the All Writs Act only if the court is acting "in aid of" a
    matter over which it previously obtained jurisdiction.
    The grant of power to issue writs "in aid of jurisdiction" under the
    All Writs Act supplies a district court with the authority to protect the
    integrity of its orders. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 
    434 U.S. 159
    , 172 (1977) ("This Court has repeatedly recognized the
    power of a federal court to issue such commands under the All Writs
    Act as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the
    frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdic-
    tion otherwise obtained."). Hence, we have recognized that "[t]he All
    Writs Act empowers a federal court to enjoin parties before it from
    attempting to relitigate decided issues and to prevent collateral attack
    of its judgments." Farmers Bank v. Kittay (In re March), 
    988 F.2d 498
    , 500 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 
    261 F.3d 1065
    , 1068 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[A] district court has the authority
    . . . to enjoin a party to litigation before it from prosecuting an action
    in contravention of a settlement agreement over which the district
    court has retained jurisdiction."), aff'd sub nom., Syngenta Crop Pro-
    tection, Inc. v. Henson, 
    123 S. Ct. 366
    , 370 (2002); Texas v. Real Par-
    ties in Interest, 
    259 F.3d 387
    , 392 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that
    a number of courts have interpreted the All Writs Act to "permit a dis-
    trict court to enjoin actions in state court . . . only where necessary
    to prevent relitigation of an existing federal judgment or otherwise to
    protect federal court orders."), cert. denied, 
    534 U.S. 1115
     (2002);
    Wesch v. Folsom, 
    6 F.3d 1465
    , 1470 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that
    the All-Writs Act "empowers federal courts to issue injunctions to
    protect or effectuate their judgments."); Kelly v. Merrill Lynch,
    Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
    985 F.2d 1067
    , 1069 (11th Cir. 1993)
    (per curiam) ("The All-Writs Act . . . gives federal courts broad
    injunctive powers to protect their own judgments. . . . This power
    includes the authority to enjoin arbitration to prevent relitigation.").
    56
    Because Silver did not participate in the MDL proceedings as
    either a litigant or as counsel for the Millers, the dispute between Sil-
    ver and the Millers is not directly before the district court and does
    not threaten its settlement order in the same way as would a post-
    settlement dispute between the Millers and their MDL counsel or the
    Millers and Honda. Cf. Thomas v. Powell, 
    247 F.3d 260
     (D.C. Cir.)
    (finding that the Anti-Injunction Act did not preclude the district court
    from enjoining state action between class counsel and his client), cert.
    denied, 
    122 S. Ct. 347
     (2001). Nevertheless, the power of the federal
    courts to safeguard the integrity of court orders "extends, under
    appropriate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the
    original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frus-
    trate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration
    of justice, and encompasses even those who have not taken any affir-
    mative action to hinder justice." New York Tel. Co., 
    434 U.S. at 174
    (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the ques-
    tion is whether the enforcement of the arbitration award threatened
    the integrity of the district court's order approving the MDL settle-
    ment agreement so that an injunction was required to prevent it.
    The district court appears to rest its decision that the injunction was
    necessary to protect the integrity of its order upon two conclusions.
    First, the court determined that the Millers, by advancing the theory
    that Silver's malpractice in the prior state lawsuit against Honda
    caused them to forgo "blue sky" damages that were not covered by
    the MDL settlement, made the scope of the MDL settlement a central
    issue in the California arbitration. Because the district court's settle-
    ment order indicated the court intended to retain exclusive jurisdiction
    over the "implementation, interpretation and enforcement of the Set-
    tlement Agreement," J.A. 550-51, the district court reasoned that the
    arbitrator's consideration of whether "blue sky" damages were cov-
    ered by the MDL settlement contravened the court's settlement order
    because it required an interpretation of the settlement agreement. See
    In re: American Honda Motor Co. Litigation, 
    162 F.Supp.2d 387
    , 395
    (D. Md. 2001).
    With respect, I cannot conclude that the arbitration award, arising
    from a California state malpractice action, threatened the integrity of
    the district court's order. The Millers are not attempting to recover,
    directly or indirectly, any additional damages from Honda. They are
    57
    not relitigating any of their claims against Honda that were resolved
    in the MDL litigation or otherwise collaterally attacking the district
    court's settlement order. The Millers's claims in arbitration involved
    the completely distinct legal issue of whether, under California law,
    Silver committed malpractice in a prior state action that was never
    before the district court. In my view, there is simply no reason to
    believe the MDL settlement order would be undermined by the
    enforcement of the arbitration award against Silver.
    In concluding that the arbitration award does not threaten the integ-
    rity of the district court's settlement order, I would emphasize that the
    proper analytical focus is on whether the injunction qualified as an
    exercise of power "in aid of" jurisdiction under the statute, as opposed
    to whether and to what extent the settlement order purported to retain
    jurisdiction over matters related to the MDL litigation. The district
    court's authority to protect its orders under the All Writs Act did not
    turn on whether the court had retained jurisdiction to do so. See Kok-
    konen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 377 (1994)
    ("Federal courts . . . possess only that power authorized by Constitu-
    tion and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree."
    (internal citations omitted)). Thus, the only significant question in
    assessing the district court's authority under the All Writs Act was
    whether that statute was satisfied.
    Finally, the district court's other conclusion serving as a basis for
    the injunction was that during the arbitration, the Millers intention-
    ally misrepresented the nature of the MDL settlement and the facts
    and circumstances surrounding it. The district court suggested that it
    was necessary to enjoin the enforcement of the California arbitration
    award to prevent the Millers from benefitting from their misrepresen-
    tations about the scope of the damages awarded under the MDL set-
    tlement. See In re: American Honda Litigation, 
    162 F.Supp.2d at
    394-
    95 n.7 ("[A]lthough I find that the arbitrator erred in his apparent
    findings, I am enjoining the award he entered not because of any mis-
    take he made but because the Millers had no right to make before him
    the deceptive arguments they did, misrepresenting what had occurred
    during the Honda bribery litigation."). The fact that the Millers mis-
    represented to the California arbitrator what occurred in the MDL liti-
    gation does not, in and of itself, threaten to undermine the district
    court's settlement order. Even if the misrepresentations resulted in an
    58
    arbitration award that was erroneous on the merits, such an award, for
    the reasons previously stated, does not threaten the integrity of the
    settlement order.
    In sum, I would respectfully hold that the district court abused its
    discretion in issuing the injunction as it was not a proper exercise of
    power "in aid of" jurisdiction under the All Writs Act.
    59