Froelich v. Senior Campus Living LLC ( 2004 )


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  •                              PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    BRIAN P. FROELICH,                         
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING LLC,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and                                No. 02-2305
    JOHN C. ERICKSON; NANCY ERICKSON;
    SCL, INC.; ERICKSON RESOURCE
    TRUST; SCL CONSTRUCTION, INC.;
    SUBCO, INC.; SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING
    HOLDINGS LLC,
    Defendants.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    Paul W. Grimm, Magistrate Judge.
    (CA-98-694-L)
    Argued: October 31, 2003
    Decided: January 22, 2004
    Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in
    which Judge Michael and Judge Traxler joined.
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: James David Mathias, PIPER RUDNICK, L.L.P., Balti-
    more, Maryland, for Appellant. Michael John Collins, THOMAS &
    2                 FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING
    LIBOWITZ, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
    John R. Wellschlager, PIPER RUDNICK, L.L.P., Baltimore, Mary-
    land, for Appellant.
    OPINION
    DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
    This diversity case involves a challenge to the valuation of a lim-
    ited liability company as determined by the statutory appraisal proce-
    dure provided under Maryland law. A member of the company, who
    objected to a reclassification of membership interests and squeeze-out
    merger that eliminated his interest in the company, exercised his right
    to have a statutory appraisal resolve the fair value of that interest
    immediately prior to the reclassification. The district court accord-
    ingly appointed a panel of three appraisers, who determined the value
    of the interest as of the day the company’s members voted to approve
    the reclassification. The company contends a court must adjust the
    valuation of that appraisal panel “downward” or order a new appraisal
    because (1) the objecting interest holder assertedly presented to the
    appraisers evidence and arguments that conflicted with earlier rulings
    of the district court and (2) the appraisers improperly included in their
    valuation appreciation resulting from the contested reclassification.
    The magistrate judge, who presided over the appraisal proceedings
    with the agreement of the parties, rejected these arguments and
    entered judgment for the member on the basis of the court-appointed
    appraisers’ valuation of the company. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    I.
    This appeal grows out of a dispute between Senior Campus Living,
    LLC (“SCL”), a developer of large, campus-style retirement commu-
    nities, and one of its former employees and interest holders Brian
    Froelich. SCL owns a number of operating retirement communities
    and several future projects in various stages of development.
    One future project regarded as critical by SCL in the fall of 1997
    was Greenspring Village in Springfield, Virginia. Equitable Real
    FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING                    3
    Estate Investment Management, Inc. (“Equitable”) had agreed to pro-
    vide $26 million in mezzanine financing for Greenspring if SCL first
    obtained $55 million in construction financing. By September 1997,
    SCL had obtained a $55 million construction loan from Mercantile-
    Safe Deposit & Trust Company, but only on the condition that SCL
    founder John Erickson — who still had substantial financial interests
    in SCL despite selling the firm to Froelich and others in a leveraged
    buy-out in 1996 — personally guarantee the loan. Erickson agreed to
    provide the guarantee, and Equitable then scheduled the closing for
    the Greenspring financing for October 3, 1997.
    On October 1, 1997, however, the SCL Board voted to remove
    Froelich from his position as Chief Executive Officer of the company
    and replace him with Erickson. As a result, Equitable decided to post-
    pone the Greenspring closing. Equitable subsequently notified SCL
    that it would require an additional $35 million in personal guarantees
    from Erickson to assuage its concerns about SCL’s financial condi-
    tion.
    Erickson told the SCL Board that he would provide personal guar-
    antees for the additional $35 million if the Board reclassified its mem-
    bership interests (both preferred and common) into a single class of
    common interests, with the reclassification to be based upon the fair
    market value of the company determined by an independent appraisal.
    Under the previous classification of membership interests (resulting
    from the 1996 leveraged buy-out), Erickson had preferred interests in
    the company worth about $160 million (including accrued and unpaid
    interest). In addition, Froelich and Erickson’s brother, Michael Erick-
    son, had subordinate preferred interests with assigned values of $8
    million and $4 million, respectively. The common interests in the
    company were allotted among John Erickson (30%), Michael Erick-
    son (26%), Froelich (26%), and thirteen other SCL employees (34%).
    These subordinate preferred and common interests only had value
    to the extent the company was worth more than the value of Erick-
    son’s senior preferred interests, i.e., $160 million. Thus, if the Board
    acted on Erickson’s proposal to reclassify the company’s preferred
    and common interests into a single class of common interests based
    on the company’s fair market value, Erickson would end up with vir-
    4                 FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING
    tually all of the common stock of SCL if the appraisal valued the
    company at less than $160 million.
    After forming independent committees to negotiate with Erickson
    regarding his proposal, explore available alternatives to Erickson’s
    offer, and confer with Equitable regarding the Greenspring closing,
    the SCL Board unanimously voted to recommend to the members that
    they accept Erickson’s reclassification proposal. By November 5,
    1997, fifteen of sixteen members had approved the proposal, with
    only Froelich dissenting. On November 6, 1997, after Erickson sup-
    plied the additional $35 million in guarantees, SCL, in Erickson’s
    words, “completed the signing and execution of all documents with
    Mercantile and Equitable for the $80 million project financing for
    [the] Greenspring [project].”
    In December 1997, SCL retained Coopers & Lybrand, LLP
    (“Coopers”) to perform an independent appraisal valuing the com-
    pany as of the November 5, 1997 reclassification. Coopers valued
    SCL at $155 million. This valuation included an appraisal of $6.325
    million for the Greenspring project. The SCL Board accepted Coo-
    pers’ valuation in January 1998. Because Coopers appraised the com-
    pany at less than the value of Erickson’s preferred interests (i.e., $160
    million), the reclassification resulted in Erickson holding 99.9% of
    the new common interests and left Froelich with $1.50 after a
    squeeze-out merger in February 1998 eliminated his remaining inter-
    est.
    Shortly after the squeeze-out merger, Froelich filed a fourteen
    count complaint against SCL, Erickson, and others in federal court.
    Froelich alleged, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, asserting that
    Erickson had disparaged SCL to potential investors (thereby thwart-
    ing SCL’s ability to obtain capital) in order to regain control over
    SCL and had devalued and engaged in self-dealing with respect to
    Froelich’s preferred and common interests. Froelich also alleged
    fraud, claiming that Erickson and the SCL Board had agreed, at the
    time of the 1996 leveraged buy-out of SCL, that Erickson would
    relinquish authority to run SCL and not disparage SCL, when in fact
    they knew that Erickson would not honor this agreement. In addition,
    Froelich asserted rights to severance pay and to a statutory appraisal
    FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING                     5
    (the latter of which had allegedly been triggered by the November 5,
    1997 reclassification and subsequent squeeze-out merger).
    Judge Benson Legg granted summary judgment to SCL on all alle-
    gations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. See Froelich v. Erick-
    son, 
    96 F. Supp. 2d 507
    , 511 (D. Md. 2000). However, Judge Legg
    granted summary judgment to Froelich with respect to his claim for
    severance pay and his demand for a statutory appraisal. 
    Id. at 511.
    As
    to the latter, the judge concluded that “Froelich is entitled to appraisal
    rights” and that appraisers would be appointed to value Froelich’s
    interest in SCL “as of November 5, 1997, which is just prior to the
    reclassification.” 
    Id. at 511,
    528. In an unpublished opinion, we
    affirmed in all respects the judgment entered by Judge Legg. Froelich
    v. Senior Campus Living, LLC, No. L-98-694, 
    2001 WL 256080
    (4th
    Cir. Mar. 15, 2001).
    Judge Legg then followed the procedures set forth in Md. Code
    Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 3-210(a) (1999) and appointed three disin-
    terested appraisers, whom SCL and Froelich had recommended, to
    value SCL as of November 5, 1997. The appraisers appointed to per-
    form the valuation were Patrick O. Ring, Joseph T. Gardemal, and
    Robert A. Frank. Patrick O. Ring, the panel chairman, received an
    MBA in financing from Wharton, worked as a bank officer for almost
    twenty years, wrote over thirty articles on business valuation and
    other financial subjects, and since 1992 had worked with the Baker-
    Meekins Company, Inc., a business valuation company. Joseph T.
    Gardemal, another panel member, was certified as a public accoun-
    tant, fraud examiner, valuation panelist, and government financial
    manager, and had worked in a number of accounting firms on busi-
    ness valuation and related financial matters and was currently work-
    ing with Capital Analysis Group, a financial consulting firm, in which
    he was responsible for business valuation and litigation support.
    Finally, Robert A. Frank was a chartered financial analyst, who had
    worked as a managing director of a real estate securities research
    group and was currently serving as the managing director of InCap
    Group, Inc.
    The parties agreed that Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm would
    preside over the appraisal proceedings. The parties submitted two
    bound volumes of exhibits and deposition excerpts to the three
    6                 FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING
    appraisers, who heard testimony from witnesses for three days in
    March 2002. The appraisers considered evidence that included a letter
    dated December 22, 1997, from an SCL Board Member to Coopers
    stating that SCL “has been unable to secure financing to further
    develop the ‘Future Projects’ [including Greenspring],” despite the
    fact that as of the November 5, 1997 valuation date, arrangements for
    financing the Greenspring project were in place (except for provision
    of $35 million in personal guarantees from Erickson) and that SCL
    actually closed on the Greenspring project on November 6, 1997. The
    appraisers also heard testimony from Coopers officials indicating that
    Coopers had relied on these representations in its appraisal. Addition-
    ally, an Equitable official testified that Equitable might have been
    willing to close on the Greenspring deal without Erickson’s $35 mil-
    lion guarantee as long as the full $55 million in construction financing
    was in place. Froelich also presented the appraisers with evidence
    regarding the willingness of other financial institutions to invest in
    SCL.
    After considering this and other evidence, the appraisers heard
    closing arguments and received lengthy memoranda from the parties.
    On June 17, 2002, the panel issued majority and minority reports; all
    three appraisers determined that the value of SCL as of November 5,
    1997, was $176 million, which was $21 million higher than Coopers’
    $155 million valuation.
    Two members of the panel, Ring and Gardemal, issued a thirty-
    four page majority report, which used two separate valuation methods
    to value SCL at $176 million. Ring and Gardemal’s first method ana-
    lyzed the approaches used in the three appraisal reports submitted to
    the panel (the Coopers report, as well as two additional reports — one
    commissioned by each of the parties), and then determined which
    approach arrived at the most reasonable conclusion as to the fair value
    of each SCL property. In this lead analysis, Ring and Gardemal
    adopted the $34 million valuation of the Greenspring project calcu-
    lated by Froelich’s appraiser, Thomas Nagle of Valuation Counselors,
    rather than Coopers’ $6.325 million valuation of Greenspring or the
    $20.94 million valuation advanced by the expert commissioned by
    SCL. Ring and Gardemal also adopted Nagle’s valuations for all of
    SCL’s current projects (which were generally lower that those offered
    by Coopers), and adopted estimates significantly lower than Nagle’s
    FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING                     7
    for SCL’s other future projects. Thus, the majority panelists’ higher
    appraisal for Greenspring largely explains why their $176 million
    total valuation of SCL significantly exceeded Coopers’ $155 million
    total valuation.1
    To “test the validity” of the $176 million total valuation based on
    their lead analysis, Ring and Gardemal conducted an alternative inde-
    pendent valuation analysis, which used cash flow projections pro-
    vided by SCL management. This alternative valuation confirmed the
    $176 million value they had reached in the lead analysis. Further, the
    third member of the panel, Robert Frank, filed an eighteen-page sepa-
    rate report, in which he employed still a different valuation method
    to arrive at an identical total value for SCL of $176 million as of
    November 5, 1997.
    Both SCL and Froelich filed objections seeking modification of the
    appraisal assessment. Judge Grimm heard extensive oral argument,
    and then, in a thorough and persuasive oral opinion, denied the objec-
    tions and adopted the appraisal panel’s unanimous conclusion that the
    value of SCL as of November 5, 1997, was $176 million. Judge
    Grimm concluded that SCL had not shown that any part of the Green-
    spring valuation conflicted with “Judge Legg’s ruling that the deci-
    sion of the board of directors fell within the protection of the business
    judgment rule,” nor had it presented evidence sufficient to convince
    him that the panel had erroneously included value created by the
    reclassification by failing to adjust for Erickson’s $35 million in per-
    sonal guarantees. Further, Judge Grimm held that even if he had
    found the majority’s lead analysis to be defective, he would have sim-
    ply adopted the majority’s alternative analysis or Frank’s minority
    report as his own valuation, and that this would have “correct[ed] the
    error.” Judge Grimm entered final judgment in favor of Froelich in
    the amount of about $11.2 million, representing the value of his inter-
    est in SCL on November 5, 1997, and pre-judgment interest.
    SCL noted a timely appeal; Froelich does not cross appeal.
    1
    The majority panelists’ lower appraisal for most of SCL’s other future
    projects meant that their estimate for the total value of SCL was $72 mil-
    lion lower than Nagle’s $248 million assessment.
    8                  FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING
    II.
    The Maryland General Assembly first authorized corporate consol-
    idations and mergers in 1868. See Roselle Park Trust Co. v. Ward
    Baking Corp., 
    9 A.2d 228
    , 231 (Md. 1939). Four decades later, in
    1908, the General Assembly enacted legislation providing a stock-
    holder objecting to a consolidation, merger, or sale of all corporate
    assets the right to demand fair value for his interests, as determined
    by a statutory appraisal. See Warren v. Baltimore Transit Co., 
    154 A.2d 796
    , 798 (Md. 1959); Am. Gen. Corp. v. Camp, 
    190 A. 225
    , 227
    (Md. 1937). This legislation was intended to overcome the problem,
    which had “proved in the past a disadvantage to the other stockhold-
    ers,” of objecting stockholders blocking mergers or consolidations
    arguably beneficial to the corporation, “and, at the same time, to pro-
    tect” fully the property rights of the objecting stockholder. Am. Gen.
    
    Corp., 190 A. at 227
    .
    Thus for almost a century, Maryland has provided by statute that:
    (1) “by compliance with prescribed conditions and procedure” one
    Maryland corporation can be consolidated with, or merged into,
    another, or sell substantially all of its assets, with the approval of less
    than all of the stockholders, 
    id., but (2)
    stockholders objecting to the
    consolidation, merger, or sale of substantially all corporate assets,
    upon satisfaction of certain conditions, have the absolute statutory
    “right to demand and receive payment of the fair value of the stock-
    holder’s stock from the successor,” Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Assn’s
    § 3-202(a) (1999).2 See Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Assn’s §§ 3-101 et
    seq. (1999). See generally, J.J. Hanks, Jr., Maryland Corporation Law
    § 10.1-10-8 at 329-43 (1990 and 2002 supp.) (hereinafter “Hanks”);
    B. Manning, The Stockholders Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
    Frank Coker, 72 Yale L.J. 223 (1962).
    2
    Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Assn’s § 4A-705 (1999) confers on “[a]
    member of a limited liability company objecting to a merger of the lim-
    ited liability company” the “same rights with respect to the member’s
    interest in the limited liability company as a stockholder of a Maryland
    corporation who objects has with respect to the stockholder’s stock
    under” Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Assn’s §§ 3-202 et seq. (1999).
    FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING                     9
    The Maryland General Corporation Law directs that this “fair
    value” is to be determined by an appraisal performed by three court-
    appointed “disinterested appraisers.” Md. Code Ann. Corps. & Assn’s
    § 3-210(a) (1999). The statute sets forth the valuation date, providing
    that, with exceptions inapplicable here, “fair value is determined as
    of the close of business . . . on the day the stockholders voted on the
    transaction objected to” (which the parties agree is November 5, 1997
    in this case). § 3-202(b)(1)(ii). The statute further provides that, again
    with inapplicable exceptions, “fair value may not include any appreci-
    ation or depreciation which directly or indirectly results from the
    transaction objected to or from its proposal.” § 3-202(b)(2). It also
    sets forth in some detail the procedure to be followed in obtaining a
    statutory determination of "fair value," including the time in which an
    objecting stockholder can exercise his appraisal right, the required
    notices, and the content of the petition for appraisal. See §§ 3-203 to
    3-208. Finally, the statute provides that the court shall, after consider-
    ation of the appraisers’ report and on motion of any party, “enter an
    order which . . . [c]onfirms, modifies, or rejects it.” § 3-211(a)(1).
    The Maryland General Corporation Law does not, however, further
    define or describe “fair value.”3 Nor does it set forth the standard a
    court should employ in reviewing the appraisers’ determination of
    “fair value.” Moreover, notwithstanding the venerable history of the
    Maryland statutory appraisal right, few cases have discussed the
    meaning of “fair value” or the role of courts in reviewing the statutory
    appraisers’ resolution of that question. In those few cases, however,
    Maryland’s high court has provided some helpful guidance.
    The court has recognized that each corporation poses a “particular”
    valuation problem and noted “the manifold possibilities and difficul-
    ties of the problem, and the impracticability of the statement of any
    rule of uniform application as to the factors of fair value.” Am. Gen.
    
    Corp., 190 A. at 229
    . The court has also pointed out that “[t]he real
    objective is to ascertain the actual worth of that which the dissenter
    3
    State appraisal statutes “variously” provide a dissenting stockholder
    is entitled to “market value,” “fair value,” “value” or “fair cash value.”
    H.G. Henn, Law of Corporations § 349 at 1002 (3d ed. 1983). Mary-
    land’s high court has noted that these “terms are considered synony-
    mous.” 
    Warren, 154 A.2d at 799
    .
    10                FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING
    loses because of his unwillingness to go along with the controlling
    stockholders, that is, to indemnify him.” 
    Warren, 154 A.2d at 799
    .
    Thus, although the value of the dissenting stockholder’s stock “should
    not be affected by a corporate change in which he refused to partici-
    pate,” Am. Gen. 
    Corp., 190 A. at 228
    , the corporation should, unless
    in liquidation, be valued “by assuming that [it] will continue as a
    going concern” and “by appraising all material factors and elements
    that affect value. . . .” 
    Warren, 154 A.2d at 799
    ; see Hanks, § 10.6
    at 340. Accordingly, “that the corporation may not offer [stockhold-
    ers] more than the market value does not mean that the appraisers are
    so limited.” Burke v. Fid. Trust Co., 
    96 A.2d 254
    , 259 (Md. 1953).
    Given the complexity and idiosyncracies of the valuation of a dis-
    senting stockholder’s interest, it is hardly surprising that the Maryland
    courts have concluded that the role of the judiciary in an appraisal
    proceeding is “limited.” 
    Warren, 154 A.2d at 800
    . In recognition that
    “[t]he questions involved are rather economic than legal in character,”
    courts are to “give great weight to the findings of the appraisers.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Thus, the standard for judicial
    review of an appraisal panel’s determination of fair value is extremely
    deferential:
    The presumption is that their award is correct, and effect
    will be given to their determination unless it appear by clear
    and satisfactory evidence that the award was, by reason of
    some material and prejudicial error of law, in conduct or of
    fact, not the fair value of the stock, without regard to any
    depreciation or appreciation thereof in consequence of the
    merger or consolidation.
    Am. Gen. 
    Corp., 190 A. at 230
    ; accord 
    Warren, 154 A.2d at 800
    ; see
    also 
    Burke, 96 A.2d at 259
    .
    With these principles in mind, we turn to SCL’s two challenges
    regarding the statutory appraisal in this case.
    III.
    SCL initially contends that Judge Grimm erred in permitting
    Froelich to present certain evidence and arguments to the appraisal
    FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING                    11
    panel that “directly contradict[ ] the prior, binding judicial rulings of
    Judge Legg and this Court.” Brief of Appellant at 4. Specifically, SCL
    complains that Judge Grimm ignored Judge Legg’s prior rulings in
    permitting Froelich to offer evidence and argument that Coopers’
    November 5, 1997 appraisal was flawed because Coopers did not
    receive accurate and complete information from Erickson and SCL
    officials on which to base its appraisal. 
    Id. at 23.
    The company asserts
    that Froelich’s submissions regarding the Cooper appraisal directly
    conflict with Judge Legg’s rejection of Froelich’s fraud and breach of
    fiduciary duty claims against SCL and Erickson and Judge Legg’s
    finding that “the decisions of the [SCL] Board are protected by the
    business judgment rule.” 
    Froelich, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 527
    .
    SCL’s argument rests on a misunderstanding of Judge Legg’s ini-
    tial findings, the statutory appraisal process, and the deference
    accorded a trial court’s rulings as to the propriety of legal argument
    and the admissibility of evidence.
    First, Judge Legg never addressed most of the grounds on which
    SCL objects to Froelich’s evidence and argument. For example, in
    granting summary judgment to Erickson and SCL on Froelich’s fraud
    counts, Judge Legg understandably addressed only Froelich’s relevant
    allegations, i.e., that Erickson and the SCL Board had fraudulently
    represented to Froelich in the 1996 leveraged buy-out of SCL that
    Erickson would relinquish authority to run SCL and not make dispar-
    aging remarks about the company when they knew he had no inten-
    tion of honoring this agreement. Froelich, 
    96 F. Supp. 2d
    . at 522-23.
    Similarly, in granting Erickson summary judgment on Froelich’s
    breach of fiduciary duty claim, Judge Legg only rejected Froelich’s
    contention that “Erickson usurped a corporate opportunity by retaking
    control of the company and its profitability,” finding “no credible evi-
    dence that Erickson created [a financial] crisis” or that the SCL Board
    did not actually view Erickson’s proposal as the best alternative for
    the company. 
    Id. at 526-27.
    Nowhere in these rulings, or his rulings
    on Froelich’s other counts, did Judge Legg even discuss SCL’s provi-
    sion of information to Coopers.
    Certainly, Judge Legg never determined the factual accuracy of the
    financing information SCL submitted to Coopers. Contrary to SCL’s
    suggestions, Judge Legg’s ruling that the business judgment rule pro-
    12                 FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING
    tected the SCL Board does not equate to a finding that the Board’s
    decisions were correct. The business judgment rule simply requires
    courts to defer to the decisions of corporate boards unless a challenger
    produces evidence establishing that the directors acted fraudulently or
    in bad faith, NAACP v. Golding, 
    679 A.2d 554
    , 559 (Md. 1996), or
    with gross or culpable negligence, Parish v. Maryland & Virginia
    Milk Producers Ass’n, 
    242 A.2d 512
    , 540 (Md. 1968); see Md. Code
    Ann., Corps. & Assn’s § 2-405.1 (1999) (codifying standard of care
    required of corporate directors); see also Hanks, § 6.8 at 179-83
    (2000 supp.). Under the business judgment rule, “[a]ll that is
    required” of directors is that they “act reasonably and in good faith
    in carrying out their duties”; they “are not expected to be incapable
    of error.” 
    NAACP, 679 A.2d at 559
    (emphasis added) (internal quota-
    tion marks and citation omitted).4
    We recognize that Froelich’s arguments that Erickson or other SCL
    officials withheld relevant information from Coopers resulting in fatal
    flaws in Coopers’ valuation may be in some tension with Judge
    Legg’s rejection of Froelich’s fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
    claims. But that tension does not constitute an irreconcilable conflict.
    Judge Legg found Froelich entitled to a statutory appraisal at the very
    same time he rejected Froelich’s fraud and fiduciary duty claims.
    Moreover, Judge Legg explicitly recognized that Froelich’s likelihood
    of success before the appraisers depended upon his ability to prove to
    them “that the Coopers and Lybrand appraisal was flawed.” Froelich,
    
    96 F. Supp. 2d
    at 528 n.25. This entirely accords with the long-
    established view of the Maryland Court of Appeals that, without any
    proof of fraud, majority and minority stockholders may hold a “wide
    variance in opinion” as to the value of a corporation, necessitating a
    statutory appraisal. See Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 
    141 A. 425
    , 432 (Md. 1928); accord Lerner v. Lerner, 
    511 A.2d 501
    , 506
    (Md. 1986); see also Walk v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 
    847 F.2d 1100
    ,
    1107 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting, in the course of applying Maryland law,
    that “allegations of ‘fraud’ are often nothing more than disagreements
    about methods of valuation, which are more appropriately resolved in
    4
    SCL points to no authority suggesting that the business judgment rule
    applies to statutory appraisals, such that appraisers must similarly defer
    to a board’s conclusions. Such a requirement would, of course, undercut
    the very purpose of having an independent statutory appraisal.
    FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING                   13
    the statutory appraisal proceeding”), vacated on other grounds by 
    492 U.S. 914
    (1989).
    Indeed, the very purpose of the statutory appraisal in this case —
    to value the company to determine the fair value of Froelich’s interest
    as of November 5, 1997 — virtually required the appraisers to con-
    sider all evidence as to any shortcomings in the Coopers appraisal.
    Section 3-202(a) directs statutory appraisers to determine the “fair
    value” of a stockholder’s interest in the corporation; in doing so, the
    appraisers must consider “all material factors and elements that affect
    value.” 
    Warren, 154 A.2d at 799
    (emphasis added). Because Coopers
    valued SCL at less than $160 million as of November 5, the reclassifi-
    cation of the company approved on that date resulted in a total elimi-
    nation of Froelich’s interest. The validity of the Coopers appraisal,
    therefore, certainly constituted a “material factor[ ] affect[ing] [the]
    value” of Froelich’s interest, which, under Warren, the statutory
    appraisers were required to consider.
    Finally, SCL’s argument completely ignores the operative standard
    of review when examining rulings challenging legal arguments as
    improper or evidence as inadmissible, under which we will vacate a
    judgment only if the trial court abused its discretion. See Rowland v.
    Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 
    340 F.3d 187
    , 194 (4th Cir. 2003); Arnold v. E.
    Air Lines, Inc., 
    681 F.2d 186
    , 194-95 (4th Cir. 1982). Because of a
    trial judge’s “superior vantage point” we defer to him or her in such
    matters even in jury trials, see, e.g., 
    Arnold, 681 F.2d at 197
    , when
    any improper argument or inadmissible evidence could mislead lay
    people. This deference seems all the more appropriate in statutory
    appraisal proceedings in which three sophisticated business people
    determine the primarily economic question of corporate value. See
    
    Warren, 154 A.2d at 800
    -01.
    Our close review of the record here reveals no abuse of discretion.
    Rather, Froelich presented the appraisers with a very substantial
    amount of appropriate evidence and argument supporting his conten-
    tion that the Coopers appraisal lacked validity. Accordingly, contrary
    to SCL’s contentions, it was well within the district court’s discretion
    to find that any fragments of improper argument or inadmissible evi-
    dence did not “unfairly prejudic[e]” the company. Brief of Appellant
    at 16. Indeed, we note that Judge Grimm’s patient superintending of
    14                FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING
    numerous documents and complicated testimony and his scrupulous
    consideration of the parties’ legal contentions before, during, and
    after the appraisal hearings evidence the utmost care, rather than any
    abuse of discretion.
    IV.
    SCL also contends that we must reject the statutory appraisal
    because it includes appreciation in value resulting from the very
    reclassification of SCL stock to which Froelich objected. As noted
    above, the Maryland General Corporation Law expressly prohibits
    appraisers from including in their “fair value” determination “any
    appreciation . . . which directly or indirectly results from the transac-
    tion objected to or from its proposal.” § 3-202(b)(2) (emphasis
    added).
    According to SCL, the November 5 reclassification was needed to
    obtain Erickson’s agreement to pledge guarantees of $35 million,
    which in turn were needed to secure the $80 million in financing com-
    mitments for the November 6 closing on the Greenspring project.
    Therefore, in the company’s view, any value evidenced by the $80
    million closing necessarily derived from the $35 million in guarantees
    that “result[ed] from” the reclassification and so should not have been
    considered by the appraisers in determining SCL’s fair value as of
    November 5.
    Unquestionably, Ring and Gardemal did consider the $80 million,
    November 6 financing of Greenspring in their lead analysis; they
    explained that they viewed “SCL’s November 6, 1997, closing on the
    Springfield financing” as “a subsequent event that provides evidence
    of value that existed as of the [November 5] valuation date.” How-
    ever, SCL has not presented “clear and satisfactory evidence” that, in
    so considering the November 6 closing, the appraisers necessarily
    incorporated value resulting from the reclassification in violation of
    § 3-202(b)(2). 
    Warren, 154 A.2d at 800
    (quoting Am. Gen. 
    Corp., 190 A. at 230
    ).
    To start, the mere fact that the appraisers took into account an
    event that occurred subsequent to the November 5 valuation date and
    the reclassification does not, in and of itself, violate § 3-202(b)(2).
    FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING                    15
    Indeed, SCL itself acknowledges that “an event occurring subsequent
    to the valuation date may be considered in hindsight as evidence of
    value that likewise existed as of the valuation date, even if the subse-
    quent event was not foreseeable on the valuation date.” Brief of
    Appellant at 32.
    Moreover, the evidence in the record does not compel the conclu-
    sion that approving the reclassification in exchange for Erickson’s
    $35 million in guarantees was in fact the only way to close on the
    financing for Greenspring, as opposed to one option among several
    that might fall within the discretion of the SCL Board under the busi-
    ness judgment rule. That is, the evidence does not show that declining
    to approve the reclassification would have precluded SCL from mov-
    ing forward on the Greenspring project. The record shows that most
    of the financing for Greenspring was in place well before the reclassi-
    fication was even proposed. Further, Froelich presented evidence that
    numerous investors were willing to invest in SCL; he also presented
    the testimony of an Equitable official who suggested that Equitable
    might have been willing to close on the Greenspring deal without the
    guarantees. Indeed, even SCL’s own expert opined that SCL “could
    have obtained the financing for one Future Project absent John Erick-
    son’s financial support.” In light of this evidence, the appraisers were
    justified in their conclusion that “[w]ith $134.4 million in equity
    value [for current SCL projects] at the valuation date, the assumption
    that $80 million in financing commitments would be available for at
    least one new project in 1998 is entirely reasonable.”5
    Operating under this legitimate assumption, the appraisers were
    certainly free to conclude that approving the reclassification in
    exchange for the $35 million in guarantees was, at most, merely one
    5
    SCL argues that if the $134 million in equity were suddenly encum-
    bered with the liability of the $80 million in financing for Greenspring
    without the guarantees, its value would have to be adjusted downward
    (making it impossible to escape the need to make an adjustment down-
    ward for the guarantees). But Froelich notes that a hypothetical outside
    buyer — whose perspective the panel must adopt in its valuation —
    would not necessarily have to immediately siphon off $65 million in
    equity, as Erickson planned to do, upon the sale of one of SCL’s projects,
    and that this would make up for any extra encumbrance on the equity.
    16                FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING
    option among several for providing the final bit of financing needed
    to close on the Greenspring deal, and not an indispensable step, the
    absence of which would have prevented any closing from occurring.
    Thus, the appraisers could reasonably look to the November 6 closing
    for evidence of the Greenspring project’s financeability (and hence
    value) on November 5, as long as they subtracted whatever they
    assessed the value or cost of that final bit of financing (in this case,
    the value of the $35 million guarantees) to be, from the perspective
    of a hypothetical outside investor. The fact that Gardemal and Ring
    state that they took the November 6 closing only as evidence that SCL
    had “substantially all of the required financing in place,” (emphasis
    added) — not all of the financing in place — suggests that the
    appraisers did, indeed, subtract those elements of the financing
    (namely the $35 million in personal guarantees) that actually resulted
    from the reclassification.
    True, Ring and Gardemal never explained in their lead analysis
    exactly how they accounted for the additional value of the $35 million
    in guarantees in their valuation. However, given the “presumption
    . . . that [the appraisers’] award is correct,” we cannot take the mere
    absence of an explicit explanation as “clear and satisfactory evidence”
    that the majority panelists failed to consider (and properly discount
    any value added by) the guarantees. 
    Warren, 154 A.2d at 800
    (quot-
    ing Am. Gen. 
    Corp., 190 A. at 230
    ). This is particularly so given that
    the record not only reveals the appraisal panel’s awareness and con-
    cern about the guarantees (both in their review of the facts involving
    these guarantees in their report, and in the questions they posed about
    the guarantees during the appraisal hearing), but also suggests a num-
    ber of ways in which they could have engaged in the analysis and
    reached the result that they did, yet still afforded proper treatment to
    the guarantees.
    For one, if, as just suggested, Ring and Gardemal concluded that
    SCL’s equity sufficed to finance Greenspring and that the $35 million
    in guarantees were therefore not actually necessary, they may well
    have determined that the guarantees did not significantly affect the
    value of SCL as of the November 5 valuation date, from the perspec-
    tive of a hypothetical outside investor.
    Alternatively, Ring and Gardemal could have reasoned that they
    did make a significant downward adjustment in value to take into
    FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING                      17
    account the guarantees by adopting Nagle’s valuation for Greenspring
    and for all of SCL’s current projects. Nagle testified that he accounted
    for the value of the guarantees in his total estimate of SCL’s value by,
    as SCL itself recognizes, “adding one percentage point to his discount
    rates on all SCL assets, across the board.” Nagle estimated this
    increase in the discount rate had a total impact of a $17 million down-
    ward adjustment, which he testified would “more than offset the pro-
    vision of a guarantee.” By adopting Nagle’s valuation of Greenspring
    and all current projects, then, Ring and Gardemal subsumed a large
    proportion of Nagle’s $17 million downward adjustment in their $176
    million appraisal. While they did not adopt all of Nagle’s valuations
    (they adopted valuations for the remaining projects that totaled $56
    million less than Nagle’s), the appraisers certainly did not have to
    incorporate the entirety of Nagle’s estimate of the value of the guar-
    antees, which Nagle himself suggested was generous.
    Finally, even if we were to conclude that the statutory appraisers
    erroneously failed to consider the $35 million in additional guarantees
    in their lead analysis, which we do not, we could simply adopt, as our
    own valuation, the majority report’s alternative analysis or the minor-
    ity report’s analysis, both of which came to an identical valuation of
    $176 million. SCL has advanced no substantive challenge to the
    approaches used in either the alternative or minority analysis.6 We
    note that Frank’s report, in particular, specifically states that he
    accounted for SCL’s need for “outside financing in the form of a $35
    million guarantee,” by “heavily discount[ing] the Greenspring proj-
    ect” and adopting a discount rate of 33.1%, nearly as large as that
    used by Coopers.
    6
    SCL simply argues that we cannot adopt Ring and Gardemal’s alter-
    native analysis because they intended it to be only a “test,” and that we
    cannot adopt Frank’s minority report because Md. Code Ann., Corps. &
    Assn’s § 3-210(b) states that the “conclusion of the majority as to the fair
    value of the stock” shall be filed with the court. See Reply Brief of
    Appellant at 22-24. Those arguments are totally unpersuasive. Section 3-
    211(b)(2)(ii) empowers a court reviewing the appraisers’ fair value
    assessment to substitute its own valuation in place of the appraisers’ if
    it rejects the appraisers’ award. Therefore, nothing would prevent us
    from adopting, as our own, the alternative valuation or Frank’s valuation.
    18                  FROELICH v. SENIOR CAMPUS LIVING
    Thus, SCL’s second challenge to the statutory appraisal fares no
    better than its first.
    V.
    For all of these reasons, the judgment of the magistrate judge is
    AFFIRMED.