United States v. Dickey-Bey ( 2004 )


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  •                             PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,               
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                               No. 04-4265
    MAURICE NORMAN DICKEY-BEY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    Andre M. Davis, District Judge.
    (CR-03-463-AMD)
    Argued: October 29, 2004
    Decided: December 29, 2004
    Before NIEMEYER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges,
    and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote
    the opinion, in which Judge Luttig and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: James Thomas Wallner, Special Assistant United States
    Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Balti-
    more, Maryland, for Appellant. Kenneth Wendell Ravenell, SCHUL-
    MAN, TREEM, KAMINKOW & GILDEN, P.A., Baltimore,
    Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas M. DiBiagio, United
    States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
    2                   UNITED STATES v. DICKEY-BEY
    OPINION
    NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
    Police arrested Maurice Dickey-Bey without a warrant after
    Dickey-Bey picked up a sealed package at Mail Boxes Etc. in Tow-
    son, Maryland, and exited from the store. Police knew before Dickey-
    Bey retrieved the package that it contained two kilograms of cocaine.
    Following the arrest, officers searched Dickey-Bey’s automobile,
    which was approximately 30 feet away, and discovered rental receipts
    and keys for other mailboxes to which other packages, also known by
    police to contain cocaine, had been sent.
    On Dickey-Bey’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his
    vehicle, the district court concluded that police did not have probable
    cause to believe that Dickey-Bey knew that the package contained
    cocaine and that, therefore, the police did not have probable cause for
    his arrest and for the search. The court also concluded that even if
    probable cause for the arrest existed, the search of Dickey-Bey’s vehi-
    cle was not a valid search incident to an arrest. It reasoned that
    Dickey-Bey’s "association with the vehicle was too attenuated at the
    time of the arrest to support application of the [New York v.] Belton
    bright-line rule," which holds that the passenger compartment of a
    motor vehicle may be searched incident to the lawful custodial arrest
    of an occupant. See New York v. Belton, 
    453 U.S. 454
    , 460-61 (1981).
    Based on the totality of the facts found by the district court, we
    conclude, as a matter of law, that the police officers had probable
    cause to believe that Dickey-Bey was knowingly possessing cocaine
    and that the police officers had independent probable cause to believe
    that Dickey-Bey’s automobile was being used as an instrumentality
    of a crime. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s suppression
    order and remand for further proceedings.
    I
    Law enforcement officials in Los Angeles notified Sergeant John
    Campbell of the Maryland State Police Package Drug Interdiction
    Unit on September 23, 2003, that three packages would be arriving
    UNITED STATES v. DICKEY-BEY                      3
    in the Baltimore area by overnight delivery service from The UPS
    Store in Culver City, California, and that the packages were thought
    to contain cocaine. The Los Angeles officers told Campbell that a
    drug-detecting dog had "alerted positive" to the packages; that the
    packages had the same return address; and that they were addressed
    variously to Baltimore-area UPS and Mail Boxes Etc. retail stores,1
    including one addressed to "Special Design at Box 187, Mail Boxes
    Etc., 727 Dulaney Valley Road, Towson, Maryland."
    The next morning, September 24, members of the Maryland State
    Police Package Drug Interdiction Unit intercepted the three suspected
    packages at two Baltimore-area UPS distribution facilities. At that
    time, they also discovered a fourth package similarly addressed and
    marked with the same return address. All four packages were scanned
    by a drug-detecting dog, and in each case the dog alerted positive,
    indicating the presence of a controlled substance.
    With this information, the Maryland State Police obtained a search
    warrant to open and search the four packages. In each package, the
    officers found four large plastic tubs of hair gel — consistent with the
    hair care theme indicated by the addressees’ names, such as "Natural
    Feels" and "Special Design" — and in each tub they found one
    plastic-wrapped block of cocaine weighing approximately one-half
    kilogram. The four packages thus contained in the aggregate approxi-
    mately eight kilograms of cocaine, having a street value of approxi-
    mately $200,000.
    The officers resealed the packages and transported them to the
    addressee mailboxes for pickup. They also enlisted the assistance of
    Baltimore City, Baltimore County, and Anne Arundel County police
    to surveil each retail location. Maryland State and Baltimore County
    police officers arrived at the Mail Boxes Etc. store on Dulaney Valley
    Road at approximately 11:00 a.m. to stake out that location. Corporal
    Chad Hymel of the Maryland State Police delivered the package
    addressed to that location to undercover Baltimore County Police
    Officer Douglas Kriete, who was to act as a Mail Boxes Etc.
    employee. Officer Kriete briefed the Mail Boxes Etc. employees on
    1
    In 2001, UPS purchased Mail Boxes Etc., and some Mail Boxes Etc.
    locations have been renamed The UPS Store.
    4                   UNITED STATES v. DICKEY-BEY
    duty, and one employee advised Officer Kriete that Box 187 was
    rented to "Lisa Ruiz," with a business name "Special Design," and
    that the individual who customarily retrieved mail from Box 187 was
    "a black male of average height, about 5’8" or 5’9", with a heavy
    build," who usually wore some type of uniform shirt or jacket. Officer
    Kriete communicated this description to the surveilling officers out-
    side the store. He also told the other officers that he would not exit
    the store unless an individual had accepted the package and was walk-
    ing out: "Unless I come out of that building," Officer Kriete said,
    "there was nobody to be arrested or nobody to be stopped." Officer
    Kriete then assumed his role as a Mail Boxes Etc. employee.
    At approximately 11:30 a.m., Baltimore County Detective Brian
    Martin observed a brown Dodge Daytona automobile pull into the
    Mail Boxes Etc. parking lot and back into a parking space. In the con-
    text of anticipating the arrival of someone who would make a drug
    pickup, Detective Martin found this conduct suspicious. All other
    vehicles in the parking lot had pulled in front-first, and a customer
    would have had to go out of his way to back into a parking space
    given the layout of the lot. The person who exited the automobile also
    fit the description of the person who customarily had picked up pack-
    ages from Box 187. In addition, Detective Martin observed that the
    person looked around the parking lot before approaching the store.
    Detective Martin communicated over the radio to the other officers
    that the person who had exited the brown vehicle matched the
    description given by the Mail Boxes Etc. employee and was about to
    enter the store.
    As the suspect, who was later identified to be Dickey-Bey, entered
    the store, the Mail Boxes Etc. employee identified Dickey-Bey to
    Officer Kriete as the one who had customarily come to pick up pack-
    ages from Box 187. Dickey-Bey approached the mailbox area and
    asked for "any mail" in his box, and he was handed the package
    addressed to "Special Design" at that box. Moments later, he exited
    the store, with Officer Kriete following him. Upon hearing the
    screeching wheels of approaching police cars, Officer Kriete placed
    Dickey-Bey on the ground and under arrest. The officers variously
    testified that Dickey-Bey was arrested approximately three to five feet
    from the brown automobile in which he had arrived. An employee of
    Mail Boxes Etc., however, testified that Dickey-Bey had not gotten
    UNITED STATES v. DICKEY-BEY                      5
    that far and was still on the sidewalk when he was arrested, approxi-
    mately 30 feet from his vehicle.
    After Dickey-Bey was secured, Detective Martin told the other
    officers that Dickey-Bey had "arrived, parked, and exited the brown
    vehicle that was backed into the spot." Approximately 15 minutes
    after Dickey-Bey was first placed on the ground, the officers pro-
    ceeded to search the automobile and discovered folded-up rental con-
    tracts and corresponding keys for various mailboxes at other UPS
    retail stores, matching perfectly the addresses on the four recovered
    packages. All of the contracts were in the name of "Lisa Ruiz." Offi-
    cers also discovered a contract and key to a fifth mailbox that was
    later found to contain a fifth package of hair-gel tubs packed with two
    kilograms of cocaine.
    Dickey-Bey was indicted for possession with intent to distribute "5
    kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
    amount of cocaine" and for conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or
    more of cocaine. After pleading not guilty, he filed a motion to sup-
    press "any and all evidence seized as a result of the illegal search of
    the defendant’s 1989 Dodge Daytona" automobile.
    Following a lengthy hearing on March 29, 2004, at which six wit-
    nesses testified, the district court issued an order from the bench
    granting Dickey-Bey’s motion to suppress. The court concluded that
    there had been no probable cause to arrest Dickey-Bey and that the
    search of Dickey-Bey’s automobile had been illegal. Considering first
    whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Dickey-Bey, the dis-
    trict court excluded from its consideration Detective Martin’s obser-
    vations of Dickey-Bey’s arrival at the parking lot, including his
    backing into a parking space and looking around before entering the
    Mail Boxes Etc. store, noting that this information was not communi-
    cated to Detective Kriete before Kriete placed Dickey-Bey under
    arrest. Taking into account the remaining evidence, the court con-
    cluded that the officers did not have probable cause to believe that
    Dickey-Bey knew the package he picked up at the Mail Boxes Etc.
    contained cocaine. In addition, the court concluded that even if there
    was probable cause to support the arrest, the search of Dickey-Bey’s
    automobile was too attenuated to be a valid search incident to arrest.
    Refusing to credit police officer testimony that Dickey-Bey was
    6                    UNITED STATES v. DICKEY-BEY
    arrested within three to five feet of his automobile, the court found
    that he was arrested "some 30 feet or more away" and that a vehicle
    at that distance could not be searched incident to arrest.
    The government filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the dis-
    trict court’s March 29, 2004 order granting Dickey-Bey’s motion to
    suppress. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
    II
    Because the district court addressed and determined the legality of
    Dickey-Bey’s arrest as important to its determination of whether the
    search of Dickey-Bey’s automobile was legal, we will begin with
    Dickey-Bey’s arrest. Inasmuch as the district court’s findings of fact
    relevant to these determinations are not challenged on appeal, we
    review its determinations de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 699 (1996).
    It is well-settled under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that a
    police officer may lawfully arrest an individual in a public place with-
    out a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the indi-
    vidual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.2
    See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 
    124 S. Ct. 795
    , 799 (2003); United
    States v. Humphries, 
    372 F.3d 653
    , 657 (4th Cir. 2004). "‘[P]robable
    cause’ to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the
    officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or
    one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown,
    that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit
    an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 
    443 U.S. 31
    , 37 (1979).
    Probable cause is judged by an analysis of the totality of the cir-
    cumstances, see Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 230 (1983), which are
    weighed "not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as under-
    stood by those versed in the field of law enforcement," 
    id. at 232.
    Under this pragmatic, common sense approach, we defer to the exper-
    tise and experience of law enforcement officers at the scene. See
    
    Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699
    . At bottom, the proper standard is intended
    2
    If the crime is a misdemeanor, however, it must be committed in the
    officer’s presence. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 
    532 U.S. 318
    , 354 (2001).
    UNITED STATES v. DICKEY-BEY                       7
    to protect "citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with pri-
    vacy and from unfounded charges of crime," while at the same time
    giving "fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protec-
    tion." 
    Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 799
    (quoting Brinegar v. United States,
    
    338 U.S. 160
    , 176 (1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted). And it
    is a "fluid concept" that turns on "the assessment of probabilities," not
    on any formula such as is applied to proof at trial. 
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 232
    . Thus, "even ‘seemingly innocent activity’ may provide a basis
    for finding probable cause." Porterfield v. Lott, 
    156 F.3d 563
    , 569
    (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Taylor v. Waters, 
    81 F.3d 429
    , 434 (4th Cir.
    1996)).
    Dickey-Bey contended below and argues to us on appeal that there
    was no probable cause for his arrest because there was no indication
    that he had any knowledge of the illegal contents of the sealed pack-
    age containing cocaine. He contends that "if there was probable cause
    to arrest [him], then there would also be probable cause to arrest the
    UPS courier who transported the box prior to . . . and after its arrival
    in Maryland."
    The government contends that probable cause in this case was pro-
    vided by the contextual facts known to the officers at the time they
    arrested Dickey-Bey. The officers knew that Dickey-Bey possessed a
    sealed package containing two kilograms of cocaine and that:
    (1) a significant amount of cocaine had [otherwise] been
    shipped to Maryland from California; (2) . . . the unknown
    sender in California had chosen to divide the total amount
    of cocaine shipped into at least four separate parcels; and (3)
    Dickey-Bey although not the lessee of the mailbox or the
    addressee was an individual who had on occasion previously
    picked up items at [Mail Boxes Etc.] from the mailbox to
    which one of the parcels was addressed.
    After examining each of the factors advanced by the government,
    the district court agreed with Dickey-Bey and concluded that each
    factor relied on by the government was insufficient to provide proba-
    ble cause. At bottom, the court was troubled by the fact that under the
    facts known to the arresting officers, Dickey-Bey could simply have
    been an innocent courier sent to pick up mail.
    8                     UNITED STATES v. DICKEY-BEY
    In reaching its conclusion, however, the district court failed to step
    back and look at the totality of the circumstances and the reasonable-
    ness of the officers’ belief, in light of those circumstances, that
    Dickey-Bey was a knowing part of a larger drug operation. Although
    it might sometimes prove useful to conduct a separate analysis of
    each fact presented and to determine whether it contributes to a find-
    ing of probable cause, such a fractured approach in this case led, as
    it often does, to an aggregation of individual conclusions of insuffi-
    ciency, prompting the court to conclude that the overall conduct was
    seemingly innocent activity. See 
    Porterfield, 156 F.3d at 569
    . In this
    same vein, Dickey-Bey argues to us that if there is probable cause to
    arrest one who picks up a sealed package containing cocaine, then
    there is probable cause to pick up any innocent citizen who picks up
    mail or a package containing contraband. Of course, his syllogism is
    a correct one as far as it goes, but it fails to take into account the total-
    ity of the circumstances that led the police officers in this particular
    case to arrest Dickey-Bey.
    The facts known to the officers before Dickey-Bey’s arrest
    revealed a sophisticated, well-planned series of transactions, involv-
    ing hundreds of thousands of dollars of cocaine. Each package
    involved — and at the time of Dickey-Bey’s arrest, the officers had
    learned of four — had the anonymous return address of a UPS retail
    store in Los Angeles; each was shipped to a box number at a different
    Baltimore-area store, thereby diffusing the risk and deflecting the sus-
    picion that might have arisen had the packages been sent in a collec-
    tion to one location; and each box was packaged and transmitted as
    a shipment of hair gel to phantom businesses at mailboxes registered
    to "Lisa Ruiz." The package held by Dickey-Bey at the time of his
    arrest was sent to "Special Design, Box 187." The nature of the pack-
    aging was systematic and consistent: Each package was filled with
    tubs of hair gel, and each tub was filled with a plastic-wrapped block
    of cocaine weighing one-half kilogram with a street value of approxi-
    mately $12,500. These facts suggest the existence of a careful and
    clever operation dealing in large quantities of cocaine. In assessing
    probabilities, an experienced officer would conclude that the person
    designated to pick up the packages was likewise part of the well-
    planned operation. It would have made little sense for a large, sophis-
    ticated operation to go to the lengths and organization demonstrated
    in this case and then casually to commit the pickup of some $200,000
    UNITED STATES v. DICKEY-BEY                      9
    worth of drugs to an unknown, uninformed, and perhaps untrustwor-
    thy courier. To the contrary, such an operation would likely have sent
    someone known to be trustworthy to pick up the packages and like-
    wise would have insisted that the packages be picked up promptly, as
    Dickey-Bey did in this case.
    That Dickey-Bey could reasonably be believed to be part of the
    conspiracy was reinforced by the evidence provided by the Mail
    Boxes Etc. employee who on September 24 identified Dickey-Bey as
    the same person who had regularly picked up packages from Box 187.
    While it certainly was possible that the person retrieving the cocaine
    was one totally innocent of the whole operation, all that is at issue is
    the reasonableness of the officers’ belief that just as Box 187 was
    selected as a drug distribution mailbox, the one who customarily cal-
    led on it was likewise selected as part of a coordinated operation. This
    was further indicated by the fact that Dickey-Bey arrived promptly to
    pick up the package, about one hour after the promised delivery time
    of 10:30 a.m. In short, the evidence known to police officers leading
    to Dickey-Bey’s arrest reasonably justified their belief that Dickey-
    Bey was part of the larger, illegal operation.
    As the government summarized in its argument to the district court
    to justify Dickey-Bey’s arrest, the officers on the scene knew (1) that
    the operation was conducted with overall sophistication; (2) that sig-
    nificant quantities of cocaine with a high value were being shipped
    from California by next-day air to Baltimore; (3) that the packages’
    disguise indicated a level of planning consistent with "more than just
    a fly-by-night kind of operation"; (4) that the multiple packages were
    sent to multiple locations; (5) that at least one of the targeted mail-
    boxes was rented by a woman but that a man who had been picking
    up packages from the box came to pick up the package on the day of
    the arrest; and (6) that Dickey-Bey arrived "just about an hour after
    the package was supposed to arrive at the particular location." We
    would add to the government’s list the facts that because Dickey-Bey
    repeatedly picked up from Box 187, it would have been unlikely for
    a well-planned operation to have used a box served by one person
    without that person having been involved; that Box 187 had appar-
    ently been designated by a coordinated operation to serve as a distri-
    bution point for a large quantity of drugs; and that the similarity with
    which each box was packaged and the high value of cocaine involved
    10                  UNITED STATES v. DICKEY-BEY
    pointed to a larger coordinated effort that would have been inconsis-
    tent with a single innocent pickup of mail by an unknowing courier.
    When "viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable
    police officer," 
    Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696
    , and "as understood by those
    versed in the field of law enforcement," 
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 232
    , the
    circumstances presented to the officers in this case supported their
    reasonable belief that Dickey-Bey was involved in a conspiracy for
    the distribution of cocaine.
    That Dickey-Bey might have evidence to present at trial to prove
    his innocence or to establish a defense does not bear on the question
    of whether officers acted reasonably in arresting him. In the totality
    of the circumstances, Dickey-Bey’s "seemingly innocent activity" of
    picking up a sealed package from a Mail Boxes Etc. store was but one
    of many facts causing the officers to believe that he was part of a
    larger operation. See 
    Porterfield, 156 F.3d at 569
    . And because Offi-
    cer Kriete had probable cause to believe that Dickey-Bey was a mem-
    ber of a drug distribution conspiracy, he was authorized to arrest him
    without a warrant. See United States v. Watson, 
    423 U.S. 411
    , 423-24
    (1976).
    III
    The district court concluded that because Dickey-Bey’s arrest was
    illegal, the search of Dickey-Bey’s automobile was likewise illegal
    inasmuch as it was not incident to a lawful arrest. Alternatively, the
    court concluded that even if probable cause existed to justify Dickey-
    Bey’s arrest, the search of his automobile was "too attenuated" to be
    a valid search incident to an arrest under New York v. Belton, 
    453 U.S. 454
    (1981). In Belton, the Supreme Court held that police offi-
    cers may search the passenger compartment of an automobile contem-
    poraneously with the lawful custodial arrest of the automobile’s
    occupant without the requirement of a separate probable cause for the
    search. 
    Id. at 460.
    And last term, the Supreme Court concluded that
    Belton also applies to vehicle searches incident to arrest "when an
    officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the
    vehicle." Thornton v. United States, 
    124 S. Ct. 2127
    , 2129 (2004).
    The Thornton Court, however, specifically declined to reach the issue
    of whether Belton is limited "to ‘recent occupants’ who are within
    UNITED STATES v. DICKEY-BEY                     11
    ‘reaching distance’ of the car," since petitioner Thornton "was in
    ‘close proximity, both temporally and spatially’ to his vehicle when
    he was approached by [law enforcement officers]." 
    Id. at 2132
    n.2
    (quoting United States v. Thornton, 
    325 F.3d 189
    , 196 (4th Cir.
    2003)).
    In this case, the district court concluded that Dickey-Bey’s arrest
    occurred "some 30 feet or more" from his vehicle approximately 15
    minutes after he was first taken down as part of his arrest and that
    these facts did not justify the application of Belton and Thornton.
    We need not, however, decide whether the search of Dickey-Bey’s
    automobile was properly incident to his arrest because we conclude
    that the circumstances in this case provided officers independent
    probable cause to search the automobile. See United States v. Ross,
    
    456 U.S. 798
    , 825 (1982) (reiterating that a warrant is unnecessary for
    an automobile search supported by probable cause). This probable
    cause was provided by (1) the facts that supported Dickey-Bey’s
    arrest; (2) the additional facts supplied by Detective Martin to fellow
    officers while they were arresting Dickey-Bey, that Dickey-Bey had
    arrived in the brown Dodge automobile and that he had backed it into
    a parking space in unlikely circumstances; and (3) the district court’s
    finding "as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, . . . [that] there
    was certainly probable cause to believe that Mr. Dickey-Bey was
    going to put th[e] box in his vehicle and that he was going to get in
    that vehicle."
    Thus, the police officers had probable cause to believe that Dickey-
    Bey was involved in a drug conspiracy, which included his retrieval
    of packages from rental boxes, and that as part of this conspiracy
    Dickey-Bey had arrived in a brown Dodge Daytona automobile that
    he used and intended to use in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accord-
    ingly, the officers had probable cause to believe that the automobile
    was an instrumentality of the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Patter-
    son, 
    150 F.3d 382
    , 386 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding "that a vehicle
    which has been used in a robbery may be seized without a warrant as
    evidence or as an instrumentality of a crime, particularly when it is
    parked on a public street"). Viewing the totality of the circumstances,
    therefore, we conclude that the officers had probable cause to search
    12                 UNITED STATES v. DICKEY-BEY
    Dickey-Bey’s vehicle without a warrant under the automobile excep-
    tion. See 
    Ross, 456 U.S. at 825
    .
    REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS