United States v. Bruce Abramski, Jr. ( 2013 )


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  •        Certiorari granted by Supreme Court, October 15, 2013
    Affirmed by Supreme Court, June 16, 2014
    PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                               No. 11-4992
    BRUCE JAMES ABRAMSKI, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
    Glen E. Conrad, Chief District Judge.
    (7:10-cr-00068-GEC-1)
    Argued: December 4, 2012
    Decided: January 23, 2013
    Before KING, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opin-
    ion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Davis joined.
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Rhonda Lee Overstreet, OVERSTREET SLOAN,
    PLLC, Bedford, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas Ernest
    Booth, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William H.
    Cleaveland, WILLIAM H. CLEAVELAND, PLC, Roanoke,
    2                 UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI
    Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States
    Attorney, Donald R. Wolthuis, Assistant United States Attor-
    ney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
    Roanoke, Virginia; Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen-
    eral, John D. Buretta, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
    eral, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
    OPINION
    KING, Circuit Judge:
    On November 17, 2009, in purchasing a Glock 19 handgun
    for his uncle in Pennsylvania, Bruce James Abramski, Jr.,
    assured the firearms dealer in Virginia that he was the "actual
    buyer" of the handgun. Abramski was thereafter charged with
    being an illegal "straw purchaser" of the firearm. Pursuant to
    conditional pleas of guilty, Abramski was convicted in the
    Western District of Virginia on June 29, 2011, for two firearm
    offenses: (1) making a false statement that was material to the
    lawfulness of a firearm sale, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (a)(6); and (2) making a false statement with respect to
    information required to be kept in the records of a licensed
    firearms dealer — that is, that he was the actual buyer of the
    firearm, when in fact he was buying it for someone else — in
    contravention of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (a)(1)(A).
    Prior to his guilty pleas, the district court denied Abram-
    ski’s motions to dismiss the charges and suppress evidence.
    Abramski appeals from the criminal judgment, maintaining
    that the court erred in two respects. First, he argues that the
    court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment
    because his conduct was beyond the purview of §§ 922(a)(6)
    and 924(a)(1)(A), in that both he and his uncle were legally
    entitled to purchase and own the Glock 19 handgun. Second,
    he contends that the court erred in denying his motion to sup-
    UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI                    3
    press on the ground that inculpatory evidence had been
    unconstitutionally seized from his residence. As explained
    below, we reject Abramski’s contentions of error and affirm.
    I.
    The facts underlying Abramski’s convictions are undis-
    puted. Prior to November 2009, Abramski, who lived in
    Franklin County, Virginia, and his uncle, Angel Alvarez, who
    resided in Pennsylvania, had several conversations concerning
    Alvarez’s desire to obtain a Glock 19 handgun. Abramski
    offered to purchase a Glock 19 for Alvarez because, as a for-
    mer Virginia police officer, Abramski could obtain a favor-
    able price from a firearms dealer that catered to police officers
    in Collinsville, Virginia. Before purchasing the handgun,
    Abramski spoke with three licensed federal firearms dealers
    and discussed how to legally conduct such an acquisition. The
    dealers apparently advised Abramski, in essence, that a
    licensed dealer in Pennsylvania could complete the transfer to
    his uncle after the handgun had been purchased by Abramski
    in Virginia. In order to implement the transaction, Alvarez
    sent Abramski a check for $400 on November 15, 2009. The
    term "Glock 19 handgun" was written in the memo line of the
    check.
    On November 17, 2009, Abramski went to the firearms
    dealer in Collinsville and purchased a Glock 19 handgun,
    among other items, paying for them with more than $2000 in
    cash. In conducting the transaction, Abramski completed
    Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
    ("ATF") Form 4473, which contained several questions about
    the purchase of firearms, to be answered by checking boxes
    marked "Yes" or "No." Of importance here, question 11.a. on
    the ATF Form 4473 stated:
    Are you the actual transferee/buyer of the firearm(s)
    listed on this form? Warning: You are not the actual
    buyer if you are acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf
    4                     UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI
    of another person. If you are not the actual buyer,
    the dealer cannot transfer the firearm(s) to you.
    J.A. 585 (emphasis on Form 4473).1 Abramski checked the
    answer "Yes" to question 11.a. Three days later, on November
    20, 2009, the $400 check from Alvarez was deposited in
    Abramski’s bank account, and the next day Abramski trans-
    ferred the Glock 19 handgun to Alvarez at a licensed federal
    firearms dealer in Easton, Pennsylvania. At that time, Alvarez
    gave Abramski a receipt confirming the transfer, reflecting
    that Alvarez had purchased the Glock 19 handgun for $400.
    Meanwhile, on November 12, 2009, a bank robbery
    occurred at Franklin Community Bank in Rocky Mount, Vir-
    ginia. An investigation of the robbery led the FBI to suspect
    Abramski. Abramski had been fired from the Roanoke police
    department in 2007, looked similar to the masked bank rob-
    ber, and was down on his luck (Abramski and his wife had
    recently separated and their home was in foreclosure).
    Abramski was arrested in early July 2010 on state law
    charges relating to the bank robbery. In connection therewith,
    two FBI agents investigating the robbery sought and secured
    search warrants relating to the investigation. The first warrant
    was issued on July 1, 2010, for the search of a home on High-
    land Farm Road in Calloway, Virginia, where Abramski’s
    parents lived, and where Abramski had moved a short time
    earlier. The "items to be seized" included things believed to
    be related to the bank robbery, such as a black square duffle
    bag, a black ski mask, firearms, and the catch-all phrase cov-
    ering "[a]ny and all articles that appear to be relevant to the
    commission of a robbery." J.A. 224. The second search war-
    rant was obtained about three weeks later, on July 19, 2010,
    for a home on Iron Ridge Road in Rocky Mount, Virginia,
    which was Abramski’s marital residence. This warrant speci-
    1
    Citations herein to "J.A. ____" refer to the contents of the Joint Appen-
    dix filed by the parties in this appeal.
    UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI                               5
    fied some of the same items as the first warrant and also
    included the same catch-all phrase. In executing the search
    warrant for the Iron Ridge Road property, agents found and
    seized a green Franklin Community Bank zippered bag con-
    taining the written receipt confirming the transfer of the
    Glock 19 handgun from Abramski to Alvarez on November
    21, 2009.
    The federal authorities have never charged Abramski with
    bank robbery, and the state bank robbery charges against him
    were dismissed on October 15, 2010. On November 18, 2010,
    however, the federal grand jury indicted Abramski for the
    firearms offenses underlying this appeal. A corrective super-
    seding indictment that apparently only deleted information
    about the firearms dealer was returned on May 12, 2011. The
    superseding indictment (hereinafter the "indictment") charged
    Abramski, in Count One, with making the false and fictitious
    statement on the ATF Form 4473 that he was the actual buyer
    of the Glock handgun, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (a)(6)
    and § 924 (a)(2).2 Count Two of the indictment charged
    2
    Count One of the indictment alleged, in relevant part, as follows:
    On or about November 17, 2009, in the Western Judicial District
    of Virginia, the defendant, BRUCE JAMES ABRAMSKI, JR., in
    connection with his acquisition of a firearm, a Glock Model 19,
    9 mm semi-automatic pistol, from a federally licensed firearms
    dealer, did knowingly make a false and fictitious written state-
    ment to said dealer, which statement was likely to deceive said
    dealer, as to a fact material to the lawfulness of such sale of the
    said firearm to the defendant, BRUCE JAMES ABRAMSKI, JR.,
    under chapter 44 of Title 18, in that the defendant, BRUCE
    JAMES ABRAMSKI, JR., represented that he was the actual
    buyer of the firearm, when in fact, as the defendant . . . then well
    knew, he was buying the firearm for another individual [in viola-
    tion of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (a)(6) and 924(a)(2)].
    J.A. 381.
    Section 922(a)(6) provides, in relevant part,
    [It shall be unlawful] for any person in connection with the acqui-
    sition of . . . any firearm . . . knowingly to make any false or ficti-
    6                      UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI
    Abramski with making a false statement with respect to infor-
    mation required to be kept in the records of a licensed fire-
    arms dealer, in violation of § 924(a)(1)(A).3 In both charges,
    the prosecution relied on the theory that Abramski was merely
    a "straw purchaser" of the firearm that was immediately trans-
    ferred to Alvarez.4
    On March 10, 2011, Abramski moved to dismiss both
    counts of the indictment (the "first dismissal motion"), con-
    tending that, because the firearm was legally transferred to
    tious oral or written statement . . . intended or likely to deceive
    such . . . dealer . . . with respect to any fact material to the lawful-
    ness of the sale[.]
    
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (a)(6). Section 924(a)(2) of Title 18 provides for punish-
    ment of a person who has violated § 922(a)(6) by both fine and imprison-
    ment.
    3
    Count Two of the indictment alleged, in relevant part, as follows:
    BRUCE JAMES ABRAMSKI, JR., knowingly made a false
    statement and representation in connection with his acquisition of
    a firearm, to a federally licensed firearms dealer, with respect to
    information required by the provisions of Chapter 44 of Title 18,
    United States Code, to be kept in the records of Town Police
    Supply, in that [he] represented that he was the actual buyer of
    the firearm, when in fact, as the defendant, BRUCE JAMES
    ABRAMSKI, JR., then well knew, he was buying the firearm for
    another individual [in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (a)(1)(A)].
    J.A. 382.
    Section 924(a)(1)(A) provides, in relevant part,
    [It shall be unlawful to] knowingly make[ ] any false statement
    or representation with respect to the information required by this
    chapter to be kept in the records of a person licensed under this
    chapter[.]
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (a)(1)(A).
    4
    A "straw purchase" of a firearm has been described as a sale where the
    individual making the purchase represents himself to be the actual buyer,
    but is actually the agent of another person who will receive possession of
    the firearm. See United States v. Nelson, 
    221 F.3d 1206
    , 1208-09 (11th
    Cir. 2000).
    UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI                          7
    Alvarez and Abramski made no material misrepresentations
    to the Virginia firearms dealer, the firearms statutes were
    never intended to punish his conduct. Also on March 10,
    2011, Abramski moved to suppress the receipt found in the
    money bag in his home, arguing that its seizure was unconsti-
    tutional under the Fourth Amendment.5 The district court
    denied both these motions from the bench on March 14, 2011.
    See J.A. 276, 310-11. The court ruled, first of all, that 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A) were violated when a
    false or fictitious statement is made on an ATF Form 4473,
    and, second, that the search warrant for Abramski’s home was
    amply supported by probable cause. In any event, according
    to the court, seizure of the receipt was proper under the good
    faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
    On April 18, 2011, after the court had denied his first dis-
    missal motion and his initial motion to suppress, Abramski
    filed a second motion to dismiss the indictment (the "second
    dismissal motion"). He therein contended that question 11.a.
    on the ATF Form 4473 is not required by law (but was cre-
    ated by the ATF) and that, inasmuch as the ATF itself decided
    that the "actual buyer" of a firearm must be ascertained at the
    time of acquisition, the ATF had failed to comply with the
    notice and comment procedures required by the Administra-
    tive Procedure Act. After conducting a hearing on the second
    dismissal motion on April 22, 2011, the district court rejected
    that motion by a published decision filed on April 25, 2011.
    See United States v. Abramski, 
    778 F.Supp.2d 678
    , 680 (W.
    D. Va. 2011) (determining that disclosure of actual firearm
    purchaser is required by law). Notably, Abramski does not
    5
    In his March 10, 2011, motion to suppress, Abramski incorrectly
    asserted that the receipt had been seized during execution of the search
    warrant for the Highland Farm Road property. See J.A. 220-21. During the
    March 14, 2011, court hearing, however, Abramski orally amended his
    motion to suppress to challenge the constitutionality of the second war-
    rant, the one dedicated to the Iron Ridge Road property, where the receipt
    was actually seized. See id. at 261.
    8                        UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI
    appeal the court’s denial of the second dismissal motion.6 On
    June 27, 2011, Abramski filed a second motion to suppress,
    asserting that, after the denial of his first motion to suppress,
    he discovered evidence that undermined the credibility of a
    witness who had provided information concerning the search
    warrants. See J.A. 385. The court denied this suppression
    motion from the bench following an evidentiary hearing con-
    ducted on June 27, 2011, and the second motion to suppress
    is not relevant to this appeal. See J.A. 514.
    On June 29, 2011, pursuant to a plea agreement with the
    United States Attorney, Abramski entered conditional guilty
    pleas, pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Crim-
    inal Procedure, to both charges in the indictment.7 On October
    3, 2011, the court sentenced Abramski to five years of proba-
    tion on each offense, to run concurrently. Abramski thereafter
    filed a timely notice of appeal.
    II.
    We review de novo legal issues relating to statutory con-
    struction. United States v. Broncheau, 
    645 F.3d 676
    , 683 (4th
    6
    From our assessment of the briefs, the government appears to consider
    the district court’s denial of the second dismissal motion to be a subject
    of this appeal. See Br. of Appellee 6 (citing district court’s April 25, 2011,
    decision denying second dismissal motion). We emphasize, however, that
    Abramski has, on the dismissal point, only appealed the denial of his first
    dismissal motion, which was disposed of from the bench on March 14,
    2011. See Br. of Appellant 3 (recognizing that Abramski’s second dis-
    missal motion was "based upon administrative deficiencies," and was
    denied, and advising that "Abramski does not raise this issue on appeal").
    7
    Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in
    pertinent part, that:
    With the consent of the court and the government, a defendant
    may enter a conditional plea of guilty[,] reserving in writing the
    right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination
    of a specified pretrial motion.
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).
    UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI                   9
    Cir. 2011). In evaluating a district court’s denial of a motion
    to suppress evidence, we review the court’s factual findings
    for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. United
    States v. Doyle, 
    650 F.3d 460
    , 466 (4th Cir. 2011). In evaluat-
    ing a probable cause issue with respect to a search warrant,
    we assess whether the magistrate judge had a "substantial
    basis" for concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v.
    Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238-39 (1983).
    III.
    We must first address a potential procedural defect that
    could impact our jurisdiction in this appeal. This court has
    recognized that, pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal
    Rules of Criminal Procedure, the "‘direct review of an
    adverse ruling on a pretrial motion is available only if the
    defendant expressly preserves that right by entering a condi-
    tional guilty plea.’" See United States v. Bundy, 
    392 F.3d 641
    ,
    645 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Wiggins, 
    905 F.2d 51
    , 52 (4th Cir. 1990). Indeed, we have observed that,
    "[a]bsent a valid conditional guilty plea, we will dismiss a
    defendant’s appeal from an adverse pretrial ruling on a non-
    jurisdictional issue." Bundy, 
    392 F.3d at 645
    .
    In order for a defendant to pursue an appeal after a Rule
    11(a)(2) conditional guilty plea, the relevant agreement must
    be in writing and must identify the specific pretrial rulings
    that the defendant intends to appeal. These requirements serve
    to "document that a particular plea was in fact conditional,
    and . . . identify precisely what pretrial issues have been pre-
    served for appellate review." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory
    committee’s note. As we have explained, the "conditions must
    be expressly described in writing, or at least so clearly shown
    on the record that there is no doubt that a conditional plea was
    agreed to." Bundy, 
    392 F.3d at 645
    .
    Abramski’s plea agreement identifies only one adverse rul-
    ing that he intends to appeal, and that ruling was made on
    10                 UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI
    June 28, 2011, the day prior to his guilty pleas. The plea
    agreement describes the conditional nature of his guilty pleas
    as follows:
    I understand that the United States consents to my
    making of a conditional plea of guilty in this case in
    accordance with Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules
    of Criminal Procedure. I reserve the right to appeal
    any and all adverse rulings of the court to date, to
    specifically include the court’s oral ruling at a
    charge conference in chambers yesterday, June 28,
    that the subsequent legal transfer of the firearm in
    question from the defendant Abramski to his uncle
    Angel "Danny" Alvarez, in Pennsylvania, does not
    negate the illegality of the defendant’s acts in acquir-
    ing the firearm from a federally licensed firearm
    dealer in Virginia.
    J.A. 575 (handwritten additions emphasized). Although the
    issue resolved by the first dismissal motion is fairly framed in
    the plea agreement, the agreement misidentifies the ruling at
    the June 28 charge conference, rather than the court’s denial
    of the first dismissal motion, as the issue sought to be
    appealed. Perhaps more significantly, an appeal of the sup-
    pression rulings is not mentioned in the plea agreement.
    During the plea hearing, the issues reserved for appeal were
    not specified on the record, although the district court and the
    prosecutors briefly discussed alterations of the plea agree-
    ment, presumably for the purpose of specifying issues that
    could be appealed. The court suggested the following:
    if it makes it any simpler, why don’t you just change
    [the conditional plea] to read that the defendant
    reserves the right to appeal all pretrial legal rulings
    that the Court has made? Why is it necessary that we
    have more complicated language? Couldn’t you just
    agree to that?
    UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI                   11
    J.A. 520. In response, the government agreed to the court’s
    suggestion. Based on this dialogue, it is evident that the par-
    ties anticipated that the defendant could appeal court rulings
    other than the single one specified in the plea agreement. Rule
    11(a)(2) and our precedent are clear, however, that the issues
    to be appealed after a conditional guilty plea should be speci-
    fied in writing, or, at the very least, clearly stated on the
    record. Nevertheless, because the court and the government
    orally agreed in broad terms to Abramski’s conditional pleas,
    we are satisfied to address the merits of his appeal on the first
    dismissal motion and the first motion to suppress. Accord-
    ingly, we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    A.
    1.
    Abramski first contends that the district court erred in
    denying his motion to dismiss the charges in the indictment,
    and in ruling that Abramski’s purchase of the Glock 19 hand-
    gun constituted a straw purchase that violated 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A). Abramski maintains that,
    because he and Alvarez were both legally entitled to purchase
    such a firearm, he was not a "straw purchaser" and his "Yes"
    answer on the ATF Form 4473 — representing that he was
    the "actual buyer" thereof — was not material and was never
    intended to be punished by the Gun Control Act of 1968, or
    by §§ 922(a)(6) or 924(a)(1)(A). Indeed, Abramski asserts
    that Congress’s intent in enacting those statutes was "to make
    it possible to keep firearms out of the hands of those not
    legally entitled to possess them." Br. of Appellant 12. Under
    Abramski’s theory, he could only be prosecuted for his Vir-
    ginia acquisition of the Glock 19 handgun if Alvarez had been
    ineligible to possess a firearm, e.g., a convicted felon, thereby
    rendering the "actual buyer" question on the ATF Form 4473
    "material to the lawfulness of the sale." See 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (a)(6). On the legal proposition pursued by Abramski,
    there appears to be a split in the courts of appeals. At least
    12                UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI
    three of our sister circuits have heretofore addressed the issue,
    and one of them seems to agree with Abramski.
    In support of his position, Abramski relies on the Fifth Cir-
    cuit’s decision in United States v. Polk, 
    118 F.3d 286
     (5th Cir.
    1997). In that case, the court of appeals assessed whether
    § 922(a)(6) liability attached where "the true purchaser [here,
    Alvarez] can lawfully purchase a firearm directly." Id. at 295.
    The Fifth Circuit determined that it did not, ruling that
    the plain language of the statute compels the conclu-
    sion . . . that § 922(a)(6) criminalizes false state-
    ments that are intended to deceive federal firearms
    dealers with respect to facts material to the "lawful-
    ness of the sale" of firearms. . . . Thus, if the true
    purchaser can lawfully purchase a firearm directly,
    § 922(a)(6) liability (under a "straw purchase" the-
    ory) does not attach.
    Id. (emphasis in original).
    Put simply, we are unable to agree with Polk. It is clear to
    us that the prohibition against false and fictitious statements
    in § 922(a)(6) is not limited to those persons who are prohib-
    ited from buying or possessing a firearm. To establish a viola-
    tion of § 922(a)(6), the prosecution is obligated to prove four
    elements: "(1) the defendant knowingly made (2) a false or
    fictitious oral or written statement that was (3) material to the
    lawfulness of the sale or disposition of a firearm, and was (4)
    intended to deceive or likely to deceive a firearms dealer."
    United States v. Harvey, 
    653 F.3d 388
    , 393 (6th Cir. 2011).
    The straw purchaser issue goes directly to the third of these
    essential elements — materiality.
    Abramski’s contention that § 922(a)(6) does not apply to a
    firearm transaction involving two eligible purchasers was
    recently rejected by the Sixth Circuit in United States v.
    Morales, 
    687 F.3d 697
     (6th Cir. 2012). In that case, the court
    UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI                    13
    also took issue with the reasoning of Polk and agreed with the
    Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Frazier, 
    605 F.3d 1271
    , 1280 (11th Cir. 2010). In Frazier, the court of
    appeals had likewise rejected Polk, explaining its decision in
    language that we readily approve:
    [t]o say that the identity of the actual purchaser is
    material to the lawfulness of one sale but not to
    another, is counterintuitive. Although Polk focused
    on whether one’s identity affected the lawfulness of
    a sale under § 922(a)(6), we focus on whether one’s
    identity is a fact that is material to the lawfulness of
    a sale. The identity of the purchaser is a constant
    that is always material to the lawfulness of the pur-
    chase of a firearm under § 922(a)(6). Thus, it can be
    reasoned that although the lawfulness of a sale may
    change depending on the identity of the purchaser,
    the fact that the identity of the purchaser is material
    to the lawfulness of the sale does not.
    Id. (emphasis added).
    In denying Abramski’s first dismissal motion from the
    bench on March 14, 2011, the court relied on the Frazier case,
    expressing concern that Abramski’s theory "creates an extra
    element in the prosecution of the offense" in that the govern-
    ment would have to "prove that the middleman, in this case
    [Abramski], knew that a subsequent purchaser was a prohib-
    ited person." J.A. 266. The court rejected that theory, ruling
    that "both counts of the indictment are legally sound. It seems
    to me that, if the government is able to prove what the grand
    jury has alleged in the indictment, that the defendant would
    be in violation of these two statutes." J.A. 276. In sum, we are
    satisfied that the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as the
    district court, correctly and properly ruled that the identity of
    the actual purchaser of a firearm is a constant that is always
    material to the lawfulness of a firearm acquisition under
    § 922(a)(6).
    14                UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI
    The ATF Form 4473, as completed and signed by Abram-
    ski, warned him — in bold type — that he was not the actual
    buyer of the Glock 19 handgun if he was buying it for some-
    one else. And the undisputed facts show that Abramski’s
    transfer of the Glock 19 to Alvarez was not an afterthought.
    On this record, that transfer was a carefully calculated event
    — indeed, it was the sole reason for Abramski’s purchase of
    the Glock 19 handgun. Because the identity of the actual pur-
    chaser of the handgun was material to the lawfulness of its
    acquisition by Abramski on November 17, 2009, he made a
    false and fictitious statement to the licensed dealer when he
    answered "Yes" to question 11.a. on the ATF Form 4473,
    assuring the dealer that he was the actual buyer.
    2.
    Turning to Count Two, § 924(a)(1)(A) of Title 18 criminal-
    izes "any false statement or representation with respect to the
    information required by this chapter to be kept in the records
    of a person licensed under this chapter." 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (a)(1)(A). To establish a violation of § 924(a)(1)(A), the
    government must prove that: (1) the dealer was a federally
    licensed firearms dealer at the time the offense occurred; (2)
    the defendant made a false statement or representation in a
    record that the licensed firearm dealer was required by federal
    law to maintain; and (3) the defendant made the false state-
    ment with knowledge of its falsity. This statutory provision
    does not require that the falsehood on the ATF Form 4473
    relate to the lawfulness of the firearm acquisition itself.
    Although Abramski argues that his "Yes" answer to question
    11.a. on the Form 4473 was not material to the recordkeeping
    requirements of § 924(a)(1)(A), the plain statutory language
    is unambiguous, and it does not require a showing of materi-
    ality. See United States v. Johnson, 
    680 F.3d 1140
    , 1144 (9th
    Cir. 2012) ("the text of § 924(a)(1)(A) unambiguously
    describes which false statements and representations it pro-
    hibits — simply those that are made with respect to informa-
    tion that is required to be kept by federally licensed firearms
    UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI                  15
    dealers"); United States v. Sullivan, 
    459 F.2d 993
    , 994 (8th
    Cir. 1972) ("While a violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 922
    (a)(6)
    expressly requires a showing of materiality no such expres-
    sion is found in § 924(a).").
    3.
    In sum, the assertion that Abramski was the actual buyer of
    the Glock 19 handgun was a false and fictitious answer to
    question 11.a. of the ATF Form 4473, and that false statement
    was material to the lawfulness of the Virginia sale of the
    handgun. Moreover, the identity of the actual purchaser of the
    Glock 19 handgun was a fact required to be maintained by the
    Virginia firearms dealer that sold the firearm. By virtue of the
    bold-print warning on question 11.a. of the ATF Form 4473,
    Abramski was on notice that he was not the actual buyer of
    the handgun if he was purchasing it for someone else.
    Accordingly, the district court properly denied Abramski’s
    motion to dismiss both charges of the indictment.
    B.
    Abramski next contends that the second search warrant
    (relating to the Iron Ridge Road property), was defectively
    issued and not supported by probable cause. As a result, he
    maintains that the agents’ seizure of the receipt concerning his
    transaction with Alvarez from the Iron Ridge Road residence
    exceeded the scope of that warrant.
    As spelled out above, the FBI agents executed two search
    warrants in their robbery investigation of Abramski. They
    first searched his parents’ home on Highland Farm Road in
    Calloway, and the results of that search led them, at least in
    part, to also search Abramski’s marital home on Iron Ridge
    Road in Rocky Mount. Abramski argues on appeal, first, that
    the affidavit for the search warrant for the Iron Ridge Road
    property was legally insufficient. Additionally, Abramski con-
    tends that execution of the search warrant for the Iron Ridge
    16                UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI
    Road property contravened the warrant’s directives, resulting
    in an unconstitutional seizure of the receipt for Abramski’s
    transfer of the Glock 19 handgun to Alvarez.
    1.
    The affidavit supporting the search warrant for the High-
    land Farm Road property included information about what the
    bank robber was wearing, what he carried, and the vehicle he
    was driving (a blue Ford Explorer). The affidavit shows that
    one of the bank tellers picked Abramski’s picture from a
    photo lineup as a "suspicious white male who visited the
    bank" several days before the robbery. J.A. 230. The affidavit
    explained that when Abramski made his purchase of the
    Glock 19 handgun at Town Police Supply, he paid in cash
    from a green zippered money pouch with white lettering. It
    also demonstrated that Abramski had limited financial
    resources and had been discharged by the Roanoke police
    department because he was believed to have stolen money
    during an investigation. Among other details, the affidavit
    revealed that Abramski had tested a green Ford Explorer on
    the day of the robbery.
    During the search on Highland Farm Road, Abramski’s
    father told the officers that Abramski had only been living
    there for about a week. The affidavit supporting the search
    warrant for the Iron Ridge Road property included informa-
    tion that Abramski may have left his belongings at that resi-
    dence. The affidavit explained that the agents had already
    seized inculpatory evidence in the Highland Farm Road
    search, including a "green zippered money pouch," and speci-
    fied that the application for the Iron Ridge Road warrant
    "does not seek authority to seize these items." Nevertheless,
    one of the agents conducting the search at Iron Ridge Road
    found an additional green zippered money bag from Franklin
    Community Bank. The receipt for the transfer to Alvarez of
    the Glock 19 handgun was found and seized from inside that
    bag.
    UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI                            17
    Following the suppression hearing conducted on March 14,
    2011, the district court ruled from the bench that "both war-
    rants were valid and that the items seized pursuant to those
    search warrants are properly admitted." J.A. 310. The court
    then concluded that "[c]learly there’s probable cause for both
    search warrants."8 Id.
    2.
    A judicial officer’s determination of probable cause is enti-
    tled to "great deference" by a reviewing court. See Illinois v.
    Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 236 (1983). "The probable cause stan-
    dard ‘is not defined by bright lines and rigid boundaries’ but
    ‘allows a [judicial officer] to review the facts and circum-
    stances as a whole and make a common sense determination’
    whether there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime
    will be found." United States v. Wellman, 
    663 F.3d 224
    , 228
    (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Grossman, 
    400 F.3d 212
    , 217 (4th Cir. 2005)).
    The prosecution maintains that the district court’s suppres-
    sion ruling must be affirmed, arguing that the "catch-all"
    clause in the search warrant for the Iron Ridge Road property
    required seizure of the receipt. It asserts that the green Frank-
    lin Community Bank money bag fell within that clause, as did
    the handgun receipt, because the officers then believed that
    Abramski had robbed the bank with a Glock handgun. The
    United States also contends that, in any event, the green bag
    was in plain view, and that the officers were entitled to seize
    it because its incriminating character was readily apparent.
    The prosecutors finally argue that the good faith exception
    applies, even if the search warrant was based on stale evi-
    dence and seizure of the green bag was somehow improper.
    8
    Finally, in the alternative, the court determined that, "even if the war-
    rants were too broad or somewhat stale, I think that the officers were enti-
    tled to, in good faith, rely on the issuance of the warrants in conducting
    the searches. So even if the probable cause is somewhat weak, I think
    good faith protects the outcome of the searches." 
    Id. at 310-11
    .
    18                 UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI
    a.
    First and foremost, it is clear to us that the Iron Ridge Road
    search warrant was supported by probable cause. The support-
    ing affidavit for that warrant connected Abramski to the
    Rocky Mount bank robbery in several ways:
    •   Abramski was flagged as a suspicious customer
    at the bank just a few days before the robbery;
    •   He was having financial difficulties;
    •   He had been fired by the police department for
    allegedly stealing money;
    •   He was about the same height as the robber;
    •   Abramski was seen wearing a watch and jacket
    similar to those worn by the robber;
    •   He had tested a green Ford Explorer on the day
    of the robbery, and the witnesses asserted that the
    robber made his getaway in a blue Ford Explorer;
    and
    •   Abramski had purchased firearms with a large
    amount of cash after the bank robbery.
    In these circumstances, there was a substantial basis for the
    magistrate judge to conclude that probable cause existed for
    the search of Abramski’s residence on Iron Ridge Road.
    b.
    Finally, we reject Abramski’s challenge to the scope of the
    search warrant for the Iron Ridge Road residence. The agents
    were then investigating the robbery of Franklin Community
    Bank, which had been carried out with a firearm similar to a
    UNITED STATES v. ABRAMSKI                          19
    Glock 19 handgun. When the agents discovered the green zip-
    pered bag bearing the Franklin Community Bank logo, and
    when they found inside that bag the receipt for Alvarez’s pur-
    chase of the Glock 19 handgun, such evidence had to be
    seized. In these circumstances, the Iron Ridge Road warrant
    was properly issued, and the agents’ seizure of the receipt was
    not unconstitutional. The district court therefore did not err in
    declining to suppress that evidence.9
    IV.
    Pursuant to the foregoing, the judgment of the district court
    is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED
    9
    In his reply brief, Abramski asserts that neither of the affidavits sup-
    porting the search warrant demonstrates that the agents believed the items
    sought would be found at Abramski’s residence seven months after the
    robbery. Rep. Br. of Appellant 5. Inasmuch as this is a staleness argument
    concerning the timeliness of the warrants, we need not address it, in that
    it was abandoned by not being raised in Abramski’s opening brief on
    appeal. See United States v. Al-Hamdi, 
    356 F.3d 564
    , 571 n.8 (4th Cir.
    2004) (recognizing that "contentions not raised in the argument section of
    the opening brief are abandoned").