Mounia Elyazidi v. SunTrust Bank , 780 F.3d 227 ( 2015 )


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  •                               PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-1290
    MOUNIA ELYAZIDI,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    SUNTRUST BANK; MITCHELL RUBENSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C., d/b/a
    Rubenstein and Cogan,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt.    Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District
    Judge. (8:13-cv-02204-DKC)
    Argued:   January 27, 2015                 Decided:   March 5, 2015
    Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion,
    in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Harris joined.
    ARGUED: Ernest P. Francis, ERNEST P. FRANCIS, LTD., Alexandria,
    Virginia, for Appellant.     Ronald S. Canter, LAW OFFICES OF
    RONALD S. CANTER, LLC, Rockville, Maryland; John Russell
    Griffin, HARTMAN & EGELI, LLP, Annapolis, Maryland, for
    Appellees.   ON BRIEF: Matthew A. Egeli, HARTMAN & EGELI, LLP,
    Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee SunTrust Bank.
    THACKER, Circuit Judge:
    Mounia    Elyazidi   (“Appellant”)    overdrew     her   checking
    account when, despite having only a few hundred dollars in the
    account, she cut herself a check for nearly $10,000.                A debt
    collector, acting on behalf of the bank, took her to court in
    Virginia and won.      Appellant, not content to pay the judgment
    and let the matter drop, filed this lawsuit against the bank and
    its lawyers (collectively, “Appellees”).         Her suit alleges that
    Appellees violated Maryland consumer protection laws, and that
    the bank’s lawyers violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices
    Act (“FDCPA”).     The federal district court dismissed Appellant’s
    suit for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
    the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.     We affirm.
    I.
    Appellant    lives   in   Fairfax    County,   Virginia.      In
    September 2010, she opened a checking account with SunTrust Bank
    (“SunTrust”), a Georgia-based bank with thousands of branches
    and ATMs across much of the South and along the East Coast.             In
    the course of opening the account, Appellant signed an agreement
    stating that her banking transactions “shall be governed by the
    rules and regulations for this account.”        J.A. 38. 1    Those rules
    1
    Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed
    by the parties in this appeal.
    2
    and   regulations   include       a   provision      addressing     the   account
    holder’s overdraft liability:
    You are liable for all amounts charged to
    your Account, whether by offset, overdraft,
    lien or fees.    If we take court action or
    commence an arbitration proceeding against
    you to collect such amounts, . . . you will
    also be liable for court or arbitration
    costs, other charges or fees, and attorney’s
    fees up to 25 percent, or an amount as
    permitted by law, of the amount owed to us.
    Id. at 56.
    As of September 15, 2010, the account held no more
    than a few hundred dollars.           Nevertheless, Appellant cut herself
    a check for $9,800. 2     She cashed the check at a SunTrust branch,
    resulting in a sizeable overdraft.
    A.
    After its own attempts to collect the money proved
    unsuccessful,    SunTrust       hired    a    Maryland   law   firm,      Mitchell
    Rubenstein & Associates (“MR&A”), 3 to bring a debt collection
    suit.     MR&A   filed   suit    on     SunTrust’s   behalf    in   the    general
    2
    The SunTrust branch cashed the check for this amount. In
    fact, though, there was a discrepancy between the number figure
    in the dollar box (“$9,800”) and the amount stated in text below
    the payee line (“Nine thousand and nine hundred 00/100
    dollars”). J.A. 214.
    3
    The amended complaint in this suit asserts that MR&A does
    business under the name Rubenstein and Cogan. Court filings in
    the Virginia debt collection action that preceded this suit
    likewise refer to the firm as Rubenstein and Cogan.
    3
    district court of Fairfax County, Virginia, on June 12, 2012.
    Instead          of   drafting    a   detailed     complaint,     MR&A    utilized    a
    warrant          in   debt,   a   standardized     pleading      that    the   Virginia
    courts make available to creditors. 4                   This standardized pleading
    provides, in relevant part:
    Plaintiff(s) claim that Defendant(s)                   owe
    Plaintiff(s) a debt in the sum of
    $ _____ net of any credits, with interest at
    _____ % from date of _____ until paid,
    $ _____   costs       and       $ _____     attorney’s
    fees . . . .
    J.A.       25.        Appellees   filled   in     the   blanks    to    indicate   that
    Appellant owed $9,490.82, plus 6 percent interest; $58 in costs;
    and $2,372.71 in attorneys’ fees.
    To support the warrant in debt, Appellees submitted to
    the court an “Affidavit of Account,” in which a SunTrust officer
    affirmed that “[t]he amount of Nine thousand four hundred ninety
    and 82/100 dollars ($9,490.82) plus reasonable attorney fees of
    25% and the costs of this proceeding is justly due and owing
    from debt to SunTrust.”               J.A. 31.      In addition, MR&A submitted
    its own affidavit, dated June 11, 2012, in support of the claim
    4
    See 
    Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-79
     (authorizing civil actions
    “brought by warrant”); In re Faruque, No. 07-13375-SSM, 
    2009 WL 2211210
    ,   at  *5   n.8  (Bankr.  E.D.   Va.  July   20,  2009)
    (characterizing the warrant in debt as a “simplified form of
    process” that “does not require a detailed statement of the
    cause of action”).
    4
    for attorneys’ fees.           In that document (the “June 2012 Revesman
    Affidavit”),        attorney    Cynthia         Kaplan      Revesman        (“Revesman”)
    requested     “an    award     of    25%    percent         [sic]    as     a    just     and
    reasonable    fee,     which    is    equal       to   or   less     than       the    actual
    arrangement    with     client       in    this    case.”       
    Id. at 32
    .      Her
    affidavit attests that her billable rate was $250 per hour and
    that she spent approximately one hour preparing the warrant in
    debt.   The affidavit further states that Revesman “will require
    an additional 3 hours for Court appearances and travel,” and
    that, based on similar cases she has handled during her career,
    “counsel anticipates at least 20 additional hours in order to
    satisfy its judgment by execution.”                
    Id.
    Later, in response to a court order, Appellees filed a
    bill of particulars outlining the allegations against Appellant.
    Among the exhibits accompanying this filing were two monthly
    statements for Appellant’s checking account.                        Appellant’s social
    security number appeared on both statements.                        When, in December
    2012, Appellant’s attorney complained about the exposure of his
    client’s    personal     financial        information,        the    judge       agreed    to
    have the number redacted.
    The general district court entered judgment “in the
    sum demanded for the plaintiff on the evidence.”                                 J.A. 151.
    Later, at a separate hearing, counsel for SunTrust submitted an
    updated affidavit supporting the claim for attorneys’ fees.                               In
    5
    this new affidavit, dated February 27, 2013, Revesman reported
    that she had expended approximately 13.9 hours on the case.                                  She
    provided a breakdown of how she spent those hours and, based on
    that breakdown, calculated a billable amount of $4,025.                                      The
    court -- explaining that “it’s been the practice of this Court
    normally to award less than what [counsel] ask[s] for” -- opted
    to award only $2,372.71 “because I think that . . . minimally
    more than that was spent in this entire matter.”                          
    Id. at 174-75
    .
    B.
    Appellant’s response to her defeat in the collection
    suit       was    to     file     a   complaint       against    SunTrust   and       MR&A    in
    circuit          court       in   Montgomery   County,        Maryland.         Her   amended
    complaint asserted seven claims in all, of which five are at
    issue       in        this    appeal. 5    The        first     four   counts    challenged
    Appellees’ efforts to recover attorneys’ fees in the Virginia
    suit:
    •    Count I accused Appellees of violating the
    Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act
    (“MCDCA”), which bars debt collectors from
    attempting   to  “enforce   a  right  with
    knowledge that the right does not exist,”
    
    Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-202
    (8);
    5
    Two of the claims, Counts V and VII, accused MR&A of
    engaging in unfair or unconscionable acts in violation of 15
    U.S.C. § 1692f. The district court dismissed those counts, and
    Appellant has not appealed their dismissal.
    6
    •    Count II accused SunTrust of unfair or
    deceptive conduct in violation of the
    Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”),
    
    Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 13-301
    (1),
    -408(a);
    •    Count III accused MR&A of making false
    representations in violation of the FDCPA,
    15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2); and
    •    Count IV accused MR&A of using “unfair or
    unconscionable means to” collect a debt
    that was neither “expressly authorized by
    the agreement creating the debt [n]or
    permitted by law,” in violation of the
    FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).
    Lastly, Appellant sought to recover for the disclosure of her
    social security number.        Specifically:
    •    Count VI accused MR&A of violating 15
    U.S.C.   § 1692f by   failing  to  redact
    Appellant’s social security number from
    the bank statements accompanying the bill
    of particulars.
    Appellees    removed     the   case    to    the      United    States
    District Court for the District of Maryland.                    There, SunTrust
    and   MR&A       separately   filed   motions      to    dismiss    all     claims.
    Broadly speaking, these motions argued that Appellant’s amended
    complaint did not state a claim.            In addition, MR&A argued that
    the   Rooker-Feldman      doctrine    deprived      the    district       court   of
    subject matter jurisdiction over the FDCPA claims in Counts III
    and IV.
    Preliminarily,     the    district     court       rejected     MR&A’s
    Rooker-Feldman argument, reasoning that Counts III and IV were
    7
    not barred because they do not challenge “the propriety of the
    [Virginia] court’s order granting a fee award.”                             Elyazidi v.
    SunTrust Bank, No. 13-2204, 
    2014 WL 824129
    , at *5 (D. Md. Feb.
    28, 2014).     Having assured itself of its jurisdiction, the court
    proceeded to dismiss all of Appellant’s claims pursuant to Rule
    12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
    First, the court concluded that Counts III and IV,
    brought under the FDCPA, failed because the warrant in debt and
    accompanying affidavits did nothing more than supply an estimate
    of the attorneys’ fees that would be due at the conclusion of
    the case, in compliance with Virginia state court procedure.
    See Elyazidi, 
    2014 WL 824129
    , at *6.                     Next, the court explained
    that   Count    VI    could     not   survive       because       the     disclosure   of
    Appellant’s social security number was, in all likelihood, a
    mere   “oversight     that      was   cured    by   redaction        of    the   relevant
    documents.”     
    Id. at *7
    .
    Finally, the district court acknowledged that, having
    dismissed    all     federal     claims,   it    was      under    no     obligation   to
    consider Counts I and II, the state law claims.                           See Elyazidi,
    
    2014 WL 824129
    ,       at    *7    (citing      
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c)(3)).
    Nevertheless,        the      court    opted        to     exercise         supplemental
    jurisdiction over those claims “[i]n the interest of judicial
    economy.”      
    Id.
        The court proceeded to dismiss Counts I and II
    8
    on     the      ground           that        the      Maryland           statutes        “have       no
    extraterritorial effect.”                 
    Id. at *8
    .
    II.
    On    appeal,       Appellees             renew    their       argument    that       the
    district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Counts
    III and IV.           The limits of subject matter jurisdiction pose a
    “threshold         issue”        that    this       court        must     investigate          “before
    addressing      the       merits”       of     Appellant’s            claims.      Jones       v.   Am.
    Postal Workers Union, 
    192 F.3d 417
    , 422 (4th Cir. 1999).
    Appellees argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
    Counts    III       and    IV     because       these       counts       --     both    challenging
    MR&A’s       pursuit       of     attorneys’         fees        in     state    court     --       “are
    premised      on     the    theory        that       the    state       court     erred    when      it
    awarded       SunTrust           25%     attorney’s              fees    in      the     judgment.”
    Appellees’          Br.    10.          Generally         speaking,        the    Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine       provides          that     jurisdiction             to    review        state     court
    decisions       lies        not        with        the     lower        federal        courts,      but
    “exclusively         with       superior       state       courts       and,     ultimately,         the
    United States Supreme Court.”                        Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 
    290 F.3d 191
    ,       196     (4th        Cir.       2002)     (internal          quotation        marks
    omitted).           However,       a    federal          court    is    not     stripped       of   its
    jurisdiction simply because the claim challenges conduct that
    was previously examined in a state court action.                                        Rather, the
    restriction         on     the    federal          district       courts’        jurisdiction        is
    9
    confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
    injuries    caused   by   state-court         judgments   rendered     before   the
    district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
    review and rejection of those judgments.”                 Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
    Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 284 (2005) (emphasis
    supplied); see Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 
    434 F.3d 712
    ,
    718-19 (4th Cir. 2006).
    The instant appeal poses no challenge to the Virginia
    court’s     judgment.       That    judgment         reflected    a    post-trial
    determination that SunTrust’s counsel was entitled to $2,372.71
    in   fees   for   the     13.9   hours        of   work   put   into   the   case.
    Appellant’s complaint takes no issue with those figures.                        Her
    argument, rather, is that Appellees’ pre-trial representations
    were unlawful because they insinuated that she owed money that,
    to that point, SunTrust’s counsel had not yet earned.                    We hold,
    therefore, that her claims are independent from the Virginia
    court’s judgment, and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not
    bar the federal district court from hearing them.
    III.
    We proceed now to the merits of Appellant’s arguments
    in this appeal.
    A.
    We begin with Counts III and IV, which allege that the
    Virginia warrant in debt and accompanying affidavits wrongfully
    10
    represented that Appellant owed $2,372.71 in attorneys’ fees --
    an amount exactly equal to 25 percent of Appellant’s debt to
    SunTrust.       Appellant     argues        that   these    representations      were
    wrongful in two ways.             First, she says, SunTrust’s rules and
    regulations merely capped her liability for attorneys’ fees at
    25 percent.        Second, she argues that she could not have owed the
    full 25 percent at the time Appellees filed the Virginia suit
    because, to that point, MR&A had not yet performed the hours of
    work necessary to justify the award.                   Count III alleges that the
    firm’s statements were false or misleading representations in
    violation     of     15    U.S.C.    § 1692e.           Count   IV   condemns      the
    statements      as    an    unfair     or     unconscionable      means     of    debt
    collection in violation of § 1692f(1).
    The district court dismissed both counts for failure
    to state a claim.          “We review the district court’s grant of a
    motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true the complaint’s
    factual   allegations       and     drawing      all   reasonable    inferences     in
    favor of the plaintiff.”             Warren v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., 
    676 F.3d 365
    , 373 (4th Cir. 2012).                     To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
    motion,   the      allegations      must    “advance      the   plaintiff’s      claim
    ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”                         Walters v.
    McMahen, 
    684 F.3d 435
    , 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl.
    Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)).                         Appellant, we
    11
    conclude, has failed to propel any of her claims across that
    line.
    1.
    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector 6 may
    not “use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or
    means in connection with the collection of any debt.”                    15 U.S.C.
    § 1692e.       It is unlawful to make a “false representation of (A)
    the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or (B) any
    services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received
    by   any     debt   collector   for   the   collection     of   a   debt.”      Id.
    § 1692e(2).         To violate the statute, a representation must be
    material, see Warren, 676 F.3d at 374, which is to say, it must
    be “important in the sense that [it] could objectively affect
    the least sophisticated consumer’s decisionmaking.”                      Powell v.
    Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, No. 14-1171, 
    2014 WL 7191354
    , at
    *7 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 2014).           Similarly, in assessing whether a
    debt       collector’s   representation       is    misleading,     we   view   the
    representation        “from   the   vantage    of    the   least    sophisticated
    consumer.”          Russell v. Absolute Collection Servs., Inc., 763
    6
    “It is uncontestable that the FDCPA creates a cause of
    action against attorneys who act as debt collectors for their
    false statements about the debt.” Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson,
    
    485 F.3d 226
    , 235 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Wilson v. Draper &
    Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 
    443 F.3d 373
    , 378 (4th Cir. 2006).      MR&A
    does not dispute that it qualifies as a debt collector under the
    statute.
    
    12 F.3d 385
    ,      394       (4th        Cir.    2014)        (internal           quotation       marks
    omitted).             Under      this       standard,     we     consider           how   a    “naive”
    consumer would interpret the statement.                              United States v. Nat’l
    Fin. Servs., Inc., 
    98 F.3d 131
    , 136 (4th Cir. 1996).                                          However,
    we     do       not     give          credit        to    “bizarre             or    idiosyncratic
    interpretations”;                we    assume       “a    quotient          of       reasonableness
    and . . . a basic level of understanding and willingness to read
    with care.”           
    Id.
    There       is    no        denying      that,       as    a     general       matter,
    “litigation           activity        is     subject      to    the       FDCPA.”         Sayyed    v.
    Wolpoff     &    Abramson,            
    485 F.3d 226
    ,     231    (4th      Cir.      2007);   see
    Heintz v. Jenkins, 
    514 U.S. 291
    , 293, 299 (1995) (holding that a
    car loan borrower could pursue FDCPA claims against the lender’s
    counsel for falsely asserting in a letter that the borrower owed
    money for a particularly broad substitute insurance policy on
    the car).         As always, though, we must view the allegedly false
    or misleading representations in context.                                 Here, where the debt
    collector        sought          no    more     than      applicable           law     allowed     and
    explained via affidavit that the figure was merely an estimate
    of an amount counsel expected to earn in the course of the
    13
    litigation, 7 the representations cannot be considered misleading
    under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2).
    The September 2010 agreement -- which Appellant signed
    -- authorized SunTrust to request “up to 25 percent” of any
    “amount owed” to the bank.         J.A. 38, 56.    Appellees’ request for
    $2,372.71 in attorneys’ fees fell within the 25 percent cap.
    The justification for requesting the maximum amount permissible
    under contract was supplied in the June 2012 Revesman Affidavit,
    which detailed the number of hours SunTrust’s counsel expected
    to devote to the suit.        The affidavit explained that the bulk of
    those hours would be spent endeavoring to satisfy the judgment
    by execution.         Though Appellant’s complaint alleges that this
    estimate had no basis in fact, Appellant’s counsel conceded at
    oral       argument   that   he   had    no   evidence   to   support   this
    allegation.
    It is true that the standardized warrant-in-debt form
    uses the word “owe,” id. at 30, suggesting perhaps that the
    7
    To be clear, this opinion in no way suggests that a prayer
    for   attorneys’   fees   can   never   present   an   actionable
    misrepresentation under the FDCPA. Some lower courts have taken
    that position.   See, e.g., Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP,
    
    733 F. Supp. 2d 635
    , 648 (D. Md. 2010); Winn v. Unifund CCR
    Partners, No. CV 06-447-TUC-FRZ, 
    2007 WL 974099
    , at *3 (D. Ariz.
    Mar. 30, 2007); see also Argentieri v. Fisher Landscapes, Inc.,
    
    15 F. Supp. 2d 55
    , 61-62 (D. Mass. 1998) (questioning, but never
    deciding, whether a prayer for attorneys’ fees could ever
    violate the FDCPA). Today’s decision does not reach this issue.
    14
    requested attorneys’ fees were presently due.                            This language,
    however, cannot be read in isolation.                          Taking the June 2012
    Revesman Affidavit into consideration, it is abundantly clear
    that the prayer for attorneys’ fees was an estimate of an amount
    the    debtor   would     owe    at     the    conclusion       of     the   case.         The
    affidavit       clarifies        that     SunTrust’s           counsel       was     simply
    “request[ing]      an    award    of     25%       percent    [sic]     as   a     just    and
    reasonable      fee.”      J.A.    32    (emphasis          supplied).        It    further
    explains that SunTrust’s counsel had spent one hour on the case
    to date, and that counsel anticipated spending at least 23 more
    hours pursuing and executing a judgment in SunTrust’s favor.
    Under    the    circumstances,           any       consumer     --     no    matter        how
    sophisticated -- should have understood the nature of Appellees’
    request.
    In sum, we hold that Appellees’ prayer for attorneys’
    fees cannot, as a matter of law, be a false, deceptive, or
    misleading representation under § 1692e.                      Accordingly, we affirm
    the district court’s judgment that Count III fails to state a
    claim.
    2.
    Count       IV,      alleging          a   violation        of    15     U.S.C.
    § 1692f(1), fails for similar reasons.                       Section    1692f      condemns
    the use of “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt
    to    collect   any     debt,”    and    provides       a    non-exhaustive         list    of
    15
    proscribed conduct.         15 U.S.C. § 1692f.            Subsection (1), which
    Appellant    invokes,      prohibits    “[t]he        collection      of     any    amount
    (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to
    the     principal    obligation)       unless    such        amount     is    expressly
    authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by
    law.”    Id. § 1692f(1).
    Appellant’s     complaint        alleges    that     the      request       for
    $2,372.71 in attorneys’ fees was unauthorized because “neither
    the agreement nor applicable law permit recovery of attorney’s
    fees for services not performed.”                J.A. 15.       This argument has
    no merit.      By signing the September 2010 agreement, Appellant
    agreed that, in the event of a “court action” to recover a debt,
    she would be contractually liable for “attorney’s fees up to 25
    percent . . . of      the    amount    owed”     to    the    bank.        Id.     at     56.
    Plainly, this agreement authorized SunTrust to seek attorneys’
    fees    in   the    Virginia    debt    collection        suit.         Though          under
    Virginia      law     an     award      of      attorneys’        fees        must         be
    “reasonable . . . under         the    facts     and     circumstances             of     the
    particular case,” Lee v. Mulford, 
    611 S.E.2d 349
    , 350-51 (Va.
    2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), it was entirely proper
    for SunTrust to estimate an appropriate fee within the limits
    prescribed     in    the    September     2010    agreement.               Indeed,       the
    Commonwealth       encourages   plaintiffs       to     include       such    estimates
    when filling out the standardized warrant-in-debt form, which
    16
    supplies a blank space for attorneys’ fees along with the spaces
    provided for the alleged debt and court costs.                         Though we draw
    “all reasonable inferences” in favor of the plaintiff, Owens v.
    Balt. City State’s Attorneys Office, 
    767 F.3d 379
    , 388 (4th Cir.
    2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), the only reasonable
    inference       here     is   that    Appellees         sought    to     enforce       their
    contractual rights in compliance with state court procedure.                                 To
    claim,    as    Appellant        does,    that    such     activity      is        unfair    or
    unconscionable under § 1692f(1) is simply not plausible.                                    We
    hold,    therefore,       that    Count    IV     fails    to    state    a        claim    for
    relief.
    B.
    We turn now to Count VI, which asserts that MR&A’s
    disclosure of Appellant’s social security number in the bank
    statements accompanying the bill of particulars constituted an
    unfair or unconscionable means of debt collection, in violation
    of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.
    Section    1692f      lists      eight     examples       of    unfair        or
    unconscionable practices.                These practices include: collecting
    money that is not expressly authorized by an agreement creating
    the debt, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1); accepting a postdated check
    without    properly       notifying       the     drawer    of    when        it    will     be
    deposited, or threatening to deposit it before the specified
    date, see id. § 1692f(2), (4); soliciting a postdated check “for
    17
    the purpose of threatening or instituting criminal prosecution,”
    id.     § 1692f(3);          making       collect       calls      to    a        debtor    without
    disclosing           the     “true       purpose        of   the      communication,”              id.
    § 1692f(5);          threatening         nonjudicial         action      to       dispossess       the
    debtor     of    property,         even        though    the    debt         collector       has    no
    present right to possess the property or no intention to take
    possession       of    it,     see       id.    § 1692f(6)(A)-(B);            “[c]ommunicating
    with a consumer regarding a debt by post card,” id. § 1692f(7);
    and   sending         mail    to     a    consumer       via    envelopes           that     plainly
    indicate the sender is a debt collector, id. § 1692f(8).                                          What
    all   of    these          enumerated          activities      have     in        common    is     the
    capacity to harass the debtor or to pressure her to pay the
    debt.
    No    doubt,       the     public       disclosure           of     one’s     social
    security number can be alarming.                        Here, though, where the lapse
    occurred in the course of litigation and was easily remedied,
    the disclosure cannot be considered unfair or unconscionable.
    While, conceivably, a threat to expose one’s social security
    number might pressure a debtor to pay off a debt, there is no
    allegation that Appellees ever made such a threat.                                         Appellees
    simply failed to redact the number before enclosing the bank
    statements       with       the    bill    of     particulars,          an    error    the       court
    promptly        corrected.                Though        Appellant        characterizes             the
    disclosure here as “a means to extort payment,” reasoning that a
    18
    “consumer will simply pay the debt rather than risk identity
    theft,” J.A. 16-17, her logic is dubious at best.              The record
    here     belies   her    assertion   that   counsel    would   “have    no
    alternative but to advise the consumer to pay the debt so that
    the consumer can avoid identity theft.”         Id. at 17.      Appellant
    was not cowed into paying the debt.          Rather, she simply asked
    the court to redact the identifying information.
    In sum, we hold that, as a matter of law, the failure
    to redact Appellant’s social security number before submitting
    the bank statements to the Virginia court was not an unfair or
    unconscionable means of debt collection under the FDCPA.               The
    district court was correct in concluding that Count VI does not
    state a claim for relief, and we affirm the dismissal of that
    claim.
    C.
    The final two claims are Maryland state-law claims,
    both challenging Appellees’ attempts to recover attorneys’ fees
    in the Virginia suit.        Count I accuses Appellees of violating
    the MCDCA, which provides that debt collectors may not “[c]laim,
    attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the
    right does not exist.”         
    Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-202
    (8).
    Count    II    accuses   SunTrust,   exclusively,     of   making   “false
    statements or representations that had the capacity, tendency,
    or effect of misleading consumers,” J.A. 14, in violation of the
    19
    MCPA.        See     
    Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 13-301
    (1),          -303
    (prohibiting “unfair or deceptive trade practice[s],” including
    the making of any “false, falsely disparaging, or misleading
    oral    or    written      statement,        visual     description,       or   other
    representation of any kind which has the capacity, tendency, or
    effect of deceiving or misleading consumers”).                       The district
    court, choosing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these
    claims “[i]n the interest of judicial economy,” dismissed the
    claims on the ground that neither the MCDCA nor the MCPA applies
    to   conduct       occurring    “entirely”      in     Virginia.         Elyazidi    v.
    SunTrust Bank, No. 13-2204, 
    2014 WL 824129
    , at *7-8 (D. Md. Feb.
    28, 2014).
    In     Maryland,     regulatory          statutes     are     “generally
    construed      as    not   having    extra-territorial           effect    unless      a
    contrary     legislative       intent   is    expressly      stated.”        Consumer
    Prot. Div. v. Outdoor World Corp., 
    603 A.2d 1376
    , 1382 (Md. Ct.
    Spec. App. 1992); see also Chairman of Bd. of Trs. of Emps.’
    Ret. Sys. v. Waldron, 
    401 A.2d 172
    , 177 (Md. 1979) (stating that
    a Maryland statute prohibiting a state pensioner from accepting
    paid legal work does not prohibit the pensioner from practicing
    law outside of Maryland, as the state’s General Assembly “has no
    power to regulate whom our sister jurisdictions may authorize to
    engage in the practice of law within their borders”); State ex
    rel. Gildar v. Kriss, 
    62 A.2d 568
    , 569 (Md. 1948) (“Ordinarily a
    20
    statute is not applicable extraterritorially, but only to acts
    done within the jurisdiction . . . .”).                  In Consumer Protection
    Division    v.    Outdoor    World   Corp.,    a   Maryland       appellate     court
    concluded that the MCPA was capable of reaching at least some
    out-of-state         activity        affecting           Maryland         residents.
    Specifically, the court held that a state agency could bring
    administrative charges under the MCPA against an out-of-state
    company that allegedly made false representations in mailings to
    Maryland residents.          
    603 A.2d at 1382-83
    .              At the same time,
    though, the court determined that the agency had no authority to
    regulate    “sales     practices     that     occur   entirely         within   other
    States.”     
    Id. at 1383
    .        Accordingly, even where the challenged
    mailings enticed Maryland residents to travel out of state on
    false pretenses, the MCPA did not govern high-pressure sales
    tactics    the    company    allegedly    employed       at    those    out-of-state
    locations.       See 
    id.
    In an attempt to frame the challenged activities as
    in-state conduct, Appellant asks us to note that MR&A’s office
    is in Maryland and that SunTrust has “dozens” of branches there.
    Appellant’s Br. 26; see also J.A. 6-7.                        The critical point,
    however, is not whether Appellees conduct business in Maryland,
    but whether some significant portion of the challenged activity
    occurred there.           Here, Appellant was a Virginia resident who
    incurred     a     debt     in   Virginia.         The     allegedly       offensive
    21
    representations appeared in Virginia court documents, and any
    harm    they    might    have    inflicted        could    have     occurred          only   in
    Appellant’s home state of Virginia.
    We   likewise     find   no        significance        in        Appellant’s
    related argument -- raised, in the first instance, on appeal --
    that “virtually every act that would create liability under the
    Maryland statutes occurred in Maryland.”                     Appellant’s Reply Br.
    23.     As to this, Appellant would have us note that MR&A prepared
    all       legal         documents       at           its          Maryland            office;
    “received” instructions          from   SunTrust           there;    and,        from    that
    office, “directed the filing” of the documents to the Virginia
    court.    
    Id.
           These facts do not appear in Appellant’s complaint,
    but     even    assuming    we      could        infer     them     from        the     stated
    allegations, it would make no difference.                    The act of sitting in
    a Maryland office and drafting court documents, or taking phone
    calls, is not the activity that Appellant seeks to condemn in
    the case.       Her complaint, rather is that she suffered harm when
    Appellees filed the allegedly offensive documents in a Virginia
    court and served process on her in Virginia.                         Appellant cannot
    use    Maryland’s     consumer    protection        laws     to    gin     up    a    lawsuit
    contesting this activity.
    We hold that the MCDCA and MCPA have no application
    here.    Therefore, Counts I and II fail to state a claim and were
    properly dismissed by the district court.
    22
    IV.
    For   the   foregoing   reasons,   the   judgment    of   the
    district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    23