United States v. Daniel Taylor ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4187
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DANIEL TAYLOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:12-cr-00570-WDQ-1)
Submitted: January 30, 2015 Decided: March 2, 2015
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Lucius T. Outlaw, III,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Scott A.
Lemmon, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Taylor pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment
for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). Taylor reserved the right to
appeal from the district court’s order denying his motion to
suppress the firearm seized from his person during a traffic
stop. On appeal, he argues that the traffic statute under which
he was stopped was unconstitutional. He further contends that
the district court made clearly erroneous findings of fact
below. We affirm.
Taylor was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped
for excessive window tint. Under Maryland law, a person is
prohibited from operating a vehicle if “there is affixed to any
window of the vehicle any tinting materials added to the window
after manufacture of the vehicle that do not allow a light
transmittance through the window of at least 35%.” Md. Code
Ann., Transp. § 22-406(i)(1)(i) (2014) (“§ 22-406(i)” or “window
tint statute”). Under the statute, a police officer who
observes a vehicle in violation of the tinting statute may stop
the vehicle, charge the driver with the misdemeanor offense, and
issue a safety equipment repair order. Md. Code Ann., Transp.
§ 22-406(i)(2) (2014).
Taylor first argues that § 22-406(i) is
unconstitutionally vague and therefore violates due process.
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Taylor contends that the statute is without guidance so that the
statute permits and encourages discriminatory enforcement by
police officers. Taylor continues that, because the statute is
unconstitutional and the Government and police officers did not
put forward another ground for having reasonable suspicion to
conduct a traffic stop, and the court made erroneous factual
findings in concluding that the stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion, the firearm should have been excluded. The
Government moves to partially dismiss the appeal because
Taylor’s challenge to the constitutionality of the window tint
statute was not preserved.
The clear terms of the plea agreement permit Taylor to
file an appeal contesting the district court’s order denying his
motion to suppress. We find that the question of whether the
constitutionality challenge was before the district court in
defense counsel’s argument is intertwined with the merits of his
challenge to the court’s suppression order and, thus, permits
our review to determine whether the issue was sufficiently
before the district court. We therefore deny the motion.
We next address whether Taylor waived his
constitutionality challenge. It is a “settled rule” that this
court will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal absent exceptional circumstances. See In re Under Seal,
749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014). “Arguments raised in a trial
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court must be specific and in line with those raised on appeal.”
Id. at 287. The argument is waived where the argument below was
“too general to alert the district court to the specific
[objection].” United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 199 (4th
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1506 (2013). “To preserve
an argument on appeal, the [party] must object on the same basis
below as he contends is error on appeal.” United States v.
Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2014).
Taylor’s motion to suppress was a bare motion without
raising any specific objection. It did not cite the Maryland
window tinting statute. The Government filed a responsive
pleading, which did not address the constitutionality of the
statute because it was not on notice that it was being
challenged. At the motion hearing, Taylor did not request that
the court find the statute unconstitutional. While Taylor did
suggest during the hearing that police officers have unfettered
and unconstitutional discretion in determining whether to
initiate a stop based on violation of the statute, Taylor’s
counsel also specifically stated that he was not “challenging
the constitutionality of window tinting as a basis for traffic
stop[s] in general.” (J.A. 88).
The district court’s written memorandum opinion did
not indicate that the constitutionality of the statute was
before it or analyze the traffic stop on that basis. Taylor did
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not move to reconsider based on the court’s failure to address
an argument allegedly raised at the motion hearing. Nor did
counsel at any time identify which portion of the Constitution
was violated by the statute. We determine that this kind of
general argument, without any reliance on legal citation, was
not intended as a constitutionality challenge, a fact enforced
by counsel’s admission that he was “not addressing the
constitutionality of the window tinting.” (J.A. 88). Based on
the record before us, we conclude that Taylor has forfeited
review of this issue.
The only remaining issue preserved for review before
us is whether the district court properly credited Detective
Williams’ testimony regarding the tinting of the windows of the
vehicle in which Taylor was a passenger. We review factual
findings underlying a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United
States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). We may
reverse for clear error only if “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Because the district court denied the motion to
suppress, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Government, the party prevailing below. United States v.
Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir. 2013). We defer to the
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court’s credibility findings. United States v. Griffin, 589
F.3d 148, 150 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009).
The “decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
810 (1996). Observation of any traffic violation, no matter how
minor, gives an officer probable cause to stop the vehicle.
United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 1993). We
conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Detective Williams’ testimony was credible. Taking his
testimony as true, it is clear that the detectives had reason to
believe that the window tint was excessive, and the stop was
therefore proper.
Accordingly, we deny the Government’s motion to
dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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