United States v. Kenneth Brown , 652 F. App'x 200 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4464
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENNETH OLIVER BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:15-cr-00025-HEH-1)
Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: June 16, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Acting Federal Public Defender, Caroline S.
Platt, Mary E Maguire, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United
States Attorney, Stephen E. Anthony, Assistant United States
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth Oliver Brown entered a conditional guilty plea to
one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). On appeal, Brown
argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence and statements obtained after Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) agents stopped him and placed him in
“investigatory detention” for questioning regarding a
prostitution investigation. We affirm the district court’s
judgment.
We review factual findings underlying a district court’s
denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 247
(4th Cir. 2015). “The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable
searches and seizures’ by the Government, and its protections
extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that
fall short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). In such
cases, “the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s
action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that
criminal activity may be afoot.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). “Although a
mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of
suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof
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of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously
less than is necessary for probable cause.” Navarette v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
We employ a “totality of the circumstances” analysis when
determining if an investigatory stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion. United States v. George, 732 F.3d 296, 299 (4th Cir.
2013). Under this approach, “multiple factors may be taken
together to create a reasonable suspicion even where each
factor, taken alone, would be insufficient.” Id. at 300 (4th
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A series of
individual actions by a defendant that in isolation would each
appear innocent or could be supported by an innocent explanation
may, when viewed together, support a finding of reasonable
suspicion. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 277. To this point,
“[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need
not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Id. at 277.
Finally, in forming an “objective basis” for initiating an
investigatory stop, officers may “draw on their own experience
and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions
about the cumulative information available to them.” Id. at 273
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that reasonable
suspicion supports FBI agents’ decision to detain Brown for
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questioning in relation to their ongoing prostitution
investigation. Specifically, FBI agents observed Brown enter a
hotel room occupied by a known prostitute within 10 to 15
minutes of when an FBI agent had scheduled a “date” with the
prostitute. Furthermore, Brown remained in the room while the
prostitute contacted the FBI agent and informed him that she was
ready for the “date.” Relying on their experiences and
specialized training with respect to prostitution
investigations, FBI agents were entitled to conclude that the
timing of Brown entering the hotel room in question, along with
his presence in the room when the prostitute contacted the FBI
agent, created a reasonable probability that Brown was involved
in prostitution, likely as the prostitute’s pimp. Brown’s
continued presence in the hotel following his exit from the room
in question also supported the conclusion that Brown was the
prostitute’s pimp. Accordingly, although one could imagine
innocent explanations for Brown’s presence in the hotel room,
the timing of his presence, combined with the FBI agents’
investigation into the prostitute, provided agents with
reasonable suspicion to believe Brown was involved in
prostitution and to detain him for questioning. *
*
Brown argues that his detention is analogous to the
detention of a random individual in a high crime area. We find
this argument without merit because the hotel room in question
(Continued)
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Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err
in denying Brown’s motion to suppress, and we affirm the
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
was the specific location of a crime, and the timing of Brown’s
presence in the hotel room creates a significantly greater link
to criminal activity than mere presence in a high crime area.
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