Temesgen Abdissa v. UNC Chapel Hill , 635 F. App'x 119 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2187
TEMESGEN TESHOME ABDISSA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNC CHAPEL HILL,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:15-cv-00394-BO)
Submitted: February 29, 2016 Decided: March 3, 2016
Before AGEE, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Temesgen Teshome Abdissa, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Temesgen Teshome Abdissa appeals the district court’s order
granting his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing
his complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
(2012). Abdissa alleged that his former employer discriminated
against him based on his race and national origin, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015). For the reasons
that follow, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for
further proceedings.
A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be liberally
construed. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.
1978). Once construed liberally, however, a federal court must
dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time the court
determines that “the action . . . is frivolous or malicious[,] .
. . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,] or
. . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We review
dismissals of a complaint as frivolous for an abuse of
discretion. Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 254 (4th Cir.
2004)
It does not appear beyond doubt that Abdissa’s complaint
“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566
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F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims
include those whose factual allegations are so nutty,
delusional, or wholly fanciful as to be simply unbelievable.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, even at the Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) stage, a complaint may proceed “even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] facts
is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because the district court dismissed
the complaint without giving Abdissa an opportunity to clarify
his claims, see Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir.
1965) (per curiam) (holding that, if pro se complaint contains
potentially cognizable claim, plaintiff should be given
opportunity to particularize allegations), we vacate the
district court’s order dismissing Abdissa’s complaint as
frivolous and remand to permit Abdissa to amend his complaint
and for further proceedings. We express no opinion as to the
viability of Abdissa’s underlying claims. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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