Frederick Aikens v. William Ingram, Jr. ( 2016 )


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  •                                  PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-2419
    FREDERICK AIKENS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    WILLIAM E. INGRAM, JR., individually and in his capacity as
    Adjutant General of the North Carolina Army National Guard;
    PETER VON JESS, individually and in his capacity as
    Lieutenant Colonel of the North Carolina National Guard,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.   Terrence W. Boyle,
    District Judge. (5:11-cv-00371-BO)
    Argued:   December 9, 2015                   Decided:   January 29, 2016
    Amended:    February 1, 2016
    Before KING, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by published opinion.       Judge Thacker wrote the opinion,
    in which Judge King joined.           Judge Shedd wrote a separate
    concurring opinion.
    ARGUED: William Woodward Webb, Sr., EDMISTEN & WEBB, Raleigh,
    North Carolina, for Appellant.     Gerald Kevin Robbins, NORTH
    CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellees.   ON BRIEF: William Woodward Webb, Jr., EDMISTEN &
    WEBB, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Roy Cooper, North
    Carolina Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
    2
    THACKER, Circuit Judge:
    Colonel Frederick Aikens (“Appellant”) challenges the
    district      court’s     grant    of   summary       judgment        on   his    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
        claim      in   favor    of    two      former       members     of    the   North
    Carolina Army National Guard, Adjutant General William E. Ingram
    (“Ingram”) and Lieutenant Colonel Peter von Jess (“von Jess”)
    (collectively, “Appellees”).                 Appellant alleges that Appellees,
    motivated by revenge, directed other service members to monitor
    Appellant’s      email     messages,         which    he    sent      while      serving    on
    active duty in Kuwait, and to forward incriminating messages to
    von Jess.       Appellant claims this alleged conduct violated his
    Fourth Amendment rights.
    The district court granted summary judgment based on
    the justiciability doctrine set forth in Mindes v. Seaman, 
    453 F.2d 197
       (5th    Cir.   1971)      (providing         a    four-factor        test    for
    reviewability        of   claims    based      on    internal      military       affairs).
    For the reasons that follow -- and acknowledging that Appellant
    now renounces any claim for equitable relief -- we affirm the
    district court on the basis of the military abstention doctrine
    set forth in Feres v. United States, 
    340 U.S. 135
     (1950).
    I.
    The district court’s opinion sets forth the extensive
    procedural history of this case, so we do not relay it here.
    See    Aikens   v.    Ingram,      
    71 F. Supp. 3d 562
    ,    565-66     (E.D.N.C.
    3
    2014).     We recount the following relevant factual background in
    the light most favorable to Appellant, the non-moving party.
    See Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 
    793 F.3d 404
    , 407
    (4th Cir. 2015).
    In    2001,    Appellant,       then    a    member    of   the      North
    Carolina National Guard (“NCNG”), was promoted from executive
    officer to full colonel and commanding officer of the 139th Rear
    Operations        Center    (“ROC”).         After       Appellant’s     promotion,
    Adjutant General Ingram named his longtime friend, von Jess, as
    executive officer in Appellant’s place.                   This assignment meant
    that Appellant was in a supervisory position over von Jess.
    In December 2002, Appellant was instructed to complete
    an officer evaluation report (“OER”) of von Jess.                         Appellant
    gave von Jess a negative OER, which explained that von Jess
    “ha[d]     not    demonstrated    the    ability     to    treat     everyone     with
    dignity and respect and should not be promoted.”                    J.A. 246. 1     Von
    Jess   appealed     the    OER   to   Ingram,   stating      that    Appellant     was
    “purposefully vindictive,” “angry,” “irrational,” and possessed
    “professional jealousy.”          J.A. 247, 257.
    In early 2003, Appellant was called to active duty and
    deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait.               Ingram and von Jess remained in
    1
    Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed
    by the parties in this appeal.
    4
    North Carolina, but the animosity between Appellant and von Jess
    did not subside.            In November 2003, Appellant received notice
    that Specialist Paul Jones and Staff Sergeant Brian McCarthy,
    information technology personnel supporting the 139th ROC, had
    used illegal means to obtain his personal emails for the better
    part       of   2003.      Appellant      learned          that    Jones    and    McCarthy
    forwarded around 130 of those emails to von Jess, who was not
    deployed at the time. 2            Von Jess referenced those emails in a
    memorandum to the North Carolina Governor’s chief of staff.                                In
    that memorandum, von Jess accused Appellant of “unethical and
    unprofessional          behavior   that    .       .   .   shows   criminal       intent    to
    overthrow the Adjutant General,” and he claimed information in
    the emails “parallel[led] treason or mutiny.”                        J.A. 259-60.          Von
    Jess also forwarded the emails to the Department of the Army
    Inspector General (“DAIG”).
    In May 2004, the DAIG informed Appellant that he was
    being investigated for contributing to a hostile command climate
    and    having      inappropriate       relations           with    women.         The   DAIG
    2
    The emails are not included in the record, but according
    to Jones and McCarthy, they included “interesting traffic,”
    i.e., emails to “women [who] were [not Appellant’s] wife,” and
    emails that indicated that Appellant “seemed to be plotting to
    overthrow [Ingram].”    J.A. 264-65 (internal quotation marks
    omitted).     Appellant   classifies  the  emails   as  personal
    correspondence with his family, church members, and his wife,
    specifically, “traffic between my wife and I that only a husband
    and wife should see.” 
    Id. at 296
    .
    5
    concluded that Jones and McCarthy improperly browsed Appellant’s
    email, but it nonetheless used the information in the emails to
    find       six    instances   of     active       duty    misconduct       on   Appellant’s
    part.       The DAIG provided its findings to the Governor of North
    Carolina and Ingram.               Ingram then forwarded the findings to the
    Commander of the First United States Army, Lieutenant General
    Russel       Honoré.          In     July      2005,       Honoré     withdrew         federal
    recognition from Appellant, and he was constructively terminated
    from    the       NCNG.   Appellant         waived       the   withdrawal       hearing    and
    elected to transfer to the retired reserve.
    On April 27, 2006, Appellant sued Appellees pursuant
    to     
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , 3      claiming           that   they      facilitated
    unconstitutional searches and seizures of his personal emails
    while he was deployed in Kuwait.                          In support of his claim,
    Appellant emphasized his turbulent history with von Jess, and a
    special camaraderie between von Jess and Ingram.                             Specifically,
    Appellant         maintains    that    von     Jess      and    Ingram     authorized      and
    directed McCarthy and Jones to monitor Appellant’s emails and
    send incriminating emails to von Jess.
    Appellees     moved        for     summary       judgment,       asserting
    Appellant’s         claims    failed     for      several       reasons.        They   argued
    3Appellant also brought a North Carolina                                 invasion   of
    privacy claim, but he has since abandoned it.
    6
    Appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails
    because    Army   Regulation       380-19,     in    effect        at   the    time   of
    Appellant’s deployment to Camp Doha, made clear that emails sent
    and received over the Department of Defense (“DOD”) computer
    system could be monitored.          See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 380-19,
    Information Systems Security § 4-1(l) (Feb. 27, 1998) (providing
    that the DOD computer system was to be used “only for authorized
    U.S.   government     use”;       use   of    the        system,    “authorized       or
    unauthorized,”     constituted      “consent        to    monitoring”;        and   “all
    communications over the DOD system [could] be monitored”); see
    also J.A. 307.        Appellees also maintained Appellant’s claims
    were nonjusticiable under Feres v. United States, 
    340 U.S. 135
    (1950).
    The district court ultimately agreed that Appellant’s
    claims were nonjusticiable, albeit under the framework set forth
    in Mindes v. Seaman, 
    453 F.2d 197
     (5th Cir. 1971) (providing a
    four-factor test for reviewability of claims based on internal
    military    affairs),      and   granted     Appellees’       motion     for    summary
    judgment.     Appellant timely noted this appeal, and we possess
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    II.
    We    review    the    district     court’s        grant     of     summary
    judgment de novo, “drawing reasonable inferences in the light
    most favorable to the non-moving party.”                   Butler v. Drive Auto.
    7
    Indus. of Am., Inc., 
    793 F.3d 404
    , 407 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal
    quotation    marks       omitted).     “The    court    shall   grant     summary
    judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
    to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.”      Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    III.
    We consider de novo the threshold legal question of
    whether the district court properly abstained from ruling on
    Appellant’s claims.         See Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 
    720 F.3d 505
    , 508
    n.4 (4th Cir. 2013) (describing the applicability of Feres v.
    United States, 
    340 U.S. 135
     (1950), as a “threshold question”);
    see also VonRosenberg v. Lawrence, 
    781 F.3d 731
    , 734 (4th Cir.
    2015) (applying de novo review to abstention questions).
    We first recognize that, at this juncture, Appellant
    is seeking only “damages against [Appellees] in their individual
    capacities.”      Appellant’s Br. 22.          Although in his opening brief
    Appellant claims to seek “a declaration that Appellees’ actions
    be   declared    unlawful      under    the    Fourth   Amendment,”       
    id.,
       he
    abandons any claim for equitable relief in his reply brief, see
    Appellant’s Reply Br. 8 (“Col. Aikens’s claims for damages . . .
    are the only claims he appeals.”); see also Oral Argument at
    8:50-9:15,      Aikens    v.   Ingram,       No.   14-2419   (Dec.   9,    2015),
    8
    available          at     http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-
    to-oral-arguments. 4
    A.
    The       district    court        granted    summary      judgment    on
    Appellant’s claim for equitable relief by relying on the Fifth
    Circuit’s decision in Mindes v. Seaman, 
    453 F.2d 197
     (5th Cir.
    1971), which provides a four-factor test for reviewability of
    claims based on internal military affairs.                      See also Williams v.
    Wilson, 
    762 F.2d 357
    , 359 (4th Cir. 1985) (adopting the Mindes
    test       where     a    servicemember      challenged      the    National     Guard’s
    empaneling of a selective retention board).
    The       parties    agree    that     Mindes      has   traditionally
    applied to actions seeking equitable relief, not damages.                             See
    Appellees’ Br. 40 (observing that this court has “adopted the
    use of the Mindes test in reviewing matters requesting equitable
    relief in          military    actions”      (emphasis      supplied));    Appellant’s
    Reply Br. 8 (“Mindes applies only to equitable relief.”).                          Thus,
    since Appellant has abandoned his claim for equitable relief,
    the    logical          conclusion   is   that     Mindes    has   no    place   in   our
    analysis.
    4
    Appellant likewise fails to challenge the district court’s
    decision that he cannot collect damages from Appellees in their
    official   capacities   pursuant  to   the  Eleventh   Amendment;
    therefore, this argument is waived.     See Yousefi v. INS, 
    260 F.3d 318
    , 326 (4th Cir. 2001).
    9
    However,       some    courts,      including     our    own,   have     sent
    mixed signals regarding whether Mindes applies to claims seeking
    damages.     See, e.g., Wilt v. Gilmore, 62 F. App’x 484, 487 (4th
    Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (relying on Mindes, affirming dismissal
    of racial discrimination claims for $2.5 million in compensatory
    damages    against        Virginia       National       Guard      officers    because
    appellant did not exhaust administrative remedies); Holdiness v.
    Stroud, 
    808 F.2d 417
    , 422-23 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying Mindes
    test to § 1983 action seeking $1 million in damages).
    Without       passing    on    the       continued     viability    of   the
    Mindes    test    in     this   circuit, 5     we    only   observe    that    in    this
    particular       case,    the     test    is    an    ill   fit.      Our     published
    decisions applying the Mindes test dealt with internal personnel
    matters such as challenges to convening of retention boards and
    military discharge.             See Williams, 
    762 F.2d at 359
    ; Guerra v.
    5 Since we adopted the Mindes test in Williams, we have
    applied it only once in a published opinion.      See Guerra v.
    Scruggs, 
    942 F.2d 270
    , 276 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying Mindes test
    to declare unreviewable a servicemember’s challenge to his
    military discharge).   Other circuits have rejected the Mindes
    test outright. See, e.g., Knutson v. Wisconsin Air Nat’l Guard,
    
    995 F.2d 765
    , 768 (7th Cir. 1993) (“We disagree with . . . the
    adoption of the four-factor analysis in Mindes.    As the Third
    Circuit has pointed out, the Mindes approach erroneously
    ‘intertwines the concept of justiciability with the standards to
    be applied to the merits of the case.’” (footnote omitted)
    (quoting Dillard v. Brown, 
    652 F.2d 316
    , 323 (3d Cir. 1981));
    accord Kreis v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 
    866 F.2d 1508
    , 1512
    (D.C. Cir. 1989).
    10
    Scruggs, 
    942 F.2d 270
    , 276 (4th Cir. 1991).                 The case at hand is
    markedly different.         Appellant alleges unconstitutional, ultra
    vires actions by National Guard officers against Appellant while
    he was serving in a federal capacity.                  As such, the Mindes test
    has no place.
    B.
    Nonetheless,       we    must    address       whether     Feres     bars
    Appellant from seeking damages under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .
    1.
    Originally, Feres stood for the proposition that the
    Government     is   not   liable    under   the    Federal    Tort    Claims    Act
    (“FTCA”) “for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise
    out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.”
    
    340 U.S. at 146
     (the “Feres ‘incident to service’ test” or the
    “Feres test”); see also United States v. Johnson, 
    481 U.S. 681
    ,
    690   (1987)   (reaffirming    the    holding      in     Feres   because     “suits
    brought by service members against the Government for injuries
    incurred incident to service . . . are the type[s] of claims
    that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in
    sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline
    and    effectiveness.”       (alteration          in     original)     (emphasis,
    citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Subsequently,      the    Supreme      Court    extended    the    Feres
    “incident to service” test to causes of action outside the FTCA
    11
    realm, including claims against federal officials pursuant to
    Bivens     v.     Six     Unknown       Named        Agents      of     Federal     Bureau   of
    Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971).                      See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace,
    
    462 U.S. 296
    , 300 (1983) (relying on Feres, holding that it
    would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a
    Bivens     remedy        against       their       superior          officers,     explaining,
    “[c]ivilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before
    entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the
    established relationship between enlisted military personnel and
    their superior officers”); United States v. Stanley, 
    483 U.S. 669
    , 684 (1987) (where servicemember sued military officers for
    giving    him     LSD    as     part    of    an     Army     experiment,        holding,    “no
    Bivens remedy is available for injuries that ‘arise out of or
    are in the course of activity incident to service’” (quoting
    Feres, 
    340 U.S. at 146
    )).
    Although Stanley clarified that the Feres “incident to
    service”    test        is     applicable          to   constitutional           claims   under
    Bivens,    the        Supreme    Court       has    not     extended     the     reasoning   of
    Chappell    and        Stanley    and    applied          the    test    to    constitutional
    claims brought against state officers under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .
    Nor have we.           Almost all of our sister circuits, however, have
    done so.        See, e.g., Newton v. Lee, 
    677 F.3d 1017
    , 1025 (10th
    Cir.   2012);         Matreale     v.    N.J.       Dep’t       of    Military     &   Veterans
    Affairs,        
    487 F.3d 150
    ,    154        (3d     Cir.      2007);      Speigner    v.
    12
    Alexander, 
    248 F.3d 1292
    , 1295 (11th Cir. 2001); Jones v. N.Y.
    State Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, 
    166 F.3d 45
    , 51 (2d Cir.
    1999); Bowen v. Oistead, 
    125 F.3d 800
    , 803 & n.2 (9th Cir.
    1997); Wright v. Park, 
    5 F.3d 586
    , 591 (1st Cir. 1993); Knutson
    v. Wisc. Air Nat’l Guard, 
    995 F.2d 765
    , 770 (7th Cir. 1993);
    Watson v. Ark. Nat’l Guard, 
    886 F.2d 1004
    , 1007 (8th Cir. 1989);
    Crawford v. Tex. Army Nat’l Guard, 
    794 F.2d 1034
    , 1036 (5th Cir.
    1986); see also Bois v. Marsh, 
    801 F.2d 462
    , 470 (D.C. Cir.
    1986) (applying Feres to an intramilitary damages action under
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1985
    (3)).
    2.
    We join our sister circuits in extending the Feres
    “incident to service” test to § 1983 actions.                      This result is
    supported    by    Supreme    Court    jurisprudence         and    respects       the
    delicate separation of powers necessary for smooth and effective
    military governance.
    First,    because   suits       under    both   § 1983    and    Bivens
    address   constitutional      infringements         by   government    officials,
    the Supreme Court’s holding in Stanley is logically applicable
    to § 1983 claims against state officials.                Indeed, the Court has
    declared, “[I]n the absence of congressional direction to the
    contrary, there is no basis for according to federal officials a
    higher    degree     of   immunity    from    liability      when    sued    for    a
    constitutional     infringement       as    authorized      by   Bivens     than   is
    13
    accorded state officials when sued for the identical violation
    under § 1983.”     Butz v. Economou, 
    438 U.S. 478
    , 500 (1978).
    This   precept     is    especially   important     in    a   case
    involving   National   Guard    service    members,   as   §   1983   actions
    would create the same “degree of disruption” to Guard affairs as
    Bivens actions would to “military discipline and decisionmaking
    . . . [in a federalized] military regime.”            Stanley, 
    483 U.S. at 682-83
    .   The Second Circuit explained,
    absent     some       reasoned     distinction,
    justiciability     of    constitutional    tort
    actions   incident    to   federal  and   state
    military service should be co-extensive.
    This is particularly true in light of the
    central role the National Guard plays in the
    national defense and the close working
    relationship between the National Guard and
    the United States Army. The policy concerns
    are the same in both contexts.         Allowing
    § 1983 actions based on injuries arising
    incident to service in the Guard would
    disrupt   military    service   and   undermine
    military discipline to the same extent as
    allowing Bivens actions based on injuries
    arising incident to service in the United
    States Army.
    Jones, 
    166 F.3d at 51-52
    .           We find this reasoning sensible and
    persuasive.
    Second, we generally decline to expand liability for
    injuries arising from military service so as not to tread on the
    delicate balance of power among the branches of government.                The
    Supreme Court has cautioned against interference with military
    disputes in the absence of explicit congressional approval.                See
    14
    Dep’t   of    Navy    v.     Egan,      
    484 U.S. 518
    ,    530    (1988)          (“[U]nless
    Congress       specifically             has         provided       otherwise,                  courts
    traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority
    of the Executive in military . . . affairs.”); Feres, 
    340 U.S. at 146
     (declining to draw out a cause of action against military
    personnel      under        the    FTCA        “absen[t]         express          congressional
    command”).
    Likewise,        this      circuit       has   been       wary       of     endorsing
    actions      for     damages      in     military        contexts.               In     Lebron       v.
    Rumsfeld, for example, a designated enemy combatant and al Qaeda
    member, Jose Padilla, alleged numerous constitutional violations
    at   the     hands     of     military         officers,        including             torture    and
    unlawful designation and detention of enemy combatants.                                    See 
    670 F.3d 540
    , 546-47 (4th Cir. 2012).                        Padilla urged this court to
    imply a new Bivens cause of action for money damages against DOD
    officials based on “a range of policy judgments pertaining to
    the designation and treatment of enemy combatants.”                                   
    Id. at 547
    .
    Declining     to     do     so,   we     noted       the    “explicit            constitutional
    delegation of control over military affairs” to the political
    branches     of    government.            
    Id. at 549
    .         We    also        observed,
    “whenever      the     Supreme         Court    has      considered          a        Bivens     case
    involving the military, it has concluded that ‘the insistence
    . . . with which the Constitution confers authority over the
    Army,   Navy,      and      militia     upon     the     political          branches       .     .   .
    15
    counsels hesitation in our creation of damages remedies in this
    field.’”           
    Id. at 550
       (quoting     Stanley,       
    483 U.S. at 682
    )
    (alterations in original)); see also Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 
    720 F.3d 505
    ,    510   (4th       Cir.    2013)    (where     current     and     former    service
    members alleged they were victims of rape and sexual harassment
    during    military        service,       holding   that     no    Bivens      remedy     was
    available, explaining, “It is clear that expansion of a Bivens-
    based    cause      of    action      [for   monetary      damages       in   a   military
    context] is the exception, not the rule.”).
    We    see    no    reason,     then,    to    allow       damages    actions
    pursuant to § 1983 against state officials for injuries suffered
    incident      to    service     --    that   the   Supreme       Court    has     expressly
    foreclosed against federal officials -- when Congress has not
    expressly      authorized        them.       Cf.   Crawford,       
    794 F.2d at 1036
    (“Section 1983 . . . claims, like those predicated on Bivens,
    invite judicial second-guessing of military actions and tend to
    overlap       the         remedial       structure         created        within        each
    service . . . .” (emphasis supplied)).                     We thus join our sister
    circuits in applying the Feres test to § 1983 suits for damages
    based on injuries sustained incident to service.
    3.
    We now address whether the Feres “incident to service”
    test bars relief in the case at hand.                   To do so, we ask whether
    the injuries of which Appellant complains -- search and seizure
    16
    of his emails in violation of the Fourth Amendment -- “ar[o]se
    out of or [we]re in the course of activity incident to service.”
    Feres, 
    340 U.S. at 146
    ; Cioca, 720 F.3d at 511.
    In the nearly 70 years since the decision, Feres and
    its progeny have failed to produce a specific element-based or
    bright-line rule regarding what type of conduct is “incident to
    service.”       See United States v. Shearer, 
    473 U.S. 52
    , 57 (1985)
    (“The Feres       doctrine      cannot    be      reduced    to    a     few   bright-line
    rules . . . .”).         Indeed, the Supreme Court “explicitly rejected
    a ‘special factors’ analysis which would consider how military
    discipline would actually be affected in a particular case.”
    Ricks     v.    Nickels,       
    295 F.3d 1124
    ,       1130    (10th       Cir.      2002)
    (discussing      Stanley,      
    483 U.S. at 681
    ).         Rather,      we   look    to
    “whether       ‘particular     suits     would      call    into     question       military
    discipline       and    decisionmaking         [and      would]        require      judicial
    inquiry    into,       and    hence    intrusion       upon,      military       matters.’”
    Cioca,    720    F.3d    at    515    (quoting      Stanley,       
    483 U.S. at 682
    )
    (alteration in original).               In other words, “where a complaint
    asserts injuries that stem from the relationship between the
    plaintiff       and    the    plaintiff’s      service       in    the    military,        the
    ‘incident to service’ test is implicated.”                     
    Id.
    If this explanation sounds broad and amorphous, it is.
    Feres    has    grown    so    broad    that      this     court     once      noted,    “the
    Supreme Court has embarked on a course dedicated to broadening
    17
    the Feres         doctrine    to    encompass,         at     a    minimum,        all    injuries
    suffered by military personnel that are even remotely related to
    the individual’s status as a member of the military.”                                        Stewart
    v. United States, 
    90 F.3d 102
    , 105 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting
    Major v. United States, 
    835 F.2d 641
    , 6644 (6th Cir. 1987))
    (alteration        omitted)       (emphases       in     original);          see    also       Erwin
    Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 622 (5th ed. 2007) (“The law
    is    now    settled       that    Bivens        suits      are      never    permitted           for
    constitutional         violations         arising      from        military        service,        no
    matter      how    severe     the    injury       or     how       egregious        the      rights
    infringement.”).
    Along    these       lines,    we     know       that    the     situs         of   the
    injury is not as important as “whether the suit requires the
    civilian     court     to    second-guess         military         decisions        .    .    .   and
    whether the suit might impair essential military discipline.”
    Shearer, 
    473 U.S. at 57
    .                 We also know that a plaintiff need not
    be on duty, see 
    id.
     (Feres barred suit where off-duty soldier
    was injured off-base by another soldier), and application of the
    Feres test does not depend on the military status of the alleged
    offender, see United States v. Johnson, 
    481 U.S. 681
    , 686 (1987)
    (“[T]his Court has never suggested that the military status of
    the   alleged       tortfeasor      is     crucial       to    the    application            of   the
    doctrine.”).          We     do    not    even    need        to   inquire     “whether           the
    discrete injuries to the victim were committed in support of the
    18
    military mission.”       Cioca, 720 F.3d at 515 (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Indeed,
    “Incident to service” is not, of course, a
    narrow term restricted to actual military
    operations such as field maneuvers or small
    arms instruction.    It has been held that a
    member   of  the   military   is   engaged   in
    activity incident to his military service
    when   he   is   enjoying   a    drink   in   a
    noncommissioned officers club, and when he
    is   riding  a   donkey   during   a   ballgame
    sponsored by the Special Services division
    of a naval air station, and while swimming
    in a swimming pool at an airbase.
    Hass for Use & Benefit of U.S. v. United States, 
    518 F.2d 1138
    ,
    1141 (4th Cir. 1975) (internal citations omitted) (holding that
    Feres    barred   suit   when   an    active-duty    serviceman,    who   was
    temporarily on off-duty status, was injured when riding a horse
    he rented from a Marine Corps stable at Cherry Point military
    base).     As one might imagine, decisions on this point have run
    the gamut.     Compare Stewart, 
    90 F.3d at 104-05
     (concluding that
    appellant’s injuries from a car accident with another service
    member were “incident to service” where appellant “was on active
    duty at the time of the accident”; “the collision occurred on
    the grounds of a military base”; and appellant “was engaged in
    activity     directly    related     to    the   performance   of   military
    obligations when he was injured”); with Ricks, 
    295 F.3d at 1132
    (Ricks’s injuries were “incident to service,” even though he had
    19
    been fully discharged and was in a military prison at the time
    of    the    injuries,         because     he     was      incarcerated          for    offenses
    committed during active duty).
    Against          this     backdrop,       we        readily       conclude       that
    Appellant’s alleged injuries arose out of activity incident to
    service.      Appellant was on active duty, deployed in a war zone,
    and   used    a       computer    system        set   up     by    the    DOD    for     military
    personnel         deployed       at    Camp     Doha.        His     computer          usage   was
    indisputably regulated by AR 380-19, which clearly stated that
    the system was to be used “only for authorized U.S. government
    use”;       use       of   the        system,     “authorized            or     unauthorized,”
    constituted        “consent       to     monitoring”;         and    “all       communications
    over the DOD system [could] be monitored.”                               J.A. 307.         Taking
    Appellant’s allegations as true, Ingram and von Jess directed
    Jones and McCarthy to monitor Appellant’s emails on this DOD
    computer system and forward them along because they wished to
    enact revenge against him.                 Appellant may claim that this is an
    “egregious        .    .   .    infringement”         of     his    rights,       Chemerinsky,
    Federal Jurisdiction at 622, but there is no question that the
    alleged infringement occurred incident to Appellant’s military
    service.
    That Appellant was a National Guardsman serving in a
    federal capacity does not change the result.                                  It is true that
    when National Guardsmen are called to active duty, they “lose
    20
    their status as members of the state militia . . . .”                                         Perpich
    v.    Department         of    Defense,             
    496 U.S. 334
    ,      347          (1990).
    Nonetheless, Feres has barred suit where a member of the state’s
    National Guard, but also a dual-status federal technician, sued
    the state adjutant general under § 1983 for conduct occurring
    when he was serving in both capacities.                              See Walch v. Adjutant
    Gen.’s Dep’t of Texas, 
    533 F.3d 289
    , 296 (5th Cir. 2008); see
    also Misko v. United States, 
    453 F. Supp. 513
    , 514 (D.D.C. 1978)
    (“[T]here    is    no    longer         any    question        that     Feres       applies        with
    equal force to members of the National Guard whose injuries are
    incident    to    active      military         duty.”).          The     Third      Circuit        has
    similarly    explained         that      “concern         for    the    disruption            of   the
    unique relationship of military personnel to their superiors and
    to other military personnel” could result “if one could hale
    another into court as a result of activity incident to military
    service.”         Matreale         v.    N.J.       Dep’t       of    Military       &    Veterans
    Affairs, 
    487 F.3d 150
    , 158 (3d Cir. 2007).                               And we agree this
    concern is “equally as compelling in the context of lawsuits
    brought by [full-time state duty] guardsmen . . . as it is in
    the   context      of    lawsuits         brought         by     [federal        active        duty]
    guardsmen.”       
    Id.
    Nor    does       it    matter      that      at     the    time    of       the   email
    monitoring       and    forwarding,           Appellees        were    not     in    Appellant’s
    direct   chain     of    command.             See    Stanley,          
    483 U.S. at
       680-81
    21
    (“Feres did      not    consider      the    officer-subordinate       relationship
    crucial,   but       established      instead      [the]   ‘incident     to    service’
    test . . . .”); cf. Johnson, 
    481 U.S. at 686
     (“[T]his Court has
    never   suggested        that    the    military        status    of   the     alleged
    tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine.”).
    For        these     reasons,          we    abstain   from        reviewing
    Appellant’s      §    1983    claim    based       on   the   Feres    “incident     to
    service” test, and we thus affirm, albeit on other grounds, the
    district court’s dismissal of this case.
    IV.
    Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the district
    court is
    AFFIRMED.
    22
    SHEDD, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I    agree    with       the    majority    that     the     Feres     “incident      to
    service”      test    warrants         our   abstention       from    reviewing        Aikens’
    § 1983 claim. Although that determination is dispositive of this
    appeal, I write briefly to express my view that even if Feres
    were inapplicable, the summary judgment is affirmable based on
    Aikens’ failure to present sufficient evidence to withstand the
    summary judgment motion.
    Aikens’ § 1983 claim is based on his contention that Ingram
    and von Jess violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and Aikens
    “grounds       his    Fourth          Amendment      claims    in         [their]    personal
    involvement in the searches and seizures of his emails.” Reply
    Brief, at 12. In moving for summary judgment, Ingram and von
    Jess presented evidence showing that they were not personally
    involved      in     the    email      monitoring.      Despite       having        had   ample
    opportunity, Aikens has failed to present any evidence to create
    a   genuine     issue      of    material     fact    tending        to    show     otherwise.
    Instead, as the district court found, the record establishes
    that       Ingram    and    von       Jess   “were    not     involved,        directly      or
    indirectly, in the [email] monitoring,” and “[n]o evidence has
    been presented that demonstrates either defendant knew how the
    emails were obtained. . . .” Aikens v. Ingram, 
    71 F.Supp.3d 562
    ,
    571-72 (E.D.N.C. 2014).
    23
    Aikens’ entire case is premised on conclusory allegations
    and speculation. Of course, such “evidence” is insufficient to
    withstand   summary    judgment.      Humphreys     &    Partners   Architects,
    L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 
    790 F.3d 532
    , 540 (4th Cir. 2015).
    Accordingly, Aikens’ § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law. For
    this   reason,   in   addition   to   the   Feres       “incident   to   service”
    test, I believe the summary judgment should be affirmed.
    24
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-2419

Filed Date: 2/1/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/5/2016

Authorities (27)

Chappell v. Wallace , 103 S. Ct. 2362 ( 1983 )

Wright v. Park , 5 F.3d 586 ( 1993 )

Newton v. Lee , 677 F.3d 1017 ( 2012 )

Frank D. Jones v. New York State Division of Military and ... , 166 F.3d 45 ( 1999 )

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of ... , 91 S. Ct. 1999 ( 1971 )

Feres v. United States , 71 S. Ct. 153 ( 1950 )

United States v. Stanley , 107 S. Ct. 3054 ( 1987 )

Richard M. Crawford v. Texas Army National Guard, Bruce A. ... , 794 F.2d 1034 ( 1986 )

50-fair-emplpraccas-1718-51-empl-prac-dec-p-39332-john-c-watson-v , 886 F.2d 1004 ( 1989 )

Perpich v. Department of Defense , 110 S. Ct. 2418 ( 1990 )

Reid Knutson v. Wisconsin Air National Guard and Gerald D. ... , 995 F.2d 765 ( 1993 )

Jon Edward Hass, for the Sole Use and Benefit of the United ... , 518 F.2d 1138 ( 1975 )

Wofton J. Stewart v. United States , 90 F.3d 102 ( 1996 )

Misko v. United States , 453 F. Supp. 513 ( 1978 )

Michael G. Holdiness v. A.M. Stroud, Jr. , 808 F.2d 417 ( 1987 )

frances-e-dillard-v-harold-brown-secretary-of-defense-of-the-united , 652 F.2d 316 ( 1981 )

Ricks v. Nickels , 295 F.3d 1124 ( 2002 )

captain-joyce-l-bois-v-john-o-marsh-jr-in-his-official-capacity-as , 801 F.2d 462 ( 1986 )

John F. Kreis v. Secretary of the Air Force , 866 F.2d 1508 ( 1989 )

Gene Hal Williams v. John A. Wilson, Iii, as Adjutant ... , 762 F.2d 357 ( 1985 )

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