Nathan Cole v. Gregory Holloway ( 2016 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-7224
    NATHAN K. COLE,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    GREGORY L. HOLLOWAY, Regional Admin.; C. W. CARPINO,
    Housing   Unit    Mgr.;   B.  D.   SCHUYLER,  Institutional
    Investigator;    L.    WYCHE,  Sergeant;   J.   A.   GUILL,
    Captain/Officer In Charge; TRACY RAY, Warden; L. A. WATSON,
    Hearing Officer,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria.   Liam O’Grady, District
    Judge. (1:15-cv-00413-LO-JFA)
    Submitted:   January 21, 2016             Decided:   February 1, 2016
    Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    Nathan K. Cole, Appellant Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Nathan K. Cole appeals from the district court’s orders
    dismissing a portion of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (2012) complaint
    with prejudice for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915A(b)(1)     (2012),       and   dismissing       the        remainder    of   the
    complaint    without     prejudice      for    failure     to     particularize     his
    claims.    We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
    We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure
    to state a claim pursuant to § 1915A.                    Slade v. Hampton Rds.
    Reg’l     Jail,   
    407 F.3d 243
    ,    248    (4th     Cir.       2005)     (citation
    omitted).     Pursuant to § 1915A, a district court shall dismiss a
    case at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous
    or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
    granted.     28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).             Allegations in a complaint
    are to be liberally construed, and a court should not dismiss an
    action for failure to state a claim “‘unless after accepting all
    well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true
    and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts
    in the plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff
    cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling
    him to     relief.’”     De’Lonta v. Angelone, 
    330 F.3d 630
    , 633 (4th
    Cir. 2003) (quoting Veney v. Wyche, 
    293 F.3d 726
    , 730 (4th Cir.
    2002)).      Courts     are   instructed      that   pro     se    filings    “however
    2
    unskillfully pleaded, must be liberally construed.”                                    Noble v.
    Barnett, 
    24 F.3d 582
    , 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994).
    Dismissing Cole’s claim that he was improperly charged with
    a disciplinary conviction and false promises were made regarding
    its disposition, the district court correctly noted the general
    legal proposition that a false disciplinary charge cannot serve
    as   the      basis    for    a       constitutional         claim.        See      Freeman   v.
    Rideout, 
    808 F.2d 949
    , 951 (2d Cir. 1986).                                 Accordingly, we
    agree with the district court that Cole failed to state a claim
    in this regard.          However, we note that there are exceptions to
    this rule.       See Sprouse v. Babcock, 
    870 F.2d 450
    , 452 (8th Cir.
    1989)    (holding      that       a    disciplinary          charge      may   be    actionable
    under § 1983 if retaliatory); Suprenant v. Rivas, 
    424 F.3d 5
    ,
    13-14 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding (in case of pre-trial detainee)
    that unprincipled manipulation of legitimate prison regulations,
    to      the      detriment             of        a       prisoner,        can        constitute
    unconstitutionally arbitrary punishment).                          Cole did not allege a
    motivation behind the Defendants’ alleged actions.                                  However, if
    Cole    could     prove      a        set   of       facts    showing      unconstitutional
    retaliation       or     arbitrary            punishment,          the     allegedly      false
    disciplinary          charges         might      support       a      claim      for    relief.
    Accordingly, we modify the dismissal of these claims to show it
    is without prejudice, and we affirm as modified.
    3
    Turning      to    the   remainder       of    the     dismissal,       an    order
    dismissing a complaint without prejudice is not an appealable
    final order if “the plaintiff could save his action by merely
    amending his complaint.”              Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers
    Local    Union    392,    
    10 F.3d 1064
    ,     1066–67      (4th    Cir.    1993).    In
    Domino Sugar, we held that if “the grounds of the dismissal make
    clear     that    no     amendment     could        cure     the    defects    in     the
    plaintiff's case, the order dismissing the complaint is final in
    fact” and therefore appealable. 
    Id. at 1066
     (quoting Coniston
    Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 
    844 F.2d 461
    , 463 (7th Cir.
    1988)).     Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss for
    failure    to    plead    sufficient    facts       in     the   complaint,    we    lack
    appellate       jurisdiction    because       the    plaintiff      could    amend    the
    complaint to cure the pleading deficiency.                       Goode v. Central VA
    Legal Aid Society, 
    807 F.3d 619
    , 624 (4th Cir. 2015).
    Here, the district court dismissed the remainder of the
    complaint without prejudice.            While the district court dismissed
    the complaint for failure to comply with a court order, the
    court had previously found that Cole’s claims had the potential
    to state a claim, although his complaint currently failed to do
    so.     Because Cole could refile an amended complaint curing the
    deficiencies noted by the district court, the portion of the
    court’s     judgment       dismissing         Cole’s        remaining       claims     is
    unappealable.
    4
    Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in formal pauperis
    and   affirm     the   district   court’s   dismissal   of    Cole’s    “false”
    disciplinary charge claim but modify the order to show that the
    dismissal is without prejudice.              As to the remainder of the
    district court’s judgment, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
    We    dispense    with   oral   argument    because   the   facts   and   legal
    contentions      are   adequately   presented   in    the   materials     before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART;
    DISMISSED IN PART
    5