Kenneth Lucero v. Wayne Early , 632 F. App'x 142 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1305
KENNETH LUCERO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WAYNE A. EARLY; MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE;
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:13-cv-01036-JFM)
Submitted: December 22, 2015 Decided: February 5, 2016
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sean R. Day, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. George A.
Nilson, Steven J. Potter, Glenn R. Marrow, Ashley E. McFarland,
BALTIMORE CITY LAW DEPARTMENT, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth Lucero seeks to appeal the district court’s order
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint against the
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and the Baltimore City
Police Department (collectively, “municipal Defendants”). This
court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral
orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949).
Because Lucero’s claims against Officer Wayne Early remain
pending in the district court, the order Lucero seeks to appeal
is not a final order. * Nor is it an appealable interlocutory or
collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack
*
The parties dispute whether the claims against Officer
Early, contained in Counts 1, 4, and 5 of the amended complaint,
remain pending in the district court. In those Counts, Lucero
challenged Officer Early’s enforcement of Baltimore’s policy
restricting leafletting in certain areas, including a claim that
Officer Early selectively enforced the policy based on the
viewpoint of the leafletters. We find that the district court’s
order is ambiguous regarding its finality. Although the court
stated, “This action is dismissed,” it did not specifically
address the claims against Officer Early in its opinion and the
motion it granted only sought dismissal of the claims against
the municipal Defendants. We conclude that the court’s
ambiguous order is insufficient to confer jurisdiction to this
court. See Reinholdson v. Minnesota, 346 F.3d 847, 849 (8th
Cir. 2003) (“To be final, an order or judgment must reflect some
clear and unequivocal manifestation by the trial court of its
belief that the decision made, so far as the court is concerned,
is the end of the case.” (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
2
of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED
3