United States v. Ronald Johnson ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4552
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD SHANE JOHNSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:13-cr-00152-RBH-1)
Submitted: December 16, 2013 Decided: January 13, 2014
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William E. Day, II, Assistant
United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Shane Johnson pled guilty without a plea
agreement to failure to register as a sex offender, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). He was sentenced to imprisonment of
twelve months and one day. Johnson now appeals. His attorney
has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), raising three issues but stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal. Johnson was advised of his right
to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not filed such a
brief. We affirm.
Johnson’s arguments on appeal have no merit. He first
contends that the district court did not comply with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11. Our review of the transcript of the Rule 11
proceeding reveals, however, that the court fully complied with
the Rule and, further, that Johnson’s plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered.
Johnson next argues that his sentence is unreasonable.
Our review of the record, including the presentence
investigation report and the sentencing transcript, discloses
that his sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable
and that the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a
sentence below Johnson’s Guidelines range. See United States v.
Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 2011).
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Finally, we reject Johnson’s argument that the
district court erred when it imposed as special conditions of
release the requirements that he undergo sex offender treatment
and pay for sex offender, substance abuse, and mental health
treatment in accordance with the Probation Office’s directive.
First, in light of the recent nature of the underlying sex
offense and Johnson’s subsequent, inappropriate contact with
minors following that conviction, mandating sex offender
treatment did not constitute an abuse of discretion warranting
remand. See United State v. Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d 71, 74-76
(1st Cir. 2013). Second, requiring offenders to pay for all or
part of court-ordered treatment is statutorily authorized and
does not constitute an improper delegation to the Probation
Office of the district court’s authority. See 18 U.S.C. § 3672
(2006); United States v. Smith, 55 Fed. App’x 716 (5th Cir
2002). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion
warranting remand with respect to this special condition.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Johnson’s conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Johnson, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Johnson requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
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then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the
motion was served on Johnson.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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