Uriel Ventura v. Jefferson Sessions, III , 680 F. App'x 192 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1804
URIEL ALEJANDRO VENTURA, a/k/a Alejandro Ventura Uriel,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: February 15, 2017 Decided: February 27, 2017
Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. Rob Heroy, GOODMAN, CARR PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, John S. Hogan, Assistant Director, Todd J.
Cochran, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Uriel Alejandro Ventura, a native and citizen of Mexico,
petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s order
denying his request for a second hearing on his application for
cancellation of removal, denying his motion for a fifth
continuance, and ordering Ventura removed to Mexico. For the
reasons that follow, we deny the petition for review.
Ventura first contends that the immigration judge erred in
refusing to allow Ventura to present new evidence and testimony
at what would have been a second hearing on his application for
cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2012).
We disagree. The Board reversed the immigration judge’s initial
decision granting Ventura cancellation of removal, finding clear
error in the immigration judge’s analysis of the hardship
factors. Although the Board later vacated the order of removal
to allow Ventura to pursue voluntary departure and any other
relief to which he may be qualified, it denied Ventura’s motion
for reconsideration of its order reversing the immigration
judge’s grant of relief. Thus, we agree with the Attorney
General that Ventura’s application for cancellation of removal
was fully adjudicated and rejected at the time his proceedings
were remanded to the immigration court. Nor do we discern any
error with the Board’s consideration of the evidence Ventura
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later proffered to support his request for a second hearing,
which led to its finding that this evidence would not have
impacted the relevant hardship analysis.
Ventura also complains that, in rejecting his request for a
second individual hearing on his application for cancellation of
removal, the agency violated his right to due process. Ventura,
however, cannot state a colorable due process claim because he
has no liberty or property interest in cancellation of removal.
See Aparicio-Brito v. Lynch, 824 F.3d 674, 684 (7th Cir. 2016)
(cancellation of removal is “a form of discretionary relief in
which there is no liberty interest at stake” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 500,
508 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that “[n]o property or liberty
interest can exist when the relief sought is discretionary”),
abrogated on other grounds by Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1
(2008).
Finally, Ventura’s petition for review implicates the
immigration judge’s denial of his motion for a fifth continuance
of his removal proceedings. An immigration judge “may grant a
continuance for good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2016).
We review the denial of a motion for a continuance for abuse of
discretion. Lendo v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 439, 441 (4th Cir.
2007). We will uphold the denial of a continuance “unless it
was made without a rational explanation, it inexplicably
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departed from established policies, or it rested on an
impermissible basis, e.g., invidious discrimination against a
particular race or group.” Id. at 441 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Upon review of the record and Ventura’s claims, we
discern no abuse of discretion in the denial of a continuance in
this case.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We further
deny the Attorney General’s motion to strike the unpublished
Board decisions filed by Ventura in conjunction with his brief.
See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(b). We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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