United States v. Troy D. Stewart , 699 F. App'x 281 ( 2017 )


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  •                                     UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 17-4155
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    TROY D. STEWART,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
    Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District Judge. (3:08-cr-00245-HEH-1)
    Submitted: October 17, 2017                                   Decided: November 1, 2017
    Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, OFFICE OF THE
    FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Valencia Roberts, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
    Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Troy D. Stewart was charged with violating various conditions of his supervised
    release. At a hearing at which Stewart admitted committing the violations, the district
    court revoked release and sentenced Stewart to 24 months in prison. Stewart appeals. His
    attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967),
    questioning whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable but concluding that there are no
    meritorious issues for appeal. Stewart was advised of his right to file a pro se brief but
    has not filed such a brief. We affirm.
    “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is
    not ‘plainly unreasonable.’” United States v. Webb, 
    738 F.3d 638
    , 640 (4th Cir. 2013)
    (quoting United States v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d 433
    , 438 (4th Cir. 2006)). The record
    establishes that Stewart was sentenced within the statutory maximum term of two years,
    see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3) (2012). The remaining question is whether the sentence is
    plainly unreasonable.
    “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must
    first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 
    595 F.3d 544
    , 546 (4th Cir. 2010). Only if we find a sentence to be unreasonable will we consider
    whether it is “plainly” so. United States v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d at 440
    .
    A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court considered
    the Chapter Seven policy statement range and the applicable 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2012)
    sentencing factors. 
    Id.
     A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court
    stated a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence
    2
    imposed, up to the statutory maximum. 
    Id.
     “A court need not be as detailed or specific
    when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction
    sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.”
    United States v. Thompson, 
    595 F.3d 544
    , 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    We conclude that Stewart’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable.
    The district court stated that it had considered relevant § 3553(a) factors, and the court
    was aware of Stewart’s policy statement range of 8-14 months.           Further, the court
    provided a sufficiently individualized assessment in fashioning the revocation sentence.
    In this regard, the court took note of Stewart’s significant criminal record, his having
    absconded from a previous term of supervision, his breach of trust and his failure to abide
    by the conditions of supervised release.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have
    found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm. This court requires that
    counsel inform Stewart, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
    United States for further review. If Stewart requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
    believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
    leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on Stewart.
    3
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-4155

Citation Numbers: 699 F. App'x 281

Judges: Niemeyer, King, Shedd

Filed Date: 11/1/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024