United States v. Juan Willis ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4454
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JUAN CARLOS WILLIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:12-cr-00623-PJM-2)
Submitted: August 1, 2016 Decided: August 11, 2016
Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian K. McDaniel, MCDANIEL LAW GROUP, PLLC, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Sujit
Raman, Chief of Appeals, Leslie Caldwell, Assistant Attorney
General, Sung-Hee Sun, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
James I. Pearce, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Juan Carlos Willis appeals his convictions for conspiracy
to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012),
and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1) (2012). On appeal, Willis alleges that the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, and alleges that the court’s
statements at the plea hearing amounted to improper
participation in plea negotiations. We affirm.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 383 (4th Cir. 2012). “A
district court abuses its discretion when it acts in an
arbitrary manner, when it fails to consider
judicially-recognized factors limiting its discretion, or when
it relies on erroneous factual or legal premises.” Id.
Although there is “no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea,”
courts may permit it where “the defendant can show a fair and
just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Id. at 383-84.
“The most important consideration in resolving a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is an evaluation of the Rule 11 colloquy
at which the guilty plea was accepted. Thus, . . . the inquiry
is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both
counseled and voluntary.” Id. In determining whether a
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defendant has established a fair and just reason for withdrawing
the plea, courts should consider the six factors identified in
United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991).
In reviewing the district court’s denial of Willis’ motion,
we note that the court conducted a thorough and appropriate plea
colloquy and confirmed multiple times that Willis was knowingly
and voluntarily pleading guilty. Consequently, “there is a
strong presumption that [Willis’] plea is valid and binding.”
Nicholson, 676 F.3d at 384. Moreover, the district court
reliably applied the Moore factors to the facts of this case.
We therefore cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Willis’ motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.
As to Willis’ second argument, although Willis attempted to
withdraw his guilty plea, he did not assert in the district
court any issue related to the court’s involvement in plea
negotiations; we therefore review the district court’s
participation in the process for plain error only. United
States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2150 (2013).
“To prevail on a claim of plain error, [an appellant] must
demonstrate not only that the district court plainly erred, but
also that this error affected his substantial rights.” United
States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 2014). “In the
Rule 11 context, [appellant] must demonstrate a reasonable
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probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded
guilty.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if a
plain error occurred, we will not correct the error unless it
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
We conclude that Willis has failed to establish plain error
in the district court’s statement during the plea hearing.
First, the court’s disputed comment was not coercive. It was
made well into the plea hearing, after Willis stated that he
wished to plead guilty and had admitted to the factual basis set
forth by the Government, while the court was considering whether
it could accept Willis’ guilty plea. After Willis hesitated in
admitting his guilt, the court emphasized that “the facts that
have been recited” by the Government and agreed to by Willis “do
constitute the crimes” charged. The court was not stating that
Willis was in fact guilty, but was merely informing Willis that
the facts he had admitted were sufficient to establish guilt for
the crimes charged.
The court’s comment “occurred during the district judge's
attempts to ensure that [Willis] was knowingly and voluntarily
entering into the agreement, which the judge, of course, was
required to do,” militating against a finding of coercion.
United States v. Cannady, 283 F.3d 641, 645-46 (4th Cir. 2002).
Furthermore, the court did not suggest that Willis “should plead
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guilty or otherwise advocate[] a particular course of action.”
Id. at 645.
The court did not “intimate that a plea” was in Willis’
best interests or suggest that Willis would receive a more
favorable sentence in exchange for pleading guilty. Sanya, 774
F.3d at 816. Nor did the court comment on the perceived
strength of the Government’s case or state that it believed the
Government would actually be able to prove at trial the factual
basis that it had set forth. Rather, the district court
attempted to resolve the inconsistent positions taken by Willis
when he agreed with the factual basis provided by the
Government, but hesitated to state that he was guilty of the
crimes charged.
Because the single, isolated comment occurred toward the
end of the plea hearing, after Willis had accepted the plea
agreement, conceded to a factual basis, and professed his desire
to plead guilty, no error occurred. See United States v.
Braxton, 784 F.3d 240, 243-44 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that error
occurred because “[t]his is not a case involving a single or
even a few brief remarks by the court, or comment made only
after a plea agreement already has been reached.”).
Accordingly, we affirm Willis’ convictions. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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