United States v. Marc Wertz , 491 F. App'x 442 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4503
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARC LEE WERTZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00135-TDS-1)
Submitted: December 20, 2012 Decided: December 26, 2012
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marc Lee Wertz appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twenty-
four months’ imprisonment. Wertz’s attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but raising two
issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in
revoking his supervised release, and (2) whether his sentence
was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
First, we review a district court’s judgment revoking
supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
of discretion, United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
Cir. 1992). Here, we find none. To revoke supervised release,
a district court need only find a violation of a condition of
supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (2006), and here Wertz admitted committing new
crimes while on release. Wertz’s convictions on state drug
charges provided the factual basis to support the revocation.
Second, we will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed
statutory range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439–40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider
whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable. Id. at 438-39. In this initial inquiry, we take
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a more deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for guidelines
sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2007). Only if we find the sentence procedurally or
substantively unreasonable must we decide whether it is
“plainly” so. Id. at 657.
While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven
policy statements of the Sentencing Guidelines and the statutory
factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§
3553(a), 3583(e) (2006), the court need not robotically tick
through every subsection, and ultimately, the court has broad
discretion to revoke the previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum. Moulden, at 656–57.
Moreover, while a district court must provide a statement of
reasons for the sentence, the court need not be as detailed or
specific when imposing a revocation sentence as when imposing a
post-conviction sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d
544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We have reviewed the record and
conclude that Wertz’s sentence is within the prescribed
sentencing range and is not plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his client,
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in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If the client requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court at that
time for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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