United States v. Armando Rendon , 467 F. App'x 192 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4593
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ARMANDO RENDON, a/k/a Armando Londonio, a/k/a Armando
Londonio-Rendon, a/k/a Armando Rendon L, a/k/a Armando
Rendon Londono, a/k/a Armando Rendon-Londonio, a/k/a Juan
Manuel Miranda, a/k/a Juan Manuel Miranda Calderon,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:10-cr-00681-DKC-1)
Submitted: February 23, 2012 Decided: February 27, 2012
Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ron Earnest, LAW OFFICE OF RON EARNEST, Riverdale, Maryland, for
Appellant. Mara Zusman Greenberg, Ann M. O'Brien, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Armando Rendon was sentenced to thirty-six months in
prison after a jury convicted him of one count each of: making
a false claim to United States citizenship, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 911 (2006); making a false statement in a passport
application, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (2006); fraudulent
use of a social security number, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 408(a)(7)(B) (2006); aggravated identity theft, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006); and re-entry of a removed
alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006). Counsel has
filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), asking the court to conduct a full examination of
the record for prejudicial error. Rendon has filed a pro se
supplemental brief in which he asserts that his counsel was
ineffective and suggesting that there was insufficient evidence
to support his aggravated identity theft conviction. The
Government has declined to file a responsive brief. Finding no
error, we affirm.
We review the district court’s denial of Rendon’s Fed.
R. Crim. P. 29 motion de novo. See United States v. Alerre, 430
F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005). When a Rule 29 motion was based
on a claim of insufficient evidence, the jury’s verdict must be
sustained “if there is substantial evidence, taking the view
most favorable to the Government, to support it.” United States
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v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 244 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). This court “ha[s]
defined ‘substantial evidence’ as evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to
support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Alerre, 430 F.3d at 693 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). We have reviewed the record of the district
court proceedings and conclude that it was reasonable for the
jury to accept the Government’s evidence as adequate and
sufficient to find Rendon guilty of the offenses with which he
was charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
We reject on this appeal Rendon’s assertion that his
trial counsel was ineffective. An ineffective assistance of
counsel claim should generally be raised in a habeas corpus
motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011) in the
district court. See United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 192,
198 (4th Cir. 1999). Although an ineffective assistance claim
may be cognizable on direct appeal if “it conclusively appears
from the record that defense counsel did not provide effective
representation[,]” United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435
(4th Cir. 2008), it does not conclusively appear on the record
that counsel provided ineffective representation. Accordingly,
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not cognizable on
this appeal.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Rendon, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Rendon requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Rendon. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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